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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the politics of forest management in 
colonial Burma. Chapter 1 establishes the theoretical and 
analytical concerns of the study. Chapter 2 describes the 
laissez-faire practices in early colonial Tenasserim which 
resulted in the depletion of that territory's teak forests. 
Chapter 3 examines how the Forest Department sought to 
regulate shifting cultivators, timber traders and peasants 
between 1856 and 1881. Chapter 4 points out that the growth 
of a professional forest service meant not only that the 
relationship between forest and civil officials had to be 
clarified, but also that state and societal forest rights 
needed differentiation.
Chapters 5 and 6 trace the efforts of the Forest
Department to rationalize forest use in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. During the era of expansion 
(1881-1902), which is the subject of Chapter 5, forest
management was extended to new territories and activities, 
but was above all reflected in the growth of reserved 
forests. Chapter 6 relates that during the era of 
consolidation (1902-23) these reserves were the focus of 
departmental activity. But, if the concentration of teak
extraction in the hands of the European firms eased forest 
management in one respect, broad societal and ecological 
changes intensified the conflict between the Forest 
Department and the peasantry. After the introduction of 
partial self-rule in 1923, that conflict became more
pronounced as forest management was politicized. Chapter 7 
assesses the implications of this change for forest politics 
up to the Japanese invasion (1942).
Chapter 8 situates the politics of forest management in 
colonial Burma in a wider context. The Burmese experience is 
summarized and then compared with that of Dutch-ruled Java, 
British India and autonomous Siam in order to clarify the 
nature of Asian forest politics in colonial times.
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PREFACE
This study examines forest politics in colonial Burma by 
addressing the question: "What were the political
consequences of the advent of a forest service in 1856 on 
forest access and conflict?" To answer that question, three 
notions were differentiated: forests as a contested resource, 
the Forest Department as a resource manager, and conflicting 
perceptions of forest use. In turn, these notions serve as 
the analytical framework of the thesis.
Given the colonial focus, research centred on a reading 
of colonial reports, journals and proceedings. Providing a 
detailed record of forest management in British Burma, most 
of these documents are located at the India Office Library 
and Records in London. Especially valuable were the annual 
reports of the Forest Department (1856-1940), the India and 
Burma Forest Proceedings (1864-1924), the Indian Forester 
(1876-1946), the European Manuscript collection and the Burma 
Office Files (1938-44). Due to funding constraints, it was 
not possible to examine records retained in Burma after the 
advent of partial self-rule in 1923. However, a comprehensive 
collection of working plans and other forestry documents held 
at the Indian Institute and the Oxford Forestry Institute 
(both in Oxford) provided a wealth of material on the post- 
1923 period. Legislative Council proceedings (Burma and 
India), general colonial documents (ie. gazetteers) and 
secondary sources at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS) and the University of London libraries were 
used to round out coverage of the colonial era.
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Several problems associated with the use of colonial 
forest records merit comment. First, colonial sources often 
overlook or fail to capture the breadth and scale of everyday 
forms of popular resistance. As Scott notes, the logic of 
such resistance is "to leave few traces in the wake of its 
passage. . . [which] eliminates much of the documentary evidence 
that might convince social scientists and historians that 
real politics was taking place".1 If this is a general and 
inescapable drawback, it must not be overstated. As this 
thesis shows, the colonial state was not always internally 
united. Many civil officials opposed the expansion of Forest 
Department powers by drawing attention to the social effects 
(including peasant unrest) of forest restrictions.
Colonial forestry accounts have an additional drawback in 
so far as records are highly technical. For non-foresters, 
there is, then, a problem of interpretation - understanding 
scientific reports in order to glean their political meaning. 
Yet, such an endeavour is essential. To understand how the 
Forest Department asserted control over diverse groups is 
also to appreciate the scientific dimensions of social and 
ecological control.
If this thesis examines forest politics in colonial 
Burma, it situates that investigation in a theoretical and 
comparative perspective. Chapter 1 introduces the analytical 
framework in the context of a discussion of political ecology 
that encompasses the role of the state, peasant resistance, 
bureaucratic politics and perceptions of resource use in
1 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990), 200.
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forest access and conflict. In contrast, Chapter 8 compares 
and contrasts the Burmese experience with that of Dutch- 
ruled Java, British India and autonomous Siam in order to 
emphasize the wider significance of colonial forestry. In 
this manner, the thesis links an analysis of forest politics 
in colonial Burma with broader theoretical and comparative 
questions.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a study of the politics of forest 
management in colonial Burma. It analyses how the Forest 
Department sought to control forest activities, and the ways 
in which others fought such control. In Burma, as elsewhere 
in the Third World, the state has played a crucial role in 
shaping forest use. Guided by the tenets of scientific 
forestry, colonial foresters mapped, enumerated and 
demarcated the forests in the promotion of long-term 
commercial timber production. In doing so, they acquired a 
detailed understanding of how peasants, timber traders and 
shifting cultivators used those forests. Such knowledge was 
used to regulate extraction, increase revenue and promote 
conservation. Prior to the introduction of partial self-rule 
in 1923, moreover, colonial foresters were able to manage the 
forest resource without having to take into account the local 
political implications of their actions - something that 
their indigenous counterparts in Burma (and elsewhere) have 
never been in a position to do. The Forest Department thus 
attempted to rationalize forest use in order to further 
diverse political, economic and ecological objectives. But it 
did so in a context of British rule that privileged imperial 
interests over local concerns.
This process had far-reaching implications for state and 
society. The creation of reserved forests, and complex rules 
regarding their access and use, the emergence of a prosperous 
timber industry, and a sizable forest bureaucracy, heralded 
major changes in the way that forests were used. These 
changes encountered widespread popular opposition, and earned
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the forest official notoriety. The extent of that notoriety 
was in itself suggestive of the importance of the changes in 
the forest sector.
It is therefore remarkable that these changes have 
received so little attention. Several authors address aspects 
of the subject but few provide detailed accounts. None 
adequately treat the politics of forest management.1 In 
contrast, general analyses focus on issues such as agrarian 
development and nationalism to the neglect of forest-related 
change.2
In thus addressing this lacuna, the thesis examines how 
the Forest Department transformed forest access and use in 
the colonial era. However, it is important to indicate what 
this thesis is not about. First, it is not an economic 
history of the Burmese teak industry. The teak industry was 
undoubtedly important, and the role of teak in the 
determination of forest policy is a central theme of this 
thesis. But, the politics of forest management in colonial 
Burma is not synonymous with teak extraction. The Forest
1 Maria Serena I. Diokno, "British Firms and the 
Economy of Burma, with Special Reference to the Rice and Teak 
Industries, 1917-1937" (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 
1983); A.W. MacGillivray, "Forest Use and Conflict in Burma 
1750-1990" (MSc. diss., University of London, 1990); F.T. 
Morehead, The Forests of Burma (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1944); E.P. Stebbing, The Forests of India, 3 vols. 
(London: John Lane for the Bodley Head, 1922-26).
2 G.E. Harvey, British Rule in Burma. 1824-1942 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1946); J.S. Furnivall, Colonial 
Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and
Netherlands India (1948; reprint, New York: New York
University Press, 1956); John F, Cady, A History of Modern 
Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958). See also
Robert H. Taylor, An Undeveloped State: The Study of Modern 
Burma's Politics. (Melbourne: Monash University Centre of 
Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper No. 28, 1983) in which 
an extensive review of the Burma politics literature turns up 
no mention of forestry issues.
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Department also regulated the extraction of non-teak timber 
and 'minor' forest products (bamboo, gums, resins). These 
products may have been a relatively insignificant source of 
revenue, but in political terms were of considerable 
importance. Thus, although the role of the European timber 
firms, and notably the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation 
Limited (BBTCL), should not be underestimated, an analysis 
of forest politics must situate that role in a broader 
context. These firms were only one type of forest user; other 
users - notably shifting cultivators, peasants and indigenous 
timber traders - must also be considered. As forest user, 
manager and custodian, Burma's Forest Department merits 
particular attention if forest conflict is to be fully 
appreciated.
Secondly, the thesis does not consider pre-colonial 
forest politics. In so far as it addresses the monarchical 
period, it is only to illustrate how colonial management was 
affected by indigenous forestry. The reverse situation - how 
Burmese forest management changed as a result of the growing 
Anglo-Burmese confrontation in the nineteenth century - is 
therefore beyond the scope of this study.3 When scholars have 
considered this issue, it has been in order to understand the 
dispute between the BBTCL and the Burmese government that led 
to the third Anglo-Burmese war (1885-86).4 In this study,
3 But see Myo Myint, "The Politics of Survival in 
Burma: Diplomacy and Statecraft in the Reign of King Mindon, 
1853-1878" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1987), 232-35.
4 Charles Lee Keeton III, Kina Thebaw and the 
Ecological Rape of Burma: The Political and Commercial 
Struggle between British India and French Indo-China in 
Burma. 1878-1886 (Delhi: Manohar, 1974); A.T.Q. Stewart, The 
Pagoda War: Lord Dufferin and the Fall of the Kingdom of Ava 
1885-6 (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 72-73.
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this episode is considered only in so far as it influenced 
subsequent colonial forest management.
Finally, the thesis does not consider in detail the 
forest politics of what the British termed the 'excluded 
areas' - those remote hill areas that form the periphery of 
modern Burma. Rather, the focus is on those directly 
administered areas ('Burma proper') in which most of the 
population lived, and in which the principal commercial 
forests were located. It was also in Burma proper that the 
major developments of colonial forest politics took place, 
and where the expansion of Forest Department control was most 
bitterly contested.
In many respects, it would seem logical to begin this 
study of forest politics in colonial Burma with the events 
of 1856. In that year, the Forest Department was created - 
the first in the British-Indian empire. More importantly, 
the Government of India ordered the scientific management of 
Burma's forests as part of the promotion of long-term 
commercial timber production. But, to appreciate the 
significance of these events, it is first necessary to 
examine forest practices in early colonial Burma. Chapter 2 
suggests that those practices were based on a laissez-faire 
system that was the antithesis of later scientific 
management. If unrestricted teak extraction led to widespread 
over-harvesting, it also illustrated the need for state 
intervention. In the altered imperial context of the 1850s, 
such intervention became politically feasible.
Chapter 3 describes the political implications of the 
new policy by looking at the Forest Department's early 
efforts to regulate timber traders, shifting cultivators and
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peasants. Between 1856 and 1881 (when the first Burma Forest 
Act was passed), forest officials asserted control over 
forest use through a mixture of coercion and compromise, 
exemplified in the development of the taungya (hill 
cultivation) forestry system. Chapter 4 explores how the 
elaboration of such control engendered change within the 
colonial state. The growth of a professional forest service 
meant not only that the relationship between forest and civil 
officials had to be clarified, but also that state and 
societal forest rights needed differentiation.
Chapters 5 and 6 trace the efforts of the Forest 
Department to rationalize forest use in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. During the era of expansion 
(1881-1902), which is the subject of Chapter 5, forest 
management was extended to new territories (Upper Burma and 
the Shan States) and activities (cutch production). Above 
all, it developed through the creation of a network of 
reserves. Chapter 6 relates that during the era of 
consolidation (1902-23) these reserves formed the principal 
focus of Department activity. But, if the concentration of 
teak extraction in the hands of the European firms eased the 
task of forest management in one respect, the elaboration of 
state control encountered popular resistance that was notably 
expressed through illegal extraction from the plains 
reserves. After 1923, partial self-rule led to the 
politicization of forest management, as issues such as the 
Burmanization of the forest sector and popular access to the 
plains reserves became prominent. Chapter 7 assesses the
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implications of this change for forest management up to the 
Japanese invasion of 1942.5
Chapter 8 situates the politics of forest management in 
colonial Burma in a wider context. The Burmese experience is 
summarized, and then compared with that of Dutch-ruled Java, 
British India and autonomous Siam in order to emphasize the 
impact of colonialism on Asian forest politics. The chapter 
concludes by relating colonial developments to contemporary 
issues.
If the central purpose of this research is to examine
the patterns of control and resistance that constitute the
forest politics of colonial Burma, it has been greatly
assisted by work in the emerging research agenda of Third
World political ecology. Broadly speaking, political ecology
may be defined as an inquiry into the political sources,
conditions and ramifications of environmental change.
Specifically, Blaikie and Brookfield note:
The phrase 'political ecology' combines the concerns 
of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. 
Together this encompasses the constantly shifting 
dialectic between society and land-based resources, 
and also within classes and groups within society 
itself.6
5 This thesis does not address the period after 1942. 
The Japanese occupation (1942-45) and subsequent brief 
reimposition of British rule (1945-48) marked a new era in 
Burmese forest politics that is best studied in conjunction 
with post-colonial developments.
6 Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield, ed. Land
Degradation and Society (London: Methuen, 1987), 17. On the 
integration of ecology and political economy, see Piers
Blaikie, The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing 
Countries (London: Longman, 1985); Stephen G. Bunker,
Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction. Unequal Exchange, and 
the Failure of the Modern State (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1985); Marianne Schmink and Charles H. Wood,
"The 'Political Ecology' of Amazonia," in Lands at Risk in
the Third World: Local-Level Perspectives, ed. Peter D.
Little and Michael M. Horowitz (Boulder: Westview Press,
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Embracing different social and ecological scales, 
political ecology addresses several interrelated research 
areas.7 First, research into the contextual sources of 
environmental change examines the general ecological impacts 
of the state, interstate relations and global capitalism. In 
a world of increasing political and economic interdependence, 
these topics signal the growing social and ecological 
influence of national and international forces.
A second research area investigates the location- 
specific aspects of ecological change. By studying conflict 
over access to environmental resources, scholars gain 
insights into how contextual actors impinge on specific 
socio-ecological conditions and relationships. More 
importantly, such research documents the resistance of the 
relatively powerless (poor peasants, shifting cultivators), 
as they fight to protect the environmental basis of their 
livelihood.
A third research area addresses the political 
ramifications of environmental change by assessing the 
effects of such change on socio-economic and political 
relationships. To what extent are environmental costs borne 
by socially disadvantaged groups, and how does this unequal 
burden affect existing socio-economic inequalities? Further, 
and as the discussion of peasant militancy over the plains 
reserves in twentieth century colonial Burma will illustrate,
1987), 38-57; Nancy Lee Peluso, "The Political Ecology of
Extraction and Extractive Reserves in East Kalimantan, 
Indonesia," Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 49-74.
7 Raymond L. Bryant, "Political Ecology: An Emerging 
Research Agenda in Third World Studies," Political Geography 
11 (January 1992): 12-36.
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unequal exposure to environmental change may lead to 
political confrontation. Examining the vulnerability of the 
poor to episodic (drought, flooding) and everyday (soil 
erosion, deforestation) forms of environmental change, this 
research highlights the important point that the impact of 
environmental change is rarely neutral, and may well 
reinforce prevailing inequalities.
By taking these questions seriously, political ecology 
is to be distinguished from much of the sustainable 
development literature which tells us very little about the 
politics of ecological change.8 More often than not, the 
latter makes sweeping assumptions about those political 
issues that most require investigation - the activities of 
the state and political-economic elites, for example. 
Instead, facile arguments about environmental change and 
human welfare are made; ecological degradation, for instance, 
is portrayed as a universal evil affecting rich and poor 
alike. In contrast, political ecology explores how such 
change is incorporated into concrete political and economic 
relationships, and the ways that it may then be used to 
reinforce or challenge those relationships.
One of the most important themes in political ecology 
concerns the political and ecological consequences of 
tropical forest change. As scholars note, Third World 
deforestation has been a ubiquitous phenomenon in the
8 Raymond L. Bryant, "Putting Politics First: The
Political Ecology of Sustainable Development," Global Ecology 
and Biogeographv Letters 1 (November 1991): 164-66; Michael
Redclift, Sustainable Development:____ Exploring the
Contradictions (London: Methuen, 1987); W.M. Adams, Green
Development: Environment and Sustainability in the Third
World (London: Routledge, 1990).
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries as forests have been 
logged or converted to agriculture.9 Inevitably, this trend 
has transformed the nature of forest access and use. But as 
the creation of eucalyptus plantations for the wood-chips 
and paper-pulp industry illustrates, reforestation or 
afforestation also resonates with political and ecological 
meaning.10 In view of their social and ecological 
significance, this focus on the world's forests is not 
surprising. As a popular source of timber and non-timber 
products, forests are an integral part of rural subsistence. 
In addition, they provide essential ecological services, 
regulating the hydrological and nutrient cycles, for 
example.11 However, tropical forests are also the focus of an 
expanding global timber trade.12 Moreover, they are often 
valued by political elites as places to which surplus 
populations may be exported, thereby obviating the need for
9 Richard P. Tucker and J.F. Richards, ed. Global 
Deforestation and the Nineteenth-Century World Economy 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983); John F. Richards 
and Richard P. Tucker, ed. World Deforestation in the 
Twentieth Century (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1988).
10 Larry Lohmann, "Peasants, Plantations, and Pulp: The 
Politics of Eucalyptus in Thailand," Bulletin of Concerned 
Asian Scholars 23 (October-December 1991): 3-17; Caroline
Sargent and Stephen Bass ed. Plantation Politics: Forest
Plantations in Development (London: Earthscan, 1992).
11 Vandana Shiva, Ecology and the Politics of Survival: 
Conflicts over Natural Resources in India (London: Sage, 
1991), chap. 2.
12 Jan G. Laarman, "Export of Tropical Hardwoods in the 
Twentieth Century," in World Deforestation in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. John F. Richards and Richard P. Tucker (Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), 147-63; Ooi Jin Bee, "The 
Tropical Rain Forest: Patterns of Exploitation and Trade," 
Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 11 (December 1990): 
117-42; Geoffrey K. Elliott, "Ecology, Economics and the End 
of Forestry in the Tropics," Asian Affairs 23 (October 1992): 
315-21.
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land reform in central agricultural areas. The role of 
forests as a 'political safety-valve' has affected patterns 
of forest change and conflict in such countries as Thailand, 
the Philippines, Indonesia and Brazil.13
As the literature also illustrates, the state has played 
a key role in forest change. Although the human ability to 
manipulate or even destroy the forests predates the 
development of the modern state, the organizational 
characteristics that have enabled that institution to 
flourish have also served to enhance social control over the 
environment. What are the special characteristics of the 
state that make it such a powerful source of environmental 
change? Two characteristics may be briefly noted.
The first characteristic concerns the state's role as 
the facilitator of development. Although that role has varied 
historically and spatially, only the state has been in a 
position to provide the physical, financial and social 
infrastructure essential to capital accumulation.14 In effect, 
the state becomes involved in the provision of public or
13 The imagery is from Larry Lohmann, "Land, Power and 
Forest Colonization in Thailand," in "The Political Ecology 
of South East Asia's Forests: Transdisciplinary Discourses," 
ed. Raymond L. Bryant, Philip Stott and Jonathan Rigg, Global 
Ecology and Bioaeoaraphv Letters (Special Issue, 
forthcoming); Philip Hurst, Rainforest Politics: Ecological 
Destruction in South-East Asia (London: Zed Books, 1990);
Anthony L. Hall, Developing Amazonia: Deforestation and
Social Conflict in Brazil's Caraias Programme (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1989).
14 R.J. Johnston, Environmental Problems: Nature. 
Economy and State (London: Belhaven Press, 1989), chap. 5; 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter B. Evans, "The State and 
Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions 
Underlying Effective Intervention," in Bringing the State 
Back In. ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda 
Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 44- 
77.
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collective goods - common currency, defense, education, 
health care - which the private sector cannot provide or does 
so only imperfectly, but which are essential to economic 
growth. State and capitalist development are thus often 
intertwined.
A second characteristic centres on the autonomous 
capabilities of the state. As recent research illustrates, 
the state is more than simply an agent of capitalism.15 
Rather, it has its own sources of power that derive from the 
state's unique socio-spatial position at the intersection of 
the domestic political order and the interstate system. In 
turn, this distinctive position ensures that the state has 
its own political, economic and strategic interests that are 
not always synonymous with capital accumulation.
Both the state's relationship to capital and the 
development of its own distinctive interests have been 
increasingly important factors in human-environmental 
interaction. With colonialism, this type of state came to 
dominate such interaction in the Third World too. 
Strengthened in the nineteenth century by such technological 
advances as the steamboat, machine gun and quinine, the 
colonial state initiated a process of change that redefined
15 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A
Comparative Analysis of France. Russia, and China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 24-33; idem, "Bringing the 
State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," 
in Bringing the State Back In. ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 3-37; Michael Mann, "The Autonomous 
Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in 
States in History, ed. John A. Hall (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1986), 109-36.
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existing practices.16 In a matter of decades, economies were 
monetized, communications networks elaborated, international 
economic linkages expanded, new export crops grown, state- 
peasant relations regularized and human expectations altered. 
Social transformation was accompanied by environmental 
permutation: changes in forest cover and type, the extension 
of agricultural production, modified soil conditions and 
increased pollution.
This social and ecological transformation was predicated 
on the use of new techniques of control and power. The 
colonial state used such means as the census, map and museum, 
to imagine "the nature of the human beings it ruled, the 
geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its 
ancestry".17 This process of imagining was arguably most 
pervasive in the forests, for it was in these areas that 
central authority was most tenuous. And, as the colonial 
state defined those forests, it also transformed them. What 
was 'progress', after all, if not the steady accumulation of 
knowledge in aid of more efficient forest land-use?
In pursuit of such progress, the colonial state drew upon 
scientific forestry practices from Germany and France. 
Scientific forestry was a management system designed to 
promote long-term commercial timber production as humankind 
made the transition from pre-industrial forests to industrial
16 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology 
and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1981), 205-6.
17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections 
on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: 
Verso, 1991), 163-64.
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tree plantations.18 As transplanted to Burma (and elsewhere in 
Asia), scientific forestry was imbued with a strong 
ecological element. Throughout the colonial period, officials 
debated the links between the forests and local water supply, 
stream flow, rainfall and climate change.19 Although couched 
in ecological terms, these debates resonated with political 
meaning. Ecology and politics were often conjoined to 
discredit indigenous practices while providing a powerful 
justification for the extension of state forest control.
The interlinked nature of political and ecological issues 
and problems is thus central to Third World political 
ecology, as it is to this thesis. Specifically, the study 
traces the development of state control over Burma's forests 
in the colonial era. But such development is always related 
to one or more of three themes that run through the entire 
study. The argument is that forest politics in colonial Burma 
needs to be understood in relation to at least three key 
notions: (1) forests as a contested resource, (2) the Forest 
Department as a resource manager, and (3) conflicting 
perceptions of forest use. As they are central to this 
analysis, each theme is briefly summarized as part of a 
consideration of the wider literature.
18 Alexander S. Mather, Global Forest Resources (London: 
Belhaven Press, 1990); and below.
19 Richard Grove, "Threatened Islands, Threatened Earth: 
Early Professional Science and the Historical Origins of 
Global Environmental Concerns," in Sustaining Earth: Response 
to the Environmental Threats. ed. David J.R. Angel1, Justyn
D. Comer and Matthew L.N. Wilkinson (London: Macmillan, 
1990), 15-29.
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Forests as a Contested Resource
The British transformed but did not create conflict over 
forest access in Burma. The monarchical state attempted to 
regulate and tax diverse forest users, not mainly teak 
traders as often assumed; and, forest users fought such 
control. In populated and settled areas, forest produce was 
hardly a 'free gift of nature'.20
If anything, early colonial rule relaxed access 
restrictions imposed by the monarchical state. Influenced by 
contemporary principles of economic liberalism, and 
preoccupied with the need to control a hostile population in 
an unfamiliar territory, British officials at first had 
neither the inclination nor the resources to systematically 
regulate forest use. Moreover, forests were the most 
problematic area of state control, and were the favoured 
haunt of insurgents and other opponents of central authority.
The deforestation of the deltaic rainforests in the late 
nineteenth century is one type of forest transformation 
prompted by colonial rule.21 In this case, the promotion of 
settled agriculture was designed to maximize revenue as it 
eliminated whole stretches of low-lying forest altogether. 
This thesis is predominantly concerned, however, with another 
type of forest transformation that pertains to modified 
patterns of access and use in those regions retained as
20 The imagery is from J.S. Furnivall, "Land as a Free 
Gift of Nature," Economic Journal 19 (1909); 552-62.
21 Michael Adas, "Colonization, Commercial Agriculture, 
and the Destruction of the Deltaic Rainforests of British 
Burma in the Late Nineteenth Century," in Global 
Deforestation and the Nineteenth-Century World Economy, ed. 
Richard P. Tucker and J.F. Richards (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1983), 95-110.
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'forest lands'.22 In these areas, the colonial state increased 
revenue and control not by eliminating forest, but rather by 
its systematic investigation and regulation. Inevitably, 
these two types of forest change were interrelated. The 
deforestation of much of the Irrawaddy delta affected the 
nature of conflict in residual forests, while changing 
conditions of access and use in the latter influenced 
patterns of deforestation in the former.
As this discussion illustrates, forest conflict was not 
static. Under the impetus of practices introduced by the 
British, Burma's forests were modified, as were patterns of 
forest use and conflict. How forest produce was attained, 
what was considered legal (and illegal) appropriation, the 
manner in which 'traditional' practices were invoked to 
resist or enforce regulation, and the ways in which shifting 
forest use reflected relative scarcity and a quest to 
'outflank' restrictions, varied by time and place, and are 
the essence of forest politics in colonial Burma. Shifting 
cultivators, peasants and timber traders challenged the 
regulation of their activities, and in doing so, ensured that 
forests remained a contested resource throughout the colonial 
period.
In pursuing this theme of forests as a contested 
resource, the study draws upon a burgeoning literature that 
addresses conflict over access. Diverse as this literature 
may be, it is premised on the assumption that peasants and 
others without the means of power nevertheless can and do 
resist the predations of political and economic elites. The
22 The forest types of Burma are discussed in Appendix
B.
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literature further assumes that such resistance is 
analytically significant, and hence integral to an 
understanding of rural change. By eschewing reductionism, it 
explores the complexity of human interaction; as Giddens 
notes, "all power relations, or relations of autonomy and 
dependence, are reciprocal: however wide the asymmetrical
distribution of resources involved, all power relations 
manifest autonomy and dependence 'in both directions'".23
It is a function of peasant-elite interaction that much 
of the conflict integral to such relations is characterized 
by what Scott terms 'everyday forms of resistance',24 Everyday 
resistance is the antithesis of the stereotypical peasant 
rebellion. Whereas the latter is overt and collective, the 
former is covert and often individual, and while the peasant 
rebellion directly challenges prevailing political and 
economic norms, everyday resistance does so but indirectly, 
and always on the sly. It is precisely this anonymity which 
is, paradoxically, its greatest strength, and yet, gravest 
weakness.25 Everyday resistance may ultimately undermine a 
detested political-economic order. But, it will only do so in 
the long-term, if at all. There are no guarantees, moreover, 
as to the desirability of the order that takes its place.
Everyday resistance thus focuses attention on 'the 
weapons of the weak'. Originally devised to understand
23 Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: 
Action. Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis 
(London: Macmillan, 1979), 149.
24 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms 
of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1985); idem, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden 
Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
25 Scott, Weapons of the Weak. 29-36.
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agrarian politics in contemporary Malaysia, it has since been 
used in other contexts, notably to explain what colonial and 
post-colonial states term forest 'crime': theft of produce, 
arson, trespass and illicit grazing.26 Such resistance was 
ubiquitous in colonial Burma as peasants attempted to 
undermine access restrictions.
Resistance in Burma also took other forms. As practised 
by shifting (and 'settled') cultivators, it involved what 
Adas calls 'avoidance protest'.27 As an attempt to deny 
material resources and labour to elites, avoidance protest 
often took the form of everyday resistance as noted above. 
Under certain conditions, however, protest was manifested 
more dramatically through the transfer of peasant services 
to a new patron, sectarian withdrawal, or flight to a new 
territory. The decision to adopt these more elaborate and 
potentially perilous forms of protest was usually an act of 
desperation, and reflected the failure of everyday resistance 
"to hold elite exactions at a tolerable level".28 In part, the 
decision reflected the social structure and economic 
practices of the oppressed groups - to take an obvious 
example, shifting cultivators may have been more disposed to
26 Ramachandra Guha, "Saboteurs in the Forest: 
Colonialism and Peasant Resistance in the Indian Himalaya," 
in Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. ed. Forrest D. 
Colburn (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), 64-92; Ramachandra Guha 
and Madhav Gadgil, "State Forestry and Social Conflict in 
British India," Past and Present 123 (May 1989): 141-77.
27 Michael Adas, "From Avoidance to Confrontation: 
Peasant Protest in Precolonial and Colonial Southeast Asia," 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 23 (April 1981): 
217-47.
28 Michael Adas, "From Footdragging to Flight: The 
Evasive History of Peasant Avoidance Protest in South and 
South-east Asia," Journal of Peasant Studies 13 (January
1986): 69.
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flight than settled agriculturists in long-established 
villages. Irrespective of the social and economic conditions 
of the dissatisfied groups, however, flight was based on 
certain contextual factors: low population density, a refuge 
territory or unoccupied lands to which individuals could go, 
and a relatively weak state.
At least initially, the advent of colonial rule hardly 
changed these forms of avoidance protest. But, as Scott and 
Adas emphasize, the gradual transformation of pre-colonial 
'contest' states and patron-client relations into new 
political and economic forms circumscribed the peasant's 
traditional room for manoeuvre, and encouraged the 
development of new forms of resistance.29 In colonial Burma, 
these altered conditions were reflected in novel types of 
political protest in the twentieth century. Yet the 
development of state control and new forms of protest must 
not blind us to the continuation of traditional resistance 
strategies. Even at the end of British rule in Burma in 1948, 
for example, flight was an option for some groups. Indeed, it 
remains a standard form of protest among Burma's ethnic 
minorities even today.30
In recent years, scholars have used concepts such as 
everyday resistance and avoidance protest to explain peasant
29 Adas, ’’From Avoidance to Confrontation," 240-47; 
James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change 
in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review 66 
(March 1972): 91-113; idem, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: 
Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1976).
30 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of 
Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 1991); Jonathan Falla, True
Love and Bartholomew: Rebels on the Burmese Border
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
32
resistance to state forest control. Guha, for example, 
examines the impact of commercial forestry and British rule 
on forest politics in colonial and post-colonial Himalayan 
India,31 British intervention in this region disrupted pre­
existing practices, and provoked resistance that culminated 
in an incendiarism campaign and labour strike in 1921. Such 
protest was a potent challenge to state authority, and Guha 
suggests that the Chipko movement is a modern variant on this 
tradition of resistance.32
Peluso documents access restrictions in the teak forests 
of central Java that have been a feature of Dutch and 
Indonesian rule.33 But the assertion of state control over 
land, labour, species and ideology gave rise to analogous 
forms of resistance: 'squatting' or clandestine farming in
state forests, strikes, migration and slowdowns, counter­
appropriation or sabotage of commercial species, and counter­
ideologies of communal ownership and resistance. In Peluso's 
view, this process of state control and peasant resistance 
has left a legacy of forester-village antagonism, rural 
poverty and forest degradation.
The studies by Guha and Peluso emphasize everyday forms 
of peasant resistance over more dramatic types of avoidance 
protest. In many cases, flight was simply not a realistic 
option in the more densely populated regions of India and
31 Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological 
Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1989).
32 Ibid., 152-53.
33 Nancy Lee Peluso, Rich Forests. Poor People: Resource 
Control and Resistance in Java (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992).
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Java in late colonial and post-colonial times.34 In 
comparison, outside of the central dry zone and Irrawaddy 
delta, colonial Burma was sparsely populated. As such, even 
in the twentieth century, a range of avoidance options, 
including flight, were effective means of resistance.
Concepts such as everyday resistance and avoidance 
protest help to clarify how peasants fight restrictions on 
forest access and use. However, what about other forest users 
- European and indigenous timber traders, for example? How do 
these groups resist the state or turn official practices to 
advantage? In what manner did Europeans enjoy an edge over 
indigenous competitors in the determination of state policy? 
Did indigenous merchants have compensating advantages - the 
complicity of villagers in illicit extraction, for example? 
These questions illustrate an important point that is at the 
core of the notion of forests as a contested resource: 
conflict must be understood as a complex phenomenon in which 
interests are as diverse as the actors involved.
This thesis views forest conflict in colonial Burma in 
such a manner. It explores how various forest users resisted 
state regulation, and how that resistance was modified to 
meet changing political, economic and ecological conditions. 
But to fully understand forest politics, the role of the 
state, and specifically the Forest Department, must be 
evaluated.
34 Peluso, Rich Forests. Poor Peopler 23; Guha, Unquiet 
Woods, 143-47.
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The Forest Department as a Resource Manager
In 1956 Burma's Forest Department celebrated its 
centenary, and in a special issue of the Burmese Foresterr 
Burmese and British foresters reflected on their professional 
experiences in the colonial era.35 If opinions diverged on 
various matters, there was unanimity on the central 
importance of the Forest Department as the steward of the 
country's forests. This ethos of stewardship was an integral 
part of official attitudes, and must be kept in mind if the 
actions of foresters are to be understood.
If foresters saw themselves as impartial umpires who 
balanced short-term public needs with long-term national 
requirements, critics saw only unnecessary restrictions on 
popular access or commercial development. And, while the 
former believed that they promoted efficient forest 
exploitation, and in the process, contributed revenue for 
essential social services, the latter alleged that such 
efficiency only favoured European firms at the expense of 
Burmese traders. In contrast, whereas European firms in the 
nineteenth century were highly critical of the Forest 
Department, by the early twentieth century they were 
generally supportive of management practices that were to 
their advantage.
These views dominated forest politics. They illustrate 
the importance of the Forest Department as a resource 
manager. They also indicate the need for a careful evaluation 
of departmental objectives, and how those objectives affected 
other forest users. In such an analysis, reductionism must be
Burmese Forester 6 (June 1956).
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avoided. The Forest Department was not an impartial umpire as 
foresters fondly believed. But it was also not a 'tool' of 
the European firms or an 'oppressor' of the masses as 
nationalists often maintained. In a sense, the Forest 
Department was a forest user like any other, extracting 
timber and other produce for its own use or sale. What 
distinguished it from the others was its role as a resource 
manager. It sustained that role by drawing upon the colonial 
state's "continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and 
coercive systems" to enforce its will and modify forest 
activity.36 In the process, the role of the Forest Department 
came to be contested as much as the forests themselves.
In the literature, the state is noted primarily as the 
instigator of ecological degradation. In the African context, 
scholars note that state intervention to enhance water 
availability in drought-prone areas, or to convert 
pastoralists to settled agriculture, often exacerbated soil 
erosion and social conflict.37 Other writers explore the 
state's contribution to Third World deforestation. Repetto 
and Gillis, for example, document the credit and other 
inducements that encourage forest removal in South East Asia 
and the Brazilian Amazon.38 These studies highlight the
36 Alfred Stephan cited in Skocpol, "Bringing the State 
Back In," 7.
37 P.E. Peters, "Struggles over Water, Struggles over 
Meaning: Water and the State in Botswana," Africa 54 (1984): 
29-49; Michael M. Horowitz, "Ideology, Policy, and Praxis in 
Pastoral Livestock Development," in Anthropology and Rural 
Development in West Africa, ed. Michael M. Horowitz and T.M. 
Painter (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 251-72.
30 Robert Repetto and Malcolm Gillis, ed. , Public 
Policies and the Misuse of Forest Resources (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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ambiguous role of the state as an environmental manager. 
There is "an inherent, continuing potential for conflict 
between the state's roles as developer and as protector and 
steward of the natural environment on which its existence 
ultimately depends".39
Such ambiguity characterized resource management in 
colonial Burma. British rule encouraged the deforestation of 
the deltaic rainforests to promote agriculture. As shown in 
this study, however, it was also marked by the creation of a 
forest service that was dedicated to the management of 
selected forest lands on a long-term commercial basis. The 
notoriety of forest officials noted earlier did not derive 
from policies that encouraged deforestation. Rather, such 
notoriety was due to their efforts to discourage practices 
that led to deforestation. In this manner, foresters sought 
to uphold the state's role as steward of the natural 
environment.
In doing so, however, they came into conflict with civil 
officials responsible for contiguous or overlapping policy 
areas. What Furnivall terms 'departmentalism' was an almost 
inevitable by-product of the way that the colonial state in 
Burma was structured/0 As the British rationalized and 
expanded state activities, they organized them along 
functional lines. However, unlike in Dutch-ruled Java, these 
specialist services were not grouped in large departments
39 K.J. Walker, "The State in Environmental Management: 
The Ecological Dimension," Political Studies 37 (1989): 32; 
see also Simon Dalby, "Ecopolitical Discourse: 'Environmental 
Security' and Political Geography," Progress in Human 
Geography 16 (October 1992): 503-22.
40 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice. 40-41, 72- 
73, 77, 240.
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with the result that "none of these [specialist] officials 
saw life whole and, by reason of frequent transfers, none of 
them saw it steadily".41 The separation of forest management 
from civil administration in 1856 was thus part of a broader 
process of bureaucratic growth and differentiation in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Discussion of bureaucratic growth, differentiation and 
conflict raises the important issue of the 'corporate 
cohesiveness' of the state.42 Earlier, the role of the state 
was considered as if it was a single actor. Here, it is 
appropriate to emphasize the internal complexity of the 
state, and to briefly note the political significance of the 
fact that although the state may be an 'actor', it is also a 
'set of institutions'.
To view the state as a unitary actor is to assume that 
policy formulation and implementation are, for all intents 
and purposes, the same. The bureaucracy is seen as the 
ultimate expression of rationalization and efficiency. Thus, 
Weber notes that "the fully developed bureaucratic apparatus 
compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine 
with the non-mechanical modes of production".43 As Dunleavy 
and O'Leary observe, in this Weberian ideal-type, "the civil
41 Ibid., 77.
42 Rueschemeyer and Evans, "The State and Economic 
Transformation," 60.
43 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of
Interpretative Sociology. 3 vols., ed. Guenther Roth and
Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 3: 973.
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servant is an automaton, an infinitively pliable 
administrative chameleon’1.'14
In practice, of course, this ideal is not attained.45 As 
a result, to understand why a policy is implemented in the 
manner that it is requires that attention be given to 
bureaucratic practices. But, if pluralist accounts have 
traditionally viewed such practices as mere manifestations 
of societal relations, state-centred accounts tend to 
minimize the importance of bureaucratic politics in favour 
of broader state-society interactions.46 Recently, however, 
scholars have begun to re-assess Weberian notions of the 
'rational bureaucrat' and the apolitical nature of the 
bureaucracy.47 In part, this has been expressed through an 
exploration of how contemporary states combine modern 
rational-legal techniques with pre-modern authority 
structures.48 Research also questions standard assumptions 
about bureaucratic interests. Dunleavy, for example, 
questions whether it is always in a bureaucrat's interest to 
budget-maximize; there may be other, more efficacious forms
44 Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, Theories of the 
State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy (New York: Meredith 
Press, 1987), 170.
45 As even Weber recognized, see Economy and Society, 1: 
225; 3: 991. Nevertheless, Weber emphasized the machine-like 
quality of the bureaucracy, see Ibid, 3: 987-90.
46 On pluralist accounts, see Skocpol, "Bringing the 
State Back In," 4. The same article illustrates the point 
that bureaucratic politics is not a central concern of the 
state-centred research.
47 Mick Moore, "Competition and Pluralism in Public 
Bureaucracies," IDS Bulletin 23 (October 1992): 67-69.
48 Michael Heller, "The Politics of Telecommunications 
Policy in Mexico" (D.Phil thesis, University of Sussex, 
1990).
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of individual and collective empowerment. Such research 
highlights the complex, and often political nature of 
bureaucratic interaction and interests.50
The point here is not that states should be treated 
"simply as disconnected collections of competing agencies".51 
Rather, addressing bureaucratic politics as part of a broader 
analysis of state activities is merely to recognize that 
power is contested within state structures as it is in other 
realms of political interaction. The precise nature of 
bureaucratic politics is of course highly variable, and 
depends on agency development and structure, the presence or 
absence of administrative coordinating mechanisms, individual 
ambitions and perceptions, the definition of formal 
responsibilities, and so on.
In the Burmese context, the distinction between forest 
and civil officials, for example, was undoubtedly reinforced 
by the nature of forest administration. As one observer 
remarked:
It has been. . .said that the work of the forest 
service begins where that of the civil administration 
ends, on the fringes of the great forests, in which
Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy. Bureaucracy and Public 
Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 174.
50 Bill Jenkins and Andrew Gray, "Bureaucratic Politics 
and Power: Developments in the Study of Bureaucracy," 
Political Studies 31 (June 1983): 177-93.
51 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda 
Skocpol, "On the Road toward a More Adequate Understanding of 
the State," in Bringing the State Back In. ed. Peter B. 
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 360.
40
the forest officer spends many months of the year, 
usually alone [sic].52
Forestry and agriculture were nevertheless inter-connected,
necessitating the cooperation of forest and civil officials.
Yet, such cooperation was tempered by programmatic and
perceptual differences. Civil administrators feared that the
elaboration of forest management (notably through the
creation of reserves) would limit their ability to regulate
agricultural activities. In turn, foresters complained that
the civil administration was pre-disposed to sanction forest
clearance. These programmatic differences were reflected in
conflicting self-perceptions: forest officials saw themselves
as 'stewards' of the forest, while civil administrators
considered themselves to be the people's 'guardians' or ma-
bap ['sole parent'].53 The need for specialized training
reinforced this division by reducing inter-departmental
movement and encouraging departmental insularity.
As administration became more complex, bureaucratic
politics was a central factor in policy implementation. To
understand forest policy, then, this thesis must address the
internal politics of the colonial state. In what manner were
52 A retinue of indigenous assistants and servants 
notwithstanding! See Alexander L. Howard, "The Forests and 
Timbers of Burma," Journal of the East India Association 
(n.s.) 15 (1924): 142. Karen villagers were equally 'unfit' 
as company for European foresters. As one official observed, 
the isolation of these officers was felt all the more because 
"during their work in the forests they are alone for months 
together with Nature and the Karens," see G.D. Burgess 
(Secretary to the Chief Commissioner) to Secretary, 
Government of India, Home Department, 8 July 1881, India 
Forest Proceedings (May 1882), 998.
53 B. Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India (Calcutta: 
Government Printing, 1900), 146; B.H. Baden-Powell, The
Forest System of British Burma (Calcutta: Government
Printing, 1873), 45.
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forest issues related to, and shaped by, other political and 
economic considerations? What role did civil officials, and 
notably Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, play in 
forest administration, and how did their other duties affect 
their approach to forest matters? What was the relationship 
between Burma's Forest Department and the governments of 
India and Britain? In 192 3, partial self-rule (dyarchy) was 
introduced in Burma, and this process was extended in 1937 
through further constitutional changes. How did these changes 
affect the Forest Department which was one of the original 
departments transferred to indigenous control? How did the 
growing politicization of government - particularly after 
1937 - alter forest management? These questions indicate that 
in order to understand the Forest Department's role as a 
resource manager, it is necessary to be clear about its 
position within a larger political and institutional context.
It is only when such an approach is adopted that it is 
possible to fully appreciate the multiple, and at times, 
contradictory functions of forest administration in Burma. 
Foresters believed their role to be the promotion of long­
term forest development and stewardship. In contrast, senior 
colonial officials viewed it as being primarily concerned 
with revenue creation? the Forest Department was "an 
instrument intended to create and free wealth as efficiently 
as possible, in the context of a larger set of external 
imperial, economic, political and strategic interests".54 This 
tension between stewardship and revenue creation,
54 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (London: C.
Hurst, 1987), 68.
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conservation and development, added to the complexity of 
resource management and conflict.
To understand forest politics in colonial Burma is also 
to consider how the Forest Department managed, as well as 
how other forest users resisted such management. But it was 
more than that. Conflict over forest access was further a 
struggle of ideas over what constituted appropriate forest 
use.
Conflicting Perceptions of Forest Use
The conquest of Burma in the nineteenth century is 
significant not only because it ended indigenous rule, but 
also because it marked the country's incorporation into the 
world's largest empire headed (initially at least) by its 
most industrialized nation. It is often observed that British 
rule transformed Burma's political-economy. It did so less 
through the use of force, however, than through the 
introduction of new ideas of social practice: laissez-faire. 
rationalization, the bureaucratic state, and nationalism. 
Scientific forestry was one of many catalysts for all of 
these.
Burma's forests bore witness to the power of these new 
ideas. Indeed, one way of classifying forest politics in 
colonial Burma is by the ideas that characterized a period 
- laissez-faire forestry in the early years, and scientific 
forestry after 1856, for example. More importantly, these 
ideas altered perceptions of forest use, often with dramatic 
effect. Under the influence of laissez-faire ideas, colonial 
officials nurtured a thriving timber industry in Tenasserim, 
but at the cost of extensive over-harvesting. From 1856, new
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ideas (and personnel) were imported from Europe in order to 
prevent similar degradation in Pegu's teak forests. The means 
chosen to promote scientific forestry, the functionally- 
defined Forest Department, itself manifested this new way of 
thinking.
The idea of laissez-faire was associated with the 
doctrine of economic liberalism. Popular with Britain's 
leaders and intellectuals in the nineteenth century, economic 
liberalism promoted free trade, comparative advantage and a 
limited state. As proposed by Adam Smith, and subsequently 
refined by such British writers as Ricardo, Torrens, and 
Mill, economic liberalism promised a simple path to 'the 
wealth of all nations'.55 If states removed barriers to trade, 
economic growth would result through an international 
division of labour that placed a premium on the optimal 
allocation of human and natural resources. Through the timely 
provision of public goods, the state would play an essential, 
if clearly supportive role.
Such views shaped early colonial forest management in 
Burma. But laissez-faire forestry never went unchallenged. 
After 1856, moreover, an alternative 'scientific' approach 
based on state intervention was adopted. Scientific forestry 
first developed in Germany and France, countries with long 
traditions of forest regulation.56 In essence, it called for
55 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations r 2 vols., ed. R.H. Campbell and A.S.
Skinner (1776; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).
56 Franz Heske, German Forestry (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1938); Dietrich Brandis, Indian Forestry 
(Woking: Oriental University Institute, 1897), 6-7; Robert K. 
Winters, The Forest and Man (New York: Vantage Press, 1974), 
275-77.
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selective harvesting and planting so as to ensure future 
timber supplies. Under this system, the future of the forest 
was not entrusted to what Smith termed 'the unseen hand of 
the market'. Rather, it was guaranteed through strict rules - 
the highly 'visible' hand of the government official. But 
those rules also tended to undermine pre-existing patterns of 
popular access and use. As foresters promoted commercial 
woods, they sought to eliminate 'worthless' species that were 
often of considerable local use-value. Scientific forestry 
was thus a system premised on long-term commercial timber 
production that was "designed to reorder both nature and 
customary use in its own image".57
In colonial Burma, the growing influence of scientific 
forestry coincided with the rise of the bureaucratic state. 
With its emphasis on regulation, enumeration and calculation, 
it is not difficult to see why scientific forestry was so 
well suited to the outlook of the country's new 'Leviathan'.58 
Both were predicated on the principle of rationalization, 
understood here in the Weberian sense of 'formal 
rationalization'.59 The latter may simply be considered as a
57 Guha, Unquiet Woods, 59. For a critique of scientific 
forestry, see Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, This 
Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 207-14.
58 John S. Furnivall, "The Fashioning of Leviathan: The 
Beginnings of British Rule in Burma," Journal of the Burma 
Research Society 29 (April 1939); reprint, ed. Gehan 
Wijeyewardene (Canberra: Department of Anthropology 
Occasional Paper, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, 1991).
59 Weber distinguishes between formal ('means-oriented') 
rationality and substantive ('ends-oriented') rationality. 
The former is notably expressed through bureaucratic 
development, but refers generally to the calculability of 
means and procedures, see Weber, Economy and Society. 1: 85- 
86, 223-26; 3: 973-75, 987-89; see also, Raymond Murphy,
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dynamic process whose "implicit ultimate value" is one of 
control: "control over nature through scientific and
technological rationalization," and "control over humans 
through rational-legal domination".60 Formal rationalization 
is not about revolutionary change, but rather consists of 
"controlled change" in order to strengthen mastery, and 
"render it deeper, more comprehensive, more subtle, and more 
legitimate".61 Such was the ultimate goal of scientific forest 
management in colonial Burma.
With its adoption, foresters became more critical of 
unscientific indigenous practices. Peasants and timber 
traders were criticized for being 'wasteful7, but shifting 
cultivators were condemned even more vigorously. The latter 
stood accused of perpetrating massive deforestation and other 
ecological crimes.62 British assessments of the superiority of 
scientific forestry over indigenous methods were decidedly 
paternalistic, if not racist. As one official remarked: "the 
paternity of the State in the welfare of its children is 
surely manifested by restricting the unthrifty methods of a 
few for the benefit of the many".63 Modern, abstract
Social Closure: The Theory of Monopolization and Exclusion 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 196-99.
60 Murphy, Social Closure. 218.
61 Ibid., 218-19.
62 Shifting cultivation is attacked even today, see 
Evelyne Hong, Natives of Sarawak: Survival in Borneo's 
Vanishing Forests (Penang: Institut Masyarakat, 1987); Harold 
Brookfield, "The New Great Age of Clearance and Beyond," in 
People of the Tropical Rain Forest, ed. Julie S. Denslow and 
Christine Padoch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), 218-24.
63 Burma Forest Proceedings (March 1902), 5. On science 
and ideologies of Western control, see Michael Adas, Machines 
as the Measure of Men: Science. Technology, and Ideologies of
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(mathematical) and industrial, scientific forestry was seen 
as yet another example of how European skill and ingenuity 
would save the natives from themselves. Given the importance 
of Burma's forests, this burden was a 'White Man's Burden' 
indeed.64
Ecological thinking was integral to this critique of 
indigenous practices. Whereas the British considered 
themselves to be 'good' ecologists, the Burmese were viewed 
as being ecologically disruptive. As the literature 
illustrates, this perceptual dichotomy was not unique to 
colonial Burma, or for that matter, to forestry. Throughout 
Africa and Asia, indigenous land-use practices were 
criticized by colonial scientists and administrators.65 Such 
criticism was then used to justify state intervention through 
agricultural improvement and soil conservation programmes. In 
Burma, a similar procedure was followed by the Forest 
Department as it asserted control over a widening territory 
and range of activities. Indeed, the whole stewardship ethos 
noted earlier was based on the claim to superior ecological 
credentials.
Western Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
64 On the ethos of the White Man's Burden, and of the 
British Empire generally, see Jan Morris, The Spectacle of 
Empire: Style. Effect and Pax Britannica (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1982); for a critique in the Burmese context, see 
George Orwell, Burmese Davs (1935; reprint, Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin, 1987).
65 Paul Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution 
(London: Hutchinson, 1985), chap. 1; Blaikie, Political 
Economy of Soil Erosion, 53-60; Jenny Elliott, "Environmental 
Degradation, Soil Conservation and the Colonial and Post­
colonial State in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe," in Colonialism and 
Development in the Contemporary World, ed. Chris Dixon and 
Michael J. Hefferman (London: Mansell, 1991), 78-81.
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The Burmese challenged that claim.66 'Traditional' forest 
practices were asserted through everyday forms of resistance 
and avoidance protest. After the First World War, the rise of 
nationalism in Burma provided another means of attacking 
scientific forestry. In a context of partial self-rule, the 
combination of peasant resistance and nationalist agitation 
was to prove a formidable challenge to the Forest 
Department's efforts to administer forest activity in the 
imperial interest. A central objective of the thesis is to 
assess that challenge as it explores those links between 
perceptions, interests, access and conflict that are the 
essence of forest politics in colonial Burma.
Contesting the Resource 
As the title of the study indicates, colonial forest 
management was not peaceable. Adopting conflict as a central 
theme takes issue with traditional accounts that extol the 
virtues of forest 'progress', and which imply that Burma's 
forests were above politics.67 Forest management was indeed 
political, as forest users, including the state, contested 
resource access and use.
Three themes in this thesis address the problem of forest 
politics in colonial Burma. The first theme concerns the 
contested nature of the forest resource, and explores how
66 For the purposes of this thesis, 'Burmese' and 
'Burman' are used interchangeably.
67 E.P. Stebbing, "The Teak Forests of Burma," Nature 
160 (13 December 1947): 818-20; idem, The Forests of India 
vols. 1-3; J. Nisbet, Burma under British Rule and Beforer 
vol.2 (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1901), chap. 3; C.W. 
Scott, "Forestry in Burma," Journal Oxford University Forest 
Society. 3rd. series 1 (1946): 24-34.
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diverse forest users resisted the imposition of state forest 
control. The second theme examines the complexities of such 
control through an evaluation of the Forest Department's role 
as a resource manager, and how that role was conditioned by 
broader political and institutional forces. The third theme, 
which is about conflicting perceptions of forest use, 
describes how state forest control changed as new ideas of 
social practice and political order were introduced, and how 
popular resistance was in turn based on the assertion of 
'traditional' practices that were often articulated as modern 
nationalist demands. Forest politics was thus a dynamic of 
control and resistance that was rooted in profoundly 
different perceptions of what was considered appropriate use 
of the forest resource.
But, as the choice of the term 'resource' highlights, 
Burma's forests were generally conceived of in a particular 
way. Rarely, for example, were the forests valued for 
themselves. Rather, they were valued for how they could be 
used to promote human welfare, and in the case of certain 
ecological arguments, overall well-being. Their utility lay 
precisely in their incorporation in human activity.
It fell to the Forest Department to regulate this process 
of incorporation. As a resource manager, it was in the 
business of making choices - where, when, how, or even if, 
the forests were to be exploited. In making these decisions, 
the Forest Department was inevitably engaging in politics. 
The next chapter will show how forest management in the early 
colonial period helped determine the nature of forest 
politics in Burma well into the twentieth century.
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CHAPTER 2
FOREST MANAGEMENT IN EARLY COLONIAL BURMA 1826-55
After the first Anglo-Burmese war (1824-26), the British 
transformed the newly acquired territory of Tenasserim from 
an economic backwater into a major regional centre. A 
prosperous timber and ship-building industry developed at the 
principal town of Moulmein based on the exploitation of the 
region's teak forests. Yet, despite the fact that such 
exploitation was characterized by widespread over-harvesting 
and conflict, colonial officials were slow to intervene to 
regulate the trade.
The present chapter describes this situation. But these 
same laissez-faire practices in Tenasserim's forests 
ultimately led to state intervention in the 1850s. Such 
intervention, and its implications for forest users, is the 
subject of later chapters, but here the concern is to 
elaborate the bases of such intervention.
Between 1829 and 1857, private firms in Tenasserim were 
essentially free to extract teak as they wished. Forest rules 
were few in number, and limited in scope. In any case, they 
were ineffectual in the absence of a forest service entrusted 
with their enforcement. But this state of affairs, which is 
here termed laissez-faire forestry, never went unchallenged. 
Throughout this period, government officials and scientists 
warned of the consequences of unfettered timber extraction. 
By the 1850s, the depletion of Tenasserim's teak forests made 
state intervention seem the only realistic option if the teak 
forests of Pegu, annexed after the second Anglo-Burmese war 
(1852), were to avoid a similar fate. More importantly, in an
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altered imperial context, the assertion of state forest 
control at last became politically feasible.
Laissez-faire Forestry in Tenasserim
The depletion of Tenasserim's teak forests had a major 
impact on the development of forest policy in colonial Burma. 
Among forest officials, this event was a reminder of the 
dangers inherent in any abdication of the state's stewardship 
role. As with any event that is mythicized, however, early 
colonial forest practice was deprived of much of its original 
complexity. That laissez-faire forestry resulted in extensive 
over-harvesting is well-known. Less well understood are the 
political and economic conditions that produced this outcome, 
and the reasons why an alternative system was not adopted.
The Tenasserim forests were an important, and timely 
addition to the British empire's rapidly diminishing teak 
supplies. A versatile timber, teak was especially sought 
after for the construction of naval vessels. Having exhausted 
British timber supplies around the turn of the nineteenth 
century, the government discovered a useful substitute for 
oak in the form of teak. Indeed, teak proved superior for 
shipbuilding, for unlike oak, it contained an oil which 
prevented metal corrosion.1 At first, teak was supplied from 
the Malabar forests of southern India, but by the 1820s that
1 John Nisbet, Burma under British Rule and Before, 
vol. 2 (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1901), 47; Robert 
Greenhalgh Albion, Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem 
of the Roval Navy 1652-1862 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1926), 35-36, 365-68. On naval
shipbuilding in Great Britain during this era, see N.D.G. 
James, A History of English Forestry (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1981), 139-60.
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supply was being rapidly exhausted.2 Moreover, teak from the 
other major source, monarchical Burma, was in erratic 
supply.3
When the British annexed Tenasserim, they sent Dr. 
Nathaniel Wallich, the Superintendent of the Botanical 
Gardens at Calcutta, to report on Tenasserim's teak forests 
in the belief that those resources were "not only ample but 
of very superior quality".4 In 1827, Wallich confirmed that 
belief. Not only were the forests extensive, but they were 
also largely untouched. And, he predicted that under British 
rule, they would rise to an importance "to which their 
wonderful natural capabilities so fully entitle them...in 
point of timber forests they stand altogether unrivalled".5 
In light of this report, the Government of India ordered the 
Province's first Commissioner, Mr. Anthony D. Maingy, to 
retain the forests on the government's behalf.
For the next two years, those forests were worked by 
government monopoly. In December 1827, Maingy reported that
2 B. Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India (Calcutta: 
Government Printing, 1900), 64-66.
3 The point here is not that Burma's rulers discouraged 
the export of teak and teak ships. In the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, such exports appeared to be on 
the rise, see Victor Lieberman, "Secular Trends in Burmese 
Economic History, c. 1350-1830, and their Implications for 
State Formation," Modern Asian Studies 25 (February 1991): 
14-15; B.R. Pearn, A History of Rangoon (Rangoon: American 
Baptist Mission Press, 1939), 70-72. Rather, political and 
economic conditions in Burma were such that the annual teak 
supply was not reliable or predictable, see Oliver B. 
Pollack, Empires in Collision: Ancr!o-Burmese Relations in the 
Mid-Nineteenth Century (Wesport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1979), 54-55.
4 E.P. Stebbing, The Forests of India. vol. 1 (London: 
John Lane for the Bodley Head, 1922), 125.
5 Cited in Ibid., 135.
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a supply of timber had been collected at Tavoy and Mergui 
"equal to load a vessel of 6 or 700 tons burthen" that 
required shipment to Bengal.6 Five months later, 511 teak 
logs valued at six thousand rupees were shipped from Tavoy 
to Calcutta to meet military, and other public purposes, as 
well as to test the Calcutta market. However, this experiment 
flopped as the consignment sold at a loss of 250 rupees.7
In 1829 the government ended its teak monopoly. Powerful 
timber merchants pressured senior officials in Calcutta and 
London, and may even have colluded to defraud government of 
revenue at the sale of state timber just noted.8 With the 
annexation of Tenasserim, these merchants had anticipated 
less regulation under British rule than they had experienced 
under the Burmese state. They were consequently furious that 
state intervention was to continue.9
But government was itself divided on the issue of the 
monopoly, and the timber merchants found a powerful ally in 
Commissioner Maingy. A tireless advocate of private 
enterprise, Maingy argued that the Government of India could
6 Selected Correspondence of Letters Issued from and 
Received in the Office of the Commissioner. Tenasserim 
Division for the Years 1825-26 to 1842-43 (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1916), 71.
7 W.R. Baillie, "Summary of Papers Relating to the 
Tenasserim Forests," Selections from the Records of the 
Bengal Government 9 (1852), 81.
8 Stebbing, Forests of India. 1: 141.
9 John S. Furnivall, "The Fashioning of Leviathan: The 
Beginnings of British Rule in Burma," Journal of the Burma 
Research Society 29 (April 1939); reprint, ed. Gehan 
Wijeyewardene (Canberra: Department of Anthropology 
Occasional Paper, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, 1991), 71.
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best promote its interests under a system of quasi-regulated
private extraction.
Instead of incurring the expense of establishments 
for preserving [the teak forests] for the sole use 
of Government the most advisable plan will be to 
issue licenses to private individuals to cut timber 
upon condition of paying to Government a duty of 10 
or 15 per cent upon the value of the timber when 
brought down for exportation the value to be fixed 
by arbitration and it being always optional with 
Government to take any portion of the timber at such 
valuation. A general and equal duty of a certain sum 
upon each tree cut would be a good mode of preventing 
the smaller and less valuable trees from being cut
down. A regulation also confiscating all timber cut
under specified dimensions would tend to preserve the 
young trees.10
Undoubtedly the Commissioner saw this plan as a reasonable 
compromise between the legitimate claims of the state and 
the demands of the timber industry. The former would be 
remunerated for the use of its forests, the latter would be 
allowed to extract timber, and the teak forests would be 
safeguarded from over-exploitation by simple rules.
Maingy was not the only colonial official who believed 
in private enterprise. As a representative of the British
empire, he was influenced, as were many others, by the
intellectual trends of the day. In 1829, the year 
Tenasserim's teak forests were thrown open to free 
enterprise, Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations had been published just 
fifty-three years, and David Ricardo's The Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation, a mere twelve years.11 If, as
10 Selected Correspondence. 71-72.
11 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations f 2 vols., ed. R.H. Campbell an£^ A..S. 
Skinner (1776; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); David. 
Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 
(1817; reprint, London: John Murray, 1821).
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Smith argued, the sovereign had only three essential duties - 
defense, justice, and certain public works and institutions 
for "facilitating the commerce of society and...the
instruction of the peoples" - then as the Crown's
representative in Tenasserim, and with support from Calcutta 
and London, Maingy's task was to put into practice this
vision of a rational but limited state.12
The decision to end the monopoly was thus not, as
Stebbing implies, largely the work of Maingy.13 It is highly 
improbable that senior officials in Calcutta and London would 
have agreed to the abandonment of a potentially lucrative 
monopoly simply as a result of a minor loss at a first timber 
sale. Rather, the loss was more likely a convenient pretext 
for the government to extricate itself from a politically 
difficult situation. As in the case of the Malabar forests, 
it was under pressure from a timber industry that could 
associate its unimpeded access to the forests with a broader 
campaign for free trade and limited government involvement in 
the economy. In an empire that produced the likes of Smith 
and Ricardo, those who promoted a teak monopoly were fighting 
an uphill battle in the early nineteenth century.
This point is an important one. It is only when the 
political and economic temper of the times is recognized that 
it is then possible to understand why laissez-faire forestry 
persisted in Tenasserim long after Maingy had left the 
province, and despite the best efforts of a succession of 
opponents to have it ended. It was only after 1850, and in an
12 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 72 3; Robert H. Taylor, The 
State in Burma (London: C. Hurst, 1987), 83, 108.
13 Stebbing, Forests of Indiar l: 140-42.
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altered political and economic context, that other ideas 
became influential.
As introduced in 1829, laissez-faire practices 
transformed Tenasserim's teak forests. Private traders 
flocked to the Province, and Moulmein became an important 
timber and ship-building town. By 1833, 7,309 tons of
converted teak had been exported to India, three large 
vessels built, and three more were under construction; to 
encourage this development, Maingy urged his superiors to 
impose a duty on teak imported from monarchical Burma to 
Calcutta.14 As Table 2.1 highlights, extraction increased in 
the main teak forests that were located to the south and east 
of Moulmein along the Ataran river. By the late 1840s, 
however, the best tracts had been exploited, and activity 
moved into adjoining territories under the rule of Shan and 
Karenni chieftains.
TABLE 2.1
TEAK TIMBER BROUGHT FROM THE ATARAN FORESTS,
1829 TO 1857-58
Years No. Harvested Trees % of Total
1829-April 1841 77,704 56.3
May 1841-April 1847 44,269 32.1
May 1847-April 1853 11,682 8.5
May 1853-April 1858 4,292 3.1
Total 137,947 100.0
Source: Calculated from D. Brandis, "Report on the Attaran 
Forests for the Year 1860," Selections from the Records of 
the Government of India (Foreign Departments 32 (1861), 139.
As noted later in this chapter, the number of harvested trees 
was actually much greater than suggested by the data in this
14 Selected Correspondence r 98-99.
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table. The figure of 137,947 trees is an estimate derived 
from the total amount of timber officially reported at 
Moulmein. As a result, it does not include the substantial 
amount of timber illicitly logged and exported from 
Tenasserim.
Be that as it may, Table 2.1 is primarily of interest 
here for another reason. By charting the cycle of extraction 
in the Ataran forests, it gives some indication of the 
movement of the timber 'frontier'. Thus, between 1829 and 
1841 forest work was on the increase, with annual extraction 
averaging 6,500 trees. During the period 1841-47, production 
peaked at about 7,400 trees, before dropping to under 2,000 
trees per annum in 1847-53. After 1853, fewer than 1,000 
trees per year were being removed, indicating that, under 
laissez-faire conditions, the Ataran forests had been all but 
cleared of marketable teak in under thirty years.
Much of that timber was exported to Europe and India to 
be used for ship-building or other purposes. But a 
considerable proportion was also used locally. Thus, by 1852 
more than one hundred ships with a tonnage of thirty thousand 
had been built at Moulmein. Not surprisingly, many timber 
merchants prospered. Moreover, they were "closely connected" 
to the large Calcutta firms, and entertained "some influence 
in government circles".15
The success of the Moulmein timber industry appeared to 
vindicate economic liberals such as Maingy. A small and 
nondescript village had been replaced by a prosperous lumber
15 Pollack, Empires in Collision, 46; J.S. Furnivall, 
Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma 
and Netherlands India (1948; reprint, New York: New York
University Press, 1956), 45.
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town, and Tenasserim's forests had become a valuable economic
resource. It seemed a textbook example of the benefits of
comparative advantage, free trade and a limited state.
In theory, the government controlled forest exploitation.
Licenses could be revoked if traders failed to abide by the
rules. Those rules stipulated that traders were to keep
government informed of their operations, and that trees below
a girth of four feet were not to be felled.16 Timber was also
subject to a 15 per cent duty, and could be requisitioned by
government. In this manner, it was hoped to meet the
government's financial and military needs while permitting
the freest possible exploitation. But as Stebbing observes:
With an adequate supervising staff these rules might 
have been effective and a check to ruthless 
exploitation. When the size of the country is taken 
into account, the absence of a trained staff and the 
ignorance appertaining to the forests themselves, 
which were unsurveyed, the above rules were counsels 
of perfection quite unrealisable.17
The addition of a small native establishment in 1833 to see
that the wood cutters "fell the teak trees fairly and do no
unnecessary damage to the Forests” did not alter the
situation.16
Government policy had a disastrous effect on the forests. 
It sanctioned unfettered teak extraction by private traders, 
but at the same time, a system of leases which could be 
revoked at any time discouraged those traders from building
16 License holders were also theoretically liable for 
the activities of their workers. For example, see the license 
of Shoay Byee, 4 June 1833, reprinted in Conservator Leeds to 
Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 10 May 1865, India 
Forest Proceedings (henceforth IFP), (November 1866), 350.
17 Stebbing, Forests of India, 1: 142.
18 Selected Correspondence. 99; Baillie, "Summary of 
Papers”, 83.
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a long-term interest in the forests. As the value of teak 
increased, traders maximized profits and yields by adopting 
a cut-and-run strategy.19 Unlike in later years, many of these 
traders were men of little substance.
TABLE 2.2
TEAK BROUGHT FROM TENASSERIM'S FORESTS BY EXTRACTION 
AGENCY, 12 APRIL-12 NOVEMBER 1841
Name of Agent No. of Trees % of Total
Cockerell and Co. 2,156 23.8
Shaik Abdullah 398 4.4
Captain Clarke 194 2.1
Mr Darwood 135 1.5
Mr Fox 322 3.6
Mr Richardson 301 3.3
Thoung Yeen 1,641 18.1
Weingo 412 4.6
Mr Munrell 66 0.7
Gyne Lyne Boey 675 7.4
Pandon Salween 824 9.1
Native Grants 1,945 21.4
Total 9,079 100.0
Source: Selected Correspondence of Letters Issued from and 
Received in the Office of the Commissioner. Tenasserim 
Division for the Years 1825-26 to 1842-43 (Rangoon:
Government Printing, 1916), 280.
Note: 'Thoung Yeen' refers to timber extraction in the
Thaungyin valley by Karens.
Table 2.2 gives only a partial glimpse of the extraction 
business. Moreover, given extensive illegal extraction, the 
data is inevitably imprecise. Nevertheless, it highlights 
the important point that in the early colonial period 
Europeans played a secondary role in teak extraction: in
1841, non-Europeans were responsible for at least 65 per cent
19 B.O. Binns, Amherst District Gazetteer (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1935), 49. The East India Company
acknowledged this problem in 1842, see Archibald Bogle 
(Commissioner of Tenasserim) to Cecil Beadon (Secretary, 
Government of India, Foreign Department), 30 November 1855, 
in Brandis, "Attaran Forests,11 9.
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of the timber harvest. Contemporary records typically fail to 
note the specific circumstances and backgrounds of these non- 
European traders. However, 18 per cent of the total was 
extracted from the 'Thoung Yeen' (Thaungyin) valley by Karens 
who were considered to have "the first right to the produce 
of their own Forests" in return for the payment of taxes.20 
Karen participation in the teak trade extended well beyond 
the Thaungyin valley, however. They were particularly in 
demand as elephant mahouts (or managers).21
If non-Europeans were largely responsible for teak 
extraction, European timber merchants controlled the 
marketing end of the business. The relationship between these 
merchants who "sat in Moulmein counting profits" and 
indigenous traders varied.22 In certain cases, Europeans 
contracted 'natives' to bring down from the forest a 
specified number of trees. In return, the latter were paid 
in kind, being allowed to retain for their own use or sale 
one-half of the timber consignment. In other instances,
20 D. Brandis, "Progress Report of the Forests of the 
Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces for 1858-59 and 1859-60," 
Selections from the Records of the Government of India 
(Foreign Departments 29 (1861), 20. Karen worked the Lower 
Thaungyin forests until 1904 and the Upper Thaungyin forests 
until 1911 as government contractors. Thereafter, the forests 
were transferred to Steel Brothers, see A.E. Ross, Working 
Plan for Lower Thaungyin Working Circle (Rangoon: Government 
Printing, 1909), 14; W. Lawton, Working Plan for Upper 
Thaungyin Working Circle (Rangoon; Government Printing, 
1918), 11.
21 Baillie, "Summary of Papers", 129-31; Charles F. 
Keyes, "The Karen in Thai History and the History of the 
Karen in Thailand," in Ethnic Adaptation and Identity: The 
Karen on the Thai Frontier with Burma. ed. Charles F. Keyes 
(Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues,
1979), 46.
22 Pollack, Empires in Collision, 46; see also 
Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, 45,
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advances were paid to Burmese workers to bring down trees at
a specified rate for each, it being left to the discretion of
those workers as to how many trees were actually extracted.23
Whatever their nationality, timber traders were scarcely
troubled by government supervision. Preoccupied with other
matters, Commissioner Maingy and other colonial officials
took little action to determine whether license holders were
obeying the rules. In certain cases, such inaction had a more
ominous meaning:
sharp practices in private enterprise and government 
abounded ... some British merchants had arrangements 
with Martaban officials to obtain stolen teak from 
competitors. British officers dealt in private trade 
in direct violation of the East India Company charter 
of 1833 .24
In general, local officials considered selective 
deforestation to be a small price to pay for economic 
development. Thus, the first two Commissioners of Tenasserim, 
Maingy (1827-33) and Mr. Edmund A. Blundell (1833-43) both 
requested that the timber duty be lowered to facilitate 
increased teak extraction and ship-building. In rejecting 
these requests, the Government of India noted that the 
"thriving condition of the trade" was the "best evidence" 
that the duty was not too high.25
As the trade thrived, revenue stagnated. Although teak 
represented as much as 50 per cent of total exports by value, 
between 1829 and 1841 it yielded 192,590 rupees, or just
23 Selected Correspondence r 198.
24 Pollack, Empires in Collision. 46; see also Binns, 
Amherst District Gazetteerr 50.
25 Selected Correspondence. 103, 246-47. Blundell
subsequently changed his position on the duty question.
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16,049 rupees per year.26 In 1839 more revenue was earned from 
the hire of Indian convicts than from the forests, and as 
much as three-quarters of the timber may have escaped duty.27 
Taking the economy of Tenasserim as a whole, the British may 
have been "more effective in taxing the land and people than 
the precolonial state had been," but this was probably not so 
in the case of the teak trade.28
As the extent of over-harvesting became known, the 
Government of India introduced stricter rules. In 1841, the 
minimum girth of harvestable trees was increased from four 
to six feet, and licensees were required to plant five trees 
for every one extracted. The Executive Engineer of Moulmein, 
Captain Tremenheere, was deputed as the Province's first 
Superintendent of Forests. Under the new system, timber 
revenue also increased, netting 133,481 rupees in the first 
three years, or nearly 45,000 rupees per year.29
These measures acknowledged the problem, but did not 
provide the political and economic resources needed to 
resolve it. With only a small establishment, and burdened 
with other duties, the new Superintendent was unable to 
effectively supervise forest work. As a result, forest rules 
continued to be subject to what Commissioner Henry M. Durand 
called in 1846 "the most gross neglect and the most barefaced 
violation".30 One indication of the government's continued
26 Brandis, "Attaran Forests," 140.
27 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice. 45-46.
28 Taylor, State in Burma. 90.
29 Baillie, "Summary of Papers," 128.
30 Cited in Pollack, Empires in Collision. 49.
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reluctance to intervene was its treatment of the 'revocable' 
timber license. Between 1829 and 1846, not one license was 
revoked, and in 1846, when Captain Guthrie (Tremenheere's 
successor as Superintendent) resorted to the clause, business 
outrage prompted the Government of Bengal to discountenance 
the move. Indeed, "large sums were paid for the transfer of 
the licenses, showing the feeling of security that was placed 
in them".31
If the government was reluctant to intervene in the teak 
trade, it was largely powerless to regulate the non-teak 
forest sector. With only a small staff to control a large and 
mountainous territory, the British were forced to rely on 
village headmen (thu-avi} to collect revenue.32 Inevitably, 
the latter under-reported the resources of their village, 
thereby depriving the colonial state of revenue.33 In 1840, 
Commissioner Blundell acknowledged the difficulties 
associated with the taxation of a natural resource that was 
only nominally state property when he noted that forest 
products
do not belong to any individuals in particular and 
are collected by those who choose to resort to the 
forests for them and who are supposed to give in an 
account of the quantity so collected, on which the 
duty is levied, but as we have no means of checking
31 H. Falconer, "Report on the Teak Forests of the 
Tenasserim Provinces," Selections from the Records of the 
Bengal Government 9 (1852), 36. Two Calcutta firms (Cockerell 
and Company and Mackay and Company) affected by Guthrie's 
actions led the campaign against the Superintendent. One of 
these firms was supplying the government with timber for 
naval purposes. Upon the orders of Deputy Governor of Bengal 
Herbert Maddock, the leases were restored; Guthrie then 
resigned in protest, see Stebbing, Forests of India, 1: 177- 
86.
32 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice. 37-39.
33 Taylor, State in Burma. 90.
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such statements, most of the duty is of course 
avoided and the amount collected small.34
Blundell also drew attention to the reason why most forest
produce was inherently more difficult to tax than teak.
This duty [on forest produce] is of precisely the 
same nature as that levied on [teak] timber...in the 
case of [the latter] however, it being a bulky 
article and obliged to be brought openly down the 
rivers, we possess effectual means of realizing the 
duty, but such is not the case with the other 
articles which are easily transportable by land 
without cognizance. For this reason I think the duty 
may well be remitted altogether, at [sic] it falls 
unequally on a few who may be too honest or too lazy 
to endeavour to avoid payment.35
In lieu of posting officials in the forest to enforce the
duty, Blundell had little option but to remit this unworkable
tax.
For similar reasons, colonial officials were ill-placed 
to regulate the activities of Tenasserim's shifting 
cultivators. Predominantly of Karen origin, these cultivators 
cut an annual hill clearing (taungya) in which they grew 
subsistence and cash crops. The Karen were long-standing 
participants in the regional economy, and paid tribute in 
kind to the local Burmese Governor.36 Under the British, that 
tribute was converted into a money payment which was "much 
more convenient" to the government "if not to the Karens".37 
First levied at the rate of fifteen rupees a year per family, 
it was subsequently reduced by 50 per cent or more. In 
reducing the tax, Blundell rejected its total abolition, 
arguing that
34 Selected Correspondence. 193.
35 Ibid., 193-94.
36 Ibid., 18-19; Brandis, "Attaran Forests," 119-20.
37 Furnivall, "Fashioning of Leviathan," 138.
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by so doing we should rather afford a premium to 
their continuance in their wild and unsettled habits 
than encourage their settlement into regular villages 
when they would come under the operation of other 
taxes. A judicious reduction... would, I think, have 
a better tendency to encourage settled habits among 
them, while to encourage immigration, new arrivals 
among them may be declared free of tax for periods of 
3 or 5 years.38
As with his predecessor, Commissioner Blundell wanted to 
convert shifting cultivators into settled agriculturists. In 
doing so, he revealed the concerns of a civil administrator - 
shifting cultivators were condemned primarily because they 
were difficult to tax and control. Shifting cultivators were 
also being criticized for allegedly destroying vast areas of 
forest. However, such criticism formed part of a broader 
critique of laissez-faire forestry.
Challenging Laissez-Faire 
From the beginning of British rule in Tenasserim, a 
succession of officials questioned the merits of laissez- 
faire forestry. Unfettered free enterprise, it was suggested, 
would only lead to the depletion of the teak forests. In this 
regard, shifting cultivation was also seen to be a problem. 
The logical corollary of such criticism was that state 
intervention was required if the forests were to be 
protected.
As early as 1827, Dr. Wallich advocated such 
intervention. As a government botanist, he held different 
views from Commissioner Maingy. With other scientists and 
surgeons in India, he was opposed to the destruction of the
38 Selected Correspondence. 193.
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Empire's largely unexplored tropical forests.39 Whereas Maingy 
saw only an under-utilised resource, Wallich noted the biotic 
diversity; and, while the Commissioner enthused about 
apparently limitless forests, the Superintendent warned of a 
timber famine.
In a letter to the government's local Political Agent, 
Sir Archibald Campbell, Wallich proposed a system quite 
different from that which ultimately came to pass under 
Maingy.
No forest exists which can with propriety be called 
inexhaustible - at least none that is liable to 
constant and extensive demands for timber. The 
quantity of teak used for public purposes... is so 
great...that the Martaban Forests, ample as they are, 
would soon be impoverished, unless they were placed 
under a vigilant and strict superintendence, their 
supplies regulated with economy, and their extent 
gradually augmented. I hope I take a correct view of 
the case, if I consider all the teak forests which 
grow in these Provinces as the exclusive property of 
the State, applicable only to public use, and not to 
be interfered with by any private individual 
whatever. Unless this principle be acted upon from 
the very outset, I will venture to predict that 
private enterprise will very soon render fruitless 
all endeavours to perpetuate the supplies for the 
public service, and one of the principal and most 
certain sources of revenue will thus be irrecoverably 
lost.40
In this important, and frequently-cited passage,41 Wallich 
suggests that Tenasserim's teak forests were too valuable to
39 Richard Grove, "Threatened Islands, Threatened Earth: 
Early Professional Science and the Historical Origins of 
Global Environmental Concerns," in Sustaining Earth: Response 
to the Environmental Threats, ed. David J.R. Angel1, Justyn 
D. Comer and Matthew L.N. Wilkinson (London: Macmillan, 
1990), 15-29.
40 Baillie, "Summary of Papers," 76-77.
41 Brandis, "Attaran Forests," 73; Stebbing, Forests of 
India, 1: 136; Ribbentrop, Forestry in British Indiar 69- 
70; F.T. Morehead, The Forests of Burma (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1944), 21.
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be left to free enterprise. Without state intervention, they
would be inexorably destroyed.
Events in Tenasserim soon confirmed Wallich's warning.
After less than a decade of laissez-faire. evidence of
widespread over-harvesting led the Government of Bengal to
send another scientist, Dr. John Heifer, to investigate the
situation. In 1837-38, Heifer reported that the development
of Tenasserim's timber trade was leading to the extermination
of the teak forests. Agreeing with Wallich, he called for
state intervention to stop the destruction. But Heifer also
condemned shifting cultivators.
I saw extensive tracts utterly destroyed, because it 
was the pleasure of some wild Karean [sic] to fix his 
abode in the vicinity, and for this purpose to clear 
the jungle by burning all down.42
In Heifer's view, this "extraordinary custom" was proof of
the hill Karen's primitive stature in what could otherwise
be a highly productive country.43 The implications of such
criticism were obvious. The colonial state should curtail a
practice that offered only a meagre living in return for
widespread forest 'destruction'.
Heifer's findings convinced Blundell of the need for
intervention. An erstwhile supporter of laissez-fairef the
Commissioner now urged his superiors in India to introduce
tough new measures to halt over-harvesting.44 Blundell's
representations led the Government of India to appoint
42 Cited in Baillie, "Summary of Papers," 90.
43 John William Heifer, "Third Report on Tenasserim," 
Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society 8 (December 1839): 985.
44 Selected Correspondence. 163; Stebbing, Forests of 
India, 1: 148.
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Captain Tremenheere as Tenasserim7s first Superintendent of 
Forests in 1841.
This appointment was an important first step in the 
promotion of a colonial forest policy. But its importance 
did not lie in any immediate effect on harvesting operations. 
As noted, laissez-faire practices in Tenasserim persisted 
until 1857. Rather, Tremenheere7s appointment was important 
because it provided an institutional basis within the 
colonial administration for an ongoing critique of unfettered 
private extraction. If Tremenheere and his successors lacked 
the requisite training and staff, they nevertheless had a 
mandate to uphold the forest rules. That mandate was used to 
publicize the rule-breaking and over-harvesting that was an 
integral part of laissez-faire forestry.
As colonial officials became more knowledgeable about 
the forests, they were also increasingly critical of shifting 
cultivators. Conflict with the hill Karen thus derived from 
the expansion of scientific knowledge and the rationalization 
of forest use that began in the early colonial period. Above 
all, it was the tendency of these cultivators to clear fields 
in teak forest that earned them official displeasure: "they 
prefer spots where young Teak abounds to any other, the soil 
being generally richer and well elevated".45 In 1848
Superintendent T. Latter went so far as to claim that 
shifting cultivators, and not timber traders, were the 
"greatest cause" of teak destruction in Tenasserim.46
45 Deputy Superintendent Maling, cited in Baillie, 
"Summary of Papers," 131.
46 Ibid., 154.
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In contrast, others believed that the Karen could be 
reformed. Commissioner Durand, for example, suspected that 
their lifestyle was due to persecution by other ethnic 
groups. British rule, however, would make them "the best 
conservators of forests which the British Government could 
employ" ; it was also suggested that the Karen in the
Thaungyin valley should receive legal entitlement to the
forests that they worked.47 As Superintendent Guthrie 
reported, such a move would "fix and increase the Karen
population" at the same time encouraging them to protect teak
tracts; moreover, timber "could be purchased from them at as 
low a rate as it could be worked by hired labour".48 This idea 
was rejected, however, in 1849 by the East India Company's 
Court of Directors who opposed the recognition of non-state 
rights to the teak forests. In doing so, they affirmed the 
status quo; the colonial state owned the forests, the timber 
merchants exploited them, and the forests continued to be 
degraded.
In the same year, however, the government once more 
solicited scientific advice, and deputed Dr. H. Falconer of 
Calcutta's Botanical Gardens to inspect Tenasserim's forests. 
Not surprisingly, Falconer's report documented what Wallich, 
Heifer and successive Superintendents had long predicted: 
laissez-faire practices had ruined the forests. License 
holders were not establishing plantations as required by law 
even though "fully aware of the impending exhaustion of their 
grants,"; and he mused that
47 Ibid., 127-28, 132.
48 Ibid., 135.
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if such have been the results of the past, when the 
forests were covered with abundance of valuable Teak 
timber, what reasonable grounds are there for 
expecting adequate measures of renewal from the 
grantees, now that they are bared?49
Yet, Falconer did not recommend that the government re- 
impose its teak monopoly. Perhaps in recognition of the power 
of the timber lobby, he urged that license holders be given 
one last chance under a system of strictly enforced licenses. 
If that strategy failed, then government was justified in 
resuming direct control of the forests.
But even these moderate recommendations were not heeded 
by government. When Tenasserim's forests were finally brought 
under a regular system of forest management in 1857-58, only 
the most inaccessible areas remained untouched, and annual 
extraction from the Ataran forests was under one thousand 
trees.50 Table 2.3 gives some idea of the extent of over­
harvesting in these forests during the laissez-faire era.
TABLE 2.3
TEAK OVER-HARVESTING IN THE ATARAN FORESTS 1827-58 
(First-Class Trees Only)
Avg. Annual No. Total No.
Trees actually removed 5,529 171,400a
Sustainable amount 3,270 101,370b
Difference (Over-harvest) 2,259 70,030
Source: D. Brandis, "Report on the Attaran Forests for the 
Year I860," Selections from the Records of the Government of 
India (Foreign Departmental r 32 (1861), 97-99.
Note: First-class trees are defined as six feet in girth or 
larger.
a. Based on the estimated number of stumps found in the 
forest in 1858.
b. As calculated by Brandis.
49 Falconer, "Teak Forests," 36-37.
50 Brandis, "Attaran Forests," 100.
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If no complete record exists of over-harvesting in 
Tenasserim, then data collected by Brandis in 1858 
nevertheless indicates the scale of the problem. By counting 
the number of stumps in a sample area, Brandis was able to 
extrapolate that, for the Ataran forests as a whole, a total 
of 171,400 first-class trees had been harvested between 1827 
and 1858, or 70,030 trees more than the estimated 
'sustainable' amount. In practice, of course, the harvest was 
even less sustainable than this discrepancy would indicate. 
Brandis only counted the stumps of first-class trees, that 
is, trees six feet in girth and larger. But, as noted, the 
official minimum girth until 1841 was only four feet - a rule 
which was, in any event, ignored by traders anxious to 
maximize their financial return by extracting all marketable 
trees in a given area.
However, the most telling indication of the depletion of 
Tenasserim's forests was to be seen in the gradual shift in 
logging out of the Province.51 By the mid nineteenth century, 
teak extraction centred on two regions: the vast and
mountainous Salween watershed that separated Burma from Siam, 
and which was controlled by autonomous local rulers (Chao); 
and the low hills known as the Pegu Yoma that separate the 
Irrawaddy and Sittang valleys of south-central Burma.52 In the
51 Commissioner Bogle noted in 1855 that many Ataran 
leases had been abandoned by traders, see Bogle to Beadon, in 
Ibid., 25.
52 On teak extraction along the Burma-Siam border in the 
nineteenth century, see Banasopit Mekvichai, "The Teak 
Industry in North Thailand: The Role of a Natural-Resource- 
Based Export Economy in Regional Development" (Ph.D. diss., 
Cornell University, 1988), chap. 3. From 1842, the British 
imposed a duty of 15 per cent on timber from this region that 
was exported via Moulmein, see Dietrich Brandis, "Memo, on 
the Subject of Duties levied on Foreign Timber imported into
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latter, the timber industry anticipated a new commercial boom 
as the British victory in the second Anglo-Burmese war (1852) 
liberated still more of Burma's great teak wealth from 
monarchical rule. European merchants foresaw little 
difficulty from the new colonial regime in Rangoon.
When Legacies Meet: Forestry in Pegu 1852-55
Significantly, however, the development of Pegu's teak 
forests followed a different course from that of the 
Tenasserim forests, and was marked by state intervention. 
The Tenasserim experience, the growing influence of the 
scientific lobby, and the consolidation of empire contributed 
to a political context conducive to change.
Pegu's annexation coincided with the publication of two 
documents critical of laissez-faire forestry. As noted, Dr. 
Falconer's report recorded the depletion of Tenasserim's teak 
forests. Submitted in 1851, it was published by the 
Government of Bengal along with other papers pertaining to 
that issue.53
If these papers documented the perils of laissez-faire 
forestry in Tenasserim, a report published in 1852 by leading 
surgeons of the East India Company offered a broader 
critique.54 Warning that unregulated timber extraction in 
India (and elsewhere) was leading to social and ecological 
disaster, it urged government to intervene before it was too 
late, and establish a system of forest conservancy. As Grove
Moulmein," IFP (August 1870).
53 See above n. 7 and 31.
54 Grove, "Threatened Islands," 23-24; Stebbing, Forests 
of India. 1: 214-18.
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observes, this report was published at a time when anxiety 
over artificially-induced ecological change gave scientists 
a measure of public influence.55
Broader political and economic trends reinforced the 
impact of these reports. Specifically, by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the British-Indian empire was beginning 
to coalesce, and colonialism entered a new, and more 
aggressive phase. This was well-illustrated in the changing 
British attitude toward Burma. Following the first Anglo- 
Burmese war, British officials briefly considered returning 
'unprofitable' Tenasserim to the Burmese; but after the 
second Anglo-Burmese war, such considerations apparently did 
not occur to colonial administrators preoccupied with the 
annexation of Pegu and its teak forests.56
Attention now turned to the systematic development of 
that empire. There was perhaps no more vigorous an exponent 
of such development than the Marquis of Dalhousie, Governor- 
General of India in the early 1850s. Dalhousie is noted for 
promoting the railway, telegraph and a unified postal system 
on the Indian subcontinent.57 Equally important, however, was 
his promotion of forest management. As Chapter 3 shows, it 
was Dalhousie who appointed Dietrich Brandis as Pegu's 
Superintendent of Forests in 1856, and who wrote the Minute
55 Grove, "Threatened Islands," 15-16, 23; see also C.A. 
Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire. 
The New Cambridge History of India, vol. 2, part 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 140.
56 Pollack, Empires in Collision, 41-42; D.G.E. Hall, A 
History of South-East Asia r 4th ed. (London: Macmillan, 
1981), 644-46.
57 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: 
Science. Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 225.
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that signalled "the dawn of scientific forestry" in the 
British-Indian empire.sa Unlike many of his predecessors, 
Dalhousie saw the utility of state intervention, and it was 
in Pegu that an organized system of imperial forest 
management was first developed.
If altered imperial circumstances facilitated a new 
approach to forest issues, that approach had to be modified 
to fit Burma's unique social and ecological conditions. It 
is by now commonplace to observe that in drawing the border 
at the conclusion of the second Anglo-Burmese war, the 
British included as much of the teak-bearing Pegu Yoma as 
possible.59 Less well known, however, is the fact that in 
doing so, colonial officials also inherited a complex 
tradition of indigenous forest regulation. At a practical 
level, that tradition was an important, if subsequently 
under-rated, influence on forest policy in colonial Burma.
Indigenous forest practices were largely unknown as the 
British began to survey Pegu's teak forests. Yet, on 26 
September 1853, those forests were declared state property 
in keeping with pre-colonial precedent. The status of teak 
as a royal tree was thereby affirmed, and residents were 
warned that "any person who shall cut, mark or fell any Teak 
timber in any of those Forests, without authority, will be 
liable to be apprehended and prosecuted according to law".60
58 Stebbing, Forests of India. 1: 256-60.
59 Pollack, Empires in Collision. 109; Hall, History of 
South-East Asia. 652; David Joel Steinberg et al., In Search 
of Southeast Asia: A Modern History, rev. ed. (Sydney: Allen 
and Unwin, 1987), 107.
60 Government proclamation, cited in J. McClelland, 
"Report on the Sitang and other Teak Forests of Pegu," 
Selections from the Records of the Government of India
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Shortly thereafter, Pegu's first Superintendent of Forests, 
Dr. J. McClelland, examined the teak forests of the Pegu 
Yoma. In two reports published in 1855, he provided a first 
account of those forests.61 In many respects, these reports 
were similar to Wallich's report on the Tenasserim forests. 
Both men documented the general nature of the teak forests; 
and, both officials warned of the perils of unregulated 
extraction. Fearing that Pegu's forests would meet the same 
fate as those in Tenasserim, McClelland predicted that "if we 
fail in the comparatively simple duty of preserving the old 
forests, we can scarcely hope to succeed in the more 
difficult task of creating new ones".62
McClelland's warning was designed to draw the 
government's attention to the destruction already wrought in 
Pegu's forests. He noted that many of the most accessible 
forests had been cut, and traders were killing undersized 
trees. Faced with such evidence, it is perhaps not surprising 
that McClelland concluded that there was no system of 
indigenous forest control in Pegu. Large landlords in 
conjunction with Rangoon timber merchants employed men 
seasonally to drag timber from the forests to the streams. 
When supplies in one area were exhausted, loggers moved to a 
new forest. In McClelland's view, this business was not part 
of the regular industry or trade of the country. There was no
(Foreign Departments 9 (1855), 114.
61 J. McClelland, "Report on the Southern Forests of 
Pegu" and "Report on the sitang and other Teak Forests of 
Pegu," in ibid.
62 McClelland, "Southern Forests," 21.
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such thing as a class of foresters or professional
woodcutters in Pegu
who have been accustomed to earn their bread by 
forest work, or who can be thrown out of accustomed 
employment or be in any way injuriously affected by 
any alterations in the forest laws or rules.63
Thus, the British were as free in Pegu as they were in
Tenasserim to manage the forests as they saw fit without
disrupting indigenous practices.
McClelland's denial of pre-colonial forest regulation in
Pegu formed part of a broader colonial conviction that the
Burmese were incapable of managing their own forests. Whereas
in Tenasserim they had 'under-exploited' a valuable asset, in
Pegu the Burmese were guilty of over-harvesting the teak
forests. To later generations of British foresters, Burmese
incompetence was axiomatic.
Yet, not all colonial officials shared this view. Indeed,
at the same time as McClelland was denying the existence of
pre-colonial forestry, his assistant was describing aspects
of such regulation. Thus, Robert Abreu observed that since
teak was a royal tree, wood-cutters or contractors had to pay
an annual 'axe tax' for the privilege of working the forest.64
At the end of each year, all timber left in the forest
reverted to the state.
Pegu's first Commissioner, Arthur P. Phayre, noted that
in pre-colonial times the thu-qvi had authorized teak
extraction in return for a fee paid on each tree felled.
63 Cited in Stebbing, Forests of India r 1: 249.
64 Robert Abreu, "Report on the Lhine, Phoungyee, and 
Zamayee Teak Forests," Selections from the Records of the 
Government of India (Foreign Department) 9 (1855), 43-44.
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Teak trees were to them in fact a property held in 
virtue of their offices, and a number of the 
inhabitants of each circle were generally interested 
in the killing of the trees and sometimes in the 
dragging of them. This consideration will show at 
once the great obstacles which have to be overcome in 
preserving the forest, since an important privilege 
of the Thoogyees has, under the British Government, 
been abrogated.65
Phayre is not, of course, suggesting that pre-colonial
practices were sustainable. Rather, he is simply
acknowledging what McClelland preferred to overlook: the
existence of a system of forest regulation and control in
monarchical Burma.
But such a system not only existed, it was also an
important, if under-rated, influence on colonial forest
policy. Patterns of forest control established in monarchical
times were often perpetuated under British rule. Technology
'flowed in reverse' as techniques of timber extraction and
regulation were passed on from the Burmese to European
traders and officials.66
It is not at all surprising that this was so. Burmese
involvement in the teak trade predated that of the Europeans,
and from at least the seventeenth century, southern Burma
exported locally-built teak ships.67 The role of the pre­
65 A.P. Phayre to J. McClelland, 20 March 1855, in ibid,
182.
66 Khin Maung Kyi, "Western Enterprise and Economic 
Development in Burma," Journal of the Burma Research Society 
53 (June 1970): 44.
67 Victor B. Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles: 
Anarchy and Conquest, c.1580-1760 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 119-20; Morehead, Forests of Burma, 
19. Between 1786 and 1824, 111 vessels representing a tonnage 
of thirty-five thousand were constructed in Rangoon, see 
Pearn, History of Rangoon r 71. In the late eighteenth 
century, labourers earned twenty kyats for every hundred teak 
logs which they sawed into planks, see Htin Aung, Epistles 
Written on the Eve of the Analo-Burmese War (The Hague:
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colonial state in this trade was crucial. Sensitive to the 
political and economic benefits to be derived from regulating 
teak extraction, Burma's rulers developed a complex system 
designed to maximize revenue and control.
The pre-colonial state apparently controlled the teak 
trade in two ways.68 First and foremost, a series of revenue 
and customs posts along the principal river and cart routes 
were used to regulate and tax commercial goods (including 
teak) as they were transported to market. For internal 
commerce, land (te) and water (hseik) toll stations served 
this purpose, whereas customs posts (kin') enabled Burmese 
rulers to control capital-district, inter-district and 
international trade.69 These posts were "a means of monitoring 
centrally the flow of manpower and other resources in a way 
no other institution could in such a diffuse administrative 
system".70 As teak was most easily transported by river, 
revenue and customs posts were an effective method of 
control.
To a lesser extent, the pre-colonial state controlled 
the teak trade by regulating extraction from the forest 
itself. It did so under a system of 'girdling'.
Girdling consists in cutting through the bark and
sapwood till the darker-coloured heartwood is entered
Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 10-11.
68 The subject of pre-colonial forestry has yet to be 
systematically researched. As such, this discussion is 
necessarily tentative.
69 William J. Koenig, The Burmese Polity. 1752-1819: 
Politicsf Administration, and Social Organization in the 
Early Kon-baung Period r Michigan Papers on South and 
Southeast Asia, no. 34 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 
1990), 56.
70 Taylor, State in Burma. 44.
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about an inch below the surface. The effect of this 
operation is...to check the possibility of sap rising 
from the root system. Deprived of food supplies the 
leaves wither...and the tree dies. A process of 
natural seasoning on the stock then follows...the 
seasoned stem being ready for felling and extraction 
in two years or more.71
This process facilitated dragging and floating operations
such that girdled teak was easier to extract than green teak.
More importantly, teak girdling was a means of state
control.72 By funnelling timber into the river network, it
limited the number of routes by which teak could be
transported to market, and thereby eased the task of control
and taxation. Timber arriving at revenue stations could be
checked to see if, when, and where it had been girdled. In
the case of the more valuable forests, specially-appointed
forest guards made dry season inspections of the forest.73
This system did not, of course, prevent illicit extraction.
Burma's forests were too large, and the administrative
capacity too small, to achieve complete control. Moreover,
teak used locally was habitually extracted by land with the
aid of buffaloes which further complicated surveillance. Yet,
as colonial officials later noted, it was generally an
effective defence against illegal extraction.74
71 Nisbet, Burma under British Rule r 2: 52.
72 The origins of girdling in monarchical Burma are 
unclear. Brandis suggests that the practice was "in 
force...ever since Teak has been exported on a large scale," 
see Government of India, Seasoning of Timber by Girdling 
previous to Felling (London: H.M.S.O., 1868), 29.
73 J.S. Vorley and C.H. Thompson, Working Plan for Magwe 
Forest Division. 1927-28 to 1957-58. vol. 1 (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1928), 24.
74 Nisbet, Burma under British Rule. 2: 52? Progf-gss
Report on Forest Administration in British Burma. 1863-64, 
60-61.
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As a wood in domestic and foreign demand, it is not 
surprising that Burma's leaders sought to control teak 
extraction. Less well known, but also important, were rules 
governing the use of other forest products. Pre-colonial 
revenue records (sit-tanslr for example, reveal that a range 
of timber and non-timber forest products were taxed.75 Thu- 
qyis and other local officials were often responsible for tax 
collection, and retained a percentage of the revenue for 
their services. Inevitably, these forest-related taxes varied 
depending on local forest use, patron-client relations, and 
the relative power of the central state.76 In an 
administratively diffuse system, the revenue actually 
received by the Burmese monarchy was much less than that 
collected at the village level. As with other forms of 
surplus, forest revenue was subject to competing local, 
regional and central claims. In addition, a low population 
density, unoccupied lands, and the relatively weak coercive 
capacity of the state, ensured that peasants could flee or 
otherwise avoid what was felt to be excessive taxation.
Pre-colonial forest regulation thus developed over 
centuries as a means to tax and control forest use. The 
British continued, or later revived, many of these indigenous 
forms of control. Colonial foresters affirmed the royal 
monopoly on teak, and regulated extraction through the 
technique of girdling. They monitored and taxed the flow of 
timber at revenue stations located along the main river
75 Frank N. Trager and William J. Koenig, Burmese Sit- 
tans 1764-1826: Records of Rural Life and Administration
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1979).
76 This variability is illustrated in the Hanthawadi and 
Taungngo land records, see Ibid.
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routes. Other forest products were also taxed as the 
administrative capacity of the Forest Department increased. 
But , diverse forest users resisted the exactions of the 
colonial state as they had denied the demands of its 
predecessor. A central objective of this thesis, then, is to 
examine how control over forest activities grew under the 
British, and the manner in which resistance was modified to 
meet a more powerful state presence in the forest.
If the British borrowed techniques of resource control 
from the Burmese, the impetus for state intervention 
nevertheless derived from the early colonial experience with 
forest management in Burma. The depletion of Tenasserim's 
teak forests illustrated the pitfalls of laissez-faire 
forestry, and in an altered imperial context, it became 
possible to experiment with new management techniques 
premised on state intervention.
The Tenasserim experience demonstrated, above all, the 
need for a forest department empowered to manage the forest 
resource on a long-term basis. The appointment of a part- 
time Superintendent notwithstanding, forest management in 
Tenasserim was characterized by the absence of state 
authority in the forests. Not surprisingly, forest rules were 
ignored, on occasion even by officials. Conflict in the teak 
forests was thus not about resistance to these rules. Rather, 
it reflected a struggle between timber traders for control of 
a rapidly diminishing resource under anarchic conditions. 
Under a system of unfettered private enterprise, such 
conflict, and attendant forest depletion, was almost 
inevitable.
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The colonial state's response to the events in Tenasserim 
is the subject of the remainder of this thesis. In 1856, the 
Burma Forest Department was created under the direction of 
Dietrich Brandis. More importantly, that Department was given 
far-reaching powers to regulate forest activities so as to 
promote long-term commercial timber production. But, as the 
next chapter shows, the transition from laissez-faire to 
scientific forestry in the mid-nineteenth century was opposed 
by diverse forest users. Timber traders, peasants and 
shifting cultivators resisted the imposition of state forest 
control. In the process, a dynamic of control and resistance 
was established that was to characterize colonial forest 
politics in Burma well into the twentieth century.
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CHAPTER 3
ASSERTING CONTROL:
THE CREATION OF A FOREST SERVICE 1856-81
The basic pattern of forest administration in colonial 
Burma was established during the twenty-five year period that 
began with Brandis' arrival in Pegu in 1856, and ended with 
the passage of the Burma Forest Act in 1881. The previous 
chapter explained how laissez-faire forestry in Tenasserim 
was predicated on unfettered private enterprise. In contrast, 
the period discussed in this chapter is characterized by 
state intervention. The Forest Department was established in 
1856 to assert control over forest users as part of an 
attempt to manage scientifically Burma's teak forests. But if 
such management was predicated on the systematic regulation 
of popular forest practices, European timber merchants, as 
well as Burmese peasants, shifting cultivators and timber 
traders resisted the imposition of state forest control.
Chapter 4 examines how the assertion of such control was 
conditioned by bureaucratic and legal changes that were 
designed to clarify the nature of state intervention. In this 
chapter, the focus is on the Forest Department's attempt to 
assert control over forest users in mid-nineteenth-century 
British Burma. It examines the forest service's efforts to 
introduce scientific management, and how various groups 
resisted the new restrictions. By focusing on the 
introduction of a reforestation scheme known as taungya 
forestry, it also illustrates one way in which the Forest 
Department attempted to overcome such resistance.
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Dietrich Brandis and Forest Policy 1856-62
It is conventional to associate the creation of the 
Forest Department with Brandis' arrival in Pegu in January 
1856. Yet, the lineage of the Department goes back at least 
to 1841 when Tenasserim's first Superintendent of Forests 
was appointed. Before examining developments after 1856, it 
is worth briefly considering why this later date was adopted.
Personality is undeniably a factor. If Commissioner 
Maingy is associated with the introduction of laissez-faire 
forestry in Tenasserim, then Brandis was instrumental in the 
advent of scientific forestry in Burma, and later India. 
Brandis received untold honours for his life's work, and even 
today, Burmese foresters speak of him reverentially as the 
'Einstein' of Burmese forestry.1 Who was this pivotal figure 
in colonial forest management?
Dietrich Brandis was born in Bonn in what is now Germany 
on 1 April 1824, son of a Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of Bonn. Educated at the Universities of 
Copenhagen, Gottingen, and Bonn, he was appointed Lecturer 
in Botany at the latter in 1849 upon completion of his 
doctorate. Keen to do research in the botanically-diverse 
forests of India, Brandis obtained the assistance of his 
English wife's family to intercede on his behalf with the 
Governor-General of India, the Marquis of Dalhousie. Reaching
1 Personal communication from Richard Gayer, London, 
1991. The following discussion of Brandis is drawn from 
Herbert Hesmer, "Dietrich Brandis and Forestry in Burma," 
trans. E. and D. von Bendemann, Guardian (Rangoon) 25, no.4 
(April 1978): 33-34; India Forest Research Institute, 100
Years of Indian Forestry. 1861-1961. vol.l (Dehra Dun: India 
Forest Research Institute, 1961), 66-68; S. Eardley Wilmot, 
"Sir Dietrich Brandis," Indian Forester 33 (July 1907): 305- 
8; Gifford Pinchot, "Sir Dietrich Brandis," Indian Forester 
35 (August 1909): 468-80.
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India in 1855, Brandis' application could not have been 
better timed. In that year, Dalhousie sought a replacement 
for Pegu's Superintendent of Forests, Dr. J. McClelland, who 
had resigned after differences with Commissioner Arthur P. 
Phayre over the issue of timber duties. Upon being offered 
the post, Brandis obtained a two-year leave of absence from 
the University of Bonn to go to India. With a recommendation 
from a friend of his father, the renowned scientist Alexander 
von Humboldt, Brandis set sail for Calcutta.
He never returned to his lecturing post in Germany. 
Spending two weeks in Calcutta in December 1855, Brandis met 
with McClelland and Dalhousie before sailing to Rangoon. Six 
years later, he was transferred to India to advise on the 
establishment of an imperial forest policy, and in 1864, was 
appointed the first Inspector-General of Forests to the 
Government of India. Created a Companion of the Indian Empire 
in 1878, Brandis was knighted in 1887, and, although he 
retired in 1883, remained active in the world of forestry 
until his death in 1907. In these years of 'retirement', 
Brandis' influence was at its peak as he helped in the 
education of British and American forestry students. Indeed, 
it was Gifford Pinchot (the founder of the U.S. Forest 
Service) who drew attention to Brandis' role as "the chief 
figure in the forest movement in the world" during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2
This biographical sketch scarcely does justice to 
Brandis' achievements, but it does illustrate the drive and 
determination of this botanist turned forester who first
2 Pinchot, "Brandis," 469.
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established a name for himself in Burma.3 It also highlights 
the important point that Brandis' influence on Burmese 
forestry did not end with his transfer to India in 1862. As 
Inspector-General of Forests, he paid careful attention to 
the evolution of forest policy in Burma.
If it is hard to imagine forestry in colonial Burma 
without thinking of the role played by this remarkable 
individual, it is also important to remember the context in 
which Brandis assumed his official duties. Chapter 2 noted 
the factors that facilitated the introduction of a new forest 
policy in the 1850s. It is useful here to elaborate the 
circumstances surrounding Dalhousie's Minute of 1855, for its 
origin was due to a policy dispute within the Pegu 
administration that threatened to establish practices in Pegu 
that had already ruined the teak forests of Tenasserim.
The notification of teak as a reserved tree in 1853 had 
little immediate effect on timber extraction. With only a 
small staff to control unexplored forests, McClelland was 
unable to control the illegal practices which flourished in 
the unsettled conditions that followed the second Anglo- 
Burmese war. Timber traders illicitly girdled teak which they 
then attempted to pass off as private timber from pre­
colonial times.4 Moreover, the Tenasserim legacy 
notwithstanding, a number of colonial officials still
3 Brandis' reputation was great even among the Burmese, 
see R.S. Troup, "Forestry in India," Calcutta Review 273 
(July 1913): 308.
4 Dietrich Brandis, "Memorandum on the Teak in the 
Tharawadie District, June 1856," Selections from the Records 
of the Government of India (Foreign Department') 28 (1860): 
69; D.G.E. Hall (ed.), The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence 
1852-1856 (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), 318.
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promoted laissez-faire. albeit subject to greater control
than in the past. The struggle between interventionists and
economic liberals found expression in a dispute between the
Superintendent and the Commissioner over the issue of timber
duties. Rejecting the rates proposed by McClelland as being
too high, Phayre recommended that the duty at Rangoon be
fixed at approximately that level obtaining at Moulmein.
Otherwise, he believed, private enterprise would not work
Pegu's forests. McClelland bitterly contested Phayre's
recommendation, and warned that
by your striking the tariff at so low a rate...it 
would seem that you looked to the immediate 
commercial interests of the Rangoon port and the 
Export trade in timber, whilst I look to the Forests 
from whence the trade is to be supplied, and give it 
as my opinion, that if your tariff were adopted, the 
trade of the port would eventually suffer with the 
ruin of the Forests, which would assuredly follow, 
though not perhaps in your time or in mine.5
Not for the last time, civil and forest officials differed
over important policy questions. Phayre's primary concern
was to encourage economic development, while McClelland's
main interest was the promotion of such development
commensurate with forest renewal.
Dalhousie addressed the issue of the timber duties in a
Minute that was communicated to Pegu's Commissioner in August
1855.6 In it, the Governor General criticized Phayre and
McClelland for not appreciating the 'full force' of the
principle that teak was to be retained as state property.
5 J. McClelland to A.P. Phayre, 29 May 1854, Selections 
from the Records of the Government of India (Foreign 
Department'I 9 (1855): 66.
6 Cecil Beadon (Secretary, Government of India, Foreign 
Department) to Commissioner of Pegu, 3 August 1855, 
Selections from the Records of the Government of India 
(Foreign Departments 9 (1855), 73-7S.
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Dalhousie was particularly scathing of Phayre's encouragement 
of private enterprise. Such an approach would deprive the 
government of "the full value" of its forests, and would not 
"ensure those traders a supply of timber who want it most, 
unless they happen to be great capitalists and speculators in 
timber."7 Noting the adverse impact of the latter on 
Tenasserim's forests, Dalhousie urged the Superintendent to 
bypass the big timber merchants, and instead sign contracts 
with local men, marketing the teak so extracted at public 
auction in Rangoon.
Following McClelland's resignation in 1855, Dalhousie 
entrusted Brandis with the difficult task of putting into 
practice this policy. But, the new Superintendent started 
work in a context of political, economic and ecological 
uncertainty. Little was known about Pegu's forests, and the 
characteristics of the teak tree, making the estimation of 
the annual allowable cut at first largely guesswork. 
Politically, the annexation of Pegu had left Britain in 
control of a Burmese population whose allegiance was 
suspect.8 Moreover, the colonial state shared a border with 
a truncated but still independent Burma in turmoil after its 
second British defeat. While the threat of a Burmese invasion 
was remote, the border area was nevertheless subject to 
unrest, mirroring the vicissitudes of Anglo-Burmese
7 Ibid., 76.
8 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (London: C.
Hurst, 1987), 116-17, 156-57; John F. Cady, A History of
Modern Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), 89- 
90, 94; J.A. Mills, "Burmese Peasant Response to British
Provincial Rule 1852-1885," in Peasants and Politics: Grass 
Roots Reaction to Change in Asia, ed. D.B. Miller (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1979), 77-104.
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relations, and Burmese court politics.9 To forest officials,
such uncertainty was particularly troubling as most of Pegu's
valuable forests were near the frontier. Indeed, the border
bisected the teak-bearing Pegu Yoma. Finally, Brandis faced
the economic uncertainties associated with the creation of a
new department in an imperial context of change and crisis.
Preoccupied with the Indian Mutiny (1857-58), the Government
of India devoted only limited resources to the Burma Forest
Department. Yet, the latter was expected to generate an
economic surplus for the imperial treasury. Inevitably,
timber merchants were quick to point out the limited nature
of that initial surplus, and pressed government to relinquish
control of the forests.
Despite such uncertainty, Brandis initiated a system in
which Burmese contractors extracted timber on the Forest
Department's behalf. He defended this policy by noting that
government must...be the pioneers of an improved 
working system and introduce into the country, as 
well as raise in it, a class of able foresters, with 
the means of working the forests properly...taking 
the forest work out of the hands of the mercantile 
community has been [therefore] no arbitrary measure.10
Brandis thus sought to develop a class of indigenous 
foresters. In doing so, he may have been motivated by the 
belief that the Burmese would be better foresters than non-
9 R.R. Langham-Carter, "Burmese Rule on the Toungoo 
Frontier," Journal of the Burma Research Society 27 (1937): 
15-32; Albert Fytche, "Narrative of the Mission to Mandalay 
in 1867," Selections from the Records of the Government of 
India [Foreign Departments 63 (1868): 21-22; Cady, History of 
Modern Burma. 93.
10 D. Brandis, "Report on the Teak Forests of Pegu for 
1856," Selections from the Records of the Government of India 
[Foreign Department] 28 (1860): 34.
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Burmese who had no attachment to the land.11 Instead of 
encountering such men, however, Brandis was besieged by 'a 
host of rogues' who absconded with advances or perpetuated 
wasteful cutting practices. Forced to improvise, the 
Superintendent relied on officials and traders (Table 3.1).
TABLE 3.1
TEAK CONTRACTORS BY REGULAR OCCUPATION 1856
Occupation No. of Contractors
Myo-ok 1
Taik-thu-gyi 2
Forest Department subordinates 11
Burmese timber merchants 4
General traders 1
Moulmein foresters 5
Total 24
Source: D. Brandis, "Report on the Teak Forests of Pegu for 
1856," Selections from the Records of the Government of India 
(Foreign Departments 28 (1860): 23.
Brandis relied primarily on two groups: Moulmein foresters 
(skilled Karen mahouts) and Forest Department subordinates. 
As the most experienced workers in the business, the former 
were particularly esteemed. But these men were already in 
heavy demand in the forests of the Salween watershed. At 
first only partly successful in his bid to bring them to 
Pegu, Brandis relied on his own employees to get the contract 
system started.
The pitfalls of this arrangement soon became evident. In 
the Tharrawaddy district, subordinates in league with 
independent contractors defrauded the government by 
substituting inferior timber for first-class logs, selling
11 However, the European firm of E. Fowle and Company 
was employed in 1856 to remove seasoned timber, see Ibid., 8.
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the latter to private parties. In the Sittang forests, timber 
was dragged into Burmese territory, and then reintroduced to 
Pegu as foreign timber.12 Subsequently, however, the system 
was established on a more regular basis. As an increasing 
number of Moulmein foresters worked the forests, local 
Burmans and Karens also acquired timber elephants and signed 
contracts.
In part, this interest reflected the system of advances 
introduced to encourage local participation. The cost of 
loans at Rangoon being so dear, the amount of teak extracted 
by a contractor was almost proportional to the amount of the 
advance granted.13 It is likely that such participation also 
reflected the relatively greater stability of British rule by 
the late 1850s. If colonial rule continued to be contested, 
particularly by pre-colonial officials, there were also local 
notables who cooperated with the British. It was from amongst 
the latter that Brandis gained converts to the new system. As 
a general rule, myo-oks and taik-thu-avis did not personally 
engage in forest work, but their sons and nephews frequently 
did.14 In this manner, Brandis' efforts to develop a class of 
indigenous foresters through a system of advances and 
contracts formed part of a larger effort to make "life under 
British rule... appear as attractive as possible".15
12 Ibid., 26-27.
13 Dietrich Brandis, "Report on the Pegu Teak Forests 
for 1857-58," Selections from the Records of the Government 
of India (Foreign Department) 31 (1861): 3.
14 Ibid; D. Brandis, "Memorandum on the Revision of 
Forest Establishment," India Forest Proceedings (henceforth 
IFP), (January 1870), 92.
15 Mills, "Burmese Peasant Response," 83.
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As the contract system coalesced, it came under attack 
from the European timber traders in Rangoon. Taking advantage 
of the government's political and economic vulnerability 
during the Indian Mutiny (1857-58), they pressured Brandis to 
sell to them all the mature timber in the forests in order to 
ease the government's financial problems.16 By not giving in 
to such blandishments, he earned their enmity, and set the 
stage for a confrontation that would long preoccupy forest 
officials.
To promote long-term teak production, Brandis not only
controlled teak extraction under the contract system. He also
devised a simple but effective method by which a forest
official could estimate the number of teak trees in a given
area. As Stebbing relates, the 'linear valuation survey'
excelled by its simplicity.
The trees along certain lines, roads, ridges, 
streams, or lines chosen across country, are counted, 
classified according to their girth, and ticked off 
on small pieces of bamboo, split into thin strips, 
each of which is again notched into ten pieces, which 
can be turned down one by one. Different pieces are 
carried for the different classes of trees. This 
device is extremely useful in a country like Burma, 
where on account of rain or dew it is often difficult 
to use a pocket-book.17
When combined with calculations as to the growth rate of
teak, moreover, the linear valuation survey formed the basis
of the first scientific working plans.18 These plans, in turn,
enhanced the ability of the Department to control teak
extraction.
16 Dietrich Brandis, Indian Forestry (Woking: Oriental 
University Institute, 1897), 33.
17 E.P. Stebbing, The Forests of Indiar vol. 1 (London: 
John Lane for the Bodley Head, 1922), 368.
18 Ibid., 368-70; Brandis, "Report for 1856," 2-7.
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However, working plans formed part of a broader attempt 
to regulate all social and ecological processes that impinged 
on teak tracts. In part, this involved the repetitious 
clearance of jungle in order to promote optimal growing 
conditions for young teak. But indigenous practices were also 
regulated? and, shifting cultivators were the focus of 
particular concern.19 If, as Furnivall argues, the coming of 
Leviathan to British Burma was all about the enshrinement of 
law at the heart of political practice, then the Province's 
teak forests after 1856 were not exempt from that process.20 
Drawing on a legacy going back to Heifer, Brandis was 
critical of indigenous practices; but he actively sought to 
modify or end such practices by law. In this manner, the 
development of Leviathan and forest management went hand in 
hand.
In October 1856, the first Forest Rules were proclaimed, 
to be subsequently revised in 1859, extended to Tenasserim 
(but not Arakan), and finally incorporated in the India-wide 
legislation of 1865.21 In effect, forest rules were a
19 Brandis, "Report for 1856," 43-45.
20 John S. Furnivall, "The Fashioning of Leviathan: The 
Beginnings of British Rule in Burma", Journal of the Burma 
Research Society 29 (April 1939); reprint, ed. Gehan 
Wijeyewardene (Canberra: Department of Anthropology 
Occasional Paper, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, 1991).
21 The following discussion of forest rules refers to 
the "Rules for Preserving the Forests in Pegu (1856)," in 
Brandis, "Report for 1856," 62-65. See also idem, Rules for 
the Administration of Forests in the Province of Pegu 
(Rangoon: Pegu Press, 1859); "British Burma Forest Rules of 
1865," in idem, Memorandum on the Forest Legislation proposed 
for British India other than the Presidencies of Madras and 
Bombay (Simla: Government Central Branch Press, 1875), 53- 
57. The forests of Arakan were of limited commercial 
importance, and were administered by civil officials until 
the end of the nineteenth century, see A.H.M. Barrington,
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mechanism to transform the state's nominal ownership of the 
teak forests into an actively exercised proprietorial right. 
Those rules prohibited the unauthorized felling of teak (III- 
IV) , and also constrained non-teak timber extraction in teak 
areas (VI). Shifting cultivators were subject to special 
control (VIII-XI) . They were prohibited from cutting tauncrvas 
in areas containing more than fifty teak trees without 
Department approval. The infringement of these rules could 
result in a two hundred rupee fine or six months imprisonment 
(XX-XXI). Ironically, the rule with the greatest long-term 
impact, the provision for the creation of reserved forests, 
was not used before 1870 (XIII).22
At first, the forest rules had a minimal impact. In 
theory, forest administration was based on a three-tiered 
structure in which subordinates patrolled districts, 
Assistants managed divisions, and the Superintendent was 
responsible for general matters. In practice, Brandis 
experienced great difficulty in finding recruits for the 
superior staff and had to rely on civil officials in several 
divisions.23 However, with their regular duties, these 
officials had little opportunity to attend to forest matters. 
Indeed, they were not expected to visit the forests, but only
Forest Administration in the Arakan Forest Division (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1918).
22 During the 1860s several reserves were provisionally 
demarcated but never formally sanctioned as a result of 
divisions within the colonial state, see D. Brandis, 
"Suggestions regarding Forest Administration in British 
Burma, 1881," IFP (February 1881), 263; and below.
23 Dietrich Brandis, "Report on the Pegu Teak Forests 
for 1858-59," Selections from the Records of the Government 
of India (Foreign Department) 31 (1861): 14; idem, "Report on 
the Pegu Teak Forests for 1859-60," in Ibid., 90-91.
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to provide a general supervision from the towns. Moreover, 
such supervision was subject to the vicissitudes of civil 
administration. In Prome division, for example, between March 
1857 and April 1859 forest matters were the responsibility of 
no less than six Assistant and Deputy Commissioners.24 As a 
result of this high turnover, forest administration devolved 
largely upon the subordinate staff, subject only to the 
occasional visits of the Superintendent.
In many areas, forest administration was virtually 
synonymous with the actions of these mostly untrained and 
poorly paid subordinates. In 1858-59, the subordinate staff 
in Pegu consisted of 56 individuals, 8 of whom earned between 
15 and 40 rupees per month, but with the rest on 10 rupees 
per month.25 Under these conditions, it is not surprising that 
fraud and indolence were rife. Typically local men, 
subordinates were well-placed to profit from their posts - 
through the illegal sale of timber, for example. Yet, 
subordinates also did much useful work. If anything, the 
principal difficulty was sickness. In 1859-60, no less than 
four out of eight subordinates in the eastern Prome forests 
died while on duty.26
Brandis tried various means to remedy this situation. In 
1858, he proposed to obtain foresters from Germany but 
without success.27 To better supervise forest work, Brandis 
moved the Department's headquarters from Rangoon to the town
24 Brandis, "Report for 1859-60," 91.
25 Brandis, "Report for 1858-59," 15.
26 Brandis, "Report for 1859-60," 90.
27 Ibid., 91.
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of Myodwin, strategically located in the Tharrawaddy forests 
near the old royal highroad from Rangoon to Ava.28
The addition of the Tenasserim forests to Brandis' charge 
in 1857 was a new burden. However, by 1861 he was ably 
assisted in Pegu by Mr. Henry Leeds and Mr. William Seaton. 
It was a measure of the times that both men, although
succeeding to the top post of Superintendent (or
Conservator), were new to forestry. Leeds was formerly the 
Executive Assistant Commissioner of Prome, and Seaton was 
originally a member of the 23rd Madras Native Infantry.29 It
would not be until the 1870s that trained foresters began to
fill the ranks of the superior service.
Even with reliable assistants, Brandis was unable to do 
much more than regulate extraction and enforce the rules. 
Forest officials had little time to undertake reforestation 
work, for example, and a teak plantation started near Prome 
in 1857 was plagued by insufficient supervision and high 
costs.30
Ultimately, the Forest Department's future rested on its 
ability to create an economic surplus. Yet, to generate that 
surplus required time and resources. Between 1856 and 1862, 
revenue fluctuated wildly in a general context of increasing 
expenditure. As a result, the financial results were highly 
variable, with a deficit of 174,492 rupees in 1857-58 turning
28 Brandis, "Report for 1859-60," 76-78. The
headquarters was moved back to Rangoon in the early 1860s.
29 Ibid., 91; D. Brandis, "Report on the Teak Forests in 
Pegu and the Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces, 1860-61," 
Selections from the Records of the Government of India 
(Public Works Departments 35 (1862): 31.
30 Brandis, "Report for 1859-60," 89.
96
into a surplus of 241,925 rupees in the following year 
(Appendix D). In part, this fluctuation reflected climatic 
factors. Good rains, for example, facilitated the transport 
of logs to market. When this coincided with high prices at 
auction sales - as happened in 1858-59 - revenue was
dramatically boosted. These fluctuations also reflected the 
shifting balance between private harvesting and government 
extraction in the 1850s and 1860s which affected the rate of 
return on felled timber. Overall, in these early years the 
negligible surplus was "in no way adequate to the toil and 
anxiety the work has entailed".31
Gradually, though, additional assistants from civil and 
military service were hired, and by the time of his departure 
for India in 1862, Brandis had created a viable Forest 
Department. Forest rules were in place and increasingly being 
enforced. Teak extraction was under greater control than had 
been the case in Tenasserim, and a small (but growing) 
surplus was being produced. A start had even been made on 
teak regeneration. In aggregate, these measures signalled the 
advent of a new regime in the teak forests of colonial Burma.
Patterns of Control and Resistance
Following Brandis' departure, the Forest Department 
continued to extend its control over Burma's forests using 
the administrative procedures introduced between 1856 and 
1862. Working plans and forest rules were refined and 
strengthened, plantation work increased as the taunava
31 Ibid. , 68.
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forestry system was developed, and after 1870, reserved 
forests were created.
The best indication of the growing power of the Forest 
Department was the increasing scope and intensity of 
resistance to its activities. Reflecting the vicissitudes of 
Department control, resistance was quite complex, and 
reflected the techniques of everyday resistance and avoidance 
protest discussed in Chapter 1. For the purposes of this 
study, it is most convenient to link resistance to specific 
patterns of control. The attempt to control teak extraction 
earned the open opposition of the European timber merchants, 
but efforts to curtail shifting cultivation prompted an 
altogether different response. As the Forest Department began 
to regulate the non-teak forest sector, conflict erupted with 
Burmese peasants and timber traders.
Controlling Teak Extraction
The European timber traders were the earliest, and most 
vocal opponents of the Forest Department. As noted, the 
contract system was designed to exclude them. Instead, it 
promoted a class of indigenous foresters - "a kind of 
aristocracy" - instilled with the virtues of scientific 
forestry.32 Denied direct access to Pegu's forests, the 
European traders could only purchase teak at government 
auctions in Rangoon.
The European timber-trading community in mid-nineteenth 
century Burma was relatively unstructured and small-scale in
32 D. Brandis to A. P. Phayre, 9 November 1859, 
Selections from the Records of the Government of India 
(Foreign Department) 31 (1861): 149.
98
comparison with the teak industry in the early twentieth 
century.33 It was nonetheless a powerful opponent of the 
Forest Department. In certain cases, firms prominent at this 
time ceased operations in the 1870s with the end of the 
permit system. Gladstone Wyllie and Company and Bulloch 
Brothers, for example, were two Rangoon-based firms with 
important extraction permits in the Prome division in the 
1860s.34 The Burmah Company worked the Sittang forests, and 
was also engaged in ship building. However, the firm went 
into liquidation in the 1870s following revelations of 
extensive illegal logging by its employees.35 In contrast, 
other firms founded at this time later became the mainstays 
of the business.36 Steel Brothers, for example, was founded 
in 1870 by William Strang Steel who purchased teak extracted 
from the Salween and Prome forests. The Romanian 
entrepreneur, John Goldenburg, founded a business in 
association with John Darwood in 1860 that worked forests on
33 The timber trade was also "highly speculative" when 
compared with the rice trade, see J.S. Furnivall, "Safety 
First: A Study in the Economic History of Burma," Journal of 
the Burma Research Society 40 (June 1957): 29.
34 Ernest Andrews, The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation 
Limited in Burmah. Siam and Java, vol. 1, Teak: The Cutting 
and Marketing (n.p., 1930-31), 8; Conservator Leeds to
Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 11 December 1865, IFP 
(February 1866), 31.
35 B.R. Pearn, A History of Rangoon (Rangoon: American 
Baptist Mission Press, 1939), 211; Government of India 
(Department of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce) to the 
Marquis of Salisbury (Secretary of State for India), 22 
January 1875, India Forest Letters (henceforth IFL), no. 4 of 
1875; A. Mackenzie (Secretary, Government of India, Home 
Department) to Messrs. Gillanders, Arbuthnot and Company, 15 
August 1884, IFP (August 1884), 1331-33.
36 F . T . Morehead, The Forests of Burma (London: 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1944), 44-47; Alister McCrae, 
Scots in Burma: Golden Times in a Golden Land (Edinburgh: 
Kiscadale, 1990).
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either side of the Anglo-Burmese border, and which later 
became known as Macgregor and Company. Foucar and Company 
was founded in 1878 by the French Huguenot businessman, 
Ferdinand Foucar, and was based in Moulmein, as was T.D. 
Findlay and Son, which acquired a teak shipping firm about 
1850.
But the most important European trader was William
Wallace. Born in Scotland, Wallace first became involved in
the Burmese teak trade during the 1850s when he visited
Moulmein as part of a contract to supply the Indian railways
with fifteen hundred tons of timber.37 Soon thereafter, he
began to work the Ataran and Pegu forests, and with the
assistance of Commissioner Phayre, won a lucrative contract
with King Mindon of Burma to work the Ningyan [Pyinmana]
forests north of the Anglo-Burmese border in 1862. On the
basis of this contract, Wallace in conjunction with other
family members, as well as Indian financiers, started the
Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Limited (BBTCL) in the
following year.
It was Wallace who led the campaign by the European
timber traders to dismantle the government contract system.
In a vintage exposition of economic liberalism, he condemned
the Forest Department's entrepreneurial role as 'unnatural',
and not in keeping with the economic principles that had
brought Great Britain international fame and power.
Suffice it to say that the powers of nature so far 
transcend the powers of Government, that all such 
matters can be much more safely left to the operation 
of natural laws entirely, and that only very
37 A.C. Pointon, The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation 
Ltd.. 1863-1963 (Southampton: Millbrook Press, 1964), 3-6.
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primitive and unenlightened communities ever attempt 
to prescribe limits to their operation.38
If Wallace could hardly deny the role of private enterprise
in the depletion of Tenasserim's forests, he was nevertheless
quick to point out the failings of the new system. The poor
financial performance of the 1850s was adduced to Department
incompetence and over-regulation which unnecessarily
diminished both the quantity and quality of timber supplies.
In establishing the contract system, Brandis attempted to
exclude from the forests the capitalists that, in his view,
were unnecessary and destructive middlemen. Turning that
argument around, Wallace suggested that it was government
that was the unnecessary intermediary in the teak trade.
In advocating an end to government intervention, Wallace
promoted a permit system under which private enterprise would
girdle, fell and extract the trees of its choice subject to
a minimum set of rules, as in Tenasserim. For those not
convinced of the superiority of free enterprise, he observed
that teak exports could be easily monitored and taxed; logs
could be floated out, after all, by only a couple of routes.
Moreover, the assurance that offenders would be severely
punished if caught would keep permit holders within the law.
By giving up the contract system, and responsibility for
girdling every teak tree to be extracted, the Forest
Department would promote efficiency in the forests, and save
the taxpayer money.
In a clever twist, Wallace also argued that by
dismantling the contract system, forest officials would then
38 W. Wallace to Conservator Leeds, 19 July 1864, 
Progress Report of Forest Administration in British Burma 
(hereafter RFA) for 1863-64, 53.
101
be able to attend to their primary duty of forest 
conservation. By interfering in what was properly a business 
concern, Wallace alleged that the Department had been failing 
at that duty.
Conservancy has been hitherto merely a name - none 
of its duties have been performed...the forests have 
neither been conserved nor improved - whilst the 
Department has presented the lametable [sic] 
spectacle of a Government trading institution, 
eminently unsuccessful and disastrously obstructive 
to the prosperity of the Provinces.39
In this manner, a return to laissez-faire practices was
reconciled with forest conservancy in the form of the permit
system.
These arguments found favour with officials in India and 
Burma who were opposed to the exclusion of the European 
timber traders from Pegu's forests. It is a measure of the 
shrewdness of Wallace's argument that it even gained the 
support of certain forest officials, notably Conservator 
Leeds. This support reflected a growing frustration with the 
amount of time that was being devoted to business arising 
from the contract system. Advances had to be made in order 
that contractors could buy or rent elephants, and hire 
labourers, but in the process, forest officials assumed the 
risks and concerns associated with the lending business.40 
Concomitantly, those officials devoted less time to forest 
conservancy. It was in order to return to what they believed
39 Ibid., 56.
40 In 1864, the government had to write-off 6,113 rupees 
advanced to contractors. Leeds linked this loss to the 
failure of the contract system to develop a class of self- 
supporting capitalists, see Conservator Leeds to Secretary to 
the Chief Commissioner, 17 March 1864, IFP (June 1864), 124- 
25.
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the Forest Department was all about that officials such as
Leeds promoted the permit system.
This system...certainly offers every advantage to 
Government... one of its great advantages is that it 
relieves the forest department of all money advances 
and their concomitant evils which by it devolve upon 
the permit-holder. Every thing which relieves the 
department of work which may and can be legitimately 
performed by others, is so much gained in the cause 
of conservancy.41
With the contract system under attack even from within the
Forest Department, a change in policy was inevitable.
As the campaign to re-open the forests to private
enterprise gained momentum, Brandis was forced onto the
defensive.42 In February 1861, the Government of India ordered
Phayre to open the Pegu teak forests to the European timber
traders. With the support of the Chief Commissioner and the
Secretary of State for India in London, however, Brandis was
able to retain the key elements of the original system in the
most valuable forests. Whereas a large area of less important
forests (west of the Irrawaddy river) were let out on twelve-
year leases with permission to girdle, in more valuable
forests (such as the Sittang forests) permits of three or six
years were issued, but with forest officials responsible for
tree selection and girdling. In the best teak tracts of the
Tharrawaddy district, the Forest Department continued to
control all aspects of extraction through the contract
system.
41 Leeds in RFA for 1863-64, 12. Leeds also recommended 
that girdling and even reforestation work be done by private 
firms, see Ibid., 72-81; H. Leeds, "Memorandum," IFP 
(September 1870), Appendix.
42 Brandis, Indian Forestry. 33-35; "Correspondence
Regarding the Opening of the Pegu Forests to Private 
Enterprise," Selections from the Records of the Government of 
India (Public Works Departments 35 (1862).
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Subsequent efforts by Wallace to extend the permit system
were rejected by the Government of India.43 Indeed, by 1867,
senior officials in India were beginning to question the
merits of the permit system itself.
Since 1862-63 the contract system has yielded a 
considerably larger net revenue per ton of timber 
than the permit system. Thus, with regard to 
financial results, the permit system does not appear 
to be preferable... as regards the interests of 
conservancy also, the permit system does not appear 
to be preferable to the contract system in British 
Burmah.44
However, it was the discovery of illegal extraction in the 
Sittang valley in 1871 that led to the demise of the permit 
system. An official enquiry revealed that lease holders had 
illegally girdled or felled 9,707 teak trees.45 In some cases, 
they had done so in connivance with local forest officials.46 
At the behest of Chief Commissioner Ashley Eden, the
43 Government of India to Secretary of State for India, 
26 July 1864, IFP (July 1864), 204. This decision was 
confirmed by London, see Secretary of State for India to the 
Governor-General of India, 25 January 1865, Selections from 
Despatches to India (henceforth SDI), (1865), 43.
44 C.H. Dickens (Secretary, Government of India, Public 
Works Department) to Chief Commissioner, 8 May 1867, IFP (May 
1867), 204-5. Between 1862-63 and 1865-66, the government 
received 10.9 rupees per ton for contractor's timber as 
compared with only 6.8 rupees per ton for permit-holder's 
timber, see Conservator Leeds to Secretary to the Chief 
Commissioner, 11 February 1867, IFP (May 1867), 200.
45 The principal lease holder involved in this
controversy was the Burmah Company. However, the BBTCL was 
also implicated, and its permit in the region was cancelled 
in 1872, see H. Carter, Working Plan of the Kabaung Reserve 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1895), 4; see also Annual
Report of the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Limited for 
1872-73, 5.
46 Including the European forester W.C. Graham who was 
subsequently dismissed, see RFA for 1872-73, 9-18; B.H, 
Baden-Powell, The Forest System of British Burma (Calcutta: 
Government Printing, 1873), 67-69; W.S. Oliphant (Secretary 
to the Chief Commissioner) to Secretary, Government of India 
(Public Works Department), 19 June 1872, IFP (September 
1872), 631-42.
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Government of India ordered the discontinuance of the permit 
system in August 1874; and, with the expiry of the last lease 
in 1877, virtually all of British Burma was once more under 
the contract system.47 Concomitantly, total extraction 
declined from a peak of 57,086 tons in 1870-71, to only 
17,585 tons in 1879-80, before once more resuming an upward 
climb in the 1880s (Table 3.2). Private enterprise was 
readmitted to Pegu's teak forests during the 1880s, but only 
on a limited scale, and subject to strict supervision.
TABLE 3.2
TEAK PRODUCTION BY EXTRACTION AGENCY, 1858-84 
(Selected Years; Amounts in Tons)
Year Forest Dept License Holder Total
1858-59 20,462 — 20,462
1862-63 16,369 19,530 35,899
1866-67 9,793 21,756 31,549
1870-71 22,765 34,321 57,086
1874-75 16,393 21,517 37,910
1879-80 16,240 1,345 17,585
1883-84 3 4,404 3,200 37,604
Source; RFA (selected years).
If the events of the 1870s led to the end of the permit 
system, developments after 1886 in relation to the BBTCL 
Upper Burma leases restored the basic pattern of the 1860s 
at an all-Burma level. Private harvesting occurred in certain 
areas (albeit subject to much greater supervision), and
47 Government of India (Department of Revenue, 
Agriculture and Commerce) to the Marquis of Salisbury 
(Secretary of State for India), 4 August 1874, IFL, no. 14 of 
1874; Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General of 
India, 19 November 1874, SDI (1874), 91; H.R. Spearman, The 
British Burma Gazetteer, vol.l (Rangoon: Government Press, 
1880), 118; Resolution of the Chief Commissioner (hereafter 
Resolution), RFA for 1877-78, 3.
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Department extraction was the norm in other forests. This 
arrangement was a feature of forest administration during the 
remainder of the colonial era.
Curtailing Shifting Cultivation
As the Forest Department asserted control over the teak 
forests, it also came into conflict with shifting cultivators 
who made hill clearings in these areas. In many respects, 
these cultivators were a greater obstacle to scientific 
forest management than were the European timber traders. 
Ostensibly weak, they resorted to covert resistance that was 
none the less effective for all its surreptitiousness.
To understand why shifting cultivators were opposed to 
the Forest Department is to appreciate the social and 
ecological conditions of taunaya cultivation. In essence, 
such cultivation is a type of dry agriculture that combines 
various techniques - partial forest clearance, shallow 
cultivation, multiple cropping, and field rotation - to 
produce food and cash crops.48 With an extensive network of 
hills, Burma has been home to an array of groups practising 
diverse forms of shifting cultivation? but in the formulation 
of colonial forest policy, there was a tendency to simplify
48 J.E. Spencer, Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern 
Asia (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1966); Karl 
J. Pelzer, "Swidden Cultivation in Southeast Asia: 
Historical, Ecological, and Economic Perspectives," in 
Farmers in the Forest: Economic Development and Marginal
Agriculture in Northern Thailand, ed. Peter Kunstadter, E.C. 
Chapman and Sanga Sabhasri (Honolulu: University Press of 
Hawaii, 1978), 271-86.
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this complexity by lumping together disparate practices under 
the all-encompassing term, 'taunqya'.49
As forest officials sought to protect Pegu's forests, 
they were scarcely concerned with the ecological and ethnic 
nuances of shifting cultivation. Attention centred on the 
teak-bearing Pegu Yoma where a sparse, and predominantly 
Karen population cleared fields on an annual basis.50 As 
fields were rotated to make maximum use of the soil's 
nutrients, temporary villages were built and then relocated 
in accordance with the taunqya cycle. More than the itinerant 
nature of this lifestyle, what amazed colonial observers the 
most was the Karen's complete disregard for the teak tree. 
Although living amidst one of the world's richest teak 
tracts, the hill Karen made little use of the wood, building 
their homes entirely of bamboo; and their occupations were 
"altogether unconnected with an article which is the source 
of wealth and industry everywhere, but in the place where it 
is produced".51 Scattered in small settlements throughout the 
hills, they were only partly integrated into the political 
economy of the valley peoples.
As colonial officials discovered, the hill Karen refused 
to trade their lifestyle for a more settled life on the
48 Tao Hai, "Some Notes on the Taungya Problem in the
Shan States," Indian Forester 39 (August 1913); 364.
50 In 1876, Karen in the Tharrawaddy and Prome hills 
numbered about five thousand individuals, D. Brandis, 
Suggestions Regarding Forest Administration in British Burma 
(Calcutta: Government Printing, 1876), 10-11.
51 J. McClelland, "Report on the Southern Forests of 
Pegu," Selections from the Recopds of the Government of India 
(Foreign Department) 9 (1855): 13.
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plains.52 In part, cultivators may have feared increased 
vulnerability to the predations of powerful political and 
economic groups which such a move might have implied. At the 
time, the British were still newcomers to Pegu and a 
relatively unknown quantity. There were no guarantees, 
moreover, that the British would stay, or that Burmese rule 
might not be reimposed at a later date. From this 
perspective, relative financial deprivation was a small price 
to pay for the greater security provided by the hills to 
which they were accustomed.
Hill Karen resistance was also linked to religious and 
cultural issues. In keeping with their animist faith, 
cultivators submitted to a carefully codified personal and 
communal regime designed to propitiate the divine nats 
(spirits) that were deemed to control most aspects of human 
life. Indeed, so strong was the fear of these nats r that 
fields were cleared and houses built only under auspicious 
circumstances, and special ceremonies marked by the beating 
of great bronze drums were held in their honour.53 In a world 
populated by mostly malevolent spirits, the tenacity with 
which Karen resisted changes to their lifestyle must be seen 
in part as a quest for spiritual redemption.
Forest officials knew or cared little about this 
spiritually sanctioned way of life. If hill Karen were
52 RFA for 1863-64, 9.
53 Harry I. Marshall, The Karen People of Burma: A Study 
in Anthropology and Ethnology (Columbus: Ohio State 
University, 1922), 63-64, 76-78, 115-26; idem, "Karen Bronze 
Drums," Journal of the Burma Research Society 19 (April 
1929): 1-14; Donald Mackenzie Smeaton, The Loyal Karens of 
Burma (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench and Co., 1887), 88; J. 
Nisbet, Burma under British Rule and Before. 2 vols. 
(Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1901), 1: 323-24.
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haunted by the belief that virtually every natural object 
was inhabited by a divinity in need of propitiation, the 
Forest Department feared an altogether more secular 
phenomenon: the destruction of the teak forests through
unchecked shifting cultivation.
Chapter 2 noted that criticism of shifting cultivation 
was already becoming prevalent in early colonial Burma. In 
later years, that criticism grew as forest officials became 
better acquainted with the extent of taunqya practices. 
Although it was periodically acknowledged that hill clearings 
did not inevitably lead to the elimination of teak, it was 
nevertheless a tenet of forest officials that they were a 
threat to forest conservancy.54 Given that the commercial 
maturation of teak (up to 150 years) took much longer than a 
typical taunqya rotation (10-20 years), unrestricted shifting 
cultivation was seen to threaten Pegu's forests as surely as 
unfettered free enterprise had done in Tenasserim. It was 
also believed that such cultivation resulted in soil erosion, 
flooding and localized drought.55 For many, taunqya practices 
were a great evil to be stamped out.
The Forest Department used various means to restrict 
shifting cultivation in teak tracts. Financial inducements 
to leave those tracts proved ineffective, but systematic 
interference in hill Karen society obtained better results. 
In pre-colonial times, cultivators paid annual imposts to
54 Brandis, "Report for 1856," 31-34; Baden-Powell, 
Forest System. 11; Nisbet, Burma under British Rule. 2: 60; 
H.W.A. Watson, "Taungya Cutting," Indian Forester 34 (May 
1908): 265.
55 RFA for 1870-71, 5; RFA for 1874-75, 17; Nisbet,
Burma under British Rule. 2: 60, 63-64.
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specially-appointed Burman myo-wun (governors).S6 Under the 
British, these imposts continued in the form of capitation 
and taunqya taxes, but were collected with greater 
efficiency.57 An even greater source of anxiety to the hill 
Karen was the prospect of prosecution for the breach of 
forest rules. As noted, cultivators found guilty of the 
destruction of teak could be fined or imprisoned. Since teak 
was scattered throughout those areas in which fields were 
cleared, forest officials could safely assume that wherever 
taunqyas were located, so too would be evidence of teak 
destruction.
Moreover, the hill Karen had no recourse to the law for
protection as shifting cultivation was not considered by the
colonial state to confer a prescriptive right to the soil. To
have acknowledged taunqya practices in such a manner would
have jeopardized state forest control.
If anything of the kind were recognised, there would 
hardly be a square mile of forest in these Yoma
hills, which could not be claimed by some Karen
family or other...the theory of any occupancy rights 
being acquired by these erratic and temporary
clearings of the forest is quite untenable.55
As a result, shifting cultivators were no longer as safe from
the exactions of the state under the British as they had been
under monarchical rule.
Hill Karen resistance to the Forest Department took many
forms. For those in close proximity to the Burmese or Siamese
frontiers, there was always the option of flight. In the
56 Cady, History of Modern Burma. 31, 42-43.
57 These taxes were six rupees per individual per year, 
see Conservator Seaton to Chief Commissioner, 27 September 
1869, RFA for 1869-70.
58 Brandis, Suggestions, 11.
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1860s, Karen reportedly moved from Tenasserim into Siam for 
this reason.59 In certain cases, cultivators cleared fields 
and girdled teak trees along the border, only to slip into 
Siamese territory at the approach of a forest official.60 
Groups that were unable or unwilling to flee resisted in 
other ways:
cases have occurred where through fear of punishment 
for breaches of rules, a whole village have gone off 
and cleared every teak seedling on a neighbouring 
Toungyah when they heard a Forest Officer was 
approaching.61
Cultivators in the Tharrawaddy district in 1859 circumvented 
the intent of the fifty trees rule by clearing a series of 
adjoining fields, none of which were found to contain fifty 
or more trees.62 When forest officials investigated such 
cases, hill Karen typically refused to cooperate. In Prome, 
such obstructiveness thwarted the course of justice; out of 
76 cases involving teak destruction in 1869-70, 67 could not 
be prosecuted for want of evidence, and in only 6 cases were 
convictions obtained.63 Non-cooperation extended to other 
aspects of forest administration. Topographical survey 
parties, for example, encountered passive resistance from 
Karen who were "adverse to rendering any assistance".64 In
59 RFA for 1865-66, 6. Although such protest is 
difficult to document, many civil officials were convinced 
that 'stringent7 forest rules were to blame, for example see 
Resolution, RFA for 1868-69, 1.
60 RFA for 1879-80, 45-46; RFA (Tenasserim) for 1881- 
82, 4.
61 RFA for 1866-67, 24.
62 Brandis, "Report for 1860-61," 26-27.
63 RFA for 1869-70, 7.
64 RFA (Pegu) for 1884-85, 7.
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many areas, cultivators pleaded ignorance of the forest 
rules. This tactic was initially quite successful as it 
played on the Forest Department's reluctance to unnecessarily 
alienate these forest dwellers.
This resistance nevertheless had its limits. As forest 
officials increased their presence in teak areas in the 
1860s, taungya-related offenses became the most commonly 
reported breach of the forest rules.65 The colonial state was 
able to intervene in the hills as the pre-colonial state was 
never able to do, and the threat of prosecution for 
violations of the forest law was a perennial reminder of that 
power.
Recrulatina Non-Teak Forest Use
If the assertion of state forest control engendered an 
early reaction from European timber traders and shifting 
cultivators, this simply reflected their close association 
with the teak forests. For groups that used the forests for 
other purposes, the advent of British rule initially 
decreased regulation as forest officials focused on teak 
management.
Chapter 2 noted that the pre-colonial state taxed various 
forest products in addition to teak, including timber and 
non-timber produce. If teak was probably a less important 
source of revenue to the Burmese kings (prior to the 1860s at 
least) than it was to the British, the taxation of forest
65 RFA for 1863-64, 2; RFA for 1867-68, 27; RFA for
1868-69, 15.
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produce other than teak was of greater importance to the 
Burmese state than it ever was to colonial officials.66
For this reason, colonial forest policy was initially of 
little concern to Burmese peasants and timber traders. With 
the exception of teak, no restrictions were placed on the 
subsistence or commercial use of forest produce. Rejecting a 
proposal made by Conservator Leeds in 1866 to regulate non­
teak timber extraction, Chief Commissioner Phayre warned that 
such a move would only "produce general alarm and 
discontent".67 In part, Phayre's response reflected a 
misconception, popular among colonial officials at the time, 
that villagers traditionally enjoyed free access to non-teak 
forest produce. More importantly, in a context of ongoing 
political unrest, the government was reluctant to introduce 
unpopular measures that would complicate the consolidation of 
colonial rule in Pegu.
With only a limited staff, the Burma administration was, 
in any case, in no position in the 1850s and 1860s to enforce 
such measures. If the Forest Department had difficulty 
controlling the teak trade, it could scarcely be expected to 
manage the larger, and more complex non-teak forest sector.
66 Prior to 1880, colonial forest revenue derived almost 
entirely from teak sales. In the 1920s, teak still accounted 
for 70 per cent of the total receipts, see Dietrich Brandis, 
"The Burma Teak Forests," Garden and Forest 9 [1895]: 12; 
Great Britain, Indian Statutory Commission, Memorandum 
submitted by the Government of Burma to the Indian Statutory 
Commission 11 (London: H.M.S.O., 1930), 55,
67 Resolution, RFA for 1865-66, 2. In rejecting Leed's 
plan, C.H. Dickens reiterated the need for caution, see C.H. 
Dickens (Secretary, Government of India, Public Works 
Department) to Chief Commissioner, 25 August 1868, IFP 
(September 1868), 255; see also Secretary of State for India 
to the Governor-General of India, 15 November 1867, SDI 
(1867), 127.
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By the 1870s, however, that situation had begun to change. An 
expanded, and increasingly professional forest service was 
better equipped than before to restrict popular forest 
access. Gradually, forest policy became more than simply the 
control of teak extraction.
To appreciate the impact of this change, it is necessary 
to take a closer look at the non-teak forest sector in mid- 
nineteenth-century British Burma.68 As a durable and long- 
lasting wood, teak or kyun (Tectona grandis) was used for 
construction (monasteries, houses, boats) and other purposes. 
But the utility of teak must not obscure the value of other 
species. Indeed, by the 1860s, the relative scarcity and high 
price of teak was "everyday bringing other kinds of timber 
more prominently into general local use".69 Multi-purpose 
timbers such as padauk (Pterocarpus macrocarpus), in 
fDipterocarpus tuberculatus), thinoan (Hopea odorata ^ , 
thitkado (Cedrela toona^, ovinma ILaaerstroemia flos- 
reoinae^, kanyin (Dipterocarpus alatus/turbinatus) and 
pyinkado fXylia dolabriformis1 were used in the construction 
of houses, carts and boats (Appendix B). Bamboo was in great 
demand for conversion into mats, umbrellas, fences, lacquer 
ware, fishing traps, and in the case of poor villagers, 
houses. The forests were also the source of firewood, 
charcoal, rope, resins, dyes, fruit and intoxicants.
The use of forest produce was conditioned by religious 
and cultural practice. As with the animist hill Karen, many
68 Nisbet, Burma under British Rule. 2: 205-304; Shway 
Yoe [J. George Scott], The Burman: His Life and Notions
(1882; reprint, Edinburgh: Kiscadale, 1989).
69 RFA for 1865-66, 26.
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Burmese Buddhists only built houses under auspicious
astrological conditions. Even the selection of timber to be
used in the construction of houses was carefully considered:
Posts are masculine, feminine, and neuter. Male posts 
are of equal size at both ends? females are larger at 
the base; those which swell out in the middle are a- 
thet ma-shi - without life; taing bilu, ogre's posts 
are largest at the top. As a general rule it may be 
taken for granted that if a house is built with 
neuter posts, its inmates will always be miserable 
and unlucky; if the posts are ogres, death and 
disaster will attend; male posts are easy-going and 
harmless; females, on the contrary, are fortunate and 
leading to honour... [moreover] the presence or 
absence of knots, and if the former, their position, 
determines the luck of the householder.70
Such considerations affected the nature and extent of timber
extraction. The quest for 'auspicious' timber may even partly
explain the wasteful practices of Burmese wood-cutters so
often decried by colonial officials.
Forest use was also influenced by market conditions. Even
before the economic changes of the late nineteenth century,
the non-teak forest sector was becoming commercialized. Thus,
traders were already extensively employed in the 1860s
collecting forest produce for plains villagers.71 These
traders extracted timber and bamboo from accessible low-
lying forests, but also worked the Pegu Yoma forests.72
Transported by river and cart road to the plains villages,
forest produce was often then sold to artisans for the
70 Shway Yoe, The Burman. 76-77.
71 RFA for 1865-66, 26-27? RFA for 1866-67, 17-18? RFA
for 1868-69, 2.
73 RFA for 1868-69, 2. Wood-oil (used in torches) was 
collected from as far afield as Mergui, see J. Butler, 
Gazetteer of the Mergui District (Rangoon: Government Press, 
1884), 32-33.
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manufacture of everything from boats and carts to umbrellas 
and lacquerware.
Social and economic changes under British rule spurred 
the commercialization of forest use. As forests were cleared 
for agriculture, and as the population of Lower Burma 
expanded, the non-teak forest sector was affected in various 
ways. Forest clearance reduced or even eliminated local 
supplies, which then had to be obtained from further afield, 
increasing the dependence of peasants on traders. Migration 
from various parts of Burma and India boosted the demand for 
agricultural implements, carts and boats. Conservator Leeds 
noted in 1866 that the value of boats had trebled within two 
years "owing chiefly to the increased cultivation of rice," 
even as the number built had jumped: in Toungoo alone, from 
200 boats in 1862-63, to 400 boats three years later.73
If the colonial state facilitated such development, it 
also restricted popular forest access in two ways. With the 
creation of the first reserved forest in May 1870, the Forest 
Department began an enclosure campaign that reduced popular 
access in teak and other areas. Free access to meet local 
subsistence needs was usually provided for in forest 
settlements, but reservation was nonetheless a highly 
divisive process. Enjoined to reduce "general claims to 
something definite and tangible," Forest Settlement Officers 
encountered much opposition.74 Whereas peasants permitted to 
obtain produce from the reserves objected to the detailed 
restrictions associated with such access, timber traders and
73 RFA for 1865-66, 26-27.
74 B.H. Baden-Powell, A Manual of Jurisprudence for 
Forest Officers (Calcutta: Government Printing, 1882), 190.
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those whose claims were rejected protested their exclusion 
from these forests. If the reserved area increased only 
gradually at first, reserves still covered 1,410 square miles 
in 1878-79 (Appendix C).
The Forest Department also limited popular access to 
selected species even outside reserves. In 1873, thitkado 
and thitka (Pentace burmanica) were proclaimed reserved 
trees, and three years later, another twelve species were 
added to the list.75 These trees could only be cut with the 
appropriate permit, but once again, an attempt was made to 
differentiate between subsistence needs and commercial 
extraction. Whereas the former was dealt with through free 
permits, the latter required the purchase of trade permits.
The new restrictions were vigorously opposed by peasants 
and traders alike. Everyday resistance to species reservation 
encompassed the illicit felling of reserved trees, and the 
emergence of a black market in free permits.76 As one official 
noted, "the practical result of giving people, living in the 
vicinity of the forests, their wood free, is to allow the 
timber merchants to extract a certain proportion of their 
season's wood free of tax",77 Alternatively, access 
restrictions were avoided altogether through the use of 
unreserved species. In certain districts this practice was so 
widespread that trade in reserved species virtually ceased; 
in general, peasants preferred "to utilize trees of other
75 Brandis, Suggestions. 25-26? B. Ribbentrop, "Special 
Report on the Working of the Revenue Notifications Nos. 33 
and 34 of 8 March 1876," RFA for 1876-77.
76 Ribbentrop, "Special Report," 6-8.
77 Ibid., 28,
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kinds rather than go to the myooke to obtain a free permit".78 
Resistance to the creation of reserved forests, as Chapter 5 
shows, included illegal extraction and grazing, the use of 
fire in prohibited areas or seasons, and incendiarism.
If the reservation of forest land was primarily designed 
to promote long-term teak production, the reservation of non­
teak species was guided by diverse considerations. Forest 
officials were often as critical of the practices of Burmese 
traders and peasants, as they were of shifting cultivators. 
Such criticism partly reflected a concern that these groups 
were eliminating species of considerable export potential.79 
There was also the question of foregone revenue. In 1866, 
Leeds suggested that taxing the non-teak trade would "add 
considerably to the revenue of the Department without any 
increase of expenditure".80 As Conservator Berthold Ribbentrop 
noted, such a move would "only give the state a legitimate 
revenue, which at present enriches individuals who have no 
particular claim whatever to it".81 In the 1870s, the 
assertion of state forest control was expressed in new ways. 
In the process, it provoked popular resistance that would 
dominate forest politics in later years.
78 RFA (Pegu) for 1880-81, 19; see also RFA (Tenasserim) 
for 1876-77, 11; RFA for 1879-80, 5; Nisbet, Burma under
British Rule. 2: 57.
79 Baden-Powell, Forest System. 13-14; Brandis,
Suggestions r 20; Ribbentrop, "Special Report," 25, 38;
Nisbet, Burma undey British Rule. 2: 56.
80 RFA for 1865-66, 26.
81 RFA for 1874-75, 25.
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Toward Cooperation: The Case of Taunava Forestry 
If the Forest Department restricted popular forest 
access, it also promoted new patterns of cooperation. 
Earlier, it was noted that Brandis sought to create an 
indigenous class of foresters. However, the most concerted 
attempt to win the support of forest users concerned the hill 
Karen. Control of the teak forests may have required the 
restriction of taunava practices, but it also convinced 
Brandis that shifting cultivation might be turned to 
advantage.
In 1856, Brandis had encouraged cultivators to sow teak
with their rice and cotton crops after noting the beneficial
effect of taunavas on young teak in the Prome district. He
predicted that
the teak, as it generally germinates after several 
months, will not impede the growth of their crops, 
and will greatly profit, both by the fertilizing 
effect of the ashes, and also by the clear ground 
during the first year after the harvest has been 
removed, which may permit it to make such progress 
as to enable it to compete successfully with other 
trees and bushes. This system, if it should succeed, 
may perhaps even be extended to Toungyas in other 
districts.82
After the experiment succeeded, the Department sought to 
introduce taunqya forestry on a systematic basis. As noted, 
however, the hill Karen refused to alter their lifestyle; 
and, it was this stance that was the source of their initial 
refusal to participate in the reforestation scheme. Karen in 
Tharrawaddy district approached by Lieutenant (later 
Conservator) William Seaton in 1863 were strongly opposed to 
a system that would gradually undermine their relatively
82 Brandis, "Report for 1856," 45-46.
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independent lifestyle by converting cultivable areas into
reserved forests from which they would be excluded.
[Karen headmen] openly admit that they look upon the 
sowing of teak in their 'yas' as taking the bread 
from the child's mouth. All that they urge to prove 
this is true enough. Every one is aware of the fact 
of their returning to the same localities to cut yas 
after a lapse of from 10 to 15 years.83
To overcome such opposition, forest officials 
alternatively enticed and compelled Karen compliance. In lieu 
of a fine for violation of the forest rules, cultivators were 
required to plant teak in their clearings.84 At the same time, 
forest officials rewarded voluntary participation. Benefits 
included tax exemption, payment of ten rupees per planted 
acre, and the provision of designated lands for the Karen's 
own use. In 1868-69, a Karen village in the Mokka-Beeling 
reserve (Tharrawaddy division) agreed to plant teak in their 
taungyas. and more soon followed, attracted primarily by the 
promise of land.85 Table 3*3 shows the growth of taunqya 
plantations in comparison with conventional Department 
plantations.
83 RFA for 1863-64, 9.
84 RFA for 1869-70, 16-17; RFA for 1872-73, 7; RFA
(Pegu) for 1884-85, 15; RFA (Pegu) for 1887-88, 3.
85 W. Seaton, "Report on the Conservancy and Management 
of the Forests of British Burma," Government of India, Copy 
of Enclosures of Forests Despatch from the Government of 
India, no. 14 (Calcutta: Government Printing, 1874), 31; RFA 
for 1872-73, 7; Secretary of State for India to the Governor- 
General of India, 26 October 1876, SDI (1876), 112.
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TABLE 3.3
GROWTH OF TAUNGYA VERSUS DEPARTMENT PLANTATIONS 1868-86 
(Selected Years; Amounts in Acres)
Year Taungya Plantations Dept Plantations
1868-69 >100 717
1873-74 500 2,287
1875-76 1,050 2,743
1878-79 2,194 3 ,339
1880-81 3,587 3 ,544
1882-83 5,131 3,585
1885-86 10,318 3,746
Source: RFA (selected years).
There were two phases to reforestation efforts during the 
years 1868-86. Prior to 1878, the Forest Department divided 
its resources fairly evenly between taungya and departmental 
plantations. If the former expanded more rapidly, the latter 
still covered a larger area in 1878. After 1878, the 
situation changed dramatically. Whereas departmental planting 
came to a virtual halt, taunqya plantations increased nearly 
five-fold in area between 1878 and 1886. Moreover, this trend 
continued until after the turn of the century.
Such dramatic growth was partly a question of cost. 
Whereas taunava plantations cost 12 rupees per acre in 1874- 
75, Department cultivation using coolie labour came to 21 
rupees per acre.86 By 1880, the total outlay on the latter had 
reached 300,689 rupees, while expenditure on the former was 
only 24,932 rupees, leading the Government of India to 
recommend the wholesale extension of the taunava forestry 
system.87
86 Resolution, RFA for 1874-75, 4.
87 C. Grant (Secretary, Government of India, Home, 
Revenue and Agriculture Department) to Chief Commissioner, 9 
November 1880, RFA for 1879-80, 2.
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However, the advantages of cheap Karen labour extended
far beyond planting work. As taunqya plantations and Karen
areas were situated within reserves (after 1877) , cultivators
were available for other tasks such as tree girdling and fire
protection. In their role as fire fighters, for example, the
hill Karen helped to prevent fires from entering the
reserves. Although the cultivators themselves could be a
source of conflagration, particularly when they cleared their
fields in the dry season, they were nevertheless adept in the
art of fire prevention and control.88
The development of taungya forestry was also conditioned
by political considerations. Specifically, forest officials
sought to win over potentially hostile hill Karen at a time
of general political unrest. Torn between a desire to enforce
the forest rules, and a concern to establish control of the
forests, these officials had to tread a fine line in their
relations with shifting cultivators. As Conservator Leeds
warned in 1867:
discretion and management will do more than all the 
terror which can be spread in the country. No one 
can judge of the mischief which people inimical to 
a Department which must, in a manner, be an unpopular 
one, can effect without being discovered.89
The Forest Department was thus anxious to eliminate areas of
conflict that threatened to turn "useful coadjutors into
powerful enemies”.90
Taunqya forestry was politically important in another
sense too. To understand why, its promotion must be situated
88 RFA for 1874-75, 11.
89 RFA for 1866-67, 24.
90 RFA for 1867-68, 28.
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in the broader context of British efforts to obtain the 
allegiance of Burma's ethnic minorities, and particularly the 
Karen. Although economically and culturally differentiated, 
many of the Karen in southern Burma shared a long-standing 
antipathy toward the numerically more populous Burmans. 
Serving as guides for the British army in the first and 
second Anglo-Burmese wars, Karen went on to play a 
significant role in the administration of colonial Burma.91
They were particularly important in the forest sector. 
As noted, Karen were prominent in the teak industry as 
government contractors and mahouts. Members of this ethnic 
group also joined the Forest Department; in Tenasserim they 
formed the backbone of the subordinate staff.92 By 
incorporating disparate cultivators into an organized system 
of forest conservancy, taungya forestry encouraged such 
cooperation, transforming the Karen "from an antagonistic 
nuisance to forest conservancy into the most loyal servants 
of the Department".93
The example of taunqya forestry illustrates that the 
Forest Department was not insensitive to the importance of 
local support in its efforts to manage the forest resource. 
Yet, as this chapter has shown, such support was rarely 
forthcoming. The transition from laissez-faire to scientific
91 The ethnic implications of colonialism in Burma are 
discussed in Robert H. Taylor, "Perceptions of Ethnicity in 
the Politics of Burma," Southeast Asian Journal of Social 
Science 10 (1982): 7-22; see also idem, State in Burma. 100- 
102; Cady, History of Modern Burma. 140-41, 317.
92 RFA (Tenasserim) for 1882-83, 4-5; RFA (Tenasserim) 
for 1884-85, 4.
93 B. Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India (Calcutta: 
Government Printing, 1900), 193.
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forestry was opposed by European timber merchants. But it was 
also resisted by Burmese peasants, shifting cultivators and 
timber traders.
The reasons for such opposition are not hard to find. As 
introduced by Brandis in 1856, scientific forestry was based 
on the assertion of state forest control primarily (but not 
exclusively) in order to promote long-term teak production. 
Such control was not new in Burma - the pre-colonial state 
had regulated a range of activities. What was new, however, 
was the comprehensiveness of the control attempted, as well 
as the actual ability of the state to pursue its objectives.
During the years 1856-81, the Forest Department asserted 
control over diverse forest users. In the process, it became 
a resource manager. But its ability to manage the forests was 
still relatively limited in 1881. It would not be until the 
early twentieth century that forest officials would have the 
requisite resources to attempt a comprehensive 
rationalization of forest activities. Yet, the developments 
discussed in this chapter set the future course of colonial 
forest politics. Patterns of control and resistance were 
established that hardly changed in subsequent decades.94
94 Of the transformation of British Burma between 1861- 
85, Furnivall writes: "It is hardly too much to say that
everything that happened after 1885 up to the introduction of 
constitutional reforms in 1923, or even up to the time of the 
Japanese invasion, was merely a development of conditions 
already in existence in 1885." Until 1923 (but not
thereafter), this statement is generally correct with regard 
to the forest sector. Furnivall is mistaken, however, in
thinking that "the working of the forests passed from Burmans 
and Karens to foreign firms," during these years. If
anything, the demise of the permit system in the 1870s was an 
opportunity for enhanced forest work by indigenous traders 
under the contract system. Teak extraction was only
concentrated in the hands of the European firms at the turn 
of the century. See Furnivall, "Safety First," 35.
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Later the thesis returns to this question of control and 
resistance in describing colonial forest politics in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, in the 
next chapter, the concern is to delineate the administrative 
changes and bureaucratic politics that defined the nature and 
objectives of state forest control.
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CHAPTER 4
DEFINING STATE FOREST CONTROL:
COLONIAL DEBATES AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
As the Forest Department asserted control over the 
forests, the delineation of rights and responsibilities 
became imperative. Chapter 3 suggested that patterns of 
control provoked widespread resistance as European timber 
merchants, as well as Burmese peasants, shifting cultivators 
and timber traders, challenged state forest control. This 
chapter describes the administrative changes and bureaucratic 
politics that shaped the development of such control.
There were three distinct, but interrelated components to 
this process. First, the Forest Department was differentiated 
from the other branches of government. This was achieved by 
the requirement that new recruits have a forestry training as 
a prerequisite for entry to the superior service. Secondly, 
the relationship between civil and forest officials was 
clarified in an attempt to eliminate inter-departmental 
conflict. Finally, the parameters of state forest control 
were established through a comprehensive definition of forest 
rights that was embodied in a revised legal code.
These changes did not occur without conflict as differing 
departmental interests were promoted. The consultations and 
debates of the 1870s did not completely resolve these 
differences. However, they did establish a modus vivendi 
between civil and forest officials that permitted, the^  
elaboration of forest administration in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century.
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Recruitment and Change in the Forest Department
The change that had the most profound impact on forest 
management was also the most gradual. The conversion of the 
Forest Department into a specialized branch of government 
with unique recruitment practices did not occur overnight. 
But the emergence of a professional forest service was 
nonetheless crucial to subsequent forest politics in Burma. 
If forest officials were at first drawn from civil and 
military ranks, by the end of the nineteenth century such 
inter-departmental mobility had ended. Later recruits were 
the product of a rigorous education based on the tenets of 
scientific forestry. In the twentieth century, forestry had 
become an established vocation, and career mobility was 
synonymous with promotion through department ranks.
Yet, the Forest Department owed its origin to a group of 
non-foresters. As noted, Brandis was a botanist (albeit, with 
a working knowledge of forestry), and his first assistants 
were civil and military officials. But as forest 
administration became more complex, the need for trained 
foresters grew. Developments in India only confirmed that 
need. With the creation of the Indian Forest Department
(1864), and the passage of the India Forest Act (1865), the 
Government of India devoted greater attention to forest 
issues. It thus became imperative that policy be implemented 
by professionals.1 To this end, Brandis obtained the approval 
of Lord Cranborne, the Secretary of State for India in 1865, 
to recruit two German foresters, and while on European
1 Government of India (Public Works Department) to the 
Secretary of State for India, 19 September 1868, India Forest 
Letters (henceforth IFL), no. 10 of 1868.
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furlough, he selected Dr. William Schlich and Mr. Berthold 
Ribbentrop.2 Respectively of the Hesse-Darmstadt and Hanover 
forest services, these two men succeeded Brandis to the post 
of Inspector-General of Forests during the last two decades 
of the nineteenth century. In the process, they strengthened 
the German influence on forest policy in the British-Indian 
empire. As in Dutch-ruled Java, British officials in India 
were hindered by the backwardness of forestry in their native 
country, and had little choice but to turn to Germany (and 
France) for assistance.3
This backwardness had other implications for recruitment 
policy. When he hired Schlich and Ribbentrop, Brandis also 
arranged for the training of English candidates for the 
Indian forest service in the forest schools of France and 
Germany. At the time, there were no such facilities in 
Britain. In 1867, seven candidates commenced study in Europe, 
and in December 1869, the first graduates arrived in India.4 
By 1886, ninety-five men had been trained in this manner, a
2 Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General 
of India, 14 September 1866, Selections from Despatches to 
India (henceforth SDI), (1866), 56; D. Brandis to H. Merivale 
(Under Secretary of State for India), 23 October 1866, India 
Forest Proceedings (henceforth IFP), March 1867, 81; 
Government of India (Public Works Department) to the 
Secretary of State for India, 11 April 1867, IFL no. 10 of 
1867; Dietrich Brandis, Indian Forestry (Woking: Oriental 
University Institute, 1897), 48-49.
3 Brandis, Indian Forestry. 6-11, 21; R.S. Troup,
"Forestry in India," Calcutta Review 273 (July 1913): 305, 
312; Peter Boomgaard, "Forest Management and Exploitation in 
Colonial Java, 1677-1897," Forest and Conservation History 36 
(January 1992): 11; Nancy Lee Peluso, "The History of State 
Forest Management in Colonial Java," Forest and Conservation 
History 35 (April 1991): 69.
4 W.F. Perree, "Indian Forest Administration," Asiatic 
Review 23 (April 1927): 251; Robert K. Winters, The Forest 
and Man (New York: Vantage Press, 1974), 281.
128
number of whom later became prominent in Burmese forestry.5 
But, in a context of growing European rivalry, this 
dependence on France and Germany could not be sustained for 
long. Indeed, the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71) disrupted 
training, and led to its centralization in France in 1874.6 
Ten years later, a national forest school was opened at 
Coopers Hill in Surrey where students undertook a three-year 
course of study in scientific forestry.7 As part of that 
programme, they were also required to spend several months 
attached to a forest division in Germany in order to gain 
practical experience. By the early twentieth century, 
forestry was taught at Oxford (1905), Cambridge (1913) and 
Edinburgh (1915). In aggregate, these developments 
represented a recognition by the British government of the 
necessity of employing trained men so as "to guard against 
the ruin of one of the most important sources of national 
wealth, if the care of the forests were left to ignorant 
persons" .B
5 B. Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India (Calcutta: 
Government Printing, 1900), 227.
6 H. Cleghorn, "Memorandum on the Continental Training 
of Indian Forest Officers," IFP (April 1884), 999-1000.
7 The School was directed throughout its twenty year 
existence by Schlich who gave up the Inspector-Generalship in 
1885 for this purpose. Following the School's closure in 
1905, Sir William was appointed Professor of Forestry at 
Oxford (1905-19), and continued to influence forestry in 
Britain until his death in 1925.
0 Parliamentary Return on Forest Conservancy, Part I, 
India, 1871, 404, cited in Brandis, Indian Forestry. 49; see 
also Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General of 
India, 15 November 1867, SDI (1867), 126-27; Secretary of 
State for India to the Governor-General of India, 6 October 
1869, SDI (1869), 152.
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If the full impact of these changes was not immediately 
felt in Burma, the addition of Schlich and Ribbentrop 
presaged future developments. Both men served in the country, 
and as Pegu's Conservator in the 1870s, the latter was 
particularly influential in the introduction of a system of 
reserved forests. Combining scientific rigour with attention 
to local botanical conditions, Schlich and Ribbentrop were in 
many respects the prototype of the new forest official.
However, these officials arrived in Burma to find an 
administration beset by instability. As the following table 
shows, the turnover of forest officials prior to 1870 was 
very high.
TABLE 4.1
TURNOVER OF FOREST OFFICIALS IN BRITISH BURMA,
1841-70
Status No. of i
Transferred to India 10
To another Department 3
Died 9
Resigned 6
Dismissed 3
Retired 3
Remained in service 2
Not Given 6
Total 42
Source: "Papers Relating to the History of Forest
Administration in Burma from 1827-1870," Burma Forest 
Proceedings (June 1891), 6-7.
Note: Forest officials here include Conservators, Deputy and 
Assistant Conservators, and Sub-Assistant Conservators.
This instability was partly due to the routine practice of 
moving foresters between provinces as part of the promotion
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process. About one-quarter of the staff was affected in this 
manner.
But other factors were also important. If foresters who
obtained a transfer to another department, resigned, or were
dismissed, contributed significantly to departmental turnover
(29 per cent), it is the death rate which nonetheless stands
out. As a result of a generally unhealthy climate, Burma
earned a well-deserved reputation among foresters as a
dangerous posting. As Table 4.1 indicates, 9 men out of 42 -
or more than 21 per cent of the total staff - died while in
service.9 Exposure to malaria, and other tropical diseases
accounted for this relatively high rate.10 Moreover, for every
forester that died, there were many more incapacitated. As
Conservator Leeds noted in 1866:
the absence and sickness among the Officers is 
becoming very much felt in operations where 
experience is required, for the details of the 
working of the Department are not at once easily 
mastered by strangers who have to be employed for a 
time.11
9 In 1881, it was noted that sixteen forest officials 
had died in the previous eighteen years during or shortly 
after leaving Burma. Assuming an annual average staff of 12 
forest officials during this period, the death rate was 7.4 
per cent per annum. See G.D. Burgess (Secretary to the Chief 
Commissioner) to Secretary, Government of India (Home 
Department), 8 July 1881, IFP (May 1882), 998.
10 Cf. Michael Adas, "Colonization, Commercial 
Agriculture, and the Destruction of the Deltaic Rainforests 
of British Burma in the Late Nineteenth Century," in Global 
Deforestation and the Nineteenth-Centurv World Economy, ed. 
Richard P. Tucker and J.F. Richards (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1983), 107; Philip D. Curtin, Death by
Migration: Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in the 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 95.
11 Progress Report of Forest Administration in British 
Burma (hereafter RFA) for 1865-66, 28.
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Understandably, many men sought a transfer to more congenial 
areas of the empire.
Poor pay and inadequate staffing levels were additional 
reasons to leave the Burma forest service. Notwithstanding 
a rising forest surplus (Appendix D), the Department was 
denied what it felt was the minimum increase in staff and 
pay that was required to keep up with its expanding 
activities. In May 1876, the Government of India refused to 
transfer additional staff to Burma, and suggested instead 
that the Conservator "contract his operations".13 Three years 
later, the Chief Commissioner rejected a fresh proposal from 
Ribbentrop on the grounds that he recommended an increase in 
pay and staff "for which there was no necessity".13 Reviewing 
this situation, Brandis noted that forest officials in Burma 
were payed less than their counterparts in the police, even 
though only the former required special training. Not 
surprisingly, morale was low, and many foresters shared a 
"strong desire...either to be transferred to India, or to 
another Department in the province".14
However, the arrival of an increasing number of recruits 
from Europe in the late nineteenth century contributed to a
12 A.0. Hume (Secretary, Government of India, Department 
of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce) to Chief Commissioner, 
23 May 1876, IFP (July 1876), 236.
13 Resolution of the Chief Commissioner (henceforth 
Resolution), RFA for 1878-79, 8.
14 D. Brandis, Suggestions Regarding Forest
Administration in British Burma (Calcutta: Government
Printing, 1876), 22; see also G.D. Burgess (Secretary to the 
Chief Commissioner) to Secretary, Government of India (Home 
Department), 8 July 1881, IFP (May 1882), 999; Government of 
India (Department of Finance and Commerce) to the Earl of 
Kimberley (Secretary of State for India), 10 November 1884, 
IFP (November 1884), 1753.
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new esprit de corps. Moreover, as forest administration was 
elaborated, additional posts were sanctioned on an 
incremental basis (Table 4.2).
TABLE 4.2
GROWTH OF THE SUPERIOR SERVICE,
1861-85
Position 1861 1874 1885a
Conservator 1 1 2
Deputy Conservator 3 3 12
Assistant Conservator 3 11 7
Total 7 15 21
Sources: W. Seaton, "Report on the Conservancy and Management 
of the Forests of British Burma," Government of India, Copy 
of Enclosures of Forests Despatch from the Government of 
India 14 (1874), 4, 6; B. Ribbentrop, Forestry in British
India (Calcutta: Government Printing, 1900), 81.
a. Burma and the Andaman Islands
Between 1861 and 1885, the superior service trebled in size, 
thereby permitting an extension of state forest control. To 
facilitate such control, moreover, European recruits were now 
also expected to undergo Burmese language training. 
Proficiency in Burmese was first examined in 1876, and 
successful candidates were awarded either a higher or lower 
standard; in 1878, although no officials had passed in the 
higher standard, 5 Assistant Conservators and 1 Sub-Assistant 
Conservator were awarded the lower standard.15 If, in the 
past, forest officials had often through sheer necessity 
learned the rudiments of Burmese, the new system formalized
15 Resolution of the Government of India (Department of 
Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce), 6 February 1877, IFP 
(February 1877), 31; Indian Forester 4 (January 1879): 298- 
315.
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that process, and made minimal proficiency a prerequisite for 
promotion and bonuses.16
The new recruitment procedures also effectively barred 
Burmese from entering the superior service. A racial division 
of labour was thus instituted that would only begin to break 
down in the late colonial period. If the 'superior7 staff 
included several German and Dutch officials, Burmese 
foresters were confined to the 7subordinate7 service.17
To be sure, an Imperial Forest School for the training 
of indigenous students as Rangers and Sub-Assistant 
Conservators was created at Dehra Dun in India in 1878. 
However, there was virtually no prospect of promotion from 
these positions. A parallel education system was thereby 
established: British candidates were educated in Europe for 
the senior posts, and Indian and Burmese recruits were 
trained at Dehra Dun for the subordinate positions. As E.C. 
Buck, Secretary to the Government of India, noted in 1888: 
"At present, there does not exist in India the means of
16 Government of India, Code of Instructions for the 
Conduct of Office Business and for the Regulation of Accounts 
in the Forest Department (Calcutta: Government Printing,
1886), 16, 20.
17 In theory, subordinates could be appointed Assistant 
Conservator. But only foresters who had completed five year's 
service as a Sub-Assistant Conservator were eligible. 
Moreover, those officials would only be promoted if trained 
(ie. European) recruits were unavailable. See Government of 
India, Code of Instructions. 8. Burmese promotion to the 
senior echelons was thus effectively ruled out. This change 
was regressive in so far as one Burmese forester (Maung Poh 
Oh) had attained the rank of Assistant Conservator by 1870 
upon instructions from the Government of India. See 
Government of India (Public Works Department) to Chief 
Commissioner, 14 June 1869, IFP (August 1869), 201; RFA for
1872-73, 12, 48.
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training men so as to qualify them for direct appointment to 
the Upper Controlling [ie. Superior] Staff".18
From a Burmese perspective, the location of the School 
in India was an added deterrent to further education. Men 
were typically reluctant to leave family and friends behind 
in Burma for the duration of the two-year course. It was not 
until 1899 that a vernacular forest school was established in 
the country for the training of Rangers and Foresters. At 
first located in the Tharrawaddy district, it was moved in 
1910 to the Pyinmana forests on the north-eastern edge of the 
Pegu Yoma. As in India, however, the objective was to provide 
a practical education for subordinates not destined for 
senior posts.19
If the superior service was separated from the 
subordinate staff by virtue of training and race, a de facto 
division also developed among Burmese foresters based on 
training and class. Comprised of Rangers and Sub-Assistant 
Conservators, the 'executive' service supervised the work of 
Foresters and Forest Guards (the 'local' service). Although 
men were promoted from the local to the executive service, 
particularly in the early years, the expansion of the Forest 
Department in the late nineteenth century led to a hardening 
of the boundaries between these two services. Whereas 
Foresters and Forest Guards were generally illiterate local
18 E.C. Buck to Revenue and Agriculture Department, 
Circular 9F, 2 June 1888, Burma Forest Proceedings 
(henceforth BFP), (June 1888), 7.
19 J. Nisbet, Burma under British Rule and Before. 2 
vols. (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1901), 1: 247;
'E.B.', "The New Burma Forest School at Pyinmana," Indian 
Forester 37 (August 1911): 421-24; R.S. Wilkie, Yamethin
District Gazetteer (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1934), 87- 
88.
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men, Rangers and Sub-Assistant Conservators were literate, 
and required special training. The latter were predominantly 
townsfolk - the sons of merchants and government officials - 
but the better-educated youth of the large country villages 
were also represented in executive ranks.20
In this manner, forest officials were differentiated by 
education, experience, class and race. Whereas Foresters and 
Forest Guards protected the forests in their local watershed 
or 'beat', Rangers and Sub-Assistant Conservators undertook 
the more complex tasks of reservation, extraction and 
regeneration. The superior staff supervised the work of 
subordinates. In reality, the chain of command was not always 
so straightforward, and varied depending on illness, unfilled 
positions and the relative economic importance of a forest 
division. In general, the less important the division, the 
greater the delegation of responsibility.
The Forest Department continued to grow in size and 
complexity after the turn of the century. However, by the 
1880s, its basic structure was established. More than 
anything else, that structure was premised on the distinction 
between European and Burmese foresters. Barred from the 
senior posts, the latter earned a reputation for dishonesty 
and indolence. Conservators noted that subordinates failed to 
perform assigned duties, fabricated reports, defrauded the 
government of revenue and extorted money from forest 
offenders.21 Even long-standing employees would "suddenly 
submit to the temptation to misappropriate revenue or accept
20 'E.B. ' , "Burma Forest School," 421.
21 RFA (Pegu) for 1876-77, 10; RFA (Pegu) for 1882-83, 
8? RFA (Pegu) for 1883-84, 47-48.
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bribes".22 If such conduct was often attributed to the
'inferior' class of person employed by the Department, it was
also acknowledged that work conditions left much to be
desired. As Conservator Seaton noted in 1873:
fever is generally so prevalent that natives rarely 
enjoy immunity from its attacks for two seasons
successively, a matter which is not to be wondered 
at. . .with the distances to be traversed through heavy 
Forest, poor diet, and difficulty of obtaining good 
shelter at every point visited.23
Poor pay exacerbated the plight of subordinates. In 1873, 
Foresters often earned less than an ordinary coolie.24
Subsequently, their pay was increased: from 10 rupees per 
month to 15-20 rupees per month in 1875-76. Concurrently, 
Forest Guards were established on a scale of 12-14 rupees 
per month.25 Notwithstanding these changes, the subordinate 
staff, and particularly the lowest paid local service,
remained a perennial source of trouble for colonial
officials.
In a sense, the development of the Forest Department in 
the nineteenth century was about adapting bureaucratic growth 
to the requirements of a specialist agency. In itself, this 
growth was unremarkable in a general context of state
22 RFA (Pegu) for 1880-81, 24. The senior Burmese 
forester Assistant Conservator Poh Oh, was a case in point. 
Appointed to that post in 1869 after eleven years of 
'exemplary' service, he was dismissed in 1875 because of an 
involvement in illicit girdling operations in the Thaungyin 
forests, see Conservator Ribbentrop to Secretary to the Chief 
Commissioner, 6 September 1875, IFP (December 1875); A. 
Fraser (Secretary to the Chief Commissioner) to Secretary, 
Government of India (Public Works Department), 5 June 1869, 
IFP (September 1869), 334.
23 RFA for 1872-73, 48.
24 B.H. Baden-Powell, The Forest System of British Burma 
(Calcutta: Government Printing, 1873), 44.
25 Brandis, Suggestions. 20.
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expansion.26 What was noteworthy, however, was the nature of 
that growth, as recruitment was geared to the creation of a 
senior cadre of professionals versed in scientific forestry.
At the same time, that development was subject to the 
vagaries of colonial administration and finance. Classified 
as a 'quasi-commercial' department, the Forest Department 
was a lucrative source of revenue that was the source of 
inter-governmental bargaining. At first, that revenue accrued 
entirely to the Government of India, and the budget of the 
Forest Department was framed in India.27 Concomitantly, forest 
administration was directed from Calcutta under the 
successive control of the Foreign, Public Works, Revenue and 
Agriculture, and Home Departments.28 It was in this context of 
central control that the Indian Forest Department was 
created, and Brandis appointed the first Inspector-General of 
Forests in 1864.
Beginning in the 1870s, financial and administrative 
power was decentralized as an incentive to provincial 
governments to increase revenue and curb expenditures. Under 
the provincial contract system, the Government of Burma was 
granted a share in selected heads of revenue. In terms of 
forest revenue, that share was set at one-sixth in 1878, but
26 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (London: C. 
Hurst, 1987), chap. 2.
27 Shein, Myint Myint Thant and Tin Tin Sein, 
"'Provincial Contract System' of British Indian Empire, in 
Relation to Burma - A Case of Fiscal Exploitation," Journal 
of the Burma Research Society 52 (December 1969): 3; 
Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India. 135.
28 If routine administration was left to the Chief 
Commissioner, the Government of India reserved the right to 
"intervene generally," see Government of India (Public Works 
Department), Circular no. 4, 22 March 1864, IFP (May 1864), 
125-27.
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four years later, was raised to one-half - a ratio that 
remained unchanged until the early twentieth century.29 As the 
Government of Burma gained a direct financial interest in 
forest revenue, the Burma Forest Act (1881) delegated 
immediate control of the Department to the Chief 
Commissioner.30 If operational control rested in Burma, the 
broad parameters of forest administration, including the 
appointment and pay of the superior staff, continued to be 
determined in India and England.31
One effect of these new arrangements was to encourage 
greater continuity in Burma's superior service. As part of 
the devolution of powers, a separate Burma List was 
established on which promotions were henceforth based, and 
transfers to other provinces below the rank of Conservator 
were discouraged.32 If Burma continued to serve as a 'nursery' 
for India's Conservators and Inspector-Generals,33 it 
nevertheless became standard for forest officials to spend
29 Shein, Burma's Transport and Foreign Trade 1885-1914 
(Rangoon: Department of Economics, University of Rangoon, 
1964), 201. The Government of Burma assumed full control over 
forest revenue in 1911.
30 Burma Forest Act 1881 (Rangoon: Government Press, 
1884), nos. 5, 29, 31, 35, 37; Brandis, Indian Forestry. 46.
31 Government of India, Code of Instructions. 2-6; B.H. 
Baden-Powell, A Manual of Jurisprudence for Forest Officers 
(Calcutta: Government Printing, 1882), 409; Ribbentrop,
Forestry in British India, 137.
32 The separate Burma List was needed partly in order to 
give forest officials serving in 'unhealthy' Burma "better 
prospects of promotion," see Government of India (Department 
of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce) to the Marquis of 
Salisbury (Secretary of State for India), 19 October 1876, 
IFL no. 32 of 1876.
33 Anonymous, "Promotion in the Forest Department," 
Indian Forester 15 (January 1889): 9-10. Of the first ten 
Inspector-Generals, seven had first served in Burma.
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most, if not all, of their professional lives in the 
Province. By the turn of the century, the Forest Department 
had been transformed from a small group of untrained civil 
and military officials into a large professional 
organization.34 But, as the Forest Department grew, it came 
into conflict with civil officials apprehensive of its 
increasing power.
Reconciling Forest and Civil Administration
If forest administration in colonial Burma was a process 
of bureaucratic growth and professional development, it must 
also be situated in a broader context of efforts to reconcile 
forest conservancy with other objectives, notably 
agricultural development. Forest policy was never devised in 
isolation from other political and economic objectives. 
Rather, the social and economic importance of the forests 
ensured that civil officials took an active hand in their 
management. Subsequent chapters examine the implications of 
this situation for specific policy issues. Here, the concern 
is to describe the general relationship between civil and 
forest administration as it developed in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century.
When Brandis established the Forest Department in 1856, 
he set in motion a process in which forest and civil matters 
came to be considered as distinct (if still interrelated) 
policy areas. Prior to that date, forest issues had been a
34 One indication of this change is to be found in the 
increasingly detailed and standardized procedure which forest 
officials were required to follow in their work regime, see 
Burma Forest Department, Departmental Instructions for Forest 
Officers in Burma (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1919).
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concern of civil officials. As noted, Captain Tremenheere 
introduced rules to halt the depletion of Tenasserim's teak 
forests in 1841. In the economically peripheral Arakan 
forests, the Commissioner placed restrictions on pvinkado 
extraction in 1863, and retained full control over forest 
matters until 1902.35
In contrast, forest officials swiftly asserted control 
over Pegu's teak forests. In doing so, they impinged on civil 
administration in two ways. First, in so far as forests had 
been an exclusively civil matter, the advent of the Forest 
Department entailed a transfer of authority that was much 
resented. Hitherto, the civil official held "sole control of 
all lands in his district, and the unoccupied lands were his 
chief means of conferring patronage".36 The arrival of the 
forest official ended such autonomy.
Secondly, Forest Department activities affected purely 
civil matters. Of particular concern to civil officials was 
the impact of the forest rules on agriculture. After 1852, 
the expansion of paddy cultivation in Lower Burma was a top 
priority of government, and the amount of forest converted 
to agriculture became "the recognised measure of a district 
[civil] officer's capability and tact".37 Moreover, the
35 W.S. Oliphant (Assistant Secretary to the Chief 
Commissioner) to Secretary, Government of India (Public Works 
Department), 24 November 1863, IFP (May 1864), 57-64; A.H.M. 
Barrington, Forest Administration in the Arakan Forest 
Division (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1918); E.P. Stebbing, 
"A Note on the Forests of Arrakan," Indian Forester 27 
(February, April-May 1901): 67.
36 C.F. Amery, "On the Relation Between District and 
Forest Officers," Indian Forester 1 (January 1876): 295.
37 Ibid; Adas, "Destruction of the Deltaic Rainforests," 
104-5.
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forests were needed for the manufacture of carts, boats and 
implements essential to the agrarian economy; restrictions 
on forest access were viewed by many civil officials as 
impediments to development.
The potential for inter-departmental conflict depended 
in part on the relative economic importance of the forest 
vis-a-vis alternative land uses. For example, forest 
officials by and large acquiesced in the conversion of the 
deltaic forests to permanent cultivation. In contrast, they 
imposed draconian restrictions on access to the teak forests 
of the Pegu Yoma, and civil officials rarely questioned the 
primacy of forest conservancy in these areas. Yet, this image 
of forest officials controlling the hills as civil officials 
regulated the plains is misleading. Just as teak, and other 
commercially important forests spilled onto the plains 
surrounding the Pegu Yoma, inviting the attention of forest 
officials, so too the growth of the non-teak forest sector in 
conjunction with agrarian development prompted a keen civil 
interest in the hill economy. In these areas, civil and 
forest interests could not be compartmentalized, but were 
part of a seamless web of agrarian and forest concerns.
It was the interlaced nature of those concerns that made 
cooperation as essential as it was problematic. Civil 
officials acknowledged that deforestation in Lower Burma was 
leading to a growing scarcity of forest produce.38 Yet, they 
were reluctant to introduce measures that might limit the 
general prosperity associated with nineteenth-century
38 Ashley Eden, "The Reorganization of the Forest System 
of British Burma," Government of India, Copy of Enclosures. 
5.
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agrarian development.39 Civil officials were also unwilling 
to surrender to forest officials the additional powers that 
the extension of forest rules in the plains forests 
inevitably implied.40 Conversely, most forest officials 
recognized the principle that agrarian development took 
precedence over forest conservancy in suitable areas. Yet, 
such development was often associated with the destruction 
of residual forests as land clearance led to unchecked timber 
extraction. The problem confronting civil and forest 
officials was, therefore, a complex one: to allow
agricultural expansion in selected areas, but not so as to 
damage the residual forest.
If accelerating deforestation made the need for rational 
decision-making more pressing, the expansion of civil and 
forest administration in the 1860s and 1870s encouraged the 
articulation of narrow department perspectives. The gulf 
between these perspectives was nowhere more evident than over 
the question of reserved forests. Under the Burma Forest 
Rules (1865), civil and forest officials were to cooperate in 
the demarcation of forest tracts.41 A forest official first 
inspected the tract and prepared a report that included 
information on local inhabitants, the reasons for reservation
39 RFA for 1873-74, 11.
40 Deputy Commissioner W.C. Plant (Myanoung) to 
Commissioner (Pegu), 12 February 1870, IFP (August 1870), 
507-8? Deputy Commissioner E.M. Ryan (Amherst) to 
Commissioner (Tenasserim), 9 October 1871, IFP (June 1872), 
320.
41 These rules were drawn up under the India Forest Act
(1865) see D. Brandis, Memorandum on the Forest Legislation 
Proposed for British India other than the Presidencies of 
Madras and Bombay (Simla: Government Central Branch Press,
1875), 57.
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and a map of the proposed reserve. The report was submitted
to the Deputy Commissioner for comment, who then forwarded it
through the Commissioner to the Conservator who in turn
attached his own remarks. Finally, the report was submitted
to the Chief Commissioner for final orders.
As the senior district official, the fate of the proposal 
often rested with the Deputy Commissioner. If this individual 
did not object to the proposed reserve, he was empowered to 
prohibit forest clearance pending the Chief Commissioner's 
decision.42 In practice, the Deputy Commissioner was often 
opposed to reservation, and was able to delay, or even halt, 
the proceedings.43 Forest officials denounced such 
obstructionism, and the lack of concern many civil officials 
showed for forest conservancy.44 But civil officials resisted 
forest reservation because they feared an erosion of their 
powers by a Forest Department which, "by its demands for 
absolute authority over the forests, has provoked the 
District Officials to the support of forest rights as against 
the Department11.45
Lacunae in the Forest Rules reinforced these fears. The 
Rules made no provision for popular access to reserves, based
42 Ibid.
43 Resolution of the Chief Commissioner, 10 May 1870, 
IFP (October 1870), 704-5; Conservator W. Seaton to Secretary 
to the Chief Commissioner, 18 November 1871, IFP (June 1872), 
322; A.O. Hume (Secretary, Government of India) to Chief 
Commissioner, 14 September 1872, IFP (September 1872), 593.
44 Amery, "Relation," 294-98; B.H. Baden-Powell, "Forest 
Conservancy in Its Popular Aspect," Indian Forester 2 (July
1876): 8-9.
45 Anonymous, "A Few Notes on 'Suggestions Regarding 
Forest Administration in British Burma' by D. Brandis," 
Indian Forester 2 (October 1876): 191.
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as they were on the assumption that it was possible "from the 
great mass of excess forest and waste, to set apart reserves, 
to be at the absolute disposal of the State, without 
interfering with the rights of the people".46 By the late 
1850s, this assumption was probably ill-founded. 
Subsequently, however, it became completely untenable as 
hundreds of thousands of migrants cleared Lower Burma's 
plains and delta forests. Not surprisingly, then, when faced 
with the prospect of outright land alienation, civil 
officials typically resisted the creation of reserves. The 
Forest Rules were also defective in that they made no 
provision for forest conservancy outside of 'Government 
Forests'.47 This omission led to the notification of much of 
the Province under this heading. If in the process a vast 
area was incorporated that was never intended for ultimate 
regulation,40 the legal definition of many low-lying areas as 
Government Forest only reinforced civil fears of a land grab 
by the Forest Department.
Moreover, the resolution of certain policy differences 
within the Forest Department only increased the likelihood 
of inter-departmental conflict after 1870. Previously, the 
Department had been divided over the best means of
46 Brandis, Suggestions r 15.
47 D. Brandis, "Memorandum on revision of Act VII of 
1865," IFP (December 1868), Appendix; A. Fraser (Secretary to 
the Chief Commissioner) to Secretary, Government of India 
(Public Works Department), 11 April 1870, IFP (August 1870), 
503.
48 B.H. Baden-Powell, "On the Defects of the Existing 
Forest Law (Act VII of 1865) and Proposals for a New Forest 
Act," in Report of the Proceedings of the Forest Conference r
1873-74. ed. B.H. Baden-Powell and J.S. Gamble (Calcutta: 
Government Printing, 1874), 13.
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guaranteeing future teak supplies. Whereas one group led by 
Conservator Leeds promoted plantations, another group under 
Inspector-General Brandis urged reservation of the best
tracts "to be converted gradually into more or less compact 
Teak Forests".49 In 1869, the latter prevailed with the
Government of India, and Leeds was replaced as Conservator 
by men (such as Seaton and Ribbentrop) who accepted the new 
policy.50 Although plantations continued to expand, 
particularly under the taunaya forestry system, the creation 
of reserves became the Forest Department's principal 
objective. As Brandis noted in 1876: "it is now acknowledged 
on all sides that the demarcation of permanent forest 
reserves is at present the most important work to be 
accomplished by the Forest Department in Burma".51
However, such work continued to be hindered by civil
officials, particularly when the proposed reserves were 
situated in populated areas. In 1875, Conservator Ribbentrop 
reported that the creation of fuel reserves had been blocked 
as "all such proposals which have been made from time to time 
have been annulled or ordered to be revised," and he
49 Brandis in RFA for 1865-66, 45-46; see also RFA for 
1866-67, 8; Secretary of State for India to the Governor-
General of India, 16 July 1868, SDI (1868), 109; E.P.
Stebbing, The Forests of India. vol.2 (London: John Lane for 
the Bodley Head, 1923), 194-95.
50 Leeds was transferred to Bengal where he served as 
Conservator until 1872. He was then demoted to the rank of 
Deputy Conservator for incompetence and sent to the Central 
Provinces. See A.O. Hume (Secretary, Government of India) to 
Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 5 October 1872, IFP 
(October 1872), 654-55.
51 Brandis, Suggestions. 1; see also Secretary of State 
for India to the Governor-General of India, 8 June 1871, SDI 
(1871), 115; Secretary of State for India to the Governor- 
General of India, 19 November 1874, SDI (1874), 90.
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attributed this to a "disinclination, on the part of the 
Civil authorities, to consent to the reservation of areas, in 
the midst of populated parts".52 Civil officials also held up 
reservation on a technicality. In the Thayetmyo region in 
1877-78, for example, they objected to various proposals on 
the grounds that "the prescribed procedure had not been fully 
carried out".53
Such foot-dragging extended to other areas as well. 
Chapter 3 noted how the Forest Department's efforts to 
regulate non-teak forest use in the 1870s provoked widespread 
popular opposition. However, such opposition was often 
strengthened by the actions of civil officials who objected 
to these restrictions. At first, forest and civil officials 
shared responsibility for the distribution of free and trade 
permits. Forest officials even required the Deputy 
Commissioner's approval before wood illegally extracted could 
be confiscated.54 In 1878, the Chief Commissioner issued 
revised rules to correct the 'misapprehensions' of civil 
officials who were "putting too liberal an interpretation on 
the scope and applicability of free permits"; and, in the 
case of species such as padauk that were becoming scarce, 
extraction came under greater Forest Department control.55 Two 
years later, however, Conservator Seaton reported that civil
52 RFA for 1874-75, 7, 9-10; see also RFA for 1873-74,
2-4.
53 RFA (Pegu) for 1877-78, 5.
54 B. Ribbentrop, "Special Report on the Working of the 
Revenue Notifications nos. 33 and 34 of 8 March 1876," RFA 
for 1876-77, 33-34; Nisbet, Burma under British Rule. 2: 57.
55 Resolution, RFA for 1877-78, 3-4.
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officials in Toungoo division had increased the number of 
free permits issued by nearly one-third in just one year.56
With the fiscal and legal changes of 1878-82, the Forest 
Department came under the immediate control of the Chief 
Commissioner. An attempt was then made to improve inter­
departmental relations by partially integrating civil and 
forest administration.57 Beginning in 1880, the divisional 
forest official became the assistant of the Deputy 
Commissioner, but retained a direct link with the Conservator 
on professional and accounting matters.58 The Deputy 
Commissioner was required to submit all forest correspondence 
to the Conservator, but was otherwise answerable only to the 
Commissioner. As with the latter, the Conservator was now 
responsible to the Chief Commissioner who had the final say 
on operational matters. More than ever before, the 
relationship between the Conservator and the Chief 
Commissioner set the general tone of forest management, as 
the interaction of divisional forest officials and Deputy 
Commissioners established the complexion of local forest 
administration.
These changes clarified forest-civil relations, but did 
not completely eliminate inter-departmental conflict. Forest 
and civil officials continued to dispute control in a number 
of policy areas. Nevertheless, the partial integration of
56 RFA for 1879-80, 32-33.
57 This move was in keeping with the wishes of the 
Secretary of State for India that "an intimate relationship" 
be achieved between civil and forest officials, see Secretary 
of State for India to the Governor-General of India, 15 
January 1880, IFP (March 1880), 127.
58 Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India. 95.
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forest and civil administration promoted greater cooperation 
which, in turn, facilitated forest reservation in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. But first, the
broader issue of forest rights had to be resolved.
Defining Forest Rights 
Forest politics in colonial Burma was all about the 
determination of forest access according to the law. As a 
result, the manner in which rights were legally defined had 
a direct impact on the nature of state forest control. In 
this section, the focus is on the decade-long debate over 
the definition of forest rights, and its resolution and 
embodiment in the Burma Forest Act (1881). For a brief period 
in the 1870s, colonial officials debated the basic principles 
of forest management that were to shape forest politics
during the remainder of British rule.
If these debates had an abstract quality about them, it 
was because they formed part of a process of legislative 
reform that culminated in the India Forest Act (1878), the 
Burma Forest Act (1881) and the Madras Forest Act (1882). 
Yet the issues that they addressed were anything but 
inconsequential for the millions of people in the British- 
Indian empire who depended on the forests for needed produce.
New legislation was needed to replace the inadequate 
India Forest Act (1865). In 1868, and again in 1869, a draft 
forest bill was circulated to the provincial governments, but 
a consensus was not achieved.59 In 1873, a conference of
59 Government of India (Department of Revenue,
Agriculture and Commerce) to the Marquis of Salisbury 
(Secretary of State for India), 28 September 1876, IFL no. 30 
of 1876.
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foresters at Allahabad examined the issue in detail.60 Two 
years later, Brandis prepared a memorandum on forest 
legislation that formed the basis of the India Forest Act 
(1878).61 In conjunction with these India-wide developments, 
Burma and other provinces were the subject of reports that 
dealt with their specific requirements. Reports by Baden- 
Powell (1873) and Brandis (1876) helped to structure the 
Burmese deliberations, and the detailed proposals which they 
contained formed the basis of the 1881 Act.62
If at first it appeared that Burma might be included in 
the 1878 legislation, the Province's unique position in 
imperial forest management ensured its treatment under 
separate legislation.63 Such legislation recognized Burma's 
distinctive social and ecological conditions. More 
importantly, the 1881 Act catered to the special 
administrative requirements associated with management of 
the Province's teak forests. Without a doubt, those forests 
were the jewel in the crown of Indian forestry, and revenue 
derived from their exploitation formed the largest share of 
the imperial forest surplus. Between 1889-90 and 1894-95, 
for example, the annual net revenue of Burma's forests 
amounted to 3,308,000 rupees or 45 per cent of the British-
60 B.H. Baden-Powell and J.S. Gamble, ed., Report of the 
Proceedings of the Forest Conference. 1873-74 (Calcutta: 
Government Printing, 1874); Brandis, Indian Forestryf 51.
61 Brandis, Memorandum.
62 Baden-Powell, Forest System; Brandis, Suggestions.
63 Government of India (Department of Revenue, 
Agriculture and Commerce) to the Marquis of Salisbury 
(Secretary of State for India), 28 September 1876/19 October 
1876, IFL nos. 30 and 33 of 1876.
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Indian total.64 The Government of India was thus only too
aware of the need to tailor legislation to Burmese needs in
order to maximize efficient resource extraction.
And yet, the general concern of both the 1878 Act and
the 1881 Act was with the definition of rights. Each act
aimed to distinguish, if not completely separate, state and
societal claims as a precursor to the full and unimpeded
commercial development of state forests. The determination
of rights and the reservation of forests was thus linked:
"the acquisition of more extensive rights by Government
within the demarcated area, against concessions made outside
its limits to the surrounding population11.65
It was the precise nature of that link that was debated
in the 1870s. With reference to India, Guha suggests that
three positions emerged on this issue:
The first, which we call annexationist held out for 
nothing less than total state control over all forest 
areas. The second, which one can call pragmatic, 
argued in favour of state management of ecologically 
sensitive and strategically valuable forests, 
allowing other areas to remain under communal systems 
of management. The third position (a mirror image of 
the first), we call populist. It completely rejected 
state intervention, holding that tribals and peasants 
must exercise sovereign rights over woodland.66
Although elements of all three positions were to be found in 
the Burmese debate, the Province's distinctive socio­
economic and ecological conditions ensured that the debate
64 Brandis, Indian Forestry. 42. In 1869-70, the net 
revenue was 39 per cent of the British-Indian total, see 
Government of India (Public Works Department) Circular no. 
5F, 11 March 1871, IFP (March 1871).
65 Brandis, Memorandum. 10.
66 Ramachandra Guha, "An Early Environmental Debate: The 
Making of the 1878 Forest Act," Indian Economic and Social 
History Review 27, 1 (1990): 67-68.
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would take a different course from that which took place in 
India.
Most evidently, the economic importance of Burma's teak 
forests was a powerful incentive for their intensive 
management. Although teak was found elsewhere, Burma was the 
principal source of the quality timber in European demand.67 
Yet, its distribution in the country's forests posed special 
management problems. Native to the mixed evergreen and 
deciduous forest, teak is only found scattered below an 
elevation of about three thousand feet, and in areas with a 
rainfall of 60-130 inches per year.68 Even in so-called teak 
forest, the tree rarely comprises more than 10 to 12 per cent 
of the total forest cover. Inevitably, the diffuse nature of 
these forests increased the costs of extraction and 
administration, and led forest officials to advocate 
extensive reservation.
Social factors also accounted for the distinctiveness of 
the Burma debate. The debate took place at a time when the 
development of an export-oriented agrarian economy was in 
full swing in Lower Burma. In a matter of decades, what 
Furnivall called the 'plural society' emerged: a society of 
individuals divided by language, religion, culture and
67 P.L. Simmonds, "The Teak Forests of India and the 
East, and Our British Imports of Teak," Journal of the 
Society of Arts 33 (February 1885): 345-55? R.S. Troup, The 
Silviculture of Indian Trees. vol.2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1921), 699-700.
68 D.J. Atkinson, "Forests and Forestry in Burma," 
Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 96 (1948): 483-84? and 
Appendix B.
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history.69 What is important here is less the precise nature 
of that society as the fact of its impermanence? it was in 
effect the antithesis of the 'traditional' society. The lack 
of a traditional society in late-nineteenth-century Lower 
Burma was in marked contrast to many areas of India, and this 
had important implications for the direction of the debate in 
Burma.
A brief comparison with the situation in Madras 
Presidency illustrates the point. It was no coincidence that 
the Madras government was "the most articulate spokesman for 
village interests in the controversy around the 1878 Act" for 
it ruled a territory that was densely populated, and which 
had a long tradition of communal forest ownership.70 In this 
setting, civil opposition to the new legislation flourished, 
and combined jealousy of the Forest Department, fear of 
popular discontent, and apprehension that the restriction of 
customary forest access would destabilize the agrarian 
economy.71 In contrast, and to the extent that it had ever 
previously existed, traditional communal forest ownership in 
Lower Burma was eliminated by the influx of Burmese and 
Indian migrants who transformed large areas of forest into 
paddy field. As noted, this did not stop civil officials from 
resisting the assertion of Forest Department control. Yet, 
in Lower Burma's plural society, their defense of traditional
69 J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A 
Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (1948? 
reprint, New York: New York University Press, 1956), 303-12.
70 Guha, "1878 Forest Act," 69.
71 Ibid., 70-72.
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access lacked authenticity, and may partly explain why the 
populist position was relatively unimportant in Burma.72
Rather, the annexationist and pragmatic positions, as 
championed by Baden-Powell and Brandis respectively, formed 
the focus of attention. Deputed by the Government of India 
in 1872 to investigate irregularities in the permit system, 
Baden-Powell used the occasion of his visit to make 
comprehensive recommendations on the reform of Burma's forest 
administration.73 In essence, he proposed a strategy of 
extensive reservation and restricted popular access. Burma's 
main teak tracts would become special reserves, but ordinary 
reserves would also be created in order to protect watersheds 
for climatic purposes, curtail 'barbarous' shifting 
cultivation, generate revenue, and 'religiously preserve' 
existing teak supplies wherever they were found. The Pegu 
Yoma, and even much of the surrounding plains forests, were 
implicated in Baden-Powell's scheme, reflecting the author's 
uncompromising belief in absolute state forest control.
That belief was also manifested in proposed limits on 
popular forest access. In what Guha calls a "legal sleight 
of hand," Baden-Powell claimed that all land that was not 
under actual cultivation belonged to the state, and access 
to such land was a privilege granted by the state, and not
72 Writing in 1871, for example, Deputy Commissioner 
A.G. Duff (Shwegyin) condemned the restriction of free forest 
access enjoyed by villagers throughout the colonial period 
and for "countless ages before," but lamely concluded that if 
these villagers were to be excluded from selected areas, they 
should receive compensation from the Forest Department, see 
Duff to Commissioner (Tenasserim), 23 September 1871, IFP 
(June 1872), 317.
73 Baden-Powell, Forest System.
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a legal right.74 There were "no such things as forest rights. 
properly so called, held by individuals or communities over 
any forests in British Burma”; rather, the state was the 
"unrestricted owner" of the forest and all that it 
contained.75 According to Baden-Powell, rights only existed 
where they had been expressly admitted in land settlements; 
otherwise, forest access was merely a privilege that could be 
modified or withdrawn at any time.76
If Baden-Powell7s proposal appealed to many forest 
officials, it received a much cooler reception among non­
foresters. In a letter to Chief Commissioner Ashley Eden in 
1874, Secretary to the Government of India A.O. Hume rejected 
a system of special and ordinary reserves in which popular 
access would be severely curtailed.77 Not only would such a 
complex system be impossible to enforce in practice, Hume 
also believed that it would only exacerbate state-peasant 
relations. Civil officials in Burma were also strongly 
opposed to the extensive access restrictions associated with 
the creation of ordinary reserves.78
74 Guha, "1878 Forest Act," 68.
75 Baden-Powell, Forest System. 50.
76 This argument is based on two linked assumptions. 
First, that in pre-colonial times, the sovereign owned all 
land that was not explicitly alienated, even if only in 
theory. Second, by right of conquest, the British inherited 
that ancient right. On this selective appropriation of 
tradition, see Guha, "1878 Forest Act," 68-69; Baden-Powell, 
Manual of Jurisprudence. 44-45, 48, 55-56, 62-63.
77 A.O. Hume to Chief Commissioner, 28 July 1874, 
Government of India, Copy of Enclosures. 2-3. Hume's decision 
was confirmed by the British government, see Secretary of 
State for India to the Governor-General of India, 19 November 
1874, SDI (1874), 90.
78 Ribbentrop, "Special Report," 23.
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As a result of such criticism, Brandis in 1876 outlined 
a simpler arrangement.79 Believing that Baden-Powell's system 
would result in reserves 'only in name', Brandis proposed one 
class of reserves that would embrace all teak tracts of 
sufficient size to merit long-term management. Outside these 
reserves, civil officials would enforce basic rules designed 
to protect selected species and regulate the timber trade. 
Few restrictions would be placed on popular access.
While upholding the state's right to manage Burma's 
forests, Brandis also insisted that customary forest access 
by settled agriculturists was a right, and not, as Baden- 
Powell believed, a privilege. Local needs not met from 
village forests could be accommodated through access to 
specified blocks within reserves in which definite rights 
would be enjoyed. In part, such liberality reflected Brandis' 
belief that extensive reservation in aid of commercial timber 
production would not "in any way" interfere with "the present 
requirements of the agricultural population".80
However, the same could not be said about shifting 
cultivators. As practised in the Pegu Yoma, shifting 
cultivation was very land intensive. In the Tharrawaddy and 
Prome hills alone, five thousand people required three 
hundred square miles to complete a twenty year field 
rotation.81 Moreover, such cultivation occurred in the most 
valuable forests. As a result, Brandis was adamant that 
shifting cultivation did not constitute a right: the Forest
79 Brandis, Suggestions.
80 Ibid., 8.
81 Ibid., 11.
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Department should feel free to take up "all valuable forest 
tracts, provided no actual settlements are 
included...deserted tounavas...may be taken up without 
prejudice to any one".82
It was partly because of this issue that Brandis opposed 
the extension of the 1878 Act to Burma. At first, Burma's 
Chief Commissioner had requested the application of that Act 
to the Province.83 But, with the support of his Department 
head, Alexander Arbuthnot, Brandis gained the approval of the 
Governor General to reconsider the issue in conjunction with 
the Chief Commissioner. Subsequently, a draft forest bill was 
circulated to civil and forest officials in Burma for 
comment.84 After extended discussion, the Government of India 
enacted the Burma Forest Act in 1881.
The Act was based largely on the 1878 Act, with, however, 
important modifications.85 Following Brandis, the 1881 Act 
prescribed one class of reserves in which only those rights 
explicitly recognized in settlement proceedings would be 
permitted, and even then, only when they were compatible with 
forest conservancy. Concurrently, unauthorized access was
82 Ibid.
83 Proceedings of the Council of the Governor General of 
India (hereafter Proceedings) 17 (1878): 130, 117.
84 G.D. Burgess (Secretary to the Chief Commissioner) to 
Secretary, Government of India (Home Department), 7 May 1880, 
IFP (October 1881), 1084-87. Civil officials were "very 
strongly opposed" to section 68 of the proposed Act which 
empowered junior forest officials to compound (ie. fine on 
the spot) forest offenses? they believed this clause would be 
liable to abuse. However, the Government of India insisted on 
its retention, see C. Bernard (Secretary, Government of 
India, Home Department), Office Memorandum, 20 May 1880, IFP 
(October 1881), 1087.
85 References are to the Burma Forest Act 1881.
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forbidden, and damage to the forests made subject to a stiff 
penalty: a five hundred rupee fine, six months imprisonment 
or both (XXVI).
Going beyond the Indian legislation, the 1881 Act also 
placed explicit limits on taunaya practices within reserves. 
Such practices were still permitted, but were subject to 
detailed regulation, and it was made clear that shifting 
cultivation did not constitute a right (XI). Although the 
Burma Land Revenue Act (1876) expressly declared that no 
rights accrued from shifting cultivation, the Chief 
Commissioner and the Forest Department sought to eliminate 
residual doubts on this matter through a re-statement of the 
principle in the context of the new piece of legislation.86
In unreserved forests, the primary objective was to 
protect reserved species and regulate trade. Yet, the Forest 
Department still had considerable power in these forests. It 
could regulate or prohibit fires, shifting cultivation, 
hunting and fishing, timber felling, pasturage, charcoal and 
lime burning, and cutch boiling (XXXVII). Moreover, avoiding 
the legal ambiguities of the 1878 Act, the Burma legislation 
made no provision for 'protected forests' or a statement of 
popular rights in unreserved forests. In part, this omission 
reflected the fact that fewer formal rights had accrued in 
Burma than in India. However, it also increased the Forest 
Department's flexibility over rights to these forests as it 
moved to reserve the best remaining teak tracts.87
86 Proceedings. 20 (1881): 199-200? Baden-Powell, Manual 
of Jurisprudence. 173, 177.
87 Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India. 111-12? 
Proceedings. 20 (1881), 4.
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The 1881 Act combined elements of the pragmatic and 
annexationist positions. The rights of settled agriculturists 
in the vicinity of reserves were selectively acknowledged, 
but those of shifting cultivators were formally denied. 
Brandis' proposal for the creation of one class of reserves 
was sanctioned, but the Act did not specify the ultimate 
extent of reservation. It expedited the assertion of Forest 
Department control, but did not place a limit on the scope of 
such control.
In effect, that limit was to be negotiated with the civil 
administration. As recommended by Baden-Powell and Brandis, 
civil officials were to control village forests in populated 
areas. More importantly, they also continued to exert an 
important influence over the creation of state reserves. In 
this respect, the difference between the 1878 Act and the 
1881 Act is instructive. Under the former, provincial 
governments in India had the power to convene a three member 
settlement committee, one member of whom could be a forest 
official, but who was in no way subordinate to the other 
committee members.88 In contrast, the 1881 Act provided for 
the appointment of a Forest Settlement Officer, but expressly 
stated that the individual should not ordinarily be a forest 
official. As Secretary to the Government of India A. Rivers 
Thompson observed during consideration of the Burma forest 
bill:
It was proposed that the chief officer to be 
entrusted with the duty should be in no way connected 
with the Forest Department; he might be a civilian or 
some other officer; and though a Forest-officer might 
be associated with such Forest-Settlement-officer in 
the investigation and record of all independent
88 Proceedings. 20 (1881), 3.
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claims and privileges, it was intended that he should 
always act in subordination to the Forest-Settlement- 
of f icer. 89
In this manner, cooperation between civil and forest 
officials was embedded in the 1881 Act.
However, such cooperation was not always forthcoming. 
Inter-departmental conflict persisted in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, albeit at a reduced level. The 
basis of such conflict remained rooted in differing 
programmatic interests. But it also reflected an important, 
if calculated, omission of the 1881 Act: the ultimate
reserved area was not specified. With large areas of Burma's 
forests as yet unexplored, forest officials were 
understandably reluctant to be precise on the matter. The 
almost inevitable result, however, was that as the Forest 
Department grew, and became more knowledgeable about the 
forests, it continually revised that total upwards. With the 
Government of India's approval, Brandis tentatively suggested 
a limit of 2000 square miles in 1874.90 As that total was 
exceeded, he proposed a revised total of 3,474 square miles 
in 1881. Within two years, even that figure was surpassed, 
and the ultimate area was disputed by the Chief Commissioner 
and the Government of India.91 The Burma Forest Act (1881) did 
not eliminate conflict within the state over forest policy. 
Rather, it shifted the terms of the debate.
89 Ibid. Thompson was the Chief Commissioner of Burma 
during the years 1875-78.
90 D. Brandis, "Demarcation of State Forests in British 
Burma," and A.O. Hume to Chief Commissioner, 28 July 1874, in 
Government of India, Copy of Enclosures.
91 A. Mackenzie (Secretary, Government of India) to 
Chief Commissioner, 7 December 1883, and Resolution, both in 
RFA for 1882-83.
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Yet, the persistence of 'departmentalism' must not 
obscure the importance of the administrative changes just 
described. If Chapter 3 illustrated how state forest control 
was affected by the resistance of diverse forest users, the 
present chapter has shown that such control was also shaped 
by bureaucratic politics. The development of a professional 
forest service was an essential part of the transition from 
laissez-faire forestry to scientific forest management, but 
it also resulted in the separation of forest and civil 
administration. In a sense, the debates of the 1870s were 
partly about seeking ways to coordinate the two services in 
a context of ongoing bureaucratic growth and differentiation. 
In the process, the role of the Forest Department as a 
resource manager was firmly situated in a broader 
institutional context.
The debates of the 1870s also reflected a need to 
establish the parameters of state forest control. If Burma's 
forests were to be managed for long-term commercial timber 
production, then the rights of forest users required careful 
definition. Following the passage of the Burma Forest Act 
(1881), forest officials began to rationalize forest use to 
that end. Those efforts are the subject of the next two 
chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
RATIONALIZING FOREST USE:
THE ERA OF EXPANSION 1881-1902
During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
the Forest Department strengthened its hold over Burma's 
forests. But the ability of forest officials to rationalize 
forest use was conditioned by the bureaucratic politics and 
the popular resistance examined in the preceding two 
chapters. In this chapter, the implications of this situation 
for the development of forest control and conflict in the 
late nineteenth century are addressed.
This chapter is thus concerned with what may be termed 
the era of expansion. The period 1881-1902 may be so 
characterized for three reasons. First, it was during this 
era that Upper Burma and the Shan States were annexed, and 
all of Burma came under British rule for the first time. The 
addition of a vast new forest estate was the occasion for a 
major expansion of Forest Department activity. Secondly, the 
period marked a rapid increase in the area enclosed in 
reserved forests, first in Lower Burma and, after 1890, in 
Upper Burma too. Finally, the late nineteenth century 
witnessed a selective, and highly ambiguous attempt to 
regulate the use of non-teak forest produce. One of the most 
important such instances concerned the management of cutch, 
a water extract of the sha tree.
Each of these areas of activity was linked by a common 
objective: the rationalization of forest use. In Chapter 6, 
this topic will be pursued further when the thesis examines 
the Forest Department's efforts in the early twentieth 
century to consolidate control over Burma's forests through
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working plans and other measures. This process of expansion 
and consolidation varied regionally, and was generally 
effected at a later stage in Upper Burma then in Lower Burma. 
More importantly, it should be recognized that the issues 
discussed in the next two chapters are closely linked. The 
expansion of Department control, and its subsequent 
consolidation, were two facets of the same process. During 
the period 1881-1923, attention focused on the 
rationalization of forest activity as part of a broader 
attempt to re-arrange land use in colonial Burma. To fully 
appreciate such rationalization, however, it is necessary 
first to be clear about the ways in which the Forest 
Department extended its activities in the late nineteenth 
century.
Forest Policy in Upper Burma and the Shan States 
After the third Anglo-Burmese war (1885-86), the British 
controlled all of Burma's forests. But, as in 1852 in Pegu, 
colonial officials inherited a series of political, economic 
and ecological problems that conditioned policy formulation. 
Specifically, the Forest Department faced problems concerning 
pre-colonial timber leases, political unrest and extensive 
over-harvesting,
The Department's first task was to gain a working 
knowledge of the forests. Under the direction of Henry C. 
Hill, Upper Burma's first Conservator, foresters set out to 
"explore, survey and roughly value the forests" beginning 
with the more valuable Pyinmana teak tracts of the north Pegu
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Yoma in 1886.1 By the early 1890s, the approximate extent and 
condition of the teak forests was known in all but the most 
remote areas. This preliminary survey confirmed what had long 
been suspected - over-harvesting was extensive.2 In the 
Pyinmana forests, for example, rough calculations indicated 
that for every 33 mature trees, 27 had already been removed 
or killed; one-sixth of the girdled trees were also 
undersized (ie. below six feet in girth).3
Forest officials found widespread evidence of over­
harvesting. However, their reports did not indicate that 
Upper Burma's forests were irreparably damaged. Contemporary 
popular accounts of pervasive deforestation may have served 
to belittle pre-colonial forestry, but they were otherwise 
highly misleading.4 Regrettably, this deforestation myth 
persists even today. Keeton, for example, comments:
the 1883-1885 'drought' and the other calamities 
attributed to [King] Thebaw's 'misrule' were, in the 
main, caused by 'modern' Deforestation. King Mindon 
had first leased extensive portions of his forests to 
the BBTC in 1862. Within twenty years many cutch, 
teak, and other timber areas in the provinces south 
of Mandalay and elsewhere were largely denuded of 
trees and other ground cover.5
1 Progress Report of Forest Administration (hereafter 
RFA) for Upper Burma for 1888-89, 6.
2 RFA (Upper Burma) for 1889-90, 6; Government of India 
(Home, Revenue and Agricultural Department) to Viscount 
Cranbrook (Secretary of State for India), 6 November 1879, 
India Forest Letters no. 157 of 1878-79.
3 RFA (Upper Burma) for 1887-88, 8.
4 Grattan Geary, Burma After the Conquest (London: 
Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Revington, 1886), 312.
5 Charles Lee Keeton III, Kina Thebaw and the 
Ecological Rape of Burma: The Political and Commercial 
Struggle between British India and French Indo-China in 
Burma. 1878-1886 (Delhi: Manohar, 1974), 143; see alsa: H&rk 
Poffenberger, "The Evolution of Forest Management Systems? in 
Southeast Asia," in Keepers of the Forest: Land Management
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What is important here is not the link between alleged 
deforestation and drought in Upper Burma,6 so much as the 
assumption that over-harvesting and deforestation were 
synonymous. This assumption is false for several reasons. 
First, it has already been noted that teak in Burma rarely 
constitutes more than 12 per cent of the total forest cover. 
Thus, even if every teak tree in a given area was removed, 
much of the forest cover would remain. In this regard, it 
must be remembered that teak extraction was non-mechanical: 
elephants hauled the felled trees to streams where the logs 
were then floated to market. As a result, damage to the 
surrounding forest was relatively minor.7 Secondly, lease­
holders in practice did not remove the entire teak crop, but 
instead took only marketable trees. If the latter included 
what forest officials termed 'undersized' trees, they 
typically did not always include the smallest timber. 
Finally, loggers bypassed completely those forests where logs 
could not be floated out due to natural obstructions. It was 
partly because these inaccessible forests had not been logged 
that the Forest Department was able to expand production in
Alternatives in Southeast Asia, ed. Mark Poffenberger (West 
Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1990), 17.
6 This link is debated even today. In Burma, it was 
extensively considered in 1909, see below.
7 This practice in pre-colonial (and colonial) Burma 
was thus different from contemporary Third World extraction 
which is usually mechanized and predicated on the existence 
of a road network. Under these conditions, forest damage is 
extensive. Elephants continue to be used in Burma today, but 
the government is mechanizing extraction, see John Blower and 
James Paine with Saw Hahn, Ohn, and Harold Sutter, "Burma 
(Myanmar)," in The Conservation Atlas of Tropical Forests: 
Asia and the Pacific, ed. N. Mark Collins, Jeffrey A. Sayer 
and Timothy C. Whitmore (London: Macmillan, 1991), 107.
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the twentieth century, despite the closure of accessible but 
over-worked areas.8
In the case of the cutch (sha) forests, over-harvesting 
was probably more serious. But even here, the sha forests of 
Upper Burma were not as denuded as they were in Lower Burma 
in 1885.9 In short, extensive over-harvesting of selected 
species under Burmese rule did not denote pervasive 
deforestation. Such deforestation was indeed occurring in 
Burma in the late nineteenth century. But, it was in British- 
held Lower Burma, and not in monarchical Upper Burma, that 
this process took place.10 The conversion of plains and delta 
forests into paddy fields under colonial rule reduced forest 
cover much more extensively than timber extraction (whether 
under Burmese or British direction) ever did.
The change in forest cover due to logging may have been 
relatively insignificant, but it reiterated what forest 
officials had learned in Tenasserim and Pegu. Unregulated 
private extraction was synonymous with over-harvesting. If 
the Forest Department was inclined to eliminate private 
extraction from Burma altogether after 1886, broader 
political considerations came into play. Specifically, there
8 A similar situation prevailed in Pegu after 1856, see 
Dietrich Brandis, "The Burma Teak Forests," Garden and Forest
9 [1895]: 12-13.
9 R.S. Wilkie, Yamethin District Gazetteer (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1934), 83? F.C. Owens, Pakokku District 
Gazetteer (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1913), 59? and
below.
10 Michael Adas, "Colonization, Commercial Agriculture, 
and the Destruction of the Deltaic Rainforests of British 
Burma in the Late Nineteenth Century," in Global 
Deforestation and the Nineteenth-Century World Economy, ed.. 
Richard P. Tucker and J.F. Richards (Durham, N.C.: Du&« 
University Press, 1983), 95-110.
166
was the question of the pre-colonial forest leases of the 
Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Limited (BBTCL), and other 
firms, and the conditions under which the colonial state 
would honour their terms.
Significantly, the option of nullifying the pre-colonial 
agreements was not seriously entertained by the British 
government. There were several reasons for this stance. 
First, from its founding on 4 September 1863, the BBTCL had 
become the most powerful British timber company in the region 
(if not the world), and enjoyed considerable influence in 
government circles.11 Secondly, as the principal lessee in 
Upper Burma, it already possessed the staff and elephants 
that the Forest Department would require years to match. 
Subject to careful supervision, therefore, the BBTCL was best 
placed to maintain teak production, at least in the short­
term.12 Finally, it was in the colonial state's own interest 
to uphold pre-colonial legal arrangements. Chapter 2 noted 
how the British claimed ownership of Pegu's teak forests on 
the basis of pre-colonial law. In 1886, this inherited 
prerogative was extended to Upper Burma, and after some
11 Such influence was reinforced by expert legal advice, 
see Anonymous, "Forest Administration under Lord Dufferin," 
Indian Forester 15 (January 1889): 7; Annual Report of the 
Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Limited (henceforth 
ARBBTCL) for 1876-77, 5; see also A.C. Pointon, The Bombay 
Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd.f 1863-1963 (Southampton: 
Millbrook Press, 1964); Ernest Andrews, The Bombay Burmah 
Trading Corporation Limited in Burmah. Siam and Java. 3 vols. 
(n.p., 1930-31).
12 C. Bernard, "Claims of the Bombay-Burma Corporation 
against the Government of Upper Burma," 29 January 1886, 
Burma Forest Proceedings (hereafter BFP), (February 1886), 5- 
6.
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initial confusion, to the Shan States.13 In the latter case, 
British proprietary rights, as expressed in the sanads 
(treaties) granted to the Sawbwas (hereditary local rulers), 
were explicitly based on the putative control of the Shan 
forests by the Burmese monarchy.14
If the colonial state recognized the pre-colonial forest 
leases, it was nevertheless committed to their revision in 
keeping with long-term teak production.15 In contrast, the 
BBTCL and other lessees, as well as the Shan Sawbwas. fought 
to protect their privileged forest access.16 Inevitably, the 
transition from Burmese to British forest management was 
marked by prolonged negotiation involving governments in 
Burma, India and England.
Negotiations began in January 1886 when the BBTCL 
conveyed to Chief Commissioner Charles Bernard its financial
13 The British government had at first intended to leave 
the Sawbwas in possession of the Shan forests. But at the 
last minute, Inspector-General Ribbentrop intervened, 
claiming the forests were a British inheritance from the 
Burmese kings, see B. Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India 
(Calcutta: Government Printing, 1900), 103-4.
14 Ibid; Resolution of the Chief Commissioner (hereafter 
Resolution), RFA (Upper Burma) for 1889-90, 2; C.U.
Aitchison, ed. , A Collection of Treatises. Engagements and 
Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, vol. 2 
(Calcutta: Government Printing, 1909), 63-65. As Anderson
notes generally of this period, the Europeans were in the 
business of "reconstructing the property-history of their new 
possessions...[and] the antiquity of specific, tightly 
bounded territorial units," see Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalismr rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 174-75.
15 Lord Dufferin, "Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy 
and Governor General of India, 17 February 1886, as to the 
Future Administration of Upper Burma," in Further 
Correspondence Relating to Burmah No. 3 (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode for H.M.S.O., 1886), 31.
16 ARBBTCL for 1887-88, 4; J. Nisbet, "Suggestions for 
the Administration and Working of the Forests in the Southern 
Shan States," BFP (December 1898), 98-102.
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claims against the Burmese monarchy. Bernard felt that the
Corporation's existing leases should be confirmed subject to
cutting restrictions. However, he also argued that
it will be better for the country, the people, and 
the forests that at the end of the existing leases 
(1890 or 1891) the Forest department should be free 
to arrange for the working of the forests after the 
most approved methods. Doubtless they would...employ 
largely the agency of the Bombay-Burmah Corporation; 
but they would regulate girdlings, fellings, and 
reproduction in the best way for securing permanent 
and steady yield from all the different teak forests 
in the country.17
Bernard's plan was thus an attempt to accommodate the Forest
Department's demands for sufficient authority to manage the
forests, but without necessarily challenging the predominance
of the BBTCL.18 Not satisfied with this plan, the Corporation
lobbied the British government, and in October 1886, the
Secretary of State for India ruled that both the existing
contracts and renewals would be recognized.19 After more than
two years of negotiation, an agreement between the British
government and the BBTCL was concluded on 18 August 1888;
that agreement then formed the basis of agreements with the
other lessees.20 Under the terms of the agreement, the BBTCL
17 Bernard, "Claims," 5-6.
18 More than seventy European and indigenous timber 
merchants in Rangoon and Moulraein urged the government on 13 
January 1886 to cancel the BBTCL leases in favour of a system 
of Department extraction. Otherwise, they claimed, the 
Corporation would achieve a monopoly, and over-harvesting 
would be the result, see Ibid., app. Q, 22-23.
19 H.C. Hill, "Brief Report on Forest Administration in 
Upper Burma for the Year 1887-88," BFP (August 1888), Upper 
Burma Circle, 22.
20 U.K. Parliament, "Return of Contract between the 
Secretary of State for India and the Bombay-Burma Trading 
Corporation referring to the Teak Forests of Upper Burma, and 
Correspondence relating thereto," Sessional Papers (Commons), 
Accounts and Papers - 12, vol. 58, 24 August 1889; Hill,
"Brief Report," 22-24; RFA (Upper Burma) for 1888-89,
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retained the right to work Upper Burma's teak forests until 
the turn of the century.21 It was to extract not less than 
100,000 tons per annum on payment of a royalty of ten rupees 
per ton on full-size timber, and six rupees per ton on 
undersized timber, but the government could reduce or even 
eliminate the allowable cut in areas already overworked.22
This agreement was important for the future of colonial 
forest policy in two respects. First, it confirmed the role 
of the BBTCL as the preeminent extraction agency in Upper 
Burma. Ultimately, this led to the further privatization of 
extraction as the government sought to counterbalance that 
Corporation's predominance in Upper Burma by allocating teak 
forests to other firms in Lower Burma. Secondly, the 
agreement confirmed government ownership of the forests, and 
its right to manage them. BBTCL activities were subject to 
the Upper Burma Forest Regulation (1887) with the Forest 
Department in complete control of teak selection and 
girdling. As such, the latter was empowered to bring teak 
extraction in Upper Burma into line with the practises 
already introduced in Lower Burma.23
appendix; RFA (Upper Burma) for 1889-90, appendix.
21 Specifically, the BBTCL leases were as follows: 
Pyinmana (1897), Chindwin (1900), Mu (1900), Taungdwingyi 
(1900), Thaingon (1900), Yaw (1900), Pyaungshu (1904).
22 U.K. Parliament, "Contract," 14-15. If the 
Corporation felt that its claims had not been dealt with 
liberally, the "improved security" of the leases was a factor 
in its willingness to reach a deal. However, this did not 
stop the firm from petitioning the British government for 
additional compensation for war-related losses, see ARBBTCL 
for 1887-88, 4; ARBBTCL for 1893-94, 5.
23 Departmental girdling was a source of tension between 
forest officials and Corporation employees in the 1890s. 
Differences occurred over the meaning of a 'first-class/ tree 
as specified in the contract. Forest officials understated it
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The British dealt with the Shan Sawbwas somewhat
differently, befitting their special political and economic 
status.24 As developed in the late 1880s and early 1890s, 
government policy in the Shan States represented a delicate 
attempt to assert British control over the teak forests, but 
not so as to alienate the Sawbwas whose allegiance was 
actively solicited. As a result, a central feature of that 
policy was the retention of Sawbwas as lessees in their 
individual states. In effect, this policy conditionally 
affirmed the autonomy that many local rulers enjoyed in pre­
colonial times. As one forest official noted, under Burmese 
rule
such Sawbwas, whose wealth or whose extent of forest 
made them conspicuous, were from time to time called 
upon to pay a duty on teak extracted from their 
forests, but as a general rule the Sawbwas were 
accustomed to work their forests just when and how 
they pleased, and it is there-fore not unnatural that 
they should have come to look upon them as their 
personal property, to be exploited to their own 
direct profit.35
Such autonomy was gradually limited, however. In 1890, the
colonial state introduced an annual tax of 200 rupees per
timber elephant as was done in pre-colonial times. But this
fixed rate was soon abandoned for one geared to the
to mean all trees seven feet or more in girth (including 
commercially-inferior trees), whereas Corporation employees 
took it to mean trees only of the best quality. In the end, 
the Forest Department agreed to exclude inferior timber from 
the girdling totals. See S.F. Hopwood, Working Plan for North 
and South Ganqaw Working Circles (Rangoon; Government 
Printing, 1916), 5; ARBBTCL for 1894-95, 4.
24 D.T. Griffiths, Working Plan for Southern Shan States 
Forest Division. 1940-41 to 1949-50, vol. 2 (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1949), 3; Robert H. Taylor, The State in 
Burma (London: C. Hurst, 1987), 93-94.
25 H. Jackson, "Preliminary Report on Some of the 
Forests in the Shan States in the Basin of the Salween,11 BFP 
(September 1891), 33.
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profitability of individual forests, and a surcharge was 
levied in cases where Sawbwas operated sawmills.26 In 1893, 
the system was modified yet again as an annual fixed 
assessment per state was introduced? richer states such as 
Kengtung and Mongpan paid 10,000 rupees, and poorer states 
paid as little as 200 rupees.27 By the end of the decade, 
evidence of illegal extraction and over-harvesting provided 
a pretext for further British intervention, and hastened the 
demise of teak extraction by the Sawbwas. In the early 
twentieth century, their place was gradually taken by the 
European firms, a change that was part of a general campaign 
to limit the autonomy of these rulers.28
The caution with which colonial officials treated the 
claims of the Shan Sawbwas and timber lessees must be 
situated in a broader context of political unrest following 
Upper Burma's annexation in 1886. The elimination of 
monarchical rule triggered the outbreak of rebellion in many 
areas as pre-colonial political and religious leaders led 
resistance to the British. The propensity of insurgents to 
take refuge in the forests when pursued by British-Indian 
forces prolonged the anti-insurgency campaign. The well- 
wooded Pegu Yoma and outer hills - "an earthly paradise for
26 Resolution, RFA (Upper Burma) for 1891-92, 6-7. 
Sawbwas also had to obey rules pertaining to the girdling of 
teak, see J. George Scott and J.P. Hardiman, Gazetteer of 
Upper Burma and the Shan Statesf vol. 2, part 1 (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1900), 313.
27 Resolution, RFA (Upper Burma) for 1892-93, 6; RFA 
(Eastern) for 1893-94, 17.
28 Nisbet, "Suggestions," 97-104; Conservator F. Beadon- 
Bryant to Revenue Secretary, 24 June 1905, BFP (October 
1907), 1-4; RFA for 1905-06, 68? Griffiths, Southern Shan
States, 2: 3? Taylor, State in Burma, 94-98.
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outlaws" - were home to Burmese insurgents until 1890, if not 
later.29 Under these circumstances, forest administration was 
introduced gradually, and forest officials required an armed 
escort to go about their duties.30 Moreover, the military 
practice of concentrating out-lying villagers in large 
stockaded villages deprived the Forest Department of a local 
labour supply to be used in fire-protection duties; 
difficulties experienced in hiring Burmese foresters, or 
persuading those hired to enter remote forests, only 
exacerbated this problem.31 Not surprisingly, Conservator Hill 
reported that it was "either not possible or, where possible, 
unadvisable to proceed against offenders more than 
exceptionally," and with the exception of teak offenses, 
violations of the law were overlooked in the 1880s.32
By the early 1890s, however, the Upper Burma forest 
administration was regularized along the lines of that in 
Lower Burma. In March 1887, the territory had been formed 
into one large forest circle, but by 1892 growing political 
stability led to its division into two, each circle being in
29 D. Wilson, "General Report on the Ngamingyaung, 
Yinmale, Kinmundaung, and Kyauk-migyaung Reserves," in BFP 
(January 1896), 214; see also Charles Crosthwaite, The
Pacification of Burma (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 32, 61; 
RFA (Upper Burma) for 1889-90, 18; RFA (Upper Burma) for
1890-91, 12-13; RFA (Upper Burma) for 1891-92, 19.
30 RFA (Upper Burma) for 1887-88, 1; RFA (Upper Burma) 
for 1888-89, 12, 19; RFA (Upper Burma) for 1889-90, 18. As 
did employees of the BBTCL, see ARBBTCL for 1888-89, 5.
31 RFA (Upper Burma) for 1888-89, 9; RFA (Upper Burma) 
for 1887-88, 9; Hill, "Brief Report," 18.
32 Hill, "Brief Report," 20; Resolution, RFA (Upper 
Burma) for 1887-88, 3; Resolution, RFA (Upper Burma) for 
1888-89, 3.
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the charge of a Conservator.33 Modelled on the Burma Forest 
Act (1881), the Upper Burma Forest Regulation (1887) was 
gradually enforced, and its provisions selectively extended 
to the Shan States.34 At the same time, additional foresters 
were posted to Upper Burma. From only sixteen officers in 
1887-88, the superior service had reached a total of twenty- 
six men by July 1893 .35 These changes both reflected and 
reinforced the growing assertiveness of the Forest Department 
in the newly acquired territory. With the exception of the 
Shan States (and other frontier areas), Burmese forest policy 
was standardized.
Creating and Protecting Reserved Forests 
The standardization of forest policy was particularly 
evident with regard to the creation of reserved forests. 
During the late nineteenth century, attention focused on the 
selection and protection of these forests. But as reservation 
became the principal means of asserting Forest Department
33 Between 1892 and 1900, Upper Burma was divided into 
a Western Circle (the region to the west of Mandalay) and an 
Eastern Circle (the area to the south and north-east of 
Mandalay). In 1900, in the first of a series of 
administrative re-designations, these circles in a slightly 
modified form became the Northern and Southern Circles 
respectively.
34 H.C. Hill, Memorandum on the Forest Laws in Force in 
Upper Burma (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1889); Secretary 
(Upper Burma) to Secretary, Government of India (Revenue and 
Agriculture Department), 3 February 1887, Upper Burma 
Proceedings (February 1887), 5; Chief Secretary (Burma) to 
Secretary, Government of India (Revenue and Agriculture 
Department), 22 September 1888, BFP (September 1888), Upper 
Burma Circle, 4; BFP (April 1889), Upper Burma Circle, 1.
35 Resolution, RFA (Upper Burma) for 1887-88, 1; Hill, 
"Brief Report," 18; Revenue Secretary (Burma) to Secretary, 
Government of India (Revenue and Agriculture Department), 6 
July 1893, BFP (July 1893), 8.
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control, it provoked widespread popular opposition, and was
a recurring source of inter-departmental friction.
The Burma Forest Act (1881) established a complex
procedure for the creation of reserved forests. A forest
official first prepared a detailed proposal which was
submitted to the Deputy Commissioner for comment, before
being passed on via the Commissioner and Conservator to the
Chief Commissioner. In this manner, civil officials could
express any objections to the proposals, and the Conservator
had the opportunity of "explaining away their objections or
adducing additional arguments for reservation".36 If the Chief
Commissioner approved the proposal, an official notification
was published, and a civil official was appointed as Forest
Settlement Officer
to ascertain by full and careful enquiry the actual 
state of things, the manner in which the reservation, 
if carried out, will affect the people in the
neighbourhood, and the rights and privileges, if any,
to which they are entitled.37
Assisted by a forest official, the Settlement Officer was
empowered to redraw boundaries so as to exclude permitted
practices, buy out rights that would interfere with forest
management, specify rights within the reserve, and in the
case of shifting cultivation, separately demarcate land
within the reserve subject to special rules.38 The proceedings
of the enquiry were then forwarded to the Deputy
Commissioner. A three-month period ensued during which local
36 J. Nisbet, Burma under British Rule and Before, vol.2 
(Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1901), 67.
37 "Instructions for Forest Settlement Officers, Upper 
Burma," BFP (April 1891), 10.
38 Ibid., 9-19; Burma Forest Act 1881 (Rangoon: 
Government Press, 1884), nos. 6-15.
175
villagers could appeal the Settlement Officer's decision. If 
an appeal was lodged, the Deputy Commissioner reviewed the 
case, and modified or confirmed the original decision, 
forwarding the proceedings as before. With the notification 
of a reserve, all rights not claimed were extinguished, a 
move that precluded their subsequent accrual. With the 
Government of India's approval, however, the Chief 
Commissioner could later cancel such a notification. This 
provision was primarily designed to permit the opening of new 
lands for permanent agriculture.39
It was on the basis of this system that extensive 
reservation took place in Lower Burma, and after 1890, in 
Upper Burma. If settlement work was hindered by a paucity of 
civil officials, much of the Pegu Yoma was nevertheless 
reserved by the turn of the century (Table 5.1).40
Year
1880-81
1883-84
1886-87
1889-90
1892-93
1895-96
1898-99
1901-02
1904-05
TABLE 5.1
GROWTH IN RESERVED FORESTS 1880-1905 
(Selected Years; Area in Square Miles)
Lower Burma Upper Burma
r 288 
r 759
, 788 
, 574
, 790
4,
5
5 ___
7,379 
7,680 
9 ,471 
10,340
2,269
5,438
7,989
9,135
10,071
Source: RFA (various years).
Total
2 ,288 
3 ,759 
4,788 
5,574 
8,059 
12,817 
15,669 
18,606 
20,411
Note: These figures include demarcated Karen areas which
constituted approximately 5 per cent of the total area.
39 Nisbet, Burma under British Ruler 2: 69.
40 H.W.A. Watson, A Note on the Peau Yoma Forests
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1923), 4.
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Two things are particularly striking about the change in the 
reserved area during this period.41 The first concerns the 
steady, almost routine increase in the reserved area in Lower 
Burma, which occurred despite the political turmoil of the 
late 1880s. If, as discussed below, forest administration was 
temporarily disrupted in many areas of Pegu in 1885-86, work 
nevertheless continued as usual in neighbouring Tenasserim. 
This, in itself, is testimony to the power and resiliency of 
the bureaucratic structures and rational-legal techniques 
introduced after 1856. In contrast, what is noteworthy about 
the pace of reservation in Upper Burma in the 1890s is its 
rapidity. Thus, whereas reserves in Upper Burma constituted 
28 per cent of the total reserved area in 1892-93, six years 
later they already represented 51 per cent. This record 
reflected both the importance of the teak forests in Upper 
Burma (particularly in the northern Pegu Yoma) , as well as 
the growing stability of forest administration in the region 
in the 1890s.
But the growth in the reserved area did not go unopposed 
in either Upper or Lower Burma. Within the colonial state, 
conflict between civil and forest officials may have been 
substantially reduced following the passage of the Burma 
Forest Act (1881), but the silence of that Act on the 
ultimate extent of reservation remained a bone of contention 
between civil and forest officials. When the Forest 
Department proposed to reserve large areas adjoining 
populated areas, civil officials were particularly reluctapt 
to support their colleagues. A proposed reserve covering 637
41 See also Appendix C.
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square miles in Henzada district was rejected by the Deputy 
Commissioner for this reason in 1884. In making this 
decision, J. Butler noted that in the past, reservation had 
led to the "total exclusion" of the people from the forests, 
and that, even with the new legislation, the quest for "a 
good balance sheet" might influence a forest official more 
than "supplying the wants of a people whose prosperity or 
reverse do not immediately come under his observation".42 In 
turn, the Commissioner of the Irrawaddy division, G.J.S. 
Hodgkinson, deemed the proposed reserve to be 'unnecessary', 
and the arguments adduced in its favour as 'unsubstantiated'; 
in the end, Chief Commissioner Charles Bernard sided with 
these officials.43
In other cases, civil officials supported a proposal only 
after recommending that substantial areas be set aside to 
meet the objections of peasants or shifting cultivators. In 
the case of Aingdon-kun reserve (Shwegyin district), Forest 
Settlement Officer J.L. Long recommended in 1894 that the 
livelihood of 181 Karen shifting cultivators and their 
families be safeguarded by allocating to them 65 square miles 
(22 per cent) of a total proposed area of 294 square miles.44 
In 1903, the Namkwin reserve in Myitkyina district was 
sanctioned over fifteen square miles, down from a proposed
42 J. Butler to Deputy Conservator (Western Division), 
30 August 1884, BFP (December 1884), 29.
43 BFP (December 1884), 29-30; see also, RFA (Pegu) for 
1883-84, 3; RFA (Tenasserim) for 1888-89, 1.
44 BFP (November 1894), 133-37; see also BFP (December 
1884), 13; BFP (July 1896), 229-32.
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size of sixty square miles.45 In some instances, exclusions 
encompassed so much of the proposed area that forest 
officials ultimately abandoned the proposal.46
In this manner, forest and civil officials became 
involved in a process of ongoing negotiations as to the 
nature and extent of reservation and Forest Department 
control. If inter-departmental friction based on differing 
programmatic interests thus persisted, it is nevertheless 
important to situate such differences in the broader context 
of a common European (typically British) heritage, as well as 
a shared interest in the maintenance of imperial rule. 
Despite their differences, civil and forest officials were 
united in their capacity as representatives of the British 
government in a land acquired by force. Their common identity 
was formally acknowledged through hiring and promotion 
policies that, until the 1920s at least, reserved the top 
jobs for Europeans. But that identity was also informally 
reinforced through various social fora, and notably the 
'Club'.
All the social activities of the Europeans are 
centred in the Club, where outdoor games such as 
golf, tennis and polo, and indoor ones such as 
billiards, snooker and bridge can be played. 
Newspapers and magazines are also to be found, while 
a library is usually attached.47
45 W.A. Hertz, Mvitkyina District Gazetteer (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1912), 96.
46 For example, the proposed Kyaukchaw reserve (Myingyan 
district), see W.F.L. Tottenham (Conservator, Southern) to 
Revenue Secretary, 15 November 1911, BFP (January 1912), 17; 
see also Methe reserve (Shwebo district) proceedings, BFP 
(July 1896), 123-81.
47 G.H. Ogilvie, "A Forestry Officer's Life in Burma," 
Sylva (Edinburgh) 14 (1934): 20.
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In many respects, the Club was, as Orwell asserts, the 
"spiritual citadel, the real seat of the British power".48 In 
such a setting, Deputy Commissioners, Police Officers, Public 
Works Officers and Forest Officers had ample opportunity to 
resolve their differences.
It was for these reasons of social and imperial 
solidarity that the Burmese could not count on civil 
officials to defend their interests against forest officials. 
Thus, peasants and shifting cultivators objected to 
settlements that typically provided insufficient access for 
grazing, agriculture, wood-cutting and the collection of 
forest produce. But, with the general support of Burma's 
civil administration, as well as the Government of India, 
the Forest Department was able to bypass such opposition and 
make rapid progress in creating reserves. Unable to prevent 
their creation, cultivators resorted to various means of 
everyday resistance and avoidance protest to subvert the 
strict rules that were now imposed in these forests.
Within reserves, forest officials sought to eliminate 
all natural and human hazards to teak growth. From the start, 
a primary concern was the exclusion of fire from these areas. 
The urgency with which forest officials sought to introduce 
fire protection reflected a belief, widespread in the 
nineteenth century, that fire was a major threat to teak.
48 George Orwell, Burmese Days (1935; reprint, 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1987), 17. It was also one 
of the few places where colonial officials were 'offstage'; 
where they were "among their own...and no longer strutting 
before the audience of colonial subjects. Activities, 
gestures, remarks, and dress that were unseemly to the public 
role of sahib were safe in this retreat," see James C. Scott, 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 12-13.
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Forest reservation and fire protection were thus closely- 
linked. But, if fire protection was integral to scientific 
forest management, it was also used as a means to criticize 
indigenous practices. Earlier, it was noted how shifting 
cultivators were condemned for their 'destructive' ways. In 
the late nineteenth century, such condemnation centred on the 
ways in which taunava fires allegedly eliminated teak in hill 
clearances, and damaged the surrounding forest. However, 
other indigenous practices also attracted the ire of forest 
officials: hunters firing the jungle in search of game,
individuals who damaged trees to collect minor produce such 
as wood-oil, varnish and honey, villagers who fired grazing 
tracts to promote the early growth of succulent grasses for 
their cattle, and careless travellers who abandoned camp 
fires and burning cheroot embers.49 If fire protection was to 
succeed, such practices had to be stopped. As a result, fire 
management encompassed the regulation of indigenous fire use, 
a task that became more difficult as the protected area 
increased.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the 
fire protection programme was expanded, but as Table 5.2 
illustrates, the protected area varied considerably on an 
annual basis.
49 B.H. Baden-Powell, The Forest System of British Burma 
(Calcutta: Government Printing, 1873), 12, 14; Nisbet, Burma 
under British Rule. 2: 63-64.
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TABLE 5.2
FIRE PROTECTION 1880-1905 
(Selected Years; Area in Square Miles)
Year Area Attempted Area Burnt Success
1880-81 150 30 80. 00
1883-84 286 25 91.26
1885-86 296 58 80 . 41
1887-88 309 94 69.58
1889-90 379 5 98.68
1892-93 529 34 93.55
1895-96 1,307 129 90.13
1898-99 3,157 710 77.51
1901-02 5,412 433 92. 00
1904-05 8,268 632 92.36
Source: RFA (various years).
Note: Prior to 1892-93, areas are for Lower Burma only.
Despite such variability, the area over which fire protection 
measures were conducted increased rapidly at the turn of the 
century. In the process, a growing proportion of the total 
reserved area was affected. Whereas the attempted area in 
1880-81 represented 6.6 per cent of the total reserved area, 
by 1898-99, that figure had climbed to 20.1 per cent. In 
1904-05, fire protection embraced 40.5 per cent of Burma's 
20,411 square miles of reserved forests.
As the attempted area increased, forest officials 
discovered that the key to successful fire protection was 
often the timely onset of the monsoon season. If the rains 
were delayed, or at all sporadic, it became increasingly 
difficult to contain the spread of fire. But if fire 
protection was subject to the vagaries of climate, it was 
also affected by human factors. Labour shortages handicapped 
Department efforts, and virtually guaranteed that fires in 
remote areas went unchecked. The fate of fire protection
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often depended on local support to help fight fires and adopt
preventative measures. In many cases such support was not
forthcoming. To understand why that was so, it is necessary
to examine the restrictions that the Forest Department
imposed on villagers in the vicinity of fire-protected areas.
At first, those restrictions were few in number, and fire
protection was predominantly an attempt to adapt to local
practices. As Nisbet observes:
This original system of 'fire protection' consisted 
in being first in the field, and in burning all round 
the areas to be protected before the villagers began 
to fire their fields and grazing lands or the Karens 
to burn their hill clearances.50
But as the reserved area expanded, and the Forest Department
became more powerful, villagers faced a growing number of
restrictions.
These restrictions were incorporated in the Burma Forest 
Act (1881). Thus, the use of fire in reserves was strictly 
prohibited (unless explicitly sanctioned), and offenders were 
liable for a five-hundred rupee fine, six months in prison, 
or both. In the dry season, additional restrictions were 
imposed: hunting was banned, and the use of fire within two 
miles of reserve boundaries was curtailed. Shifting 
cultivators permitted to clear taunayas in reserves had to 
fire-trace their fields to reduce the risk to adjoining 
areas. But the most unpopular rule was that which compelled 
the assistance of all those who exercised any right in 
reserves, or who received emoluments from the government, in 
the fighting of fires and the apprehension of offenders. By
50 Nisbet, Burma under British Rule. 2: 65.
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this measure, foresters sought to place the onus of 
responsibility for fire prevention on villagers.
The rules became the focus of ubiquitous, if covert 
popular resistance. Such resistance encompassed the illegal 
use of fire, village complicity, labour strikes or slowdowns, 
and incendiarism. In many cases, resistance took the form of 
continuing practices that were now an offence under the law. 
Thus, hunters fired reserves in search of game, shifting 
cultivators failed to fire-trace their clearings, and 
peasants fired grazing tracts to provide food for their 
cattle in prohibited areas.51
Suspects could also count on village complicity. Although 
rewards were offered for information leading to the arrest of 
offenders,52 strong social pressures within the village offset 
this measure. As one frustrated forester in Tharrawaddy 
division observed in 1891, the offer of a one-hundred rupee 
reward to informers was useless, because "in no case was such 
information given in spite of the numerous incendiary or 
mysterious fires which occurred”.53 In another instance, an 
entire reserve was burnt, but an arrest could not be made as 
information was unattainable.54
51 RFA (Pegu) for 1880-81, 2, 9? RFA (Pegu) for 1884- 
85, 18; RFA (Eastern) for 1893-94, 11; J.P. Hardiman, Lower 
Chindwin District Gazetteer (Rangoon: Government Printing, 
1912), 114.
52 Forest Department Circular No. 3 (1891), 13 August 
1891, BFP (August 1891), 10.
53 G.Q. Corbett to Conservator (Pegu), 21 September 
1891, BFP (November 1891), 66; E.P. Popert (Conservator, 
Pegu) to Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 4 February 
1886, BFP (March 1886), 4.
54 RFA for 1894-95, lxii.
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Forest officials also complained of villager indolence
and negligence when called upon to perform fire-fighting
duties. The case of Kyaungthaik village (Minbu division) is
typical. Called upon at noon to assist with a fire, the
villagers did not arrive until evening, and even then "only
remained a short time, going away before the fire was put
out".55 In other cases, villagers refused to turn out when
required to do so.56 Whatever the cause of the blaze,
villagers were reluctant to assist the activities of a
department that was notoriously unpopular.
The most serious and calculated form of resistance was
incendiarism. As might be expected, it was often difficult
in practice to determine whether a fire was deliberate,
accidental or natural. But it was precisely this anonymity
which made incendiarism such a popular form of resistance.
In many cases, incendiary attacks were small and isolated
affairs by individuals with a particular grievance against
the Forest Department.57 However, other attacks suggested
broad-based opposition to the forest rules. In one Upper
Burma village, for example,
the rules relating to protection from fire were read 
over and explained to villagers at the forest 
settlement, but two days after the rules had been 
explained to one village, a fire was started by one 
of these villagers within half a mile of the 
Divisional officer's camp.50
55 RFA for 1898-99, ciii.
56 RFA (Western) for 1894-95, 11; A. Rodger, Working
Plan for East Yoma. Satsuwa and Tindaw Reserves (Maymyo: 
Maymyo Branch Press, 1907), 7.
57 For example, see RFA (Tenasserim) for 1877-78, 8.
58 RFA (Eastern) for 1893-94, 10.
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In Tharrawaddy division, repeated warnings given to suspect 
villages near the Minhla reserve, only led to an increase in 
incendiary attacks; but when the forest official urged a 
collective fine, he was overruled by the Deputy Commissioner 
who warned against any "impolitic move" in the matter.59
During the third Anglo-Burmese war (1885-86), and 
subsequent political unrest, incendiary attacks against 
reserves, plantations and Department premises were common in 
Pegu, and formed part of a broader resistance to the British. 
In the Prome and Tharrawaddy divisions, key reserves were 
overrun by insurgents and became their headquarters.60 
Reserves and plantations that had been fire protected since 
the 1870s were destroyed. In Prome division, 78 per cent of 
the area attempted was burnt through, and in Tharrawaddy 
division, 67 per cent of the 44,688 acres attempted was 
similarly set ablaze.61 In contrast, Tenasserim experienced 
little unrest, and 97 per cent of the attempted area was 
successfully fire protected in 1885-86.62
During these troubles, forest officials were greatly 
assisted by the hill Karen. As noted, in more peaceful times 
these cultivators planted teak and fought fires on the Forest 
Department's behalf. But during the fighting, the hill Karen 
were indispensable as they contained fires in a number of
59 G.Q. Corbett to Conservator (Pegu), 21 September
1891; F.D. Maxwell to Commissioner (Pegu), 22 September 1891, 
both in BFP (November 1891).
60 RFA (Pegu) for 1885-86, 5-6; RFA (Pegu) for 1886-
87, 5.
61 RFA (Pegu) for 1885-86, 5-6.
62 RFA (Tenasserim) for 1885-86, 5.
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reserves set alight by insurgents.63 In retaliation they were 
attacked: taunava plantations were fired, and at least one 
headman was shot.64 The loyalty of these scattered and unarmed 
groups of hill Karen was important not so much for any 
military advantage that it gave the British in quelling the 
rebellion.65 Rather, such loyalty was important because it 
facilitated the rapid restoration of forest administration, 
even in remote reserves. The events of 1885-86 illustrated 
that Department control in these areas was more dependent on 
the support of shifting cultivators than perhaps forest 
officials realized or cared to admit.
If incendiarism was a source of trouble to the British, 
it nevertheless did not disrupt the expansion of fire 
protection efforts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. Paradoxically, it was at this juncture that fire 
protection came under attack from within the Forest 
Department itself. Herbert Slade, one of colonial Burma's 
ablest young foresters, was turning conventional wisdom on 
its head when, in an article published in the Indian Forester 
in May 1896, he suggested that annual ground fires "should be
63 Resolution, RFA for 1885-86, 3.
64 RFA (Pegu) for 1886-87, 7-8; RFA (Pegu) for 1885-
86, 6; John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1958), 137-38.
65 These groups must not be confused with the Karen 
troops who assisted the British in suppressing the revolt. 
Undoubtedly, cultivators provided intelligence on the 
insurgents. But if the American missionary, Dr. Vinton, 
enthused at the time about the significance of Karen 
volunteers, this said more about Western perceptions of the 
Karen than it did about the military campaign itself, see 
Donald Mackenzie Smeaton, The Loyal Karens of Burma (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench and Co., 1887), 8-19, 54-55; Martin Smith, 
Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed 
Books, 1991), 44-45.
187
considered as the friends and not the natural enemies of the 
teak" and that fire was thus "one of the forest officer's 
most useful agents as long as it is his servant and not his 
master".66 Slade's landmark article generated much debate, and 
incensed foresters, like Conservator G.F. Prevost, who 
believed that to promote the use of fire was "to hark back to 
the very commencement of Indian forestry," and was thus 
highly unscientific.67 But as a growing number of officials 
became convinced that fire actually helped teak in its 
struggle to survive, views defending the status quo were 
heard less frequently. Indeed, by the second decade of the 
twentieth century, it was conventional to view indiscriminate 
fire protection as both a waste of funds and a threat to the 
teak forests. As a result, after the First World War the 
programme was restricted to young plantations only.
Regulating the Use of Cutch 
To promote long-term teak production, the Forest 
Department developed a network of reserves that were fire- 
protected, and in which hill Karen planted teak. But if teak
66 Herbert Slade, "Too Much Fire-Protection in Burma," 
Indian Forester 22 (May 1896): 176. Educated at the Nancy 
Forest School in France, Slade joined the Burma Forest 
Department in 1882. After various postings, he was deputed to 
Siam in 1896 to help the Siamese establish a forest service. 
In recognition of his services, Slade was awarded the 'Third 
Class of the Order of the White Elephant of Siam' in 1899, 
and his name is still widely remembered in Thailand today. In 
1901 he returned to Burma, where he died of cholera soon 
thereafter while on special duty in Arakan.
67 RFA (Tenasserim) for 1895-96, 7-8. On the subsequent 
debate, see H. Carter, "Fire Protection in the Teak Forests 
of Burma," Indian Forester 30 (August 1904): 363-66; R.S. 
Troup, "Fire Protection in the Teak Forests of Burma," Indian 
Forester 31 (March 1905): 138-46. However, fire protection 
was attacked as early as 1875, see M.J. Slym, Memorandum on 
Jungle Fires (Maulmain: Tenasserim Press, 1876).
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was the primary concern, forest officials also regulated the 
use of non-teak timber and 'minor' forest produce. As noted, 
the Forest Department ran into difficulties when it first 
attempted to control non-teak forest use in the 1870s. Those 
difficulties intensified in the 1880s as forest officials 
explored new methods of control. In this regard, particular 
attention was paid to cutch, and discussion of the 
vicissitudes of its management illustrates a complex, and 
often overlooked facet of forest policy.
In the nineteenth century, cutch was a product in 
domestic and foreign demand. A water extract of the sha tree 
(Acacia catechu^, cutch was used for tanning and dyeing 
fishing nets, canvas sails and leather, and to a lesser 
extent as an astringent medicine and for chewing with the 
betel leaf.68 Found primarily in the dry deciduous and scrub 
forests of the plains (Appendix B), sha was also used for 
agricultural implements, carts, wheels and firewood, but it 
was as a source of cutch that it became the focus of an 
important cottage industry in central Burma.69
At the time of the second Anglo-Burmese war (1852), that 
industry was already well established. One of Pegu's leading 
exports next to timber, cutch supplies were described in 1855 
as 'inexhaustible', and stretched along the Irrawaddy valley
68 F . T . Morehead, The Forests of Burma (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1944), 63; Alex Rodger, A Handbook 
of the Forest Products of Burma (1921; reprint, Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1951), 66-67; F.J. Branthwaite, "Cutch 
and Its Adulterants," Indian Forester 18 (May 1892): 184- 
85; Shway Yoe [J. George Scott], The Burman: His Life and 
Notions (1882; reprint, Edinburgh: Kiscadale, 1989), 71.
69 On the manufacture of cutch, see Rodger, Handbook of 
Forest Products, 67; H. Slade, "Manufacture of Cutch in 
Burma," Indian Forester 12 (June 1886): 257-61; Nisbet, Burma 
under British Rule, 1: 374-75.
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from just north of Rangoon to beyond the Burmese border.70 
Under colonial rule, the cutch trade developed rapidly, and 
by the mid-1860s, foresters were reporting the deforestation 
of accessible areas.71 In a context of political unrest, it 
was considered impolitic to introduce unpopular restrictions, 
but by the early 1870s British rule in Pegu had begun to 
stabilize. Attention then turned to the regulation of this 
trade.
But regulating the cutch trade posed problems quite 
different from those experienced in managing the teak 
industry. The former was located in relatively populated 
areas, and hence used lands that were already intensively 
used by shifting cultivators and peasants. These land-use 
patterns were further complicated by seasonal variation. In 
good times, cutch boiling was the principal livelihood of 
the poor in Prome and Thayetmyo districts. When the rains 
failed, however, their numbers were greatly increased by 
other cultivators desperate to eke out a subsistence. On 
these occasions, the cutch industry became an important means 
of famine relief.72
70 J. McClelland, "Report on the Sitang and other Teak 
Forests of Pegu," Selections from the Records of the 
Government of India (Foreign Departments 9 (1855): 141-42; 
Owens, Pakokku District Gazetteer. 54.
71 D. Brandis, "Memorandum on the Working Plan of the 
Forests for 1865, 1866 and 1867," India Forest Proceedings 
(henceforth IFP), (March 1865), 96. In 1871-72 alone, cutch 
exports from Burma were valued at £2 million, see A.O. Hume 
(Secretary, Government of India) to Chief Commissioner, 14 
September 1872, IFP (September 1872), 591.
72 Government of Burma, Thayetmyo District Gazetteer 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1911), 45-46; A.H.M.
Barrington, Working Plan for Allanmvo Forest Division, 1927- 
28 to 1936-37 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1928), 28.
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For these reasons, the cutch question was never treated 
as purely a forest matter. Rather, its regulation required 
the cooperation of civil and forest officials. Yet, as noted, 
such cooperation was tempered by programmatic differences. In 
part, therefore, the complexity of the government's response, 
and the different methods used to combat cutch deforestation, 
reflected the vagaries of bureaucratic politics.
In 1871, Chief Commissioner Ashley Eden directed that 
cutch tracts be examined with a view to their reservation, 
and three years later, the first reserve was created.73 In 
1876, sha was reserved, and a five-rupee tax per cauldron 
was imposed.74 Notwithstanding these actions, between 1876 
and 1879 at least 750,000 trees were cut down in the 
Irrawaddy valley, and by decade's end, large cutch-yielding 
trees had all but disappeared from the Tharrawaddy, Prome 
and Thayetmyo districts outside of reserves.75
The Burma Forest Act (1881) marked a new phase in cutch 
regulation. Sha was removed from the reserved list, but 
licenses continued to be required for trade purposes, and 
the cutting of trees below three feet in girth was 
prohibited. A myo-ok (township officer) was appointed to 
supervise cutch manufacture.75 Village cutch reserves were
73 Baden-Powell, Forest System. app. A; RFA for 1874- 
75, 6.
74 This became the standard method of taxation. Earthen 
pots or iron pans were used to boil the chipped heartwood of 
the sha tree.
75 D. Brandis, "Suggestions regarding Forest
Administration in British Burma 1881," IFP (February 1881), 
249.
76 RFA (Pegu) for 1882-83, 25.
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also to be established under indigenous management.77 If this 
delegation of power was only tentative, it was nevertheless 
an ambitious attempt to win local support for the protection 
of cutch. Significantly, these reserves were the 
responsibility of the Deputy Commissioner, and forest 
officials played only an advisory role. Indeed, in the 
demarcation of reserves in Thayetmyo district in 1884-85, 
they were not consulted.78
These measures did not slow cutch deforestation. In part, 
this failure was due to the general unrest surrounding the
annexation of Upper Burma which led the government to
temporarily relax restrictions on the cutch industry. Cutch 
boilers were allowed to pay their taxes by instalment, and
reserves were opened to them free of charge.79 But it also
reflected an under-estimation of the problem.
As the extent of deforestation became known, civil and 
forest officials debated what to do. In 1889, a proposal to 
re-reserve sha was rejected because "it was feared that the 
rights of taungya-cultivators would be unduly interfered 
with"; instead, the cutting of the tree for fuel was 
prohibited.80 In Upper Burma, where supplies were more 
plentiful, rules were strengthened to prevent a repeat of
77 Burma Forest Act 1881. nos. 31-34; RFA for 1884-85, 
app. 0; BFP (November 1888), 1-10.
78 BFP (November 1888), 1-2.
79 P.J. Carter to Chief Commissioner, 4 September 1890, 
BFP (September 1891), 49.
80 Chief Commissioner to Conservator (Pegu), 7 May 1891, 
BFP (May 1891), 24.
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the Lower Burma experience.81 But, as the rules continued to 
be flaunted, the government took more drastic action. In 
February 1892, sha was reserved in Lower Burma, and only a 
few licenses were henceforth issued by forest officials.82
Conflict over cutch was at its height during the 1890s. 
With the reservation of sha, shifting cultivators faced a 
new challenge to their way of life. As Chief Commissioner 
Frederick Fryer conceded, this act "no doubt increased the 
difficulties of taungya cultivation".83 Inevitably, the number 
of prosecutions soared: of the 1,838 cases reported in 1893- 
94, no less than 1,451 were in the Thayetmyo and Prome 
divisions, many of which concerned the felling of sha in 
taungyas.84 As the conflict between shifting cultivators and 
the government intensified, enquiries held in Prome and 
Thayetmyo districts in 1893-94 confirmed widespread 
resistance among Burman and Karen cultivators pushed by sheer 
necessity into open defiance of the law. As one thu-gyi 
commented: "the people do not wish to preserve any cutch
trees at all".85 As if in confirmation, officials reported
81 Forest Department Circular no.2 of 1891, 7 May 1891, 
BFP (May 1891), 25-26.
82 Forest Department Circular no.2 of 1892, 12 February 
1892, BFP (February 1892), 6-7.
83 Resolution, RFA for 1893-94, 2.
84 Ibid.
85 Statement of Maung Shwe Ni, Chinle village, 23 
November 1893, cited in C.H. Hampden and J.L. Long, "Special 
Cutch Enquiry, Shwele Township, Prome District," BFP (August 
1894), 11.
193
that the experiment with village cutch forests had failed as 
"villagers take no interest" in them.86
Faced with such pervasive opposition, a special 
conference of civil and forest officials was convened in 
Prome in March 1896 to resolve the crisis. It was decided 
that the Forest Department would reserve the best cutch 
tracts, village reserves would be cancelled, and remaining 
areas would be abandoned to shifting cultivators. In this 
manner, government sought "to provide for the resuscitation 
of a profitable industry without harassing the taungya- 
cutters by frequent prosecutions".07
Shifting cultivators were not the only group to challenge 
cutch regulation. As the price of cutch climbed, and supplies 
dwindled, cutch boilers ignored the rules, and the theft of 
trees from reserves became commonplace.88 In Pegu in 1886- 
87, of 135 breaches of the forest law, 71 involved cutch, and 
when such offenses later declined, scarcity rather than 
obedience to the law was the cause.89 Scarcity was also 
reflected in the adulteration of cutch, as the bark of than 
fTerminalia oliveri1) was used; when the government attempted
86 Minutes of the Proceedings of the Cutch Conference, 
Prome, 24 March 1896, BFP (July 1896), 13.
07 Resolution, 15 July 1896, BFP (July 1896), 16.
88 G . Q . Corbett, Working Plan for Taunanyo Forests
(Simla: Government Central Printing Office, 1891), 9; H.
Carter, Working Plan for Shwele Forests (Calcutta: Government 
Printing, 1893), 7.
89 RFA (Pegu) for 1886-87, 4-5; RFA (Pegu) for 1889- 
90, 4.
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to eliminate this practice by reserving than. cutch boilers
shifted to new species.90
A more serious challenge to cutch regulation developed
in Upper Burma. As sha supplies on private lands were
exhausted, villagers claimed adjoining tracts as bobabaina
(ancestral) lands, and employed workers to boil cutch.91 The
bobabaina campaign spread, but the response of the colonial
state to this unexpected challenge was delayed by the legal
uncertainties surrounding these claims. As the Deputy
Commissioner of Magwe district dryly observed in 1893:
"'Bobabaing land' is a very elastic and somewhat
unsatisfactory term, and one that requires a good deal of
examination".92 Not surprisingly, forest officials denounced
bobabaina claims as a cover for illicit cutch-boiling.
Conservator A.L. Home, for example, charged that
the quantity of cutch that finds its way to market 
from Upper Burma is out of all proportion to the 
legitimate outturn of cauldrons for which licenses 
are issued; areas [to be managed] are so large...that 
if the establishments were doubled it would still be 
impossible to efficiently check illicit boiling.93
The problem was exacerbated, as Conservator F.B. Dickinson
observed, by the unwillingness of Magistrates to convict
offenders without unequivocal proof.94
While many civil officials shared the general concerns
of their colleagues in the Forest Department, there were
90 RFA (Pegu) for 1888-89, 17; RFA (Pegu) for 1889-90,
18.
91 RFA (Eastern) for 1892-93, 7.
92 RFA for 1892-93, lxxii.
93 RFA (Western) for 1893-94, 9.
94 RFA (Eastern) for 1893-94, 9.
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others who criticized what they perceived to be the heavy- 
handedness of forest officials. Blaming these officials for 
much of the legal confusion surrounding the bobabaina issue 
in the Pyinmana forests, for example, Commissioner D. Norton 
charged that
complaints were vague, procedure was irregular, 
several distinct offences were lumped together, and 
the misjoined defendants could not have known 
precisely the charges which they had to meet.95
Cutch-boilers (many from Lower Burma) took advantage of these
divisions within the colonial state to expand their
activities.96
In ruling on this matter in 1894, Chief Commissioner 
Fryer agreed with forest officials that many bobabaina claims 
were a front for illegal activities. But, he rejected any 
precipitous action that might involve "an amount of 
interference with the people on which with our present
knowledge of Upper Burma it would be unwise to venture"; 
rather, claims would be individually adjudicated in the 
course of land settlements, and civil officials in the
interim were free to decide policy on a local basis.97
The Chief Commissioner's ruling resolved the legal 
confusion surrounding the bobabaina issue. It did not, 
however, guarantee the preservation of the sha forests. 
Deforestation continued in the early twentieth century as 
residual tracts were whittled away. Civil officials
encouraged such destruction when, during times of drought,
95 RFA for 1893-94, lxx.
96 RFA for 1892-93, lxxi.
97 Resolution, RFA for 1893-94, 10-11; see RFA (Western) 
for 1896-97, 9-11, for two different responses to the issue 
by civil officials.
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they issued free licenses to cultivators in distress. In the 
Yamethin and Thayetmyo districts, for example, sha stands 
(even in reserves) were all but eliminated in this manner.98 
Ultimately, changing market conditions, not government 
regulation, saved sha from total elimination. As prices 
increased, cheaper substitutes such as mangrove extracts and 
aniline dyes gradually displaced cutch.99
The fate of cutch management was a humbling reminder to 
colonial officials of the limits of state forest control. In 
part, such management was ineffectual precisely because it 
highlighted the inter-departmental differences discussed 
earlier. Forest officials sought to preserve sha forests as 
part of an attempt to promote long-term cutch production. 
Civil officials could scarcely find fault with this 
objective, but were primarily concerned with more immediate 
matters such as famine relief.
The fate of cutch management was conditioned above all 
by the widespread popular opposition that it provoked. In 
Upper Burma, peasants acting in league with cutch traders 
used bobabaina claims to undermine the new restrictions while 
at the same time asserting traditional claims to forest 
lands. In Lower Burma, cutch traders relied on covert methods 
of resistance, and shifting cultivators, who cleared fields
98 Wilkie, Yamethin District Gazetteer. 84-85; Pe Kin, 
"Thayetmyo Forest Division," Guardian (Rangoon) 16 (February 
1969): 48; P. Burnside and C.H. Thompson, Working Plan for 
Thayetmyo Forest Division. 1931-32 to 1940-41. vol. 1 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1933), 17.
99 Rodger, Handbook of Forest Products. 66-67.
Ironically, shifting cultivators responded to cutch shortages 
by "growing their own cutch," see A.N. Barker, Working Plan 
for Meiktila Forest Division. 1929-30 to 1958-59. vol. 1 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1931), 17.
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in sha tracts, defied colonial officials by continuing with 
practices that were now illegal. Conspicuous by its absence 
was the popular goodwill that was essential to cutch 
management.
The cutch issue is a reminder that state forest control 
was not nearly as successful or trouble-free as forest 
officials might have wished. Yet, the Forest Department's 
ability to regulate a range of forest activities at the turn 
of the century was much greater than it had been in 1881. As 
this chapter has shown, during the 'era of expansion' a vast 
new forest estate was acquired upon the annexation of Upper 
Burma and the Shan States. More importantly, an increasing 
proportion of Burma's commercially valuable forests was set 
aside in reserves. That process continued in the early 
twentieth century (Figure 2). By 1911, reserves covered 
26,077 square miles or 15 per cent of a total administered 
land area of 170,000 square miles.100 This transition from 
unreserved to reserved status is central to the subsequent 
development of forest politics in colonial Burma. If forest 
officials continued to regulate practises outside reserves, 
during the early twentieth century, their attention 
increasingly turned to the consolidation of control inside 
reserves.
100 Shein, Burma's Transport and Foreign Trade 1885- 
1914 (Rangoon: Department of Economics, University of
Rangoon, 1964), 12; Appendix C.
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Figure 2. Map of Reserved Forests, c. 1923
Source: Adapted from L. Dudley Stamp, The Vegetation of Burma from 
an Ecological Standpoint (Rangoon: University of Rangoon, 1924), S.
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CHAPTER 6
RATIONALIZING FOREST USE:
THE ERA OF CONSOLIDATION 1902-23
If the 1881 Act marked the start of a new phase in forest 
management based on the expansion of Forest Department 
control, then the passage of a new Burma Forest Act in 1902 
reflected a need to consolidate previous gains. Unlike its 
predecessor, the 1902 Act was "by no means revolutionary in 
character," and was largely designed to overcome the 
'inconvenience' of having separate laws for Upper and Lower 
Burma.1 No great debates marked its enactment in turn-of- 
the-century Burma, as was the case in the 1870s in Burma and 
India. The 1902 Act improved the efficiency of, rather than 
materially altered, existing legislation.
That the 1902 Act indicated 'business as usual' in 
Burma's forests should not obscure its symbolic and practical 
importance. After 1902, forest management became an ever more 
rigorous attempt to adapt reserves for long-term timber 
production according to scientific principles. Yet, as the 
next chapter shows, the Forest Department's ability to fulfil 
that task was brought into question in the 1920s and 1930s. 
In 1923, partial self-rule or dyarchy was introduced in 
Burma, and forests was among the first subjects transferred 
to Burmese ministerial control. Under this system, forest 
management was increasingly politicized.
To appreciate the full impact of dyarchy on the forest 
sector, however, it is necessary first to explore the 
development of forest administration in the early twentieth
1 H.M.S. Mathews, Burma Legislative Council
Proceedings f 19 December 1901, 2.
200
century. In a sense, the era of consolidation (1902-23) was 
relatively 'uneventful' when compared with what came before 
or after. On the one hand, the reserved area continued to 
expand, but less dramatically than in the late nineteenth 
century. On the other, the politics associated with Burmese 
nationalism had yet to have an impact on forest 
administration. But this calm was deceptive, for it hid 
important changes that shaped forest politics in the late 
colonial era.
Three changes were particularly significant. First, teak 
extraction increasingly devolved upon the Bombay Burmah 
Trading Corporation Limited (BBTCL) and other European firms, 
subject, however, to ongoing Forest Department control. 
Secondly, forest officials introduced comprehensive working 
plans in order to promote long-term commercial timber 
production. Attention also turned to such ecological issues 
as watershed protection and soil erosion as the Department 
elaborated its resource management mandate. Finally, the 
closing of the agricultural frontier in Lower Burma increased 
the pressure on residual plains and delta forests 
exacerbating conflict over access.
Timber Extraction by European Firms
The most dramatic change of the period concerned the 
European timber firms. From the turn of the century, five 
companies came to dominant the teak trade at the expense of 
Burmese timber traders and the Forest Department. If the 
BBTCL consolidated its preeminence, the early twentieth 
century also witnessed the rise to prominence of Steel 
Brothers, Macgregor and Company, Foucar and Company, and T.D.
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Findlay and Sons. Under a system of long-term renewable 
leases, these firms gained control of Burma's most valuable 
teak tracts. As Chapter 7 shows, this arrangement was 
criticized by Burmese nationalists after 1923. Here, the aim 
is to describe the reasons for this change, and to assess the 
implications for the Forest Department.
The role played by the European firms in the teak trade 
has been recorded in official company histories, as well as 
in the memoirs of former employees.2 But with the notable 
exception of the BBTCL, that role was not always a prominent 
one, at least in so far as teak extraction was concerned. 
Before 1897, only the BBTCL and Macgregor and Company were 
lease-holders, and the latter had been granted a lease in the 
Toungoo forests in 1889 primarily in order to counter­
balance the preponderance of the former in Upper Burma.3 It 
was only in 1897 that Steel Brothers and Foucar and Company 
secured leases in the Katha and Shwebo divisions, and T.D. 
Findlay and Sons did not commence forest work before 1903.4
Forest officials were understandably wary of extraction 
by these firms. After all, it was private enterprise that
2 A .C . Pointon, The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation 
Ltd. r 1863-1963 (Southampton: Millbrook Press, 1964); H.E.W. 
Braund, Calling to Mind: Being some account of the First
Hundred Years f!870 to 19701 of Steel Brothers and Company 
Ltd. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1975); J.H. Williams, Elephant 
Bill (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1950); A.A. Lawson, Life in 
the Burmese Jungle (Sussex: Book Guild, 1983); Hugh Nisbet, 
Experiences of a Jungle-Wallah (St. Albans: Gainsborough
Press, 1936).
3 J. Nisbet, "The Development and Trade of Burma," 
Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review 25 (1908): 90; RFA
(Pegu) for 1889-90, 11.
4 As noted, these firms did have prior experience in 
milling and marketing, see F.T. Morehead, The Forests of 
Burma (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1944), 44-47.
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was responsible for extensive over-harvesting in both Lower 
and Upper Burma prior to 1885. Not surprisingly, then, many 
in the Forest Department favoured the government contract 
system over private extraction.
In Upper Burma, the BBTCL's pre-colonial predominance 
was confirmed by the agreement of August 1888. With the 
exception of the Toungoo lease, however, Lower Burma's 
forests had been worked by Burmese contractors since the 
demise of the permit system in the 1870s. These were "not 
moneyed men," however, and consequently, they depended on 
cash advances to buy elephants and hire labourers.5 
Reiterating a point made by Brandis in the 1850s, Conservator 
Edwin P. Popert noted that this system induced local 
inhabitants "to take an interest in forest matters," and 
fostered an allegiance to the Forest Department.6 When 
queried on the matter by the Government of India in 1888, 
Burma's Conservators expressed satisfaction with the system, 
and subsequently, one Conservator predicted that it would be 
extended as leases expired in Upper Burma.7
5 E.P. Popert (Conservator, Pegu) to Assistant 
Secretary, 6 January 1888, Burma Forest Proceedings 
(henceforth BFP), (March 1888), 13-14. Between 1876 and 1879, 
the average annual gross earnings of a contractor working in 
the Pegu Yoma rarely exceeded 10,000 rupees; the most 
successful contractor - a Karen named Maung Engyke - earned 
59,377 rupees. In contrast, the annual average profit alone 
of the BBTCL during this period was at least 188,280 rupees. 
See Annual Report of the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation 
Limited (henceforth ARBBTCL), various years; D. Brandis, 
"Suggestions regarding Forest Administration in British Burma 
1881," India Forest Proceedings (henceforth IFP), (February 
1881), 355.
6 Popert to Assistant Secretary, 6 January 1888, 14; see 
also P.J. Carter, "Note on the Extraction of Timber by 
Government Agency in Burma," Indian Forester 21 (May 1895): 
183-95.
7 BFP (March 1888), 13-16; RFA (Eastern) for 1896-97,
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That prediction became more credible in 1898 when it was 
discovered that employees of the BBTCL had felled green teak 
in the Pyinmana forests. Following these revelations, the 
Corporation's lease in that area was cancelled, and a 120,000 
rupee fine was imposed.® Ernest Andrews, the Corporation's 
manager responsible for teak marketing and milling, wrote to 
a colleague that the situation was so grim at this moment 
that it seemed "pretty clear that our centre of gravity will 
have to be moved to Siam11.9
But it is a measure of how powerful the BBTCL had become 
in the late nineteenth century that the company was permitted 
to continue teak extraction in Upper Burma, albeit under a 
system of short and medium-term contracts. As the scandal 
broke, R.H. Macauley and C.B, Lacey (two of the BBTCL's 
senior managers) had been hastily dispatched to Simla to 
plead the Corporation's case before senior members of the 
Government of India. There, the two men successfully parried 
claims by the Forest Department that they, and other senior 
company officials, had possessed prior knowledge of the 
affair.10
As a result of these meetings, the Government of India 
ruled in 1899 that the lease (purchase contract) system was 
to be continued, subject to the state receiving "adequate 
remuneration", and extraction remaining within the "normal
30.
a J. Nisbet (Conservator, Eastern) to Revenue 
Secretary, 23 February 1898, BFP (April 1899), 87-90.
9 Cited in Pointon, Bombay Burmah, 41.
10 The Corporation also pledged to make "every effort" 
to prevent a recurrence of "the irregularities complained 
of," see ARBBTCL for 1897-98, 5.
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possibility” of the forests as determined by the Forest 
Department.11 Although the government reserved the right to 
work the forests if it was not satisfied with the terms 
offered by the European firms, this decision effectively 
eliminated the possibility of Department extraction in Upper 
Burma. As Burma's Revenue Secretary observed in a letter to 
Upper Burma's Conservators in March 1899: "the general
question of departmental extraction versus extraction by 
private firms has been settled and further remarks on it are 
not required".12 Concurrently, and as part of an attempt to 
prevent a BBTCL monopoly, the Government of India offered 
leases to the other European firms.13 With the exception of 
the Toungoo forests, this decision did not apply to Lower 
Burma.
In 1907, however, Lower Burma's forests were opened to 
private enterprise as part of a major reorganization of the 
teak extraction business. The Forest Department retained 
control over extraction in those forests drained by the 
Myitmaka river, but other forests that had been worked by 
government agency for more than thirty years were surrendered 
to the European firms. These firms were granted fifteen-year 
leases (with a fifteen-year renewal) in Upper and Lower
11 T.W. Holderness (Secretary, Government of India, 
Department of Revenue and Agriculture) to Revenue Secretary 
(Burma), 21 February 1899, BFP (June 1900), 12-13.
12 Revenue Secretary to Conservators (Eastern and 
Western Circles), 6 March 1899, BFP (June 1900), 14.
13 J. Wilson (Secretary, Government of India, Department 
of Revenue and Agriculture) to Revenue Secretary (Burma), 5 
October 1906, BFP (October 1907), 49. The leases were of
seven to ten years duration and all offers were accepted, see 
Resolution of the Lieutenant-Governor (hereafter Resolution) , 
RFA for 1899-1900, 1; RFA (Northern) for 1899-1900, 5.
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Burma.14 As Table 6.1 illustrates, the European firms were 
responsible for a growing percentage of the teak extracted.
TABLE 6.1
TEAK OUTTURN BY AGENCY 1900-1924 
(Average Annual Outturn in Tons)
Years Govt BBTCL Other Euro . Non-Euro. Total
1900-04 69,077 65,081 24,621 46,847 205,626
1904-09 69,721 80,918 60,608 26,228 237,475
1909-14 47,636 110,575 106,457 19,052 283,720
1914-19 75,286 119,441 133,589 16,852 345,168
1919-24 108,490 172,847 208,950 23,119 513,406
Source: H .R. Blanford, "Distribution of Teak Forests," Note
prepared
689.
for the Government of Burma, [1936], MSS Eur. D .
The general movement of teak production shows a steady rise 
during this period, but output increased most rapidly during, 
and immediately after, the First World War. However, this 
increase was accompanied by a re-allocation of production 
among the extraction agencies. The principle losers were the 
non-European or Burmese timber traders whose combined outturn 
fell from 23 per cent of total production in 1904-09, to 
under 5 per cent in 1919-24. Not only did the outturn of this 
group fall as a percentage of total outturn, it also fell in 
real terms: from an annual average of 46,847 tons in 1900- 
1904, to only 16,852 tons per annum during the period 1914-
19. If this dramatic drop partly reflected wartime economic 
conditions - Burmese traders were often unable to borrow the 
capital they needed to meet license pre-payments in the 
context of a general credit squeeze - the very modest nature
14 "Policy of Government to be pursued in the Allotment 
of Forests in Burma to Timber Firms," 14 September 1907, BFP 
(October 1907), 62-68.
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of the postwar increase was indicative of a broader trend.15 
Excluded from the most valuable teak tracts, Burmese firms 
had to settle for residual forests under less attractive 
short-term contracts. The different treatment accorded 
Burmese and European firms by the colonial state became the 
focus of sustained conflict in the 1920s and 1930s.
Department extraction also became less prominent in the 
twentieth century than it was in the nineteenth century. 
Although it temporarily increased over the period 1900-1924 
(the dip of 1909-14 notwithstanding), Department extraction 
as a percentage of total extraction fell: from one-third at 
the beginning of the period to one-fifth at the end. This 
decline continued in subsequent years: in 1927-28, it was
down to 11 per cent of the total, and outturn (50,344 tons) 
was less than half of the 1919-24 level. The shrinkage in 
output was a direct outcome of the restricted area allocated 
for such extraction. The circumscription of Department 
extraction also affected the Burmese contractors who worked 
on the Forest Department's behalf. Many of these men now 
became employees of the European firms: "the native
Government contractors lost their elephants and gradually 
became their servants".16
15 This credit squeeze also affected the extraction of 
non-teak timber by Burmese firms which declined by more than 
half during the first year of the war, see RFA for 1914-15,
20. On the dependence of Burmese timber traders on Burmese 
and Indian Chettiar money-lenders, see Burma Forest 
Department, Review of Forest Administration in Burma during 
the five years 1909-10 to 1913-14 (Rangoon: Government 
Printing, 1916), 17; RFA for 1915-16, 20? H.C. Walker, "The 
Issue of Timber Licenses in Burma," Indian Forester 43 
(February 1917): 70-75.
16 Kyaw, "An Old Forester Looks Back," Burmese Forester 
6 (June 1956): 24; RFA for 1900-1901, 28.
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If Burmese timber traders and the Forest Department 
became less important in teak extraction under the new 
system, the relative importance of the BBTCL vis-a-vis the 
other European firms was also reduced. Thus, although the 
BBTCL's outturn virtually trebled between 1900 and 1924, 
extraction by the other European lessees increased nearly 
three times as fast. The BBTCL share of total extraction by 
European firms fell during the same period from 73 per cent 
to less than 45 per cent. Through the judicious allocation 
of leases, the colonial state sought to prevent a BBTCL 
monopoly.
There were various reasons for the government's new 
extraction policy. First, and as a result of previous over­
harvesting, quality teak was becoming scarce in Burma.17 There 
were fears that the prevailing high prices and diminished 
supplies would favour Siamese teak or even the substitution 
of other woods on the international market.16 It was precisely 
these conditions, however, that favoured extraction by the 
European firms. Only these companies possessed the financial 
means to conduct the capital intensive extraction that was 
now required as the Forest Department sought to open up 
remote and inaccessible teak tracts. By the early twentieth 
century, the exhaustion of the most accessible forests had 
altered the economics of teak extraction. Large firms which
17 This was notably manifested in a decline in the 
percentage of squaring logs in favour of less valuable planks 
and undersized (yathit) logs, see Ernest Andrews, The Bombay 
Burmah Trading Corporation Limited in Burmah, Siam and Java, 
vol. 1, Teak: The Cutting and Marketing (n*p., 1930-31), 44.
18 T .A. Hauxwell, "The Teak Timber Trade of Burma," 
Indian Forester 31 (November 1905): 618; Shein, Burma's 
Transport and Foreign Trade. 1885-1914 (Rangoon: Department 
of Economics, University of Rangoon, 1964), 161-62.
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could muster hundreds, if not thousands, of elephants and 
workers were favoured at the expense of Burmese contractors 
who were rarely able to accumulate significant amounts of 
capital.
Secondly, the government promoted teak extraction by the 
European firms because it simplified forest management. Under 
the contract system, forest officials supervised the 
activities of a myriad of Burmese contractors, many of whom 
lived a hand-to-mouth existence on government advances. 
Chapter 3 noted that the administrative work associated with 
this system prompted some officials to support private 
extraction in the 1860s. As forest management became more 
complex in the early twentieth century, foresters once again 
noted the advantages of private extraction.19 With only five 
European firms on long-term leases to supervise, rather than 
hundreds of contractors on annual licenses, the Forest 
Department would be free to devote more time to forest 
conservancy without losing overall control of teak 
extraction. From this perspective, the revenue lost under 
the new system due to a lower rate of return on extracted 
teak would be partially offset by reduced management costs.20 
Moreover, revenue would become more stable as annual 
extraction became less dependent on the vicissitudes of 
contractor finances.
Third, the government was influenced by the lobbying of 
the European firms. The BBTCL was particularly important in
19 Hauxell, "Teak Timber Trade," 629, 631-32; RFA for 
1905-06, 8.
20 W.J. Keith, Burma Legislative Council Proceedings. 5 
April 1915, 396. For annual revenue and expenditure data, see 
Appendix D.
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this regard, and it's predominance in Upper Burma was used
to advantage in the lease negotiations. Specifically, the
prospect that the Corporation might shift its operations to
Siam worried some colonial officials.21 Not only would such
a move benefit Burma's chief competitor, it would also
disrupt timber extraction in Upper Burma. For, the Forest
Department had neither the staff nor the elephants to take
over from the European firms. And, as Conservator Thomas
Hauxwell warned:
it must not for one moment be imagined that the 
stopping of the purchase contract system would result 
in the working power [ie. elephants] being thrown 
into the hands of Government. The major portion would 
be transferred for similar work elsewhere, and in all 
probability a very large amount of invested capital 
in other directions would also disappear.22
In this gloomy prognostication, the withdrawal of private
capital was a major source of concern.
In practice, the European firms had no need to threaten
a capital strike. After the turn of the century, senior
officials in Burma, India and England were in agreement that
extraction by these firms needed to be increased at the
expense of Department extraction. Echoing remarks made by
William Wallace forty years earlier, Indian Revenue and
Agriculture Secretary J. Wilson summarized the new official
mood in 1906:
21 The BBTCL deputed John Bryce to investigate Siam's 
forests in 1884, but it was not until the 1890s that the firm 
began to elaborate its operations in the country, see ARBBTCL 
for 1883-84, 5; ARBBTCL for 1893-94, 4; see also Banasopit 
Mekvichai, "The Teak Industry in North Thailand: The Role of 
a Natural-Resource-Based Export Economy in Regional 
Development" (Ph.D diss., Cornell University, 1988), 110, 
204; Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam c. 1890- 
1920 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), 111-12.
22 Hauxwell, "Teak Timber Trade," 630.
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It is of great importance that the energies of the 
limited Forest Staff should be devoted mainly to the 
improvement of the forests under their charge, and 
that they should be relieved of operations which can 
be as efficiently conducted by private enterprise.23
After the turn of the century, Burma's foresters expressed 
similar sentiments. Conservators even went so far as to urge 
government to "gradually abandon" department extraction in 
favour of the purchase contract system.24 As noted, this 
about-turn reflected a recognition among forest officials 
that extraction work was hindering their ability to perform 
other tasks. But it also reflected a change of personnel: in 
1906, none of Burma's Conservators had served in that 
capacity prior to 1900. Conservators like Edwin Popert and 
John Nisbet, whose views on private enterprise had been 
shaped by the over-harvesting of the past, had retired or 
left Burma.
The new official mood was cemented by a network of 
social affiliations between colonial officials and employees 
of the European firms that was already in evidence in the 
nineteenth century, but which only received its fullest 
expression in the twentieth century. That network operated at 
various levels: company directors met with Whitehall
officials in London, local managers maintained links with 
senior administrators in Rangoon and Delhi, and assistants 
socialized with civil and forest officers in the district 
headquarters' Club. These affiliations served, among other 
things, to ensure the representation of corporate interests
23 Wilson to Revenue Secretary (Burma), 5 October 1906, 
BFP (October 1907), 49.
24 As reported by Chief Conservator F. Beadon Bryant in 
1906, and cited in Blanford, "Distribution of Teak Forests".
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at the key decision-making points in the imperial hierarchy.
As the following statement by a Burmese forester makes plain,
they were typically very effective in this regard too:
The Forest Officers almost all of them, being 
Europeans, were very friendly with the managers and 
assistants of those European firms. Consequently, 
hardly any native forest officer could dare to write 
a report against the firms even when they infringed 
certain clauses of the lease; also it was difficult 
to give straight-forward and bold explanations to the 
[Divisional Forest Officer] if he received reports 
from the European lessees against his native 
officers.25
If the European firms, and particularly the BBTCL, 
enjoyed considerable influence with government, the same 
could not be said of their Burmese counterparts. These firms 
were run by small capitalists who may have been influential 
in their local communities, but who possessed negligible 
influence with those senior officials in Rangoon, Delhi and 
London responsible for the allotment of teak leases. This 
lack of influence was to prove fatal for many Burmese 
companies as European firms acquired the most profitable teak 
leases. The Burmese teak-trading community was effectively 
'decapitated' in the early twentieth century.26
The government's support of the European firms may also 
have been motivated by broader political calculations. To 
understand why this was so, it is necessary to appreciate 
the changing nature of politics in twentieth-century colonial 
Burma.27 As Chapter 7 shows, the introduction of dyarchy in
25 Kyaw, “An Old Forester Looks Back," 24.
26 Aung Tun Thet, Burmese Entrepreneurship: Creative 
Response in the Colonial Economy (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag 
Wiesbaden, 1989), 64, 80-83.
27 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (London: C. 
Hurst, 1987), chap. 3.
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1923 resulted in the gradual politicization of forest
management. In the process, European predominance in the teak
trade became an issue in the nationalist campaign. Yet, there
were important political benefits to be gained from
consolidating extraction in non-Burmese hands. Although
referring to a different place and time, Anderson's
explanation as to why Indonesia's Suharto regime favoured
multinational corporations after 1967 is apposite:
The key to understanding this long-standing 
[arrangement] lies in recognizing the advantages that 
multinationals offer the state qua state. Thanks to 
their hierarchical structures, they provide the 
center with sizable, easily accessible 
revenues...they are [also] what one might call 'Grade 
A pariah entrepreneurs,' meaning that their 
executives have neither the interest nor the capacity 
to pursue political ambitions inside Indonesia. These 
corporations present no direct political threat to 
the state, as a powerful indigenous business class 
might do.28
There are clearly differences between the situation faced by 
multi-nationals in post-colonial Indonesia, and that which 
confronted the European firms in colonial Burma. The latter 
enjoyed privileged access to senior government circles that 
the former did not. Thus, an explanation of European 
preponderance in colonial Burma's teak trade must remain 
couched largely in terms of the importance of the imperial 
connection.
And yet, the advantages that Anderson suggests that the 
state realized in New Order Indonesia were also a factor in 
twentieth-century colonial Burma. Indeed, the fact that,
28 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: 
Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," 
Journal of Asian Studies 42 (May 1983): 477-96; reprinted in 
Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in
Indonesia r Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1990), 113.
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unlike President Suharto in Indonesia, the British in Burma 
faced a serious nationalist challenge to their rule made the 
concentration of economic power in non-indigenous hands all 
the more important to the maintenance of political control. 
As such, the preponderance of the European firms was part of 
a larger attempt to maintain colonial rule by preventing the 
Burmese from gaining access to the key means of capital 
accumulation. In turn, this hindered the development of an 
indigenous business class that might have linked up with 
aggrieved peasants to challenge colonial rule. Moreover, the 
restriction of Department extraction eliminated the 
possibility of significant capital appropriation by a 
'corrupt' Burmese Forests Minister after 1923. At the very 
least, the knowledge that teak extraction would be controlled 
by the European firms until the late 1930s, if not 
thereafter, must have been some comfort to colonial officials 
apprehensive about a transfer of forests to Burmese control.
If the European firms were thus favoured, the government 
did not completely give up its own extraction operations. In 
what became known as the Myitmaka Extraction Forest Division 
in 1921, Timber Assistants supervised Burmese contractors as 
before.29 Various reasons were put forth for the retention of 
Department extraction. At least initially, it was viewed as 
a means to guarantee the British Admiralty a regular supply 
of quality timber.30 Department extraction also served to
29 RFA for 1920-21, 49; Htao Hai, "Commercial vs. Quasi- 
Commercial Departmental Teak Extraction in Burma," Indian 
Forester 43 (March 1917): 111-16; H.W.A. Watson, Note on 
Departmental Extraction of Teak in Frome. Ziaon and 
Tharrawaddv Divisions (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1917).
30 RFA for 1909-10, 14; RFA for 1912-13, 26.
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sustain the small timber mills in Rangoon that depended on 
this source to stay in business. By keeping these mills in 
operation, the Department avoided becoming dependent on the 
big European firms which largely controlled teak milling in 
Burma.31 Further, it enabled the government to obtain accurate 
information as to extraction costs and the sale price of teak 
which could then be used in lease negotiations. Finally, such 
extraction gave the government some leverage over the local 
teak market, and was the principal means by which it could 
prevent price fixing and other forms of collusion among the 
lessees.32
As Department extraction was restricted to the Myitmaka 
watershed, forest officials could devote more time to forest 
management. During the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, they introduced working plans and other measures 
that regulated in great detail forest access. It is to the 
discussion of such measures that this chapter now turns.
Ecology and the Politics of Scientific Forestry
From the passage of the 1902 Act to the advent of dyarchy 
in 1923, the Forest Department consolidated control over 
Burma's forests and forest users. Whereas working plans 
minutely regulated socio-ecological conditions within 
reserves so as to maximize efficient commercial exploitation, 
a revised taunaya forestry system enhanced Department control 
over shifting cultivators. By the early 1920s, Burma's
31 RFA for 1912-13, 26; Maria Serena I. Diokno, "British 
Firms and the Economy of Burma, with Special Reference to the 
Rice and Teak Industries, 1917-1937" (Ph.D diss., University 
of London, 1983), chap. 6.
32 RFA for 1909-10, 14; Resolution, RFA for 1910-11, 2.
215
forests were managed much more intensively than had been the 
case in the nineteenth century, and this had important 
implications for forest conflict.
This more intensive style of forest management was 
epitomized in the creation of working plans. As developed by 
Brandis, the working plan was a rough forest survey designed 
to facilitate immediate extraction. As reserves were 
demarcated, however, the need for a location-specific 
approach became apparent, and in 1885, Deputy Conservator 
J.W. Oliver prepared the first modern working plan in the 
Thanze reserve, Tharrawaddy division.33 This plan sub-divided 
the reserve into blocks and compartments which were to be 
harvested on a rotational basis. As with other plans of the 
era, it was solely concerned with teak; "ordinary jungle 
woods" were to be sold "without restraint at nominal rates, 
as their removal would make room for teak".3* With this plan, 
the 'teak selection' system was formalized. In order to 
maintain, if not increase, the proportion of teak in the 
forest, climber cutting, and the removal of other species 
through 'improvement' fellings, were prescribed.
Over the next twenty years, the area under working plans 
expanded slowly as priority was given to reservation. But the 
need for working plans became more urgent as the government 
allocated timber leases to the European firms. In 1902, the 
Government of Burma introduced a five-year programme under 
which six working-plan parties were employed. Two years
33 J.W. Oliver, Working Plan of the Thonze Reserve 
(Rangoon: Government Press, 1885); H.R. Blanford, "Forest 
Management and Preparation of Working Plans in Burma," Empire 
Forestry 4, 1 (1925): 57-58.
34 Oliver, Thonze Reserve, 18.
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later, a new approach was adopted to expedite work in which 
the effort expended on the plan was linked to the value of 
its forests.35 The start of the First World War in 1914 halted 
field work, but not before most of the valuable Pegu Yoma and 
Chindwin reserves had been covered.36 From 1920, the creation 
of working plans was taken up with renewed vigour, and a 
special branch was formed within the Forest Department to 
facilitate this process. As Table 6.2 illustrates, plans 
covered an increasing proportion of the reserved area in the 
1920s.
TABLE 6.2
WORKING PLANS AS A PERCENTAGE OF RESERVED FORESTS,
1899-1930
(Selected Years? Amounts in Square Miles)
Year
1899-1900
1904-05
1909-10
1914-15
1919-20
1924-25a
1929-30a
A: Working Plans B: Reserved Forests A/B (%)
1,817 
3 ,388 
7,241 
8,857 
10,855 
12,083 
19,967
17,153
20,411
25,691
28,239
29,874
28,227
29,487
10.59 
16 .60 
28.18 
31. 36 
36. 34 
42 . 81 
67.71
"ForestSources: RFA (various years); H.R. Blanford,
Management and Preparation of Working Plans in Burma," Empire 
Forestry 4, 1 (1925): 58.
a. Figures for the Federated Shan States excluded.
35 Resolution, RFA for 1902-03, 2; Blanford, "Working 
Plans," 58-59. For a minor working plan prepared according to 
the fast-track method, see S.F. Hopwood, Working Plan for 
Thlnaadon-Yama and Patolon Workina-Circles (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1915).
36 Blanford, "Working Plans," 59; H.W.A. Watson, A Note 
on the Pegu Yoma Forests (Rangoon: Government Printing, 
1923), 22. Later, these plans were revised according to a 
standardized procedure, see Burma Forest Department, Working 
Plans Manual Burma f 3rd ed. (1938; reprint, Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1948).
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If the data lump together plans of varying scope and detail, 
the expansion in the area under working plans during this 
period was nonetheless remarkable. Whereas the reserved area 
nearly doubled in size, the area covered by plans increased 
more than tenfold.
And yet, these plans began to provide systematic 
guidelines for non-teak extraction only after the First World 
War. This omission reflected what Conservator F.B. Hanson in 
1903 suggested was "the exaggerated importance" of teak on 
the export market, and "the comparative neglect, not to say 
contempt, of all other kinds".37 If pyinkado and padauk had 
long been exported to India for conversion into railway 
sleepers and gun carriage wheels, attempts by the Forest 
Department to expand the non-teak timber trade failed 
miserably.38 The promotion of in exports is illustrative in 
this regard.39 A durable wood extensively used in Burma for 
house building (Appendix B), the government encouraged its 
export by offering concessions to the European firms in 1898 
(and again in 1906). These concessions included: 5,000 tons 
of free timber in the first year, 10,000 tons at half royalty 
during the next five years, and a fixed royalty thereafter. 
In addition, the government promoted this wood through the
37 F.B. Manson to Revenue Secretary, 8 June 1903, BFP 
(August 1903), 10; see also B.H. Baden-Powell, Memorandum on 
the Supply of Teak and Other Timbers in the Burma Markets 
(Calcutta: Government Printing, 1873), 5.
38 R.S. Troup, Burma Padauk (Calcutta: Government 
Printing, 1909), 39; RFA for 1874-75, 23-24; RFA for 1879- 
80, 48. Between 1876-77 and 1899-1900, the Department shipped 
3,785,013 tons of padauk to Madras and Bombay, see F.B. 
Manson (Conservator, Tenasserim) to Revenue Secretary, 21 
September 1901, BFP (January 1902), 123.
39 R.S. Troup, Burmese In Wood (Calcutta: Government 
Printing, 1909).
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dissemination of information and samples. Despite these 
efforts, the export trade failed to develop due to high 
freight charges and the conservatism of British timber 
buyers.40
Similar obstacles confronted the export of other 'jungle' 
woods.41 If jungle-wood exports increased in the early 
twentieth century - from 9,923 tons per annum (1901-05) to 
32,959 tons per annum (1911-15) - this trend merely reflected 
an attempt on the part of traders to find substitutes for 
expensive teak.42 Despite such export growth, moreover, teak 
continued to dominate Burma's timber exports: between 19Il­
ls, exports of all kinds of timber were 203,927 tons per 
annum, but teak exports constituted 170,968 tons or 84 per 
cent of the total.43
During the First World War, the urgent need for timber 
led to a more diversified extraction that included a variety 
of woods hitherto never exported.44 Concurrently, a visiting 
Canadian forester, H.R. MacMillan, urged Burma's foresters to 
take steps to develop the non-teak hardwood trade, and opined 
that there was "no sound reason" why revenue from the
40 Alexander L. Howard, "Commercial Prospects of Burma 
Woods," Asiatic Review 19 (July 1923): 396-99.
41 On the government's equally doomed efforts to promote 
the commercial use of bamboo, see R.W. Sindall, Report on the 
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Pulp in Burma (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1906); Morehead, Forests of Burma, 62- 
63.
42 Shein, Burma's Transport and Foreign Trade, 161-62.
43 Ibid., 161.
44 For example, such hardwoods as taukkyan (Terminalia 
tomentosa), panga (Terminalia Chebulal, as well as such 
softwoods as hnaw (Adina cordifolia'), didu (Bombax insicrne  ^
and letpan (Bombax malabaricumK  See RFA for 1917-18, app. I.
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country's hardwoods should not eventually rival that from 
teak.45 MacMillan's visit had a major impact in Burma, and led 
to a Department initiative designed to 'show the way' for 
private enterprise.46 The post-war enthusiasm for non-teak 
timber was also expressed in working plans as forest 
officials regulated the extraction of diverse species.47
This interest in non-teak timber was part of a broader 
attempt to rationalize forest use. From 1909, the Forest 
Department even debated whether to abandon the teak selection 
system in favour of the uniform system - the latter being a 
method which combined clear felling with natural regeneration 
on a sequential basis.45 An experimental working plan for the 
Mohnyin reserve (Katha division) was developed; during the 
First World War, a similar plan was drawn up for the 
Tharrawaddy division.49
45 H.R. MacMillan, "Notes on the Prospect of Working the 
Hardwood Forests of Burma," Indian Forester 42 (October
1916): 481-99; Htao Hai, "Burma Jungle Woods and the Europe 
Market," Indian Forester 45 (June 1918): 243-52.
46 BFP (April 1918); G.S. Hart, Note on a tour of 
Inspection in the Forests of Burma (Simla: Government Central 
Press, 1918), 7-8; F.A. Leete, Memorandum on Departmental 
Extraction v. Cooperation with Traders for the Development of 
Trade in Burma Hardwoods (Rangoon: Government Printing, 
1923) .
47 A.P. Davis, Working Plan for Indauno Working Circle 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1918); C.H. Philipp, Working 
Plan for Yinke Wording Circle (Rangoon: Government Printing, 
1921) .
48 Proceedings of the First Burma Forest Conference held 
at Maymyo between the 13th and 20th June 1910 (Rangoon:
Government Printing, 1910); H.C. Walker, "The Uniform System 
in Burma," Indian Forester 41 (April 1915): 105-11; H.R.
Blanford, "The Uniform System in Burma," Indian Forester 41 
(October 1915): 366-71.
49 H.R. Blanford, The Mohnyin Working Plan (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1911); H.R. Blanford and D. Ellis, 
Working Plan for the Yoma Reserves in the Tharrawaddy 
Division. 3 vols. (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1918-19).
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These developments had important implications for various 
forest users, but particularly shifting cultivators. The 
connection between changes in extraction techniques, and the 
Forest Department's relationship with these individuals, 
becomes more evident if the development of taunaya forestry 
from the 1880s until the 1930s is reviewed.
As Chapter 3 noted, a primary function of the taunava 
forestry system was to convert an ecological 'menace' into 
something more useful. But the use of shifting cultivators 
to plant teak in their taunayas was paradoxical in so far as 
it was predicated on a way of life that was to be eliminated. 
Each acre planted with slow maturing teak (150 or more years) 
was an acre no longer available for use by the hill Karen. As 
cultivators were shifted from one location to another, the 
meaning of their work also changed. They became forest 
labourers who also grew food and cash crops, rather than 
semi-autonomous agriculturists who happened to plant teak.
This transformation occurred slowly, and was never 
completed under colonial rule. Yet, by the late nineteenth 
century, some areas were already planted up. In the West 
Salween division, for example, it was reported that the Karen 
were "beginning to realize that they are virtually building 
themselves out, as the eligible lands become occupied with 
the teak they are planting".50 Similar sentiments were 
expressed by Karen in Tharrawaddy division, where a 
sympathetic Deputy Commissioner urged that action was 
required to check "the gradual elimination of the taungya
50 RFA (Lower Burma) for 1892-93, lxi; see also RFA 
(Pegu) for 1895-96, 10; RFA (Pegu) for 1897-98, 14; RFA for 
1901-02, 23.
221
cultivator by the Forest Department which is now in
progress11.51 However, in most of Lower Burma's teak forests,
the situation was the same: cultivators were being hemmed in
by plantations and reserves.52
Foresters viewed this process with equanimity:
It should not be forgotten that toungya [sic] 
cultivation is a system that must in time die out, 
when the population has increased sufficiently. To 
reserve a portion of forests against taungya is 
simply to anticipate by a few years what ultimately 
must happen anyhow.53
The spatial dislocation of shifting cultivators into an ever
smaller area simply mimicked what 'natural' processes would
do. The contradiction between this attempt to eliminate a
valued way of life, and a broader campaign to gain the
support of the hill Karen, was a recurrent source of tension
between cultivators and the Forest Department.54
Hill Karen and foresters nevertheless cooperated to their
mutual benefit. In the late nineteenth century, such
cooperation was at its height (Table 6.3).
51 J.J. Cronin, cited in RFA for 1895-96, lxix.
52 Cultivators applied in vain for the opening to them 
of reserves, see F.W. Collings, "Note on the Possibility of 
Permanent Cultivation in the Upper Reaches of the Baingda- 
Daik-U Township," BFP (June 1916), 154-55.
53 B.H. Baden-Powell, The Forest System of British Burma 
(Calcutta: Government Printing, 1873), 12.
54 Shifting cultivators resisted by cultivating in 
forbidden areas, see A.H.M. Barrington, Working Plan for 
North Zamayi Reserve (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1919), 2, 
10; C.W.D. Kermode, Working Plan for Henzada Forest Division. 
1929-30 to 1938-39. vol. 1 (Rangoon: Government Printing,
1929), 20.
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TABLE 6.3
GROWTH IN TAUNGYA PLANTATIONS, 1886-1934 
(Area in Acres)
Year Planted Annual Increase Total
1886-96 31,741 3 ,174 42,059
1896-06 28,496 2,850 70,555
1906-16 6,291 629 76,846
1916-24 21,894 2,737 98,740
1924-34 16,610 1,661 115,350a
Sources: RFA (various years).
Note: Numbers include all species planted by this method but 
teak was at least 75 per cent of the total.
a. Estimate only? assumes taunava plantations were 86 per 
cent of the total planted area, as in 1923-24, the last year 
for which this figure was provided.
The initial sharp rise in the planted area - from 10,318 
acres in 1886 to 70,555 acres in 1906 or a sevenfold increase 
- gives us some indication of the Forest Department's early 
enthusiasm for this reforestation method. After 1906, 
however, the record becomes more ambiguous.
As the plantations matured, problems began to emerge that 
tempered the initial enthusiasm. It had been assumed, for 
example, that teak required only two years of weeding and 
clearing; in fact, a much more extensive time was needed. The 
trees also required thinning in order to ensure proper 
growth, a process that had been neglected,65 These seemingly 
innocuous ecological miscalculations had serious financial 
and administrative consequences. Extra plantation work cost 
the Department scarce funds. Moreover, additional supervision
55 B. Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India (Calcutta: 
Government Printing, 1900), 194-95? J. Nisbet, Burma under 
British Rule and Before (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 
1901), 2: 83-84.
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was needed to check an increasingly complex system, thereby
placing a new burden on an already overextended staff.56
Inevitably, the quality of the work declined. As plantations
expanded, supervision decreased, leaving cultivators free to
choose their own sites? all too frequently, these sites were
already stocked with teak, thereby defeating the purpose of
adding to, and not replacing natural stocks.57
More importantly, critics questioned the principles on
which taungya forestry was based. Foreshadowing future
debates,58 a number of foresters challenged the efficacy of
teak monoculture, arguing that the increased probability of
disease and insect damage associated with concentrated
regeneration would offset any benefits. As Assistant
Conservator H.N. Thomson warned in 1896:
Teak is not by nature a gregarious tree, and all our 
efforts to make it so are sure not to be so 
successful as is anticipated...Teak, when growing in 
pure patches, as the result of taungya plantations, 
is peculiarly liable to damage from insects, fungi 
and other pests, which danger is greatly reduced when 
it is mixed with other species.59
In the twentieth century, scientific evidence tended to
confirm Thomson's warning. It was found, for example, that
teak was naturally subject to the predations of an insect
pest known as the bee-hole borer fXyleutes ceramica1), but
56 RFA for 1905-06, 6; H.C. Walker, "Reproduction of 
Teak in Bamboo Forests in Lower Burma," Indian Forester 30 
(February 1904): 51.
57 RFA for 1904-05, 11. Cultivators also picked flat, 
swampy ground that was often better suited for their crops 
than for teak, see J.D. Clifford, "The Formation of Teak 
Taungya Plantations in Burma," Indian Forester 43 (March
1917): 121.
58 Julian Evans, Plantation Forestry in the Tropics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 413-16.
59 RFA (Tenasserim) for 1895-96, 8.
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that damage was much higher in plantations than in mixed
forests. In the early 1930s precise data became available,
but even then the ambiguous nature of that data left
foresters divided.60
The fortunes of taungya forestry fluctuated in accordance
with these ecological cum administrative debates. Between
1906 and 1918, planting virtually ceased as attention turned
to natural regeneration techniques such as improvement
fellings.61 Yet, planting not only resumed at the end of the
First World War, it became an integral part of plans to
convert Burma's forests to uniformly aged timber stands.62
Suddenly, as Chief Conservator Frederick Leete observed,
cultivators had acquired a new respectability:
The change of attitude with regard to the taungya 
cutter is remarkable. For many years Forest Officers 
looked upon him as an unmitigated curse. It is now 
recognized, however, that he can play a useful part, 
and that, in the taungya cutter Burma possesses an 
extremely valuable asset in the regeneration of 
forests.63
This new respectability soon ended, however. The reluctance 
of the European firms to enter the non-teak timber trade, 
combined with the government's decision in the early 1920s
60 At issue was whether the incidence of rainfall or the 
concentration of teak was ultimately to blame for the damage. 
See C.W. Scott, Measurements of the Damage to Teak Timber by 
the Beehole Borer Moth (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1932); 
H . G . Champion, The Problem of the Pure Teak Plantation 
(Calcutta: Government Printing, 1932); Kyaw Sein, “The Bee- 
Hole Borer of Teak," Burmese Forester 13 (December 1963): 32- 
39.
61 Taungya forestry still had its supporters during 
these years, see G.S. Hart, Note on a Tour of Inspection in 
Burma (Simla: Government Central Branch Press, 1914), 9-10. 
Hart was Inspector General during the First World War.
62 H.R. Blanford, “Regeneration with the Assistance of 
Taungya in Burma," Indian Forest Records 11, 3 (1925): 83.
63 RFA for 1918-19, 4.
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not to undertake the extraction of such wood departmentally, 
reduced the appeal of the uniform system, and with it, that 
of the shifting cultivator.64
The onset of the Great Depression sealed the fate of 
taunaya forestry. In 1935, the Government of Burma declared 
that the system was 'too speculative' an endeavour to be 
justifiable on economic, or any other grounds, and ordered 
its gradual termination. Although many foresters protested 
this decision, the British empire's first system of taungya 
forestry had effectively come to an end.65
The vicissitudes of the system have tended to obscure 
the broader political changes that redefined taunaya forestry 
even as its fate was being debated. As noted, the system was 
partly designed to increase state control in the politically 
unstable, but economically important Pegu Yoma at a time of 
British weakness. By the twentieth century, the need for such 
an arrangement was less pressing. An improved transportation 
and communications network, and a more extensive knowledge of 
Burma's forests and inhabitants, were only part of a larger 
process of state empowerment.66 In 1900 forest officials were
64 On Steel Brother's disappointing experience with non­
teak extraction in the interwar period, see Braund, Calling 
to Mind. 53-54; R.J. Sayres, Working Plan for Pvinmana Forest 
Division. 1936-37 to 1946-47. vol. 2 (Rangoon: Government 
Printing, 1937), 100. Earlier, the BBTCL extracted pyinkado 
for the Burmese sleeper trade, but abandoned the business 
after repeated losses, see ARBBTCL for 1895-96, 4; ARBBTCL 
for 1900-1901, 4.
65 The decision is reprinted in RFA for 1939-40, 20; see 
also, RFA for 1934-35, 19; RFA for 1935-36, 20; C.W.D.
Kermode, "Natural and Artificial Regeneration of Teak in 
Burma," Indian Forester 72 (January 1946): 15-21.
66 Taylor, State in Burma, chap. 2.
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in a much stronger position to regulate forest activities 
than were their predecessors in 1870.
That increased power was reflected in the more systematic 
approach which was now taken toward the taunaya question. If 
an outright ban was never seriously considered, efforts were 
still made to persuade the hill Karen to take up permanent 
cultivation.67 Such efforts were, however, largely to no 
avail.
None of them, in fact, would think of engaging in 
any permanent cultivation either in the hills or in 
the plains unless ya-cutting were prohibited, and 
then only as an alternative to working as a coolie.
The Karen believes that the jungle will continue to 
support the present generation, and is incapable of 
looking beyond that.66
As a result, attention centred on the strict regulation of
taunaya activities. Wherever possible, the area set aside in
reserves for that purpose was reduced; to facilitate the
process, a census of Karen living in the Pegu Yoma was also
conducted.69 Conservator J.W.A. Grieve captured the prevailing
mood when he noted that "the taungya-cutter is like a forest
67 A ban was not considered for at least two reasons. 
First, forest officials relied on cultivators to serve as 
labourers, particularly in remote areas where labour was 
scarce and expensive. Secondly, the problems associated with 
forcibly evicting thousands of cultivators from the forest 
were formidable, and probably beyond the ability of even the 
colonial state to overcome.
68 E.F. Baum, "Report on the proposal to induce Karen 
taunqya-cutters in the Upper Baingda Drainage Area to settle 
down to permanent cultivation," BFP (June 1916), 164.
69 H.W.A. Watson, Working Plan for Pyu-chauna and Pyu- 
kun Reserves (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1902), 3; idem, 
"Taungya Cutting," Indian Forester 34 (May 1908): 264-69; 
J.S. Vorley, Working Plan for Prome Forest Division. 1930- 
31 to 1939-40. vol. 1 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1935),
222-27. The number of taungya cutters in this area was 1,054 
in 1922, down from 1,757 at the time of settlement, see 
Watson, Peau Yoma Reservesr app. IV.
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fire, he is a bad master, but, under control, he is the best 
servant the forest can have".70
To this end, the Forest Department established forest 
villages for its indigenous employees doing planting and 
other work. Under the Burma Village Amendment Act (1921), 
forest officials were granted extensive powers, and assumed 
the responsibilities of subdivisional civil officers in these 
villages. These changes increased the ability of the 
Department to specify the rights and duties of cultivators.71 
In the Pyinmana division, for example, villagers were not 
allowed to have more than six acres of cultivable land each 
as "a greater grant merely means that the villager becomes 
too affluent or that most of his time is spent in 
cultivation" ,72
Other political changes also affected the status of 
taunaya forestry. Upon the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886, 
the British obtained a vast new forest estate. As the Forest 
Department extended its operations into this area, limited 
funds and staff prevented the promotion of planting in Upper
70 J.W.A. Grieve, "Note on Forest Policy in Burma," 
Indian Forester 42 (September 1916): 446-47.
71 Government of Burma, Village Manual (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1940), 119-25; A.P. Davis, "Forest
Villages in Burma," Indian Forester 49 (December 1923): 641- 
45. Cultivators often resisted this more regimented work 
arrangement, see RFA for 1917-18, 31; RFA for 1921-22, 53; 
G.S. Shirley, "Growing of Timber so far as Forest Villages 
and Taungyas are concerned (Burma)," Third British Empire 
Forestry Conference Papers (1928): 612-15; A.F.R. Brown,
Wprking Plan for Yamethin Forest Division, vol. 1 (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1932), 30-31.
72 F.G. Burgess and C.R. Robbins, Working Plan for 
Pyinmana Forest Division. 1927-28 to 1936-37. vol. 1 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1929), 121.
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Burma.73 Instead, a system of natural regeneration based on 
improvement fellings was adopted. Under these conditions, it 
was almost inevitable that interest in intensive silviculture 
would decline (the brief interest in the uniform system 
notwithstanding). As Conservator John Nisbet noted, the 
introduction of taunaya forestry was predicated in part on 
British control of the more limited teak forests of Lower 
Burma.74
These factors contributed to the ambiguous status of the 
system in the twentieth century. Such ambiguity heightened 
the financial insecurity of cultivators who depended on 
emoluments from the Forest Department. For many hill Karen, 
taungya forestry had become a way of life. Yet, just as the 
colonial state undermined their relatively autonomous 
lifestyle in the 1860s, it now disrupted their new-found 
dependency in the late colonial period. Not for the last 
time, Karen who trusted the British, in the end felt 
betrayed.75
73 Taunaya forestry was attempted with Kachin living in 
the Bhamo division in the 1920s. However, the experiment was 
at first stymied by "the slackness and opium-smoking 
tendencies of the forest villagers"? it thereafter remained 
a small-scale operation, see E.S. Hartnoll and F.T. Morehead, 
Working Plan for the Kaukkwe Portion of the Bhamo Forest 
Division. 1935-36 to 1947-48 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 
1936), 20, 25.
74 J. Nisbet, "Notes on Improvement Fellings for the 
Benefit of Teak in Fire-protected Reserved Forests, Burma," 
Indian Forester 25 (May 1899): 202-14.
75 Even foresters recognized that policy changes were 
"grossly unfair", see H.W.A. Watson, "Forestry in Lower 
Burma," Indian Forester 44 (May 1918): 215. Following the 
Second World War, Karen felt betrayed when they were not 
granted independence by the British, see Martin Smith, Burma: 
Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 
1991), 50-52, 72-87 passim, 110-12, 137-54 passim.
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If the cooperation embodied in the taungya forestry 
system began to break down in the early twentieth century, 
other factors increased the likelihood of conflict between 
the colonial state and shifting cultivators. Specifically, 
a growing ecological concern focused attention on the 
practises of hill peoples throughout Burma. As Chapters 2 
and 3 illustrated, criticism of shifting cultivators, and 
the Karen in particular, was a prominent feature of early 
colonial rule. During the nineteenth century, such criticism 
reflected an overriding interest in the protection of teak, 
and was usually only indirectly about ecological questions. 
In contrast, forest officials in the twentieth century became 
increasingly concerned about hill erosion, siltation and 
flooding.
There were several reasons for this change. First, as 
the main teak tracts were demarcated, the Forest Department 
reserved forest lands that were valuable for other reasons. 
Forests containing sha, and other commercial species were 
sporadically demarcated.76 But forests were also reserved 
predominantly, if not exclusively, for ecological reasons. 
The creation of ecological (as opposed to teak or sha  ^
reserves was an integral part of the elaboration of forest 
control in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Secondly, forest officials were influenced by the 
Government of India's 1894 statement on forest policy. If 
Dalhousie's Minute of 1855 had established the state's 
intention to manage commercially valuable forests (such as 
teak forests), the 1894 statement went further by laying down
76 For example, see F.C. Owens, Pakokku District 
Gazetteer (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1913), 59.
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the general principles according to which all of British- 
India's forests were to be managed.77 Thus, it recognised four 
types of forest: (1) protection forests to be maintained on 
climatic or physical grounds; (2) commercial forests to be 
managed for timber production? (3) local supply forests 
designed to satisfy subsistence needs? and (4) pasture lands. 
Prompted by criticism that the forest service in India was 
paying insufficient attention to the needs of the 
subcontinent's agricultural population, the policy statement 
was primarily intended to address that issue.78 As such, it 
was only partially applicable to Burma, where different 
conditions (such as a more favourable population-to-land 
ratio) prevailed.
If Chief Commissioner Frederick Fryer concluded that the 
1894 statement was of "little application to Burma," the 
document nevertheless encouraged a greater ecological 
awareness among officials.79 Through reservation and new 
restrictions on shifting cultivators, forest officials sought 
to protect watersheds, and thereby (it was believed) 
safeguard the plains villages from flooding and decreased 
water supplies. At first, attention focused on the dry 
deciduous and scrub forests of central Burma, but 
subsequently, the Forest Department targeted more remote
77 Resolution of the Government of India, Department of 
Revenue and Agriculture, Circular No. 22F, 19 October 1894, 
BFP (December 1894), 65-71.
78 Specifically, the government was responding to a 
report on Indian agriculture by Dr. Voelcker published in
1893, see Madhav Gadgil and Raraachandra Guha, This Fissured 
Land: An Ecological History of India (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 135.
79 Revenue Secretary to Inspector General, 20 December
1894, BFP (December 1894), 73-74.
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areas in northern Burma and the Shan States.80 Between 1897 
and 1909, over 2,000 square miles were reserved, and in the 
latter year, 3,700 square miles were being considered for 
reservation, for reasons "at least partially climatic".01
The impetus for ecological reservation came from a belief 
that deforestation in the hills was linked to agricultural 
distress in the plains, as well as to general climate change. 
In 1909, however, when the Government of India inquired into 
this matter, it found that when pressed to substantiate the 
link between deforestation and ecological change, forest and 
civil officials were generally unable to do so.62 There was no 
evidence to suggest that rainfall, ground-water levels or 
flooding had significantly changed in recent decades, despite 
a reduction in overall forest cover. And, as Burma's Revenue 
Secretary noted, there was no sign that "serious injury to 
cultivation or other interests" was occurring either.83 
Despite such inconclusive evidence, the governments of Burma
80 A.M. Reuther (Conservator, Pegu) to Revenue 
Secretary, 21 May 1899, BFP (July 1899), 313; Review of the 
Chief Conservator, RFA for 1905-06, 1; Alex Rodger, Forest 
Reservation in Burma in the Interests of an Endangered Water- 
Supply (Calcutta: Government Printing, 1909); Ralph Neild and 
J.A. Stewart, Kvaukse District Gazetteer (Rangoon: Government 
Printing, 1925), 85-86; G.W. Dawson, Bhamo District Gazetteer 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1912), 46; RFA for 1909-10, 
67.
81 G.F. Arnold (Revenue Secretary) to Secretary, 
Government of India (Department of Revenue and Agriculture), 
15 July 1909, BFP (December 1909), 90, 96-99.
82 BFP (December 1909), 9-122.
83 G.F, Arnold to Secretary, Government of India, 
Department of Revenue and Agriculture, 15 July 1909, BFP 
(December 1909), 89.
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and India continued to uphold a policy of watershed 
protection.84
In a sense, this policy was more about the regulation of 
shifting cultivation then it was about watershed protection. 
In his submission to the inquiry, Chief Conservator John H. 
Lace noted that although "the reservation of large areas [to 
protect teak] has done much to prevent the denudation of 
important catchment areas,” the restriction of shifting 
cultivation remained the "most urgent" task facing the 
government.03 In the twentieth century, foresters blamed 
cultivators for ecological degradation throughout Burma, even 
if there were plausible alternative explanations.86 Diverse 
hill peoples and practices were lumped together and blamed 
for erosion, flooding and landslips; processes that occurred 
naturally, but for which colonial reports typically made no 
allowance.87
84 Ibid., 90-91; E.D. MacLagan (Secretary, Government of 
India) to Department of Revenue and Agriculture, Circular No. 
8F, 28 April 1911, BFP (June 1911), 19-21.
85 Lace to Revenue Secretary, 16 March 1909, BFP 
(December 1909), 59-60.
85 The association of shifting cultivators with 
ecological degradation remains strong today, see Thiem 
Komkris, "Forestry Aspects of Land Use in Areas of Swidden 
Cultivation," in Farmers in the Forest: Economic Development 
and Marginal Agriculture in Northern Thailand, ed. Peter 
Kunstadter, E.C. Chapman and Sanga Sabhasri (Honolulu: 
University Press of Hawaii, 1978), 61-70; Evelyne Hong,
Natives of Sarawak: Survival in Borneo's Vanishing Forests 
(Penang: Institut Masyarakat, 1987), 135-38.
07 F.B. Manson, "The Erosion of the Hills to the East of 
the Sittang River, Burma," Indian Forester 31 (April 1905):
223-27; D.E.B. Manning, "Some Aspects of the Problem of 
Taunayas in Burma," Indian Forester 67 (October 1941): 502- 
5; T .S . Thompson, Soil Erosion and its Control in the Shan 
States , Burma (n.p., 1944).
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In addition to the creation of reserves, the Forest 
Department restricted shifting cultivation in ecologically- 
fragile, but unreserved hill forests under the 1902 Act and 
Rules. Rule 19, for example, prohibited cultivation in 
designated public forest lands; other rules were more 
selective, and applied to teak, and (in Arakan) oyinkado 
forests.80 These rules were a flexible means to restrict 
tauncryas without having to resort to the more costly and time 
consuming measure of reservation. They also could be applied 
quickly over an extensive area. In 1909-10, Rule 19 was used 
to cover 100 square miles in Arakan and 222 square miles in 
the Ruby Mines district.09
The ability of the Forest Department to enforce these 
rules was conditioned in part by its expansion in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Table 6.4 illustrates 
the growing size and complexity of the Department in this 
period.
88 Burma Forest Act (1902), sec. 33 (2a/b); Rule nos. 
17-19. The penalty for breach of these rules was six months 
imprisonment, a five-hundred rupee fine, or both (Rule 98). 
See Government of Burma, The Burma Forest Manual (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1922).
89 Review of the Chief Conservator, RFA for 1909-10, 1. 
Shifting cultivators were often able to resist this sweeping 
but difficult to enforce rule, see Kermode, Henzada Forest 
Division, 1: 6; H . B . Barrett, Working Plan for Bassein Forest 
Division. 1929-30 to 1938-39, vol. 1 (Rangoon: Government 
Printing, 1930), 5.
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TABLE 6.4
GROWTH OF THE FOREST DEPARTMENT, 1893-1923 
(Sanctioned Strength)
Position 1893 1907 1923
Chief Conservator _ 1 1
Conservators 4 4 9
D/A Conservators 35 56 103
Forest Engineers - - 10
Extra D/A Conservators 15 60 110
Total 54 121 233
Sources: Revenue Secretary (Burma) to Secretary, Government 
of India (Department of Revenue and Agriculture), 6 July
1893, BFP (July 1893), 8; Great Britain, Minutes of Evidence 
taken before the Royal Commission upon Decentralization in 
India. vol. 3 (London: H.M.S.O., 1908), 131; Great Britain, 
Indian Statutory Commission, Memorandum submitted by the 
Government of Burma to the Indian Statutory Commission, vol. 
11 (London: H.M.S.O., 1930), annexure 1: Forest Department, 
60-61.
Note: D = Deputy; A = Assistant
In practice, the actual strength of the forest service often 
lagged behind its sanctioned level. In 1907, for example, 
there were 91 officials on active service, or 75 per cent of 
the allowable level. In 1923, there were 160 officers on 
duty, or just 69 per cent of the full complement. The growth 
in the number of forest officials was nevertheless 
impressive. Between 1893 and 1923, the operational strength 
of the forest service grew threefold.
But the Forest Department not only grew in size, it also 
became more complex as new posts were added. The most 
important addition was that of Chief Conservator in 1905.90 
Between 1876 (when a second Conservatorship was established)
90 Appendix E lists Burma's Chief Conservators between 
1905-42.
235
and 1905 (by which time there were four Conservators) , no
single forest official held supreme charge in Burma. The
Province's Conservators corresponded with the Inspector-
General of Forests in India on technical questions, but
otherwise reported to the Lieutenant Governor through the
Revenue Secretary. The latter was typically unfamiliar with
forestry. The result was a procedure scarcely designed to
inspire confidence:
It consequently often occurs that, when important 
suggestions are made by any one Conservator, the 
opinions of the other three are taken; and if it 
should happen that two are for and two against the 
proposals, the matter is shelved indefinitely.91
The post of Chief Conservator was designed to remedy this
situation. As head of the Department in Burma, this official
became the principal forestry adviser to the Government of
Burma. In addition to assuming responsibility for many of the
technical matters previously controlled by the Inspector-
General of Forests, he was also placed in charge of
government timber sales.92
Technical positions were also created. In 1913, a
Research Officer was appointed, and following the First World
War, the posts of Silviculturist and Botanist were created.93
From 1920, Forest Engineers were appointed to improve Burma's
road network.9* Such functional diversification continued in
91 Nisbet, Burma under British Rule. 1: 248.
92 Great Britain, Minutes of Evidence, 3: 131.
93 H.R. Blanford, "Highlights of One Hundred Years of 
Forestry in Burma," Burmese Forester 6 (June 1956): 16-17; 
A.H.M. Barrington, "Forest Development in Burma," Empire 
Forestry 4, 2 (1925): 256.
94 As noted, teak was extracted by river. However, the 
lack of metalled roads hindered non-teak extraction. As these 
woods could not be floated out, they had to be transported by
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the 1920s - the posts of Zoologist, Forest Economist and Game 
Warden were created - and was only brought to a halt by the 
Great Depression of the 1930s.
As manifested in its increased size and complexity, the 
Forest Department was more powerful than it had been in the 
past. It was able to regulate timber extraction and shifting 
cultivation as never before. But as forest officials sought 
to strengthen their hold over Burma's forests in the early 
twentieth century, they met the growing opposition of Burmese 
peasants. Broad societal and ecological changes limited the 
ability of the Department to protect forests, especially near 
populated areas, at a time when the need for such protection 
was most pressing.
Forest Crime as Everyday Resistance
That inability was nowhere more evident than in the case 
of the plains and delta reserves.95 In a sense, efforts to 
safeguard these forests went against the grain of colonial 
policy. After all, Burmese cultivators had been encouraged by 
the British to view low-lying forest as an obstacle to be 
overcome. Indeed, the conversion of such forest into paddy 
fields was facilitated by diverse financial incentives. Thus, 
colonial officials exempted recently occupied land from
cart, but unpaved roads limited the carting season, see RFA 
for 1922-23, 27-28.
95 For the purposes of this study, no distinction is 
made between plains and delta reserves. The former 
encompassed low-lying areas covered by mixed evergreen and 
deciduous forest and dry deciduous and scrub forest; the 
latter incorporated the mangrove swamps of the Irrawaddy 
Delta (Appendix B). For a brief description, see J.B. 
Carrapiett, "Plains Forests," Burmese Forester 2 (March 
1952): 15-18; Pe Kin, "From the Hills to the Delta," Guardian 
(Rangoon) 15 (October 1968): 39-44, and 15 (November 1968): 
12-16.
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taxation for up to twelve years, arranged for the conversion 
of squatter's tenurial rights to full legal ownership, kept 
taxes on fallow lands low, and waived payment of the 
capitation tax for the first two years of a migrant's 
residency.96 Moreover, the state funded the construction of 
canals and embankments, and improved river and land transport 
networks, as part of a grand attempt "to facilitate the 
movement of labour and export products and to make 
cultivation of empty lands possible".97 However, if colonial 
officials encouraged agriculture, they also recognized that 
selected plains forests had to be spared the axe in order to 
provide villagers with a ready supply of timber and fuel. In 
a context of rapid agricultural expansion, that task was 
always difficult, but it became ever more so as residual 
forests were whittled away.
To appreciate why this was so, it is necessary to grasp 
the sheer scale of agricultural expansion under British rule. 
Between 1852 and 1905-06, the area under rice cultivation in 
Lower Burma expanded from about 700,000/800,000 acres to 
nearly 6,000,000 acres. Concurrently, the Delta's population 
climbed from about one million in 1852 to over four, million 
in 1901 .98 Prior to 1880, land clearance was concentrated in 
Prome, Henzada and Tharrawaddy districts, as well as around 
the expanding towns of Rangoon, Bassein and Pegu. In many 
cases, this process involved the reclamation of fallow or
96 Michael Adas, The Burma Delta: Economic Development 
and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier. 1852-1941 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 33-36.
97 Ibid., 35,
98 Ibid., 58.
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previously cultivated lands, rather than the removal of 
primary forest. In the last two decades of the century, 
however, Burmese and Indian migrants increasingly cleared 
virgin, and predominantly forested lands in the lower delta 
region. It is estimated that at least three million hectares 
of kanazo (Heritiera fomesl forest alone were eliminated in 
this manner."
Adas suggests that this ecological transformation was
viewed with equanimity by peasant and official alike.
Colonial administrators, Indian migrants, and Burmese 
peasants all became so caught up in the rewarding 
process of clearing, cropping, marketing, milling, 
and exporting rice that no one...gave a thought to 
the destruction of the great rainforests that was a 
central consequence of the delta's development...to 
participants at all levels the forest was seen only 
as an obstacle. To British officials it was a 
striking symbol of precolonial backwardness, 
ignorance, and neglect. Its transformation into rice 
paddies was repeatedly cited by colonial 
administrators as clear proof of the superiority of 
European over indigenous rule.100
The benefits of agricultural clearance undoubtedly obscured
the ecological effects of extensive deforestation. However,
the British were concerned about the social implications of
this change. From the late 1890s, the government sporadically
established plains reserves in an attempt to meet the
agricultural population's forest needs.101 Forest and civil
99 Michael Adas, "Colonization, Commercial Agriculture, 
and the Destruction of the Deltaic Rainforests of British 
Burma in the Late Nineteenth Century," in Global 
Deforestation and the Nineteenth-Century World Economy. ed. 
Richard P. Tucker and J.F. Richards (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1983), 106.
100 Ibid., 104-5.
101 Resolution, RFA for 1896-97, 2; RFA (Pegu) for 1899- 
1900, 3; RFA for 1902-03, 23; Pe Kin, "From the Hills to the 
Delta," 41; J.S. Furnivall and W.S. Morrison, Svriam District 
Gazetteer (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1914), 92.
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officials may have disputed the size and management of these 
reserves. Burmese peasants and timber traders may have 
subverted their purpose through illicit extraction. But there 
was not a consensus of opinion about deltaic deforestation. 
Rather, it was precisely because the issue was in dispute 
that forest politics in late colonial Burma came to be so 
closely associated with the status of the plains reserves. In 
the next chapter, this question is discussed in greater 
detail. Here is described the erratic creation of plains 
reserves, and the everyday resistance that frustrated their 
management.
The distinction between 'plains' and 'hill' reserves only 
became meaningful with the great land clearances of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the 1870s and 
1880s, for example, reserves were created in the Irrawaddy 
and Sittang valleys to protect teak and sha forests, and to 
provide fuel for an expanding rail and river transport 
network.102 At first indistinguishable from the surrounding 
forest, these reserves were gradually transformed into 
isolated patches of forest as peasants converted unreserved 
forests into paddy fields. Located ten miles east of Zigon, 
the case of the Myodwin teak plantations is illustrative. As 
described by Brandis in 1860, the village where these 
plantations were started was 'surrounded' by forest. Indeed, 
it was primarily for its strategic location in the 
Tharrawaddy forests that it was chosen as the temporary
102 Resolution, RFA for 1870-71, 2; RFA for 1874-75, 9- 
10? S.G. Grantham, Tharrawaddy District Gazetteer (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1920), 63. As fuel reserves near railway 
lines were depleted, imported coal became the main fuel, see 
Shein, Burma's Transport and Foreign Trade. 77.
240
headquarters of the Forest Department.103 In 1915, however, a 
forest official reported that the Myodwin plantation was 
"entirely surrounded by paddy fields and temporary 
cultivation".104
Agricultural clearance in Lower Burma raised the question 
of village forest needs. However, this question illustrated 
better than any other the differences between civil and 
forest officials over forest management. Whereas civil 
officials viewed plains forests in transitional terms - their 
sole objective being to facilitate agricultural development - 
forest officials urged stringent access restrictions in 
order to ensure the long-term production of timber and fuel.
Inter-departmental differences manifested themselves in 
various ways. Civil officials criticized the Forest 
Department's policy of requiring cultivators to pay for minor 
forest produce and grazing rights in reserves. Noting the 
negligible income derived from the latter, the Commissioner 
of Sagaing division remarked in 1898 that it was this kind of 
"petty economy" that made forest officials "so thoroughly 
unpopular with the people".105 In contrast, foresters drew 
attention to problems such as tree damage associated with
103 D. Brandis, "Report on the Pegu Teak Forests for 
1859-60," Selections from the Records of the Government of 
India (Foreign Department! 31 (1861): 76-78.
104 A. Rodger, "The Myodwin Teak Plantations, Zigon
Division, Lower Burma," Indian Forester 41 (October 1915): 
372; see also Pe Kin, "History of Forest Management in 
British Burma," Guardian (Rangoon) 15 (December 1968): 14; 
A . J . Page, Pegu District Gazetteer (Rangoon: Government
Printing, 1917), 80.
105 RFA for 1897-98, cxvix; see also RFA (Lower Burma) 
for 1890-91, lvi-lvii.
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allowing cattle to freely roam in reserves.106 Their response 
was to impose user fees or even close reserves.107
Differences also emerged over the constitution and use 
of village fuel and fodder reserves. Entrusted with their 
creation in Lower Burma in 1886, civil officials failed to 
implement the policy. In 1895 Chief Commissioner Fryer was 
forced to intervene and order once more their creation.108 At 
the same time, civil officials were quick to recommend the 
'disforestation' (forest clearance designed to permit 
permanent agriculture) of plains or delta reserves. In the 
case of the Kamase and Yitkangyi reserves in 1901, the 
Commissioner of Pegu division recommended their 
disforestation even though, as Conservator Hauxwell observed, 
they represented virtually the last opportunity in Pegu 
district to maintain a local fuel supply.109 In other 
instances, civil officials in Hanthawaddy district questioned 
the long-term closure of several fuel reserves, even though 
they acknowledged their depleted condition.110 Moreover, in
106 RFA for 1903-04, 9; RFA (Tenasserim) for 1897-98, 
10; F. Beadon Bryant (Conservator, Southern) to Revenue 
Secretary, 25 December 1904, BFP (January 1906), 47; 
Grantham, Tharrawaddy District Gazetteerf 63.
107 In Tenasserim in 1897-98, out of a total reserved 
area of 4,137 square miles, 3,843 square miles were 
completely closed, and of the remainder, only 203 square 
miles were opened to cattle all year, see RFA (Tenasserim) 
for 1897-98, 10.
108 Resolution, 8 October 1895, BFP (January 1896), 121- 
22; Resolution, 13 October 1894, BFP (October 1894), 270-73.
109 T.A. Hauxwell (Conservator, Pegu) to Revenue 
Secretary, 12 August 1901, BFP (November 1901), 4-5; see also 
Tan Chein Hoe, Working Plan for Delta Forest Division. 1947- 
48 to 1956-57f vol. 2 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1951), 
2.
110 BFP (January 1910), 252-53.
242
the reserves that they did establish, civil officials often 
granted user rights that undermined their long-term 
management. In 1902-03, rights admitted by Settlement 
Officers in the Toungoo, Pegu and Thaton districts were 
subsequently restricted for this reason.111 Not surprisingly, 
Chief Conservator C.G. Rogers concluded in 1915 that fuel 
reserves created after 1896 had "largely failed" to guarantee 
local supplies or prevent the destruction of remaining 
unreserved forests.112
More than these inter-departmental differences, the 
colonial state's inability to deal with the question of 
village forest needs reflected widespread popular resistance 
to access restrictions. As Scott notes, the power of everyday 
resistance derives primarily from its pervasiveness and 
anonymity.
Just as millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy- 
nilly, a coral reef, so do thousands upon thousands 
of individual acts of insubordination and evasion 
create a political or economic barrier reef of their 
own...It is only rarely that the perpetrators of 
these petty acts seek to call attention to 
themselves. Their safety lies in their anonymity.113
At various stages, this thesis has documented the ability of 
Burmese peasants, timber traders and shifting cultivators to 
disrupt state forest control through everyday forms of 
resistance. Chapter 3 noted how the regulation of shifting
111 RFA for 1902-03, 23.
112 C.G. Rogers, "Note on Proposal to Form Reserves in 
Unreserved Forests (Public Forest Land) for the Supply of 
Forest Produce to the Agricultural Population of Burma," BFP 
(June 1917), 363-65.
113 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms 
of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1985), 36.
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cultivation and the use of selected non-teak species was 
resisted through the illegal felling or burning of timber. 
Such resistance grew in the late nineteenth century, and as 
Chapter 5 illustrated, impeded efforts to fire-protect 
reserves and regulate the cutch industry. The ability of 
these groups to sabotage forest policy was nowhere more 
evident, however, than with regard to the depletion of the 
plains reserves.
One indication of the intensifying conflict over these 
reserves is to be found in the growing number of breaches of 
the forest law. That information is collected in Table 6.5. 
Although the data summarize all forest crime, a substantial 
proportion of the offenses pertained to the plains reserves. 
In 1918, for example, 90 per cent of reported forest offenses 
in Tharrawaddy division concerned these areas.114 Peasants 
apprehended for the illegal possession of timber, or for 
having illicitly grazed their cattle in reserves, formed the 
bulk of detainees, and were fined under the compounding 
clause (sec. 62) of the 1902 Act. This clause was a flexible 
means to punish petty offenders on the spot without being 
forced to the more time-consuming and expensive recourse of 
the courts. However, in more serious instances of large- 
scale theft and fraud, cases were taken to court.
114 Hart, Tour of Inspection in the Forests of Burma, 8.
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TABLE 6.5
BREACHES OF THE FOREST LAW 1889-1930 
(Selected Years)
Year Cases Tried Cases Compounded Total
1889-90
1894-95
1899-1900
1904-05
1909-10
1914-15
1919-20
1924-25
1929-30
1,153 
1,687
440
639
663
867
878
843
701
2,983
1,527
2,403
2,429
3,786
4,993
6,672
9,014
946 1, 386 
3 ,622 
2,190 
3 ,270 
3,307 
4,629 
5,694 
7,825 
10,701
Source: RFA (various years).
The evolution of forest crime between 1889 and 1930 is 
revealing on several counts. First, although the total number 
of cases more than doubled in the early 1890s, thereafter 
they declined, and until 1912 fluctuated between 2,500-3,500 
offenses per year. The initial increase is accounted for by 
the cutch crisis which, as Chapter 5 noted, peaked during 
this period. Conversely, the decision to ease cutch 
restrictions led to a decline in the number of offenses in 
the late 1890s. Although the cutch crime wave of the early 
1890s is only partly related to the issue of the plains 
reserves, it is nevertheless interesting because it 
foreshadowed developments after 1912 when the plains reserves 
became the focus of popular resistance. At first glance, the 
period 1896-1912 represented a relative lull in forest crime. 
However, this pause in the upward climb of reported offenses 
reflected not so much the quiescence of peasants and shifting 
cultivators as the way in which legal violations were 
treated. It was during this period that the power to compound
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offenses was removed from subordinates below the rank of 
Deputy Ranger as part of an anti-corruption drive. In the 
process, the government effectively reduced the number of 
offenses that were reported. Forest crime was not in abeyance 
during this period, it was simply less likely to be reported.
Secondly, the period after 1912 reveals a steady increase 
in the number of reported offenses, with the 1929-30 figure 
more than treble that of 1909-10. As discussed below, this 
increase reflected broad social and ecological changes 
arising from the closing of the agricultural frontier in 
Lower Burma around the time of the First World War.
Finally, Table 6.5 is revealing because it shows an 
interesting trend in the way that the Forest Department 
handled offenses. Notwithstanding the restrictions placed on 
its use by the subordinate service, the compounding clause 
became the predominant means by which foresters attempted to 
deter crime. Whereas in 1889-90 compounding cases made up 68 
per cent of the total, in 1929-30 that figure had risen to 84 
per cent. In part, this shift to on the spot punishment 
reflected the increasing incidence of petty offenses as 
peasants became desperate and took greater risks to obtain 
produce.
But the increased use of the compounding clause also 
reflected the vicissitudes of the judicial system. Forest 
officials frequently complained of delays, as well as the 
propensity of magistrates to dismiss cases, or only nominally 
punish offenders.115 However, the high acquittal rate also
115 RFA (Pegu) for 1894-95, 5; RFA for 1901-02, 5; RFA 
for 1904-05, 6; RFA for 1906-07, 15; RFA for 1911-12, 17.
Civil officials often viewed the situation differently. In
1898-99, for example, Deputy Commissioner D. Ross opined that
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reflected inadequate case preparation by foresters.116 The 
result, as Table 6.6 illustrates for the Pegu Circle between 
1899 and 1902, was a system in which conviction was 
uncertain, and the deterrent effect of the law accordingly 
weakened.
TABLE 6.6
RESULTS OF CASES BROUGHT TO TRIAL IN PEGU CIRCLE,
1899-1900 to 1901-02
1899-1900 1900-1901 1901-1902
Division C A % C A % C A %
Thayetmyo 74 — — 46 6 12 28 3 10
Prome 55 19 26 20 20 50 10 7 41
Tharrawaddy 34 4 11 7 2 22 28 10 26
Rangoon 11 9 45 24 1 4 24 6 20
Pegu 23 4 15 5 1 17 10 3 23
Bassein 22 4 15 50 47 48 53 16 23
Henzada 24 5 17 17 3 15 8 3 27
Agency 9 — — 38 3 7 10 2 17
Total 252 45 15 207 83 29 171 50 23
Source: RFA (various years).
Note: C = Convictions; A ~ Acquittals; % = % of failure.
The rate of conviction showed considerable annual and 
regional variation. In aggregate, the conviction rate fell 
from 85 per cent in 1899-1900, to 71 per cent the following 
year, before rising to 77 per cent in 1901-02. Such 
variability was even more pronounced at the divisional level. 
Thus, in Bassein division the conviction rate dropped from 85 
per cent in 1899-1900, to only 52 per cent the year after, 
before climbing to 77 per cent in 1901-02. Finally, the
"it is well for the people that there is an unbiassed 
Magistrate between them and the Forest Officer," see RFA for 
1898-99, xcv.
116 RFA for 1900-1901, 4; RFA for 1901-02, 5;
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variation was often quite large between divisions. In 1899- 
1900, the conviction rate was 100 per cent in the Thayetmyo 
and Agency (or depot) divisions, but only 55 per cent in the 
Rangoon division. Faced with such volatility, it is not 
surprising that foresters preferred to commute offenses to a 
simple fine.
Even if the conviction rate in court had been higher, it 
is doubtful whether the law could have prevented the 
depletion of the plains reserves. The difficulties associated 
with law enforcement in populated areas were enormous. Forest 
officials noted that reported offenses were only a fraction 
of the real number of infractions; the number of undetected 
cases ran "into the thousands" because foresters did not 
record a case unless the identity of the offender was at 
least suspected.117 Produce was typically stolen from reserves 
under cover of darkness, and offenders were habitually 
"screened by the surrounding villagers".118 In cases where 
subordinates shielded villagers, illegal activity was more 
blatant. In one Pegu reserve in 1907-08, a surprise visit by 
a civil official led to the discovery of twenty-six cattle 
camps with six hundred cattle as well as illegal fisheries, 
all tolerated by the local Ranger.119 In the delta, villagers 
used boats to penetrate reserves taking advantage of the
117 RFA for 1908-09, 5; RFA for 1916-17, 6.
110 RFA for 1906-07, 5. Timber theft was most prevalent 
during the dry season (November to June) when carting was 
easiest, see R.S. Troup, Working Plan for Satpok. Sitkwin and 
Thindawyo Working Circles (Rangoon: Government Printing,
1905), 39; H.C. Smith, Working Plan for South Tounaoo Forest 
Division. 1923-24 to 1932-33 (Maymyo: Government Printing, 
1923), 17.
119 RFA for 1907-08, 8-9; RFA (Pegu) for 1897-98, 7.
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numerous streams to escape detection; foresters even 
discovered a "fair-sized" village of fuel cutters inside one 
reserve.120 Timber traders were believed to be the principal 
offenders, as they exceeded the terms of their trade permits 
or paid villagers for local free timber.121
The financial loss incurred by the government in terms 
of foregone revenue was considerable. In 1910-11, the illicit 
removal of bamboo from the Prome and Thayetmyo divisions 
alone deprived the treasury of 10,000 rupees; in 1919-20 it 
was estimated that 250,000 tons of kanazo (used for firewood) 
valued at 250,000 rupees was illegally extracted from the 
delta reserves.122 Indeed, theft from the latter was so rife 
that at least 75 per cent of timber, and 50 per cent of fuel, 
was harvested in this manner.123 As with the cutch industry, 
forest officials were as incapable of controlling, as they 
were of taxing, this forest trade.
The growing scarcity of forest produce that became 
noticeable around the time of the First World War intensified 
the struggle over the plains reserves. However, the 
willingness of a growing number of peasants to routinely 
flaunt the forest law must also be situated in the broader 
context of increasing agricultural landlessness and
120 RFA for 1918-19, 22. In all, there were nine delta 
reserves covering 1,061 square miles, see Pe Kin, "From the 
Hills to the Delta," 40.
121 H. Carter (Conservator, Southern) to Revenue 
Secretary, 16 August 1905, BFP (December 1906), 344-45; RFA 
for 1911-12, 17; RFA for 1914-15, 19.
122 RFA for 1910-11, 6; RFA for 1919-20, 23.
123 RFA for 1918-19, 22; A.W. Moodie, Working Plan for 
Delta Forest Division. 1924-25 to 1933-34. vol. 1 (Maymyq: 
Government Printing, 1924), 33.
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deprivation in Lower Burma. In contrast to the situation that
prevailed in the nineteenth century, by the early twentieth
century unoccupied land was becoming scarce. As Adas
observes, the closing of the agricultural frontier had
important political and economic implications:
The Delta rice frontier closed gradually and 
unevenly. No government proclamations marked its end; 
in fact few government officials noted its demise and 
only a handful understood its importance. As the 
frontier closed, however, the potential and 
protection that it had provided for the cultivating 
classes also came to an end. With the open land 
buffer gone, problems inherent in the nature of 
economic development in Lower Burma grew more intense 
and an era of apparent prosperity and content gave 
way to decades of conflict and unrest.124
Thus, between 1906-07 and the onset of the Great Depression
in 1930, the area let to tenants climbed from 30 per cent to
nearly 46 per cent of the total occupied land in the Delta.125
As a growing proportion of cultivators became tenants or were
otherwise marginalized, restrictions on forest access had a
more devastating effect. Moreover, the failure of the Forest
Department to develop fuel and timber plantations (as in the
teak sector),126 meant that its sole contribution to the issue
of peasant forest needs was a coercive one. Access to
reserves was limited, if not cut-off entirely, to permit
natural regeneration in overworked areas.127 Those who
transgressed the rules were punished. As a result, foresters
were in the paradoxical position of "protecting the reserves
124 Adas, The Burma Delta, 128-29.
125 Ibid., 150.
126 For an exception, see J.M.D. Mackenzie, "Fuel and 
Bamboo Plantations in the Sittang Delta of the Pegu District, 
Lower Burma," Indian Forester 43 (January 1917): 2-9.
127 C.W. Scott, Working Plan for Insein Forest Division. 
1927-28 to 1936-37 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1928), 14.
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against the very people in whose interests they are being 
protected" .128
The most serious consequence of this policy was that it 
enhanced the opportunities for corruption among subordinates. 
Such corruption was fairly common, and helps explains why the 
Forest Department was so unpopular.129 The low pay, difficult 
work conditions and limited prospects that encouraged 
indolence and corruption among Burmese in the nineteenth 
century had scarcely changed in the early twentieth century. 
Thus, a Forest Guard in 1905 still earned less in many 
districts than an ordinary coolie.130 Burmese foresters 
expressed their dissatisfaction by moving to more 
remunerative, and less hazardous employment in other 
departments or in the private sector. What colonial officials 
termed 'wastage' was high among subordinates. In 1919-20, of 
a permanent staff of 2,637, 732 men left the service: 17
retired, 57 died, 375 resigned and 283 were dismissed.131
But, as the latter figure indicates, many subordinates 
were fired. In certain cases, these officials were guilty of 
defrauding the government of revenue or failing in their 
duties. Frequently, however, they were dismissed for having 
extorted money from the public. In this regard, the power to
128 RFA for 1918-19, 22;
129 Report of the Bribery and Corruption Enquiry 
Committee 1940 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1941), 28-29.
130 RFA for 1904-05, 18.
131 Review of the Chief Conservator, RFA for 1919-20,
11. In other years, the turnover was in the order of 300-
350 men, see F.A. Leete (Chief Conservator) to Revenue
Secretary, 1 March 1920, BFP (December 1920), 1-2; Review of 
the Chief Conservator, RFA for 1920-21, 13; RFA for 1922- 
23, 3.
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compound offenses was an especially potent weapon. As one
civil official observed in 1896:
what is complained of so much is the enormous power 
which is placed in the hands of subordinates of 
levying blackmail. It is a case of either
subsidiarizing the forest gaungs [ie. guards] or 
being run in.132
It was to stop the compounding clause from becoming "an 
engine of oppression" that reforms were introduced at the 
turn of the century restricting this power to the rank of 
Deputy Ranger or higher.133 Indeed, subordinates below that 
rank were forbidden to receive any money on the government's 
behalf.134 Nevertheless, corruption continued to be rife in 
the subordinate service. As Burma's Conservators observed in 
1905, "the venality of these underpaid subordinates is
proverbial," and was a "veritable blot on Forest
Administration in Burma".135
It was partly to seek ways in which to diffuse the 
growing confrontation between peasants and foresters over 
village needs that senior officials met in a series of 
meetings between 1917 and 1919. After much debate,
Lieutenant-Governor Reginald Craddock proposed a scheme in 
which village reserves would be created under the Forest 
Department's control. Produce from these reserves would not
132 G.M.S. Carter (Deputy Commissioner, Thayetmyo) cited 
in RFA for 1895-96, lxviii.
133 D. Ibbetson (Secretary, Government of India, 
Department of Revenue and Agriculture) to Revenue Secretary, 
29 June 1897, RFA for 1895-96, 2? Burma Forest Act (1902), 
sec. 62 (1), and Forest Department Circular No. 19 of 1919, 
in Government of Burma, Burma Forest Manual. 28, 228-30.
134 Burma Forest Department, Manual of Standing Orders 
for Forest Subordinates (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1919).
135 Conservators to Revenue Secretary, 12 February 1905, 
BFP (October 1906), 13-14.
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be free, but foresters would devote greater attention than 
before to their management.136 Indeed, Craddock claimed that 
it was "just as much the duty of the Forest Department to 
conserve forests" for the agricultural population as it was 
"to conserve them for commercial purposes or for climatic 
reasons".137 In a sense, the Lieutenant Governor was simply 
reiterating the Government of India's 1894 statement on 
forest policy which had emphasized the agricultural 
population's needs. In another sense, Craddock's scheme fit 
well with the quest to rationalize forest use.
That quest was soon overshadowed by political
t
developments which culminated in the introduction of dyarchy 
in 1923. However, the issue of the plains reserves did not go 
away. Indeed, as the next chapter shows, the issue was 
integral to forest politics in the late colonial era.
The preceding two chapters have described the Forest 
Department's efforts to rationalize forest use between 1881 
and 1923. This forty-two year period comprised an era of 
expansion (1881-1902) in which state forest control was 
asserted over a widening territory and range of activities, 
and an era of consolidation (1902-23) during which the gains 
of the late nineteenth century were consolidated. This 
process affected forest politics in different ways. A key 
development was the change in the relationship between the 
Forest Department and the European firms from one rooted 
predominantly in conflict to one based on mutual 
understanding and advantage. The concentration of teak
136 Reginald Craddock, "Minute on Forest Produce in 
Burma," BFP (November 1919), 246-50.
137 Ibid., 246.
253
extraction in the hands of the European firms may have freed 
foresters to attend to other matters. Yet, social and 
ecological changes were undermining the ability of those 
officials to manage the forests in populated areas. Colonial 
officials had a taste of what was to come during the cutch 
crisis of the 1890s, but it was the depletion of the plains 
reserves in the early twentieth century that illustrated more 
than any other event the power of everyday resistance. For, 
if the actions of peasants, timber traders and shifting 
cultivators demonstrated one thing during this period, it was 
that there were definite limits to the ability of the Forest 
Department to rationalize forest use. After 1923, and in a 
more politicized context, those limits became even more 
apparent.
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CHAPTER 7
THE POLITICS OF RATIONALIZED FOREST USE 1923-42
The introduction of dyarchy on 1 January 1923 marked a 
new phase in colonial forest management in Burma. A 
'transferred' subject, forests became the responsibility of 
a Burmese Minister who was answerable to a partially elected 
Legislative Council. On 1 April 1937, the dyarchy reforms 
were extended when a system of parliamentary government was 
established in which Burmese politicians were given 
additional powers. There were of course limits to these 
powers. The Minister could be overruled by the British 
Governor. The allocation of timber leases and senior 
appointments remained under British control. Yet, the 
constitutional changes, and particularly those of 1937, were 
significant.
However much they might have wished it, British foresters 
could not remain aloof from such change. As a transferred 
subject which directly or indirectly affected the lives of 
most Burmese, it was only to be expected that forest policy 
would come under detailed scrutiny and criticism after 1923. 
Challenged in the Legislative Council by nationalists, that 
policy was sharply attacked outside of the formal political 
process too by peasants, monks and nationalists who boycotted 
the dyarchy system.
Contrary to those accounts that emphasize continuity with 
the past,1 this chapter suggests that the system of
1 F.T. Morehead, The Forests of Burma (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1944); H.R. Blanford, "Highlights of 
One Hundred Years of Forestry in Burma," Burmese Forester 6 
(June 1956): 12-23.
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rationalized forest use that was introduced between 1856 and 
1923 was gradually undermined by the politics of the interwar 
period. Prior to 1923, the British asserted control over 
Burma's forests in keeping with imperial interests, and 
without having to face the local political implications of 
their actions. If the assertion of state forest control in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was sporadically 
marked by conflict between forest and civil officials, by the 
early 1920s a system of rationalized forest use was in place 
that made such conflict largely a thing of the past. As a 
result, the politics of forest management in the interwar 
period was largely given over to incorporating the Burmese 
into this system under the constitutional reforms of 1923 and 
1937, In the process, the British were forced to confront as 
never before the local political implications of colonial 
forest policy.
This chapter, then, examines how political change during 
the 1920s and 1930s affected forest management. Specifically, 
it focuses on two issues: popular access to the plains
reserves, and the Burraanization of the forest sector. The 
previous chapter described how the closing of the 
agricultural frontier in Lower Burma reinforced popular 
resistance to access restrictions. During the interwar 
period, such resistance became increasingly politicized as 
nationalists seized upon the access issue in their campaign 
against the British. In contrast, the Burmanization issue 
mainly concerned the Burmese middle-class. It was this class 
which would benefit most from the employment opportunities in 
government and business that would occur with reform in this 
area.
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Forests as a Transferred Subject
If the politicization of forest management began with 
the introduction of dyarchy in 1923, the origins of that 
process may be traced back to the years 1919-22. Acting upon 
the advice of the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, and the 
Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, the British 
Parliament passed the Government of India Act in 1919 as part 
of a plan to establish the dyarchy system of tutelary 
democracy on the Indian sub-continent. The omission of Burma 
(thought to be politically less advanced than India) from the 
1919 reforms was the occasion for the 'first sustained 
campaign' of the Burmese nationalist movement against the 
British.2 Surprised by this political agitation, the British 
Parliament voted in 1921 to extend dyarchy to Burma. A Burma 
Reforms Committee (the Whyte Committee) was then appointed to 
sort out the details.3
It did not necessarily follow from this decision to 
extend dyarchy to Burma that forests would be treated as a 
transferred subject. Following the passage of the Government 
of India Act in 1919, only in Bombay were forests 
transferred, and even then, only over the strong objections
2 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (London: C. 
Hurst, 1987), 119-23; Albert D. Moscotti, British Policy and 
the Nationalist Movement in Burma 1917-1937. Asian Studies at
Hawaii No. 11 (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1974),
24-30, 71-76; Reginald Craddock, The Dilemma in India
(London: Constable and Co., 1929), 116.
3 Burma Reforms Committee, Report and Appendices
(henceforth BRCR), and Record of Evidence (henceforth BRCE), 
3 vols. (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1922).
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of the Inspector General.4 It would have been surprising if
in the case of Burma's much more valuable forests similar
objections had not been raised. In practice, of course, the
status of Burma's forests was the subject of much dispute. As
the Whyte Committee noted:
The question of the transfer or reservation of 
forests was one of the crucial points of our inquiry.
On it there was a more definite cleavage of opinion 
among our witnesses than on any other subject.5
The European community was generally opposed to the
transfer of forests. In its submission, the Government of
Burma expressed a common European concern when it suggested
that Burma's forests were too valuable to be left to the
vagaries of inexperienced Burmese management.6 Teak
extraction by the European firms might be disrupted by
Burmese ministers intent on promoting indigenous enterprise.
Moreover, forest conservancy could be jeopardized:
It would not be wise to place responsibility for it 
in the hands of a Minister who will be responsible 
to, and naturally largely influenced by the wishes 
of, an electorate which is as yet completely 
untrained, and incapable of appreciating the 
importance of a policy of scientific and far-sighted 
development.7
Chief Conservator Leete expressed similar sentiments in a 
brief to the Whyte Committee. The government had always been 
"prodigal in its liberality" in granting popular access to
4 F. Lewisohn, "Note of the Local Government's views on 
the subject of the Franchise and of Transferred Subjects, 
etc." BRCR, app. IV, 41.
5 BRCR, 17.
6 Lewisohn, "Local Government's views," 41; J.A. Swan 
(Steel Brothers), BRCE 1: 126; H.A. Thornton (Commissioner, 
Mandalay), and D.F. Chalmers (Deputy Commissioner, Thaton), 
BRCE 2: 144-45, 207.
7 Lewisohn, "Local Government's views," 41.
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reserves.8 Yet, forest management remained an unpopular 
undertaking in Burma reflecting, he believed, the country's 
lack of a 'healthy public opinion' on forest matters. As a 
result, it was premature to consider the transfer of forests 
to indigenous control.
The Burmese who testified before the Whyte Committee 
contested this claim, and drew attention to the pitfalls of 
the present system. Yet, these witnesses were hardly radical 
nationalists. Many of the latter had boycotted the Committee 
hearings at the insistence of the General Council of Burmese 
Associations (GCBA),9 Rather, the Burmese witnesses were 
mainly pro-British officials and lawyers.
Nevertheless, their complaints about forest 
administration foreshadowed many of those made subsequently 
by radical politicians. They noted, for example, that Burmese 
were being eliminated from the teak trade in favour of the 
European firms; but they were also restricted to small leases 
in the extraction of other hardwoods.10 Concurrently, the 
emphasis on commercial timber extraction detracted from local 
subsistence needs. The Pyinmana lawyer Maung Kan Baw observed 
that since reserves (kvo-waincM had been created, the forests 
were "given by compartments... a man who obtains a 
lease,..won't allow the villagers to come and take
8 BRCE 3: 81, 93.
9 Maung Maung, Burma's Constitution, 2nd ed. (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 17; Moscotti, British Policy, 
32, 78. The GCBA was a prominent nationalist organization of 
the 1920s.
10 Maung Kan Baw (Advocate, Pyinmana), BRCE 2: 57, 62; 
Saw Pah Dwai (Karen National Association, Thaton), Ibid., 
240, 242-43.
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firewood”.11 Village access was, in the words of another 
witness, being "gradually circumscribed" to the "great 
economic loss" of the peasantry.12 Out of sheer necessity, 
villagers ended up stealing from the reserves.13 In the view 
of these witnesses, the system lacked legitimacy and was 
ineffective precisely because it was undemocratic.
Under an elected Burmese Minister, the Forest Department 
would be sensitive to indigenous needs. As the Tharrawaddy 
barrister Maung Kyaw asserted, he would rule "more in 
accordance with the wishes of the people".14 If such a change 
led to a relaxation of access restrictions, various witnesses 
believed that villagers would not abuse their new liberty. 
Villagers were against excessive restrictions and taxation, 
and not conservation.15 Moreover, the message of conservation 
would have a better chance of success if it came from a 
Burmese Minister who would "bring home to his countrymen the 
importance of the subject".16 The transfer of forests would 
not only reduce conflict over reserves; it would also 
facilitate their ultimate conservation.
To the general dismay of Burma's European community, the 
Whyte Committee agreed with this argument. By allowing the
11 Ibid., 61.
12 Taw Sein Ko (Bahuthuta Association, Mandalay), Ibid.,
68.
13 Maung Po Hla (Deputy Commissioner, Pyapon), BRCE 3:
24.
14 BRCE 1: 274.
15 Ibid., 278; Maung Shwe Tha (Deputy Commissioner, 
Sagaing), BRCE 2: 132; Maung Po Yun (Advocate, Kyaukse), 
Ibid., 181.
16 Maung Shwe Tha (Deputy Commissioner, Sagaing), BRCE 
2: 127.
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Burmese to manage one of the larger revenue-earning
departments, the government would promote the legitimacy of
its reforms at the same time as it facilitated the emergence
of a trained indigenous administrative elite. Moreover, the
Committee believed that conservation measures would be more
credible under an elected Burmese Minister.
Measures of development and of conservation, 
particularly those in the interests of the villagers, 
to which he gave his support, would be much more 
likely to gain general acceptance than if proposed by 
the Executive.17
The Whyte Committee assumed that the appointment of such an
individual would undercut popular opposition to forest
management. It also took for granted that the interests of
an elected Burmese Minister and villagers would coincide.
The introduction of dyarchy in 1923 granted Burma greater
administrative autonomy within the British-Indian empire. In
keeping with the recommendations of the Whyte Committee,
forests was accorded transferred status.18 Formal control of
the Forest Department now passed to the Minister of
Agriculture, Excise and Forests who was appointed by the
British Governor from among the elected members of the
Legislative Council.
Inevitably, ministerial appointments were subject to the
vicissitudes of electoral politics. Wherever possible, the
Governor favoured pro-British politicians over the more
17 BRCR, 18.
18 In London, some Conservative Members of Parliament 
opposed the transfer of forests, but in closing the debate on 
the Burma Reform Bill on 12 June 1922, Lord Winterton 
suggested that in making such a transfer Britain was meeting 
"the acid test of her sincerity" toward reform in Burma. The 
Bill was approved without difficulty, see John F. Cady, A 
History of Modern Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1958), 239-40; Moscotti, British Policy, 80.
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popular, but also more radical nationalists. In this respect, 
the group comprising the Progressive ('Golden Valley') Party 
and the Independent Party, was especially important.19 A 
significant force in the Legislative Council between 1923 and 
1932, this group represented conservative Burman interests, 
as well as those of the country's powerful minorities. In 
January 1923, one of its leading members, Joseph A. Maung 
Gyi, was chosen by Governor Harcourt Butler as the first 
Forests Minister. Born in 1871, this London-trained barrister 
was one of the most prominent (and controversial) politicians 
of the interwar period.20 Maung Gyi served in various 
ministerial and administrative posts, but is best known for 
having been the only Burman to serve as (acting) Governor 
under British rule (1930-31). In December 1925, another 
member of the conservative group, Lee Ah Yain, assumed the 
Forests portfolio. A representative of Burma's small but 
influential Chinese population, Lee Ah Yain served as Forests 
Minister until his death in 1932. The post then briefly 
reverted to J.A. Maung Gyi.
If members of the pro-British group were favoured, 
opponents of the government also received ministerial 
appointments. In 1924-25, the Forests Minister was Yamethin 
U Pu, a member of the Twenty-One Party (named after the 
twenty-one GCBA members who left that association in 1922 to
19 Frank N. Trager, Burma: From Kingdom to Independence, 
a Historical and Political Analysis (London: Pall Mall 
Press,1966), 51.
20 J.A. Maung Gyi gained notoriety for his close 
cooperation with the British, see Maung Maung, Burma and 
General Ne Win (London: Asia Publishing House, 1969), 16? Nyo 
Mya, "Profile: Sir Joseph Augustus Maung Gyi," Guardian 
(Rangoon) 2, 6 (April 1955): 10-11.
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participate in the first dyarchy elections). In December 
1932, U Kyaw Din, a supporter of the anti-dyarchist leader, 
Dr. Ba Maw, was appointed to the post. Finally, on 9 April 
1934, the veteran nationalist, and head of the Twenty-One 
Party (also known as the People's Party and the United GCBA), 
U Ba Pe, became Forests Minister after a no-confidence motion 
in the Legislative Council led to the resignation of Kyaw Din 
and J.A. Maung Gyi.21 Ba Pe's career as editor, businessman 
and politician enabled him to become one of the leading 
spokesmen of Burmese middle-class interests in the 1920s and 
1930s.
Formal control of the Forest Department thus rested with 
the elected member of the Legislative Council chosen as 
Minister by the Governor. The latter was required to act on 
the advice of his Minister unless there was "sufficient 
reason to dissent".22 In turn, the Minister was advised on 
Department matters by a Forest Secretary who also coordinated 
policy with the Chief Conservator. Beginning with H.O. 
Reynolds in 1923, this position was filled by a senior 
British official, but starting in the 1930s, Burmese 
officials such as U Kyaw Min and U Tin Tut were chosen for 
the post.
If dyarchy enabled selected Burmese politicians to attain 
senior government posts, in practice they possessed little 
real power. Thus, the superior service continued to be filled
21 Kyaw Din had fallen foul of Ba Maw and other 
politicians in 1933-34 when he supported the British on the 
proposed separation of Burma from India, see Cady, History of 
Modern Burma, 361-62.
22 F.S.V. Donnison, Public Administration in Burma: A 
Study of Development during the British Connexion (London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), 54-55.
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by India Forest Service (IFS) recruits appointed by the 
Secretary of State? the Governor retained control over their 
pay and promotion.23 Appointments to the subordinate staff 
were made by British forest officials.
As such, there was little that the Minister could do to 
promote Burmese advancement within the Department. If steps 
were taken during the 1920s to recruit Burmese to the 
superior service, this process began before the introduction 
of dyarchy.24 Moreover, Burmese advancement remained slow. In 
1923, there were no Burmese in the IFS; five years later 
there were three.25 Subsequently, the IFS was renamed the 
Burma Forest Service (BFS) Class I, but traditional hiring 
practices persisted. Between 1925 and 1939, 18 Burmese were 
recruited to the Class I service; during the same period, 27 
Europeans were appointed.26 At the time of the Japanese 
invasion in 1942, of 70 Class I officials 53 (76 per cent) 
were European.27 A British official may have been correct in 
noting that the Forest Department was 'fairly Burmese in
23 Great Britain, Indian Statutory Commission, Memorandum 
submitted by the Government of Burma to the Indian Statutory 
Commission, vol. 11 (London: H.M.S.O., 1930), 31.
24 Ibid., 58.
25 Or, more accurately, three of Burmese and "allied 
races," Ibid., 62.
26 Report of the Forest Reconstruction Committee (1944), 
app. VI, 24—27, Burma Office File (BOF), M/3/1531.
27 H.C. Smith, "Reconstruction in Burma, the Forest 
Department: Preliminary Review of Past Administration"
(1942), 10, BOF M/3/1531. In contrast, out of 145 Indian
Civil Service employees, 81 (56 per cent) were British, see 
Trager, Burma: From Kingdom to Independence. 369.
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character,' but, as in the past, the Burmese filled the lower 
ranks, and the senior posts went to Europeans.28
The Burmese Minister also had no say over forest 
management in the Shan States and other excluded areas. 
Indeed, the creation of the Federated Shan States was partly
designed to shelter the Sawbwas from "the effects of a more
democratic government and of Burmese nationalism".29 In 1920, 
Lieutenant-Governor Reginald Craddock informed Sawbwas that 
the Shan forests, and all revenue derived from them, Would be 
managed by the new Federation.30 In practice, British
foresters drawn from the Burma cadre continued to control 
these forests. Under the direction of the Commissioner, the 
Federation's forest service was assisted by the Chief 
Conservator and other officers on an unofficial basis.31 If 
the Shan States were the most important excluded territories, 
they were not the only ones. Control over much of the Chin 
Hills, for example, was transferred from the Forest
Department to Political Officers in 1927.32 In this manner,
28 Donnison, Public Administration in Burma. 66.
29 Taylor, State in Burma. 96-97.
30 Reginald Craddock, Speeches by Sir Reginald Craddock. 
Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, 1917-1922 (Rangoon: Government 
Printing, 1924), 233-34.
31 H.W.A. Watson, A Note on Forest Administration and 
Policy in the Federated Shan States (Rangoon: Government 
Printing, 1929), 1-3; D.T. Griffiths, Working Plan for
Southern Shan States Forest Division. 1940-41 to 1949-50. 
vol. 1 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1949), 3. The link
between the Shan State and Burma forest services was also 
reflected in salaries. The pay of men in the former was based 
on that of the latter, but with a 40 per cent 'Compensatory 
Local Allowance' in addition. See Commissioner (Federated 
Shan States) to H. Butler (Governor of Burma), 5 May 1927,
Clague Papers, MSS Eur. E. 252/3.
32 Progress Report of Forest Administration in Burma 
(henceforth RFA) for 1927-28, 3.
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dyarchy occurred in conjunction with the administrative
disengagement of politically sensitive areas from Burmese
ministerial control.
Given the limitations on ministerial authority, it is
not surprising that many nationalists denounced dyarchy.
Tharrawaddy U Pu expressed a popular sentiment when he
suggested in February 1930 that the system was "not good at
all for this country...the Ministers are merely puppets in
the hands of their glorified Secretaries. . . ”.33 The Government
of Burma's submission to the Indian Statutory Commission
(Simon Commission) indirectly supported these claims.34
Summarizing the experience of the Forest Department since
1923, it noted that
the relations between the legislature and executive 
in regard to forest administration have thus been 
more in the direction of education of the legislature 
than of effective interference by it.35
It was partly because dyarchy left unchanged the basic
operation of transferred departments that the Government of
Burma supported additional reforms. For this very reason,
however, dyarchy elicited little support among the Burmese.
As Governor Butler conceded in 1926, dyarchy was "almost a
term of abuse" in Burma.36
33 Burma Legislative Council Proceedings (henceforth 
BLCP) , 28 February 1930, 541. As noted, this did not stop 
some nationalists from accepting ministerial posts.
34 Sir John Simon was appointed by the British 
government in 1927 to review the operation of dyarchy and to 
make recommendations on further constitutional reform.
35 Great Britain, Memorandum by the Government of Burma.
64.
36 Cited in Maung Maung, Burma's Constitution. 20.
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If the effect of the introduction of dyarchy was not as 
pronounced as some nationalists had hoped, or as great as 
many British officials had feared, it would nonetheless be 
inappropriate to dismiss the 1923 reforms. The advent of a 
partially elected Legislative Council, and formal Burmese 
ministerial control, affected forest administration even 
before the late 1930s.37
Moreover, after 1937 that effect was even more 
pronounced. Under the Government of Burma Act (1935) which 
came into effect on 1 April 1937, Burma was constitutionally 
separated from India. Concurrently, the introduction of a 
Westminster-style system of parliamentary government provided 
those politicians who were willing to cooperate with the 
British with an opportunity to acquire real political power.38 
But to appreciate the effect on forest management of these 
constitutional changes, this chapter now addresses two 
central issues of the interwar period: popular access to the 
plains reserves, and the Burmanization of the forest sector.
37 An incident related by the Burmese forester, U Pe 
Kin, although in itself of a trivial nature, gives some idea 
of the often subtle, but nevertheless important changes that 
dyarchy imposed on British behaviour. In the late 1920s, R. 
Unwin (a future Chief Conservator) lectured at Rangoon 
University. On one occasion, he used derogatory language in 
referring to students in the class, an event which was 
reported to Forests Minister Lee Ah Yain. The latter took the 
matter up with the University authorities, and Unwin 
apparently had to apologize to the students. See Pe Kin, 
"Life in the Forest Service," Guardian (Rangoon) 15 (March 
1968): 17. Such an occurrence would have been inconceivable 
in the pre-dyarchy period.
38 Robert H. Taylor, "Politics in Late Colonial Burma: 
The Case of U Saw," Modern Asian Studies 10 (April 1976): 
161.
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Popular Access to the Plains Reserves
The struggle over the plains reserves did not suddenly 
emerge in the 1920s. Conflict grew during the early twentieth 
century, and as Chapter 6 noted, was exacerbated by the
closing of the agricultural frontier around the time of the
First World War. Dwindling unreserved forests and growing
landlessness combined in such a manner as to guarantee that 
freedom of access to residual stands would be a rallying cry 
for nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s. In certain
instances, peasants sought freer access to plains reserves in 
order to obtain needed timber and non-timber forest products 
or to graze cattle. In other cases, they demanded individual 
title to land which, although forested, was suitable for 
permanent agriculture. However contradictory these objectives 
may at times have been, they formed the basis of a political 
campaign to open the plains reserves that was a direct 
challenge to the system of rationalized forest use imposed by 
the British.39
As the anti-colonial struggle intensified, the status of 
the plains reserves took on a new meaning. Before they had 
been widely resented and actively subverted. Now, these 
reserves became a symbol of imperial domination. Through 
wunthanu athin - village nationalist organizations 
established throughout Burma in the early 1920s - peasants
39 As a British forester protested in 1925: "Some
balance must be struck between the individual demand for land 
and the communal need for cheap fuel, bamboo and houseposts,” 
see A.H.M. Barrington, Working Plan for North Tounqoo Forest 
Division. 1920-21 to 1928-29 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 
1925), 19-20. However, the Forest Department's neglect of 
village forest needs only reinforced the tendency of the 
Burmese to assert individual over communal claims, see below.
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stepped up their resistance to the colonial state. Combining 
everyday resistance with overt collective action, these 
organizations derived their strength from peasant grievances 
as well as general anti-British sentiments.40 That they were 
affiliated with national groups such as the GCBA and the 
General Council of Sangha Sammeggi (an organization founded 
by monks in 1920) was important in at least two respects. 
First, peasant grievances were now expressed nationally, and 
as a result, could no longer be dismissed by the colonial 
state as being of purely local, and hence, minor 
significance. Secondly, the GCBA served as a link between the 
increasingly politicized peasantry and the urban political 
elite. If, as is noted below, these two groups had differing 
interests and objectives, through the medium of the GCBA they 
nevertheless found common ground in the 1920s. At GCBA 
meetings, peasant demands were incorporated in conference 
resolutions. The 1925 conference, for example, resolved that 
"the poor should be allowed to use thit-pok (thitkado), 
firewood and bamboo free"; four years later, the Forest 
Department was urged to recognize "the just rights of the 
poor people concerning the forest products".41
40 Taylor, State in Burma. 192-93. Opposition to 
colonial rule was also expressed through localized 
rebellions, see Michael Adas, "Bandits, Monks, and Pretender 
Kings: Patterns of Peasant Resistance and Protest in Colonial 
Burma, 1826-1941," in Power and Protest in the Countryside: 
Studies of Rural Unrest in Asia. Europe, and Latin America, 
ed. Robert P. Weller and Scott E. Guggenheim (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1982), 93-94.
41 Maung Maung, "Nationalist Movements in Burma, 1920- 
1940: Changing Patterns of Leadership, from Sangha to Laity" 
(M.A. Thesis, Australian National University, 1976), 593, 
601.
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Peasant grievances were also publicized in the 
Legislative Council. In March 1923, for example, U Ba Pe 
noted the “general complaint all over the country” was that 
the forest rules prevented the poor from "enjoying the fruits 
of the country".42 In 1930, U San Lu drew attention to the 
plight of villagers in Thayetmyo district whose livelihoods 
were jeopardised by the proposed extension of a reserve.43 The 
opposition also proposed legislative amendments designed to 
relax access restrictions. In September 1926, to take one 
example, San Lu recommended that the Burma Forest Act (1902) 
be amended so as to extend the radius of free domestic 
consumption from ten to twenty miles; but the resolution was 
lost on division by 43 votes to 26.44 These initiatives did 
not result in reform. They were nevertheless politically 
significant in so far as they were a means by which 
nationalists could confront the government with the social 
implications of its forest policy.
Those implications were scarcely addressed by the Burma 
Forest Committee that was appointed in 1924 to consider the 
organization of the Forest Department and timber extraction. 
Composed mainly of pro-British officials, politicians and 
businessmen, the Committee was supportive of existing
42 BLCP, 21 March 1923, 292.
43 BLCP, 20 February 1930, 220-22. Villagers in this
district extracted fuelwood for local mills as well as for 
the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company. In 1920-21, 10,740 tons were 
extracted; in 1927-28 that figure was 53,770 tons, see P. 
Burnside and C.H. Thompson, Working Plan for Thavetmvo Forest 
Division. 1931-32 to 1940-41, vol. 1 (Rangoon: Government 
Printing, 1933), 17.
44 BLCP, 1 September 1926, 86-90.
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policy.45 Thus, the commercialization of forest produce in 
populated areas was "an inevitable result of progress and 
prosperity," and it found that there was "little that 
requires remedy" in the Department's relations with the 
people.46 However, three nationalists who sat on the Committee 
- U Ba Pe, U E Maung and U Thin Maung - disagreed with that 
conclusion. In a Note of Dissent, they suggested that the 
Forest Department oppressed villagers by making them pay for 
produce that was previously free; the official allowances for 
domestic consumption were inadequate, and thus inequitable, 
as the poor were forced onto the market. With forests now a 
transferred subject, it was time to administer them "more in 
the interests of the sons of the soil".47
The failure of the 'moderate' nationalists to modify the 
forest rules was followed by a more radical response by 
peasants in the late 1920s. Illegal extraction from the 
plains reserves increased, boosting dramatically the total 
number of forest offenses. In 1922-23, there were 6,310 
cases; six years later that figure was 10,922. Offenses were 
also becoming more serious. Teak-related incidents increased 
as villagers and traders challenged the very essence of 
colonial (and pre-colonial) policy. There was, in the words 
of the Chief Conservator, a "lessening respect for teak as a
45 Report of the Burma Forest Committee 1925 (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1926). The Committee comprised: J.A. 
Maung Gyi (Minister) , Yamethin U Pu, U E Maung and U Ba Pe 
(Nationalist Party), A. Anderson (Chamber of Commerce), C.B. 
Smales (Chief Conservator), Hatim Tai (Forest Service), U Ba 
Oh (Chamber of Commerce) and Lee Ah Yain (Progressive Party) . 
Yamethin U Pu was later replaced by U Thin Maung.
46 Ibid., 24, 27.
47 Note of Dissent by U Ba Pe, U E Maung and U Thin 
Maung, Ibid., 37-38.
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royal tree".48 Subordinates were also attacked. In 1925, a
Forester in Thayetmyo division was murdered, and such
violence was not atypical.49 The political significance of
this turn of events was not lost on British officials. As
Chief Conservator H.W.A. Watson observed in 1928:
The actual numbers and results of forest offenses 
are becoming serious...[a] general gradual increase 
would under existing conditions be the normal result 
of expansion of cultivation and population eating 
into the unclassed forest available for domestic 
supply; but the sharp increase of the past six years 
appears to be largely an expression of general 
lawlessness closely connected with political 
agitation.50
One indication of such politicization was the increasing 
employment of expert defense lawyers, a trend which forced 
the Forest Department to turn to the Criminal Investigation 
Department for help. A public prosecutor was also hired in 
the Tharrawaddy district, and additional officers were 
deputed to investigate cases.51
Such conflict was an integral part of the broader anti­
imperial struggle of the 1920s. If the wunthanu movement 
facilitated peasant resistance to the colonial state, it also 
prompted an organized and repressive British response: anti­
boycott legislation, coercive tax collection and military 
reprisals. This cycle of repression and resistance culminated
48 RFA for 1925-26, 21.
49 RFA for 1924-25, 3; RFA for 1925-26, 21. Such
violence was part of a broader campaign against Burmese and 
Indians who cooperated with the British, see Taylor, State in
Burma, 194; Adas, "Bandits, Monks, and Pretender Kings," 94-
97.
50 RFA for 1927-28, 21-22.
51 RFA for 1928-29, 30.
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in the Hsaya San rebellion of 1930.52 A district leader of the 
GCBA, Hsaya San was commissioned by that organization in the 
late 1920s to investigate popular complaints against the 
state, including its denial of public access to plains 
reserves. In 1929, he proposed that the GCBA confront the 
government on this matter. The right to free timber and 
bamboo for family use must be recognised or a campaign of 
non-violent resistance would be started. When the GCBA 
leadership refused to sanction such a move, Hsaya San began 
to secretly organize associations based on civil disobedience 
and armed insurrection.53
The rebellion broke out on 22 December 1930 in 
Tharrawaddy district but spread to adjoining areas.54 As Hsaya 
San's headquarters was located in the Pegu Yoma east of 
Tharrawaddy, work in those forests came to a halt.55 Moreover, 
Department employees were attacked: in all, six men were
killed and three were wounded during the rebellion. As in 
1885-86, a feature of the unrest was "the extensive burning 
of Forest Department buildings by the rebels": 91 buildings 
worth 104,479 rupees were destroyed in 1930-31, and property 
valued at 36,058 rupees was destroyed in the following year.56 
For their part, foresters participated in the suppression of
52 Taylor, State in Burma. 192-99.
53 Maung Maung, "Nationalist Movements," 180-81.
54 The rebellion broke out the day after Acting Governor 
J.A. Maung Gyi refused to reduce taxes in Tharrawaddy 
district.
55 Subordinates assisted in the capture of this rebel 
stronghold, see Maung Maung, "Nationalist Movements," 187- 
88. The government learned of the rebellion from a Ranger in 
Lower Thonze, see RFA for 1930-31, 49.
56 RFA for 1930-31, 50; RFA for 1931-32, 46.
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the rebellion, and their local knowledge proved invaluable; 
many were later honoured by a grateful government.57
The government was caught off-guard by the rising and 
troops from India had to be joined with local forces and 
Karen levies to quell the rebellion.58 By 1932 it was 
essentially 'a thing of the past', and forest work in Lower 
Burma had been fully resumed. Yet, Karen who worked for the 
Department in the South Pegu division remained armed, and 
foresters in the Myitmaka division required armed escorts, 
as late as 1934-35.59
Popular resistance did not end with the defeat of Hsaya 
San. With the restoration of 'order', forest offenses 
increased: from 9,298 in 1931-32 to a pre-war peak of 13,192 
in 1935-36. In 1933, Conservator A.W. Moodie lamented that 
plains reserves were being protected in name only: "in fact 
the growing stock in many reserves is gradually 
diminishing".60 Three years later, 50 per cent of offenses in 
Lower Burma occurred in these forests.61 In 1938, twenty-five
57 C.G.E. Dawkins to Enid Dawkins, Dawkins Papers, MSS 
Eur. D. 931/15; F.G. Burgess, "Touring under Difficulties in 
Burma," Indian Forester 57 (June 1931): 257-64; J.S. Vorley, 
"The Forest Department and the Burma Rebellion," Indian 
Forester 62 (January 1936): 9-11; Blanford, "Highlights," 19.
58 Maung Maung, "Nationalist Movements," chap. 7. As in 
1885-86, the hill Karen were of invaluable assistance to the 
British, see E.C.V. Foucar, I Lived in Burma (London: Dennis 
Dobson, 1956), 74; RFA for 1930-31, 47.
59 RFA for 1934-35, 65; RFA for 1933-34, 44; Blanford, 
"Highlights," 19.
60 RFA for 1932-33, 23; see also Kyaw Zan, "Choice of 
Species in the Thitcho Plains Reserve of the Zigon Forest 
Division," Burmese Forester 2 (March 1952): 21.
61 Compared with offenses in the hill reserves (22%) and 
in the unclassed forests (28%). In contrast, offenses in 
Upper Burma were predominantly in unclassed forests (47%) as 
opposed to hill reserves (34%) and plains reserves (19%), see
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officers were specially employed to speed up the disposal of 
petty cases.
The Forest Department also sought to diffuse popular 
anger over the plains reserves. They did so by addressing 
the local supply question in a more forthright manner. Bowing 
to political pressure, the government in 1938 raised the 
radius of free domestic consumption in unreserved forests 
from ten to twenty miles.62 The question of village forest 
supplies was treated in a series of revised working plans 
prepared during the 1920s and 1930s.63 If the onset of the 
Great Depression (and attendant staff retrenchment) quashed 
the implementation of these plans, they nevertheless were an 
indication that the Department was finally beginning to 
acknowledge village needs.64 On the eve of the Second World 
War, the Forest Department even began a campaign to explain 
its activities to the public.65
RFA for 1935-36, 30.
62 RFA for 1938-39, 43, 73; Burma Legislature. House of 
Representatives. Proceedings (henceforth BLHORP), 23 August 
1938, 123.
63 Such work was hampered by a general lack of 
silvicultural knowledge about non-teak forests, see H.W.A. 
Watson, A Note on the Position of the Province as Regards the 
Preparation and Revision of Working Plans (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1921), 2; A.H.M. Barrington, Working 
Plan for North Tounaoo Forest Division. 1920-21 to 1928-29 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1922), 39.
64 M.V. Edwards, Working Plan for South Tounaoo Forest 
Division. 1933-34 to 1947-48. vol. 2 (Rangoon: Government 
Printing, 1938), 5; R.J. Sayres, Working Plan for Pyinmana 
Forest Division. 1936-37 to 1946-47. vol. 2 (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1937), 100; A.F.R. Brown, Working Plan 
for Yamethin Forest Division. 1930-31 to 1939-40. vol. 1 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1932), 63.
65 RFA for 1939-40, 69; J. Russell Andrus, Bupyese 
Economic Life (1948; reprint, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1956), 101.
275
Despite these efforts, the Department was unable to end 
conflict over the plains reserves. In November 1919, the 
demarcation of plains reserves had been effectively frozen 
by a rule requiring that reservation must not be undertaken 
without the consent of neighbouring villagers.66 But that rule 
left the status of existing reserves in doubt.67 Petitions by 
peasants and politicians to disforest reserves in favour of 
permanent cultivation increased in number to such an extent 
in the 1920s that foresters were devoting much of their time 
to this issue.68 Moreover, illegal extraction eroded the 
remaining reserves, and efforts to protect them only 
heightened the Forest Department's unpopularity.
During the 1930s, the Department's ability to protect 
the plains reserves was weakened still further. As a result 
of the Great Depression, teak prices and exports fell
66 Resolution of the Government of Burma, No. 1R-47, 15 
November 1919, Burma Forest Proceedings (henceforth BFP), 
November 1919, 232-37; Testimony of S.F. Hopwood (Chief
Conservator), Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, 
Evidence taken in Burma. vol. 12 (London: H.M.S.O., 1928), 
116.
67 A situation scarcely clarified by Forest Department 
Circular no. 24 of 1935. According to this Circular, 'many' 
plains reserves were to be disforested and made over to 
villagers as Village Common Lands. Yet, in 1940 British 
foresters reported that an application to disforest the 
Twante-Konda reserve was held up pending a final decision on 
the plains reserve question. See RFA for 1935-36, 10, 12;
D.J. Atkinson and F. Allsop, Working Plan for Insein Forest 
Division. 1937-38 to 1946-47. vol. 2 (Rangoon: Government
Printing, 1940), 121.
60 Report of the Burma Forest Committee 1925, 24-25. The 
case of the Kanyutkwin reserve is instructive. Petitions to 
disforest the reserve before 1923 were rejected by the 
government because of its importance as a source of timber. 
Under dyarchy, however, the reserve was disforested, see H.C. 
Smith, Working Plan for South Tounaoo Forest Division. 1923- 
24 to 1932-33 (Maymyo: Government Printing, 1923), 47;
BLHORP, 4 September 1939, 470, 472.
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dramatically.69 In turn, forest revenue plummeted: from
21,737,618 rupees in 1926-27, to only 7,999,782 rupees in 
1933-34 .70 In a context of general retrenchment, the 
government cut forest administration.71 As Table 7.1 
illustrates, positions of all ranks were eliminated.
69 During 1930-34, annual teak exports averaged 163,000 
tons compared with 234,000 tons in 1925-29, see S.F. Hopwood, 
"The Influence of the Growing Use of Substitutes for Timber 
upon Forest Policy with Special Reference to Burma," Indian 
Forester 61 (September 1935): 562. The price of teak fell
from 97.9 rupees per ton in 1928-29 to 40.3 rupees per ton in 
the early 1930s, see Harry Champion and F.C. Osmaston (ed.), 
The Forests of India vol. 4 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1962), 464.
70 As expenditure fell more slowly than revenue, net 
revenue also declined (Appendix D) . Between 1921-31, the 
forest surplus was 17-23 per cent of total revenue; by 1932- 
33, it was only 12 per cent, see Report of the Burma 
Retrenchment Committee 1934 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 
1934), 28.
71 The government was guided by the recommendations of 
several committees: Report of the Burma Retrenchment 
Committee 1934; Second Interim Report of the Fiscal Committee 
1938 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1938); Report of the
Committee on Expenditure on the Public Services,. 1939-40. 
Part I (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1940). It was reviewing 
the latter two reports when the Japanese invaded, see BLHORP, 
18 February 1941, 57; F.T. Morehead, "Organisation of the
Forest Service in Burma with particular reference to the 
Report of the Fiscal Committee of 1938," BOF M/3/1531; Smith, 
"Reconstruction in Burma," 2.
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TABLE 7.1
STRENGTH OF THE FOREST STAFF 1913-37
1. Gazetted Staff 
A. IFS/BFS Class I
1913-14 1926-27 1936-
CCF/CFs 5 10 8
DCFs/ACFs 58 103 72
Total A 63 113 80
B. BFS Class II 72 106 71
C. Special Staff — 20 2
Total Gazetted Staff 135 239 155
2. Subordinate Staff
Rangers 178 230 149
Deputy Rangers 306 482 373
Foresters 1,709 1,885 1,376
Special Staff — — 81
Total Subordinate Staff 2 ,193 2,597 1,979
3. Office Establishment
(Clerks; Menials) 612 1,144 867
Total Staff (1-3) 2,940 3 ,980 3,001
Source: Adapted from Harry Champion and F.C. Osmaston ed. , 
The Forests of India, vol. 4 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1962), 441.
Note: Gazetted Staff comprises: (a) the superior service also 
known as the India Forest Service and Burma Forest Service 
Class I (Chief Conservator, Conservators, Deputy and 
Assistant Conservators); (b) the Burma Forest Service Class 
II (Extra Deputy and Assistant Conservators); (c) Special 
Staff (Forest Engineers and Timber Assistants).
The total number of staff in 1936-37 (3,001 men) was little 
more than it had been just prior to the First World War 
(2,940 men). More importantly, the strength of the 
subordinate staff was less in the mid-thirties than it had 
been 1913-14. Whereas in the latter year there were 2,193 
foresters, in 1936-37 there were only 1,979 subordinates in 
service. With fewer Rangers and Foresters, the protection of
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all reserves, but particularly the accessible plains 
reserves, became more difficult. As Conservator C.E. Milner 
noted in 1934, villagers refused to extract designated trees 
apparently 'preferring to steal' what they needed, safe in 
the knowledge that there was little that the Forest 
Department could do to stop them on a much reduced staff.73
The political changes of the late 1930s only intensified 
these difficulties. Following the suppression of the Hsaya 
San rebellion, the link between the peasantry and the urban 
nationalists was briefly disrupted.73 Whereas the former 
resumed strategies of everyday resistance, the latter became 
embroiled in the politics surrounding the proposed 
constitutional separation of Burma from India.74 If 
politicians such as Dr. Ba Maw and U Saw gained prominence 
in the early thirties defending the rebels, the general 
preoccupation of the middle-class nationalists with political 
and constitutional matters, as well as the dependence of many 
of these individuals on Indian financing, discredited many of 
them in the eyes of the peasantry.75 In turn, this situation 
gave rise to new political groups, notably the radical (ie. 
socialist) group of mostly middle-class youth and students 
known as the Do Bama As i ay on ('We Burmese' Association). 
Although this group was based in Rangoon, and did not become 
prominent until the late 1930s, its emphasis on radical 
social and economic change - including the nationalization of
73 RFA for 1933-34, 22,* Thein Lwin, "Why We Had Failed?" 
Burmese Forester 6 (June 1956): 34-35.
73 Taylor, State in Burma. 195-96.
74 Cady, History of Modern Burma. 322-55.
75 Ibid., 356-57? Taylor, State in Burma. 187.
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control over the country's forest - was probably more in 
keeping with the aspirations of Burma's hard-pressed
peasantry in the 1930s than were the pronouncements of such 
nationalists as U Ba Pe, U Chit Hlaing, Dr. Ba Maw and U 
Saw.76 However, the real significance of Do Bama Asia von
objectives as they pertained to forestry did not become
apparent until after the Second World War.
Of more immediate relevance to the question of the plains 
reserves was the advent of parliamentary government in April 
1937. This change enhanced the ability of the Burmese
political elite to intervene in forestry matters. The 
politicization of forest administration between 1937 and 1942 
is discussed more fully below. What needs to be noted here, 
however, is that applications to disforest reserves were no 
longer judged according to technical criteria.77 Rather, these 
applications were openly used in the context of a general 
shortage of agricultural land to advance the interests of the 
Burmese political elite.78 It was for this reason that, after
76 Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win. 66-67. The 
relationship between peasants, youth and politicians in late 
colonial Burma was quite complex. It would be wrong, for 
example, to suggest that the interests of the youth and 
peasantry were identical, or for that matter, that the 
objectives of the youth necessarily or always diverged from 
those of the established politicians. See Taylor, State in 
Burma f 163, 202-16.
77 Which is not to say that prior to 1937 applications 
were necessarily always judged according to these criteria, 
see J.S. Vorley, Working Plan for North Pegu Forest Division. 
1936-37 to 1945-46 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1937), 16. 
Prior to 1937, however, the application process was only 
partly politicized.
78 After 1930, land alienation accelerated as landowners 
were unable to pay debts called in by money-lenders. Thus, 
whereas the total area held by non-agriculturists climbed 
from 31 per cent in 1929-30 to nearly 50 per cent in 1934- 
35, the area let to tenants increased during the same period 
from 46 per cent to 59 per cent, see Michael Adas, The Burma
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1937, the fate of applications to disforest plains reserves 
depended on the views of the Parliamentary Secretary and 
never on the technical advisers "unless the two happened to 
agree".79 As Conservator H.C. Smith noted, politicians "vied 
with each other for the 'honour and glory' of being 
responsible for the disforestation of reserved forests".80 
Thus, Members of the House of Representatives petitioned the 
government to disforest reserves in their districts; but if 
the official objective was to provide land to the rural poor, 
in practice local notables affiliated with national 
politicians (and notably U Saw) were often the ultimate 
beneficiaries of disforestation.81 Plains reserves were 
disforested in, among other places, Meiktila, Myingyan and 
Magwe districts as a result of such political interference.82
There is a paradox in all of this. Never of much economic 
significance to the colonial state, the plains reserves were 
created in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
almost as an afterthought by a Department preoccupied with
Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian
Rice Frontier. 1852-1941 (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1974), 188-89. In this context, the pressure to clear 
residual reserves increased. On plains reserves disforested 
between 1923 and 1939, see BLHORP, 4 September 1939, 469-73.
79 Smith, "Reconstruction in Burma,” 6.
80 Ibid., 3-4; see also J.W.R. Sutherland, Working Plan 
for Minbu Forest Division. 1937-38 to 1951-52. vol. 1 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1938), 17; Tan Chein Hoe,
Working Plan for Delta Forest Division. 1947-48 to 1956-57. 
vol. 2 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1951), 14; A. Long,
"Village or Community Forests," Burmese Forester 2 (March 
1952): 28-29; J.B. Carrapiett, "Plains Forests," Burmese
Forester 2 (March 1952): 15.
81 For example, see BLHORP, 23 March 1939, 1362-63; 
BLHORP, 6 April 1939, 1871-72.
82 Thein Lwin, "Why We Had Failed?" 34.
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the management of the hill forests. Yet, the closing of the 
agricultural frontier in Lower Burma, combined with the 
growth of nationalist sentiment, guaranteed these reserves a 
high political profile in the 1920s and 1930s. That Europeans 
were being favoured in the allocation of forest leases and 
jobs only reinforced the general image of an exploitative and 
anti-Burmese central state.
Burmanization of the Forest Sector
The plains reserve issue was primarily a concern that 
related to the peasantry. In contrast, the Burmanization 
question was of central importance to the urban middle- 
class. This group generally prospered under colonial rule, 
but by the 1920s its position was under attack from Indian, 
Chinese and European interests. The promotion of Burman 
control of the forest sector was thus part of a broader 
effort to protect Burmese elite interests in the transition 
to self-rule.
There were two distinct but interrelated aspects to that 
process. First, the Burmese elite sought to remove obstacles 
that prevented Burmese from attaining senior posts in the 
Forest Department and the European firms. Secondly, it fought 
for a re-allocation of the teak leases in order to advance 
Burmese economic interests. The former was designed to ensure 
the representation of Burmese elite interests within existing 
state and non-state decision-making structures. In contrast, 
the latter was an attempt to gradually transform those 
structures through a reconstitution of teak lease-holdings.
As noted, Burmese Ministers had little opportunity to 
promote Burmese advancement within the Forest Department
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under the dyarchy system. For their part, members of the 
opposition challenged the government on this issue in the 
Legislative Council. In 1923, for example, Yamethin U Pu 
moved that forest expenditure be substantially cut in protest 
at the lack of Burmans in the superior service. After a 
heated debate, the resolution was defeated by only a one- 
vote margin.83 Resolutions were also made in 1924 and 1926 to 
draw attention to the non-promotion of Burmans (and Anglo- 
Indians).84 In 1932, U Ba Thi (Mandalay) pointed out that the 
government could save funds, and at the same time promote 
Burmanization by replacing highly paid Europeans with 
Burmese.85 These legislative manoeuvres were useful in so far 
as they helped to maintain the Burmanization issue on the 
political agenda. Yet, they only marginally affected the rate 
of Burman advancement in the Forest Department and the 
European firms.
Under the 19 3 7 constitution, the Burmese political elite 
was better placed to pursue change in this area. The subject 
of Burman advancement in the European firms was broached by 
the Ba Maw government in 1938 when it proposed that 25 per 
cent of the superior service of the European lessees should 
be Burman within five years.86 More importantly, the extent to 
which each firm complied with this scheme would be taken into
83 BLCP, 21 March 1923, 279-96.
84 BLCP, 20 March 1924, 555-57; BLCP, 18 March 1926, 
426-29.
85 BLCP, 25 February 1932, 460-63; see also Note by M.M. 
Ohn Ghine and U Shwe Tha, Report of the Burma Retrenchment 
Committee 1934. 227.
86 This proposal was made in light of the report of the
1937 Forest Enquiry Committee which is discussed below.
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account in the future disposal of leases.87 The issue was 
later raised again by Premier U Saw. In a meeting with the 
European firms on 17 September 1941, he urged them to meet a 
50 per cent target in return for which they would be awarded 
a concession on timber royalties. An agreement was reached in 
principle, but the Second World War interrupted the 
conclusion of a final deal.08
The war also interrupted deliberations that would have 
led to a more rapid Burmanization of the Forest Department. 
In November 1941, the U Saw government appointed a committee 
to enquire into recruitment policy.89 Several meetings were 
held, but the Japanese invasion disrupted the committee's 
work, and no report was published. Yet, the appointment of 
the Recruitment Committee signalled the government's 
impatience with the slow pace of Burman recruitment, and its 
determination to speed up the process. The Burmese committee 
members were united in their opposition to further European 
recruitment; only the two European officials dissented on 
this issue.90 In taking this stance, the Burmese were able to 
point to the growing number of trained local men: by 1938, 42
07 Government press release, "Burma's Forest Reserves, 
Extraction Policy, Big Lessees and Burmanisation," Rangoon 
Gazette 27 May 1938, BOF M/3/501; Arthur Bruce, "Burma 
Recollections," MSS. Eur. E. 362/3.
08 Note of the Meeting between Premier U Saw and 
Lessees, 17 September 1941, BOF M/3/501; Annual Report of the 
Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Limited (henceforth 
ARBBTCL) for 1940-41, 2; Bruce, "Burma Recollections".
89 Smith, "Reconstruction in Burma," 14. The Committee 
comprised: U Kyaw Mya (Chairman), U Lwin (Secretary), U Kyaw 
Din, U Aye (Government Minister), R. Unwin (Chief 
Conservator), and H.C. Smith (BFS I).
90 Ibid. The U Saw government (1940-42) was committed to 
the Burmanization of all sectors of government, see BLHORP, 
26 September 1940, 1348; BLHORP, 18 February 1941, 57.
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individuals had been awarded a Bachelor of Science in 
Forestry from Rangoon University; all but one had entered the 
Burma forest service thereby creating an available pool of 
recruits for senior posts.91
If politicians attempted to accelerate the Burmanization 
campaign, they also intervened actively in Department 
activities. Such intervention reflected frustration at the 
slow pace of bureaucratic reform. More importantly, it was 
indicative of the growing politicization of forest 
administration.
This process was particularly evident during U Saw's term 
as Forests Minister. Appointed in February 1939, Saw 
skilfully used the numerous patronage opportunities of the 
Department to promote his quest for the premiership.92 As the 
Forests Ministry was increasingly "used as a political 
instrument," the Chief Conservator became marginalised, and 
political appointees ignored the recommendations of 
foresters.93 The appointment of Palit Maung Maung - a former 
Forest Department employee dismissed for corruption - as 
Saw's personal assistant was particularly significant in this 
regard as this individual was a senior official in Saw's own 
Mvochit Party.94 The Ministry also overruled officials in a
91 Burma Legislature. Senate Proceedings. 23 February 
1938, 6-7.
92 Saw retained the Forests portfolio after he became 
Premier in September 1940, see Taylor, "The Case of U Saw," 
179; John LeRoy Christian, Burma and the Japanese Invader 
(Bombay: Thacker and Co., 1945), 250. On political 'nepotism' 
prior to Saw's appointment, see BLHORP, 26 August 1938, 318- 
19.
93 Smith, "Reconstruction in Burma," 5-6; Thein Lwin, 
"Why We Had Failed?" 37-38.
94 BLHORP, 19 March 1941, 1010-11.
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move which "undermined the authority of the executive" and 
interfered with the carriage of justice.95 U Thein Lwin, 
Burma's Director of Forests under the Japanese, relates how 
on one occasion prior to the war he compounded a forest 
offence that was committed by a politician. Subsequently, 
however, he was ordered to withdraw the case by the Minister, 
but this order was communicated through the accused person.96 
Free grants of timber for ponqyi kvauncr (monasteries) were 
also used to ensure Saw of the support of key religious 
leaders.97 More seriously, control over the subordinate 
service, which hitherto had rested with senior British 
foresters, was centralized in the Ministry such that the 
belief became widespread that "appointments were bought and 
sold".98 In the years immediately prior to the Japanese 
invasion, a kind of de facto parallel administration thus 
emerged. Based in the Burman-controlled Secretariat, it 
linked forest management to party politics as never before, 
and in the process, undermined the authority of colonial 
officials.
Not only did the Burmese political elite seek to promote 
its interests through the Burmanization of the superior
95 Smith, "Reconstruction in Burma," 7; BLHORP, 31 
August 1939, 320-21.
96 Thein Lwin, "Why We Had Failed?" 37; see also BLHORP, 
6 April 1939, 1868.
97 Taylor, "Case of U Saw," 173; Smith, "Reconstruction 
in Burma," 51. In 1939-40, timber valued at 52,103 rupees was 
granted for religious purposes. In addition, 'special' free 
grants of timber, fuel, and other produce from reserves 
valued at 183,734 rupees were made in that year, up from 
45,707 rupees in the year before, see BLHORP, 18 February 
1941, 61.
98 Smith, "Reconstruction in Burma," 24; Taylor, "Case 
of U Saw," 173; Thein Lwin, "Why We Had Failed?" 37.
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service of the Forest Department and the European firms. It 
also demanded that Burmese be allotted a greater share of the 
teak leases as part of a gradual re-allocation of the lease- 
holdings. The previous chapter suggested that the 
consolidation of teak extraction in the hands of the European 
firms in the early twentieth century was partly designed to 
impede the development of an indigenous business class. This 
second aspect of the Burmanization campaign, then, was an 
attempt to reverse that process.
Ironically, the emergence of a Burmese middle class in 
the twentieth century was partly based on prior participation 
in the timber trade. Indeed, a number of leading politicians 
of the inter-war period owed their privileged social position 
to success in that trade." Shwegyin U Pu, who was briefly 
Premier (1939-40), was born into a family of timber merchants 
in Shwegyin. The business was sufficiently lucrative to 
enable him to be educated in England. The grandfather and 
father of another leading politician, u Chit Hlaing, 
prospered in the timber business; the family financial legacy 
was later put to use in the nationalist struggle.100 U Thin 
Maung, a Hanthawaddy-based politician and outspoken critic of 
the Forest Department, had been in the business since before 
1923 .
Timber money may have contributed to the development of 
a Burmese middle class under British rule. But with the
99 Taylor, State in Burma. 169, 171.
100 Upon his return from England in 1903, Chit Hlaing 
had urged his father to get out of the timber trade because 
"the forest laws were so framed that no [Burman] could escape 
being penalised." In 1910 Chit Hlaing#s father quit forestry 
for agriculture. See BLHORP, 14 March 1940, 1056.
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allocation of the most valuable teak forests to the big 
European firms under a system of long-term renewable leases 
after 1907, the possibility that Burmese firms would become 
strong enough one day to compete with their European 
counterparts was eliminated.101 In 1925, and again in 1937, 
the government appointed a committee to review the timber 
allocation question, but each time, the recommendation was 
against fundamental change. To be sure, a few Burmese 
obtained teak leases, some even for extended periods.102 Many, 
however, remained confined to short-term contracts, and 
Burmese as a whole had access to only the least desirable 
forests.
Burmese nationalists tried to change this situation. In 
the Legislative Council, they denounced a policy that 
deprived the Burmese of their rightful share of the teak 
leases. As U Thin Maung noted in 1923: " Burma is rich in 
forest produce and yet the timber trade is entirely out of 
the hands of the Burmese people".103 If this allegation was 
not completely true, the preponderance of the European firms
101 To be sure, Burmese controlled the non-teak trade 
throughout the colonial era. But the profit from this trade 
was not as large as that derived from the teak trade.
102 The principal indigenous lessees (and the length of 
their leases) included: Saw Po Nyein and Saw Tha Dwe, two 
Karen traders in Thaton (21 years); Ba Oh and Son, a Burman 
firm also based in Thaton (21 years); Ah Yu, a Chinese trader 
in Thayetmyo (16 years); U Ba Thaw, a Burman working in Minbu 
(11 years); Ba Oh and Co., an Indo-Burman firm with a lease 
in Insein (16 years); Daw Kyu, a Burman trader operating in 
Thayetmyo (21 years); U Thin Maung, a Burman trader (and 
politician) in Thayetmyo (11 years); and U Po Dan and Son, a 
Burman firm in South Toungoo (11 years). See On Gyaw, "Burma 
Teak Lease" TMs, [1947], Indian Institute, Oxford; Morehead, 
Forests of Burma r 43.
103 BLCP, 20 March 1923, 243. A similar criticism was 
voiced by U Bah Oh (another timber trader) in the pre­
dyarchy Legislature in 1921, see BLCP, 9 April 1921, 811-12.
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was beyond dispute. Whereas those firms held 28 leases 
covering an area of 56,926 square miles in 1925, 'native' 
firms held 15 leases comprising only 1,614 square miles. 
Unleased forests covered 3,000 square miles but were mostly 
depleted.104 Under the system of renewals, the only way that 
the Burmese could acquire forests from the European firms was 
if the latter violated the terms of their leases, or could 
not reach an agreement with the government over royalties. 
Over the years, there were lease violations by the European 
firms.105 Nevertheless, the government rarely revoked their 
leases, and the allocation of forests remained essentially 
unchanged during the interwar period.106
When Burmese obtained teak (and non-teak) leases, they 
were still at a disadvantage. As noted, with only a few 
exceptions these traders operated under a system of short­
term contracts (one to five years) in which they were 
required to pay royalties in advance.107 Originally, a post­
payment system was used, but the Forest Department had 
encountered difficulties with revenue collection and fraud.108
104 BLCP, 10 March 1925, 29.
105 F.A. Leete, "Inspection Note on Teak Fellings and 
Extraction in the Nawin Forests, Prome Division under the 15 
Year Lease dating from 1908-09 held by Messrs. Steel Bros, 
and Co. Ltd.", BFP (November 1916), 95-128; E.S. Hartnoll and 
F.T. Morehead, Working Plan for the Kaukkwe Portion of the 
Bhamo Forest Division. 1935-36 to 1947-48 (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1936), 21.
106 Maria Serena I. Diokno, "British Firms and the 
Economy of Burma, with Special Reference to the Rice and Teak 
Industries, 1917-1937" (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 
1983), 215.
107 Ibid., 180-82.
108 H.C. Walker, "The Issue of Timber Licenses in 
Burma," Indian Forester 43 (February 1917): 71.
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Yet, as Conservator Herbert Walker acknowledged, pre-payment
'played into the hands' of money-lenders; by 1917, most
revenue earned under this system was supplied by these
individuals.109 Burmese operating under one year licenses were
in a similar predicament. Before obtaining a license, they
were required to pay a security deposit ranging from 500 to
2,500 rupees; and, at the end of the twelve months, the
traders paid royalty on all contracted timber whether it was
extracted or not.110
Speaking before the Legislative Council in 1932, U Tun
Win, a politician from Amherst district, summarized the sense
of frustration and anger felt by timber traders in Tenasserim
whose declining fortunes were attributed to a policy that
accorded European firms preferential treatment:
At one time the Burmese timber traders in Moulmein 
were very prosperous, and any visitor can see, when 
he comes to Moulmein, the remains of these glorious 
days when the Burmese timber traders enjoyed their 
prosperity. But they are now very poor, in fact you 
would hardly find any Burmese timber trader doing a 
good business in Moulmein now. On the other hand, 
you will find one or two Indians and Europeans doing 
good business. Why is that? What is the reason for 
that? I want to explain to the House. The European 
timber traders or firms are given the best forests 
with leases extending from 10 to 25 years and they 
are allowed to extract timber without payment in 
advance or security, and they settle accounts with 
the Government once a year. But on the other hand, 
none of the Burmese traders get a lease or none of 
them can work the forest without payment in advance.
Now, Sir, the European firms doing timber business in 
these four divisions [ie. Ataran, West Salween, 
Thaungyin, Thaton] not only get the leases from 
Government but they work, as I have said, without 
paying any advance - what advantages they have! When
109 Ibid., 70-71; see also Diokno, "British Firms," 191-
92.
110 U Tun Win, BLCP, 25 February 193 2, 451-52; U Ba, 
BLHORP, 8 March 1938, 759. Between 1937 and 1940, about 20 
per cent of contractors failed to extract all the contracted 
timber on time, see BLHORP, 15 February 1940, 51.
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a poor Burman timber trader wishes to work a forest 
he has got to apply for a license for a year. What 
kind of timber does he get? He gets timber which is 
called 'unclassed timber' - rejected by Foucar & 
Company - they are known as Foucar's rejected 
timber. . .11:L
There are at least three instructive features to these 
remarks. First, U Tun Win reminds his listeners of an earlier 
time when Burmese timber traders prospered, and Moulmein was 
a major lumber town. But this golden period was not in pre­
colonial times. Rather, it occurred under British rule in the 
nineteenth century. In this regard, the contrast with the 
situation of the peasantry is revealing. If, in lamenting 
access restrictions imposed by the colonial forest service, 
the peasant was wont to hark back to pre-colonial times when 
access was 'traditionally' more open and free, the Burmese 
timber trader, in criticizing twentieth-century forest 
policy, was liable to invoke an era when British foresters 
facilitated the forest work of Burmese as well as European 
firms. This difference in perceptions is significant. 
Whereas peasants tended to view colonial forest management in 
uniformly bleak terms (ie. access denied), Burmese timber 
traders held a more nuanced view. If they condemned the 
favouritism shown toward the European firms, the Burmese 
traders nevertheless remembered that it was the colonial 
state that had facilitated their erstwhile success. As a 
result, their energies went into lobbying that state to 
reverse policies favouring the European lessees, and not, as 
with the peasantry, in attempting to undermine the basis of 
state forest control.
111 U Tun Win, BLCP, 25 February 1932, 451.
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Yet, Tun Win's remarks are also interesting because they 
illustrate the extent to which the Burmese faced an uphill 
struggle in their campaign to alter forest policy in the 
1920s and 1930s. Thus, he observes that while the Burmese 
have to pay in advance in order to obtain one-year licenses 
for wood that is often sub-standard ('rejected' timber), the 
European firms enjoy long leases, are not subject to pre­
payment or security rules, and have the right to reject sub­
standard timber. This difference in treatment was indicative 
both of the systematic preference given to the European firms 
by government (see Chapter 6), as well as the insurmountable 
commercial advantages it gave those firms vis-a-vis Burmese 
traders.
Finally, Tun Win's comments are revealing because they 
capture the sense of nationalist outrage at a policy that 
discriminated against Burmese in a business in which they 
had long experience. Thus, he notes that not only Europeans, 
but also Indians, are doing well in Moulmein. In contrast, 
Burmese (hitherto well-off) are 'now very poor'. Moreover, 
they are forced into the humiliating position of having to 
accept second-rate teak that has already been 'rejected' by 
the European firms. Having to depend on rejected timber in 
this manner was undoubtedly as unrewarding financially, as it 
was demeaning psychologically, to the Burmese timber traders. 
Above all, it was a perennial reminder of the subordinate 
position which they now held in the teak industry.
That subordinate position was reinforced by a system of 
royalties that, once again, treated the Burmese less 
favourably than it did the Europeans. In general, the rate
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was higher for the former than it was for the latter.112 
Equally significant, however, was the fact that the 
government was prepared to reduce the European rates in bad 
economic times in order to maintain teak production, but was 
reluctant to extend the same advantage to Burmese traders.113 
Yet, it was precisely because they were less capitalized than 
their European competitors that Burmese firms were most in 
need of such a reduction.
The implications of such favouritism were most obvious 
during the 1930s. On 1 July 1933, the government reduced the 
royalty rates paid by the long-term lessees by 30 per cent 
"in order to assist the lessees in maintaining the market for 
teak by lowering the price and placing it on a competitive 
basis11.114 This decision cost the government 1,450,000 rupees
112 Diokno, "British Firms," 187; BLHORP, 26 February 
1937, 132. In Thaton, T.D. Findlay and Sons paid 23 rupees 
per ton on full-sized timber as compared with 45 rupees per 
ton by U Bah Oh and Sons and 40 rupees per ton by Saw Tha Dwe 
and Saw Po Nyein, see W.S. Shepherd, Working Plan for Thaton 
Forest Division. 1935-36 to 1944-45 (Rangoon: Government
Printing, 1937), 6. Rates varied depending on timber
accessibility and quality, but these factors do not account 
for the discrepancy in the European and Burmese rates.
113 The government assisted the European firms through 
royalty concessions before the 1930s, see Smith, South 
Tounqoo Forest Division. 17; W.C. Rooke, Working Plan for
Minbu Forest Division. 1927-28 to 1936-37 (Rangoon:
Government Printing, 1928), 9; A.J.S. Butterwick, Working
Plan for South Pegu Forest Division. 1937-38 to 1946-47. vol. 
2 (Rangoon: Government Printing, 1938), 4.
114 Hopwood, "Substitutes," 567. This rebate was for 
1933-34. In 1934-35, a 15 per cent rebate was granted, which 
was increased to 30 per cent in 1935-36, before being reduced 
to 15 per cent in 1936-37. The full rates were restored in 
1937-38. The BBTCL welcomed this "broad-minded policy," as a 
result of which Corporation profits were "rather better" than 
expected, see ARBBTCL for 1934-35, 3-4; ARBBTCL for 1935-
36, 3.
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in 1933-34 alone.115 As the European firms virtually 
monopolized such leases, the reduction was a de facto tax 
break for them. However, there was no equivalent reduction 
for Burmese traders.115 In 1936, the Government of India (at 
the Government of Burma's behest) raised the duty on Siamese 
teak imported into Burma via the Salween river from 7 per 
cent to 25 per cent. This move was in response to 
representations by the European lessees, and was bitterly 
opposed by Burmese traders in Moulmein whose interests were 
adversely affected, but who were not consulted on the 
matter.117 A representation by the Moulmein Timber Traders' 
Association calling for the repeal of this duty was rejected 
by the Government of Burma.118
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Burmese who had 
once been 'very much engaged' in the timber business, by the
115 The European firms obtained a reduction prior to the 
rebate by rejecting all but the best teak as 'refuse'. Such 
timber was then disposed of by the government and the 
proceeds divided with the firm in question. By increasing the 
percentage of refuse teak, the European firms reduced the 
average royalty paid from 25.6 rupees per ton in 1931-32 to 
18.9 rupees per ton in 1932-33. See Champion and Osmaston, 
Forests of India 4: 465-66; A.C. Pointon, The Bombay Burmah 
Trading Corporation Ltd.. 1863-1963 (Southampton: Millbrook 
Press, 1964), 80-81; Tan Chein Hoe, Working Plan for Allanmyo 
Forest Division. 1937-38 to 1951-52r vol. 2 (Rangoon: 
Government Printing, 1939), 9.
116 BLCP, 9 February 1933, 37; BLCP, 2 March 1935, 392, 
394-95; Aung Tun Thet, Burmese Entrepreneurship: Creative 
Response in the Colonial Economy (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag 
Wiesbaden, 1989), 63-64. The royalty on non-teak timber was 
belatedly reduced by 20 per cent, but as U Ba charged the 
reduction was "so low that it was not possible for the small 
traders to go on working," see BLHORP, 3 March 1937, 285-86.
117 BLCP, 12 August 1936, 87-91; BLCP, 13 August 1936, 
123-24. The BBTCL closed its operations in the Salween 
forests in 1932-33, see ARBBTCL for 1932-33, 3.
118 BLCP, 17 August 1936, 274-75; BLHORP, 8 March 1937, 
425-30.
294
1930s were becoming increasingly peripheral. As U Thin Maung
noted, this trend had much to do with the fact that "the
larger firms are quite able to make their points of view
heard [by government], but the local traders are not and
their opinions are often ignored".119
British foresters denied this allegation. Rather, they
pointed to the financial instability and unreliability of
indigenous firms. Among Burmese traders, only the work of
the Indo-Burmese firm Bah Oh and Company was considered to
be "up to the standard of a European firm".120 Moreover, teak
extraction in remote areas required "far more experience,
capital and elephant power than any of [the] existing
indigenous traders have yet shown that they possess".121
In contrast, the European firms had the financial and
human resources to do the job. In 1924, their invested
capital in Burma amounted to 100,000,000 rupees (£7,500,000),
and they employed 55,000 men.122 Moreover, as Conservator F.T.
Morehead noted:
Teak has had to face periods of acute depression and 
powerful competition from cheaper timbers and 
substitutes of all kinds. The fact that it retained 
its markets in the face of adversity and competition 
must be attributed not only to its inherent 
superiority over other timbers, but also in a 
considerable degree to the very high standard of 
efficiency and high international reputation to which
119 BLCP, 4 March 1935, 404; see also U Ohn Maung, BLCP, 
2 March 1935, 394-95.
120 H.R. Blanford, "Distribution of Teak Forests," Note 
prepared for the Government of Burma, [1936], MSS Eur. D. 
689.
121 Ibid.
122 Morehead, Forests of Burma. 43.
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these old established firms had brought the Burma 
teak industry.123
It was the highly capitalized and international European
firm, then, and not the small-scale and under-financed
Burmese trader, that was best placed to maintain teak
production, and thereby provide the government with a stable
financial return from its forests. In the context of the
Great Depression, this concern was particularly important.
As the government began to negotiate the new teak leases
in the mid-1930s, then, it was influenced by conflicting
interests and pressures. On the one hand, there was growing
pressure from the nationalist movement to increase the
Burmese role in that trade. On the other, colonial officials
were committed to "maintaining as far as possible the outturn
of the five European teak firms".124
Yet, this commitment was itself not without complication.
By the 1930s, most of Burma's teak forests had been gone over
at least once, and in unreserved forests teak had been
largely eradicated. Forest officials anticipated that this
would lead to a downturn in extraction. But this trend had
important implications for the balance of extraction between
the European firms. In effect, the downturn would work
against the smaller firms and to the advantage of the Bombay
Burmah Trading Corporation Limited (BBTCL) , thereby reversing
a long-standing tenet of forest policy.125 Unlike in the early
1900s, however, there were few unworked forests to adjust
123 Ibid.
124 Blanford, "Distribution of Teak Forests".
125 With its large holdings, the BBTCL held considerable 
reserves of large trees, see Ibid.
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the balance. Reviewing this situation, Chief Conservator H.R.
Blanford recommended in 1936 that the existing leases be
renewed, but that several unworked forests in Thayetmyo
division be given to Macgregor and Company and Steel
Brothers. Small and easily accessible forests, meanwhile,
would be distributed to indigenous firms on long and short-
term contracts.126
The lease negotiations became even more complex after
the constitutional changes of April 1937 enhanced the power
of the Burmese political elite. However, two months before
these changes were to take effect, the Government of Burma
appointed a five man Committee to review the 1907 policy on
the allocation of teak leases, and advise
whether any modification was required special 
attention being paid to the rights in law and equity 
of the existing lessees in conjunction with the 
desirability of meeting the legitimate wishes of 
Burmans to be more closely associated in the economic 
development of the timber trade.127
The Committee interviewed representatives of the European
firms, the principal indigenous traders and the Forest
Department; it also issued a questionnaire to which ninety-
seven replies were received. If this procedure seemed to the
Committee 'sufficient to represent fully all points of view,'
the terms of reference limited the scope of issues that could
be considered. Many of the replies to the questionnaire, for
example, "ventilated grievances, such as methods of
126 Ibid.
127 Report of the Forest Enquiry Committee 193 7 
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1937), i. The Committee
included: J. Clague (Financial Commissioner), U Kyaw Min
(Forests Secretary), C.E. Milner (Chief Conservator), F.B. 
Leach (Burma Chamber of Commerce) and U Ba Maung (Burmese 
Chamber of Commerce).
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collection of royalty, which are not the concern of this 
Committee".128 As noted, it was precisely this issue which was 
of preeminent concern to Burmese traders during the interwar 
period.
Completed within a matter of weeks, the Committee's 
Report was submitted to the Governor in April at the same 
time as the first Burmese government assumed office under 
the new constitution. This situation was hardly a 
coincidence. Rather, the intent behind appointing the 
Committee on the eve of the constitutional changes was to 
establish an agenda for gradual reform which the politicians 
upon assuming office would find difficult to alter. From the 
carefully worded terms of reference to the composition of the 
Committee (and witnesses), the government's objective was to 
signal reform in order to avert the possibility of major 
change.
The Committee's report reflected this delicate balancing
act. On the one hand, it supported the continued predominance
of the European firms. For the benefit of the incoming
Burmese government, the document warned that
any attempt to take away large areas from the
existing lessees besides being inequitable would lead 
to disorganization of the teak trade and would in all 
probability seriously affect Government revenue.129
As a result, it would be 'impossible' to substantially
increase the area allocated to indigenous enterprise in the
next fifteen-year cycle. On the other hand, in a move
designed to placate the new government, the Report
recommended that the 1907 Resolution be replaced with a new
128 Ibid., 1.
129 Ibid., 13.
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policy. The latter would have as its central objective the 
provision of "more and wider opportunities for indigenous 
enterprise".130 To this end, the Committee urged against the 
inclusion of rights of renewal or first refusal, thereby 
leaving open the prospect of a future lease re-allocation. 
In short, they urged a policy that would promote Burmese 
traders, but in such a manner that both government revenue 
and the short-term preeminence of the European firms would 
not be jeopardized.
In April 1937, Dr. Ba Maw became the first premier under 
the new constitution. One year later, the Ba Maw government 
confirmed the essential elements of the 1937 Report. Whereas 
selected accessible forests were to be divided into small 
blocks for indigenous firms, the major forests would be 
leased to the European firms for fifteen years. At that 
stage, the Burmanization issue would play a central part in 
the re-allocation of leases.131 According to BBTCL manager 
Arthur Bruce, this decision by the Ba Maw government 
indicated that it had the 'good sense' to recognise that "the 
continued presence of the British long term lessees was 
indispensable to the economy, for at least another fifteen 
years".132
130 Ibid.
131 As noted, this did not necessarily entail the 
elimination of the European firms if they had sufficiently 
Burmanized their staff. Nevertheless, it seems likely that 
Burmese firms would have benefited from any subsequent round 
of allocations. See Government of Burma, "Burma's Forest 
Reserves, Extraction Policy, Big Lessees and Burmanisation," 
BOF M/3/501; see also BLHORP, 13 March 1939, 940; BLHORP, 14 
March 1940, 1067.
132 Bruce, "Burma Recollections," 23-24. For which, Ba 
Maw was accused of colluding with the British, see BLHORP, 8 
March 1938, 751.
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This may well have been the case. To be sure, and as Ba 
Maw and others have pointed out, Burmese politicians between 
1937 and 1942 were still restricted in what they could do 
under the new constitution.133 Burma remained a colony subject 
to the ultimate control of the British, and this was nowhere 
more evident than in the extensive powers retained by the 
Governor. Yet, this chapter has noted how Burmese politicians 
intervened in forest administration after 1937.
Indeed, it was because the Burmese political elite now 
controlled forest administration as never before that it had 
good reason for promoting a gradual re-allocation of the teak 
leases. Any sudden change would have seriously disrupted 
government revenue as there were no Burmese firms even 
remotely in a position to replace the European lessees in the 
foreseeable future. A disruption in revenue would have 
limited patronage opportunities in a highly competitive 
political environment. If the political elite was "intensely 
keen" to gain access to "the privileges and protections that 
the mantle of state authority would provide them with in both 
their intra-elite conflicts and their contest with British 
officialdom," then it would have been illogical (and
133 Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a
Revolution. 1939-1946 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968), 18-19; Trager, Burma: From Kingdom to Independence, 
52-53. More significant was the political instability of the 
post-1937 period. The Ba Maw government (1937-39) was kept in 
office only with the support of European and ethnic minority 
groups; these groups would hardly have tolerated radical 
change on the lease question, see Cady, History of Modern 
Burma. 386, 389.
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impolitic) on their part to in any way limit that authority 
through precipitous action.134
For these reasons, no pre-war Burmese government 
challenged the short-term predominance of the European firms. 
If anything, those firms encountered more trouble from 
British foresters then they did from Burmese politicians.135 
Negotiations became dead-locked over royalty rates such that 
the European firms appealed to Financial Advisor James Baxter 
and Forests Secretary U Tin Tut for their assistance.136 In 
September 1941, the issue was placed before Premier U Saw, 
and a tentative deal was arranged but never completed owing 
to the war.
The Second World War ended these efforts of the Burmese 
political elite to control the forest sector. If the European 
firms still predominated, Burmese traders could anticipate a 
gradual re-allocation of the teak leases in their favour. 
Moreover, the Burmanization campaign had achieved some
134 Taylor, State in Burma. 187. The possibility of 
increasing Department extraction was not considered for two 
reasons. First, such extraction was only 9-10 per cent of 
production in the 1930s. The Forest Department was thus 
hardly better-placed than the Burmese firms to expand its 
operations on short notice. Secondly, the Burmese political 
elite (and the wealthy Burmese who financed it) was 
essentially conservative in outlook. As such, it sought to 
promote Burmese economic interests through a gradual re­
allocation of leases, and not through de facto 
nationalization. See idem, "Case of U Saw," 166-68; BLHORP, 
24 March 1937, 738-39; BLHORP, 13 March 1939, 937-38.
135 Bruce, "Burma Recollections," 27; Pointon, Bombay 
Burmah, 86. However, in the House of Representatives radicals 
campaigned to nationalize the timber industry, see U Ba 
Hlaing, BLHORP, 27 February 1939, 500, and BLHORP, 14 March 
1940, 1056.
136 An English-trained barrister, Tin Tut was the first 
Burman appointed to the Indian Civil Service in 1921. He 
played an important role in government until his death in 
1948.
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success in other areas. The superior service of the Forest 
Department was beginning to change (albeit slowly) under 
political pressure. Politicians were achieving a 
Burmanization of sorts through their assertion of direct 
political control over that Department.
This chapter has shown how the system of rationalized 
forest use introduced after 1856 was gradually undermined 
during the years 1923-42. If the introduction of dyarchy in 
1923 did not spell immediate change, it nevertheless focused 
attention on hitherto neglected issues. No longer could 
British foresters ignore the local political implications of 
their actions as had been the case in the pre-dyarchy period.
On the one hand, an increasingly desperate peasantry 
stepped up its challenge to the colonial state. Through 
wunthanu athin at the local level, and the GCBA at the 
national level, peasant grievances were politicized and 
linked with broader nationalist issues. In the Legislative 
Council, ambitious politicians sought to win peasant support 
by attacking the Forest Department over its plains reserves 
policy, and by emphasizing the adverse social effects of 
access restrictions on forest land and produce.
On the other hand, and as the Burmanization issue 
illustrates, the advent of partial self-rule was seized upon 
by the Burmese middle-class as an opportunity to reverse its 
declining financial position by asserting its claim to the 
top forestry jobs and the most valuable timber leases. If, in 
1942, the Burmese political elite had yet to achieve its goal 
of the Burmanization of the European firms and the Forest 
Department, the 1937 constitutional changes and attendant 
politicization of forest administration nevertheless
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indicated that further power-sharing between Europeans and 
Burmese was inevitable. For similar reasons, a gradual re­
allocation of the teak leases had become a central objective 
of forest policy in late colonial Burma.
In many respects quite different, the peasant access and 
Burmanization issues were nonetheless linked in so far as 
they illustrated a common grievance: Burma's forests were not 
being managed in the 'best' interests of the Burmese. What 
those interests were, and who was to define them, was still 
the subject of debate at the time of the Japanese invasion.
The interplay between everyday forms of popular 
resistance and broader political processes has been a central 
concern of this chapter, and of the thesis as a whole. In 
making sense of that relationship, and its implications for 
the politics of forest management in colonial Burma, it is 
useful now to briefly compare the Burmese experience with 
that of other countries. By contrasting developments in 
British India, Dutch-ruled Java and autonomous Siam with 
those in British Burma, it is possible to gain a better 
understanding of why forests were managed in the way that 
they were in colonial times.
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CHAPTER 8
FORESTS IN COLONIAL TIMES:
BURMA'S EXPERIENCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
This thesis has studied the politics of forest management 
in colonial Burma. It has examined the manner in which the 
Forest Department asserted control over forest access and 
use, and the ways in which others fought such control. This 
attempt was, of course, not new. In pre-colonial Burma, the 
monarchical state regulated access. What was new, however, 
was the method and scale of the attempt, as well as the 
greater coercive and administrative power of the colonial 
state. If early colonial forestry was virtually synonymous 
with teak over-harvesting under laissez-faire. than Brandis' 
appointment as Superintendent of Forests in 1856 signalled a 
new approach. As the European doctrine of scientific forestry 
was introduced, the Forest Department controlled a widening 
territory and range of activities.
Resistance to such control took various forms and changed 
over time. Burma's shifting cultivators, peasants and timber 
traders used strategies of everyday resistance and avoidance 
protest to circumvent forest rules. In the case of the latter 
two groups, such opposition was also expressed after the 
First World War through the nationalist movement. In 
contrast, early conflict between the Forest Department and 
the European firms gave way to cooperation based on perceived 
mutual advantage in the twentieth century. Differences over 
royalty rates notwithstanding, European predominance in the 
teak trade was an integral part of the government's system of 
rationalized forest use. However, the altered political
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circumstances of the late colonial era gradually undermined 
that system.
By examining the forest politics of colonial Burma, this 
thesis has explored the ambiguities of forest control and 
conflict. In the end, what emerges is not a picture of 
'progress' and 'romance' as colonial foresters would have 
it. Rather, colonial forest management was at each and every 
stage a political process in which resource access and use 
was bitterly contested. The implications of this central 
theme in the Burmese experience can be compared in a broader 
colonial context. In a concluding section, the discussion 
relates colonial developments to contemporary issues.
Forests in Colonial Times
Nowhere was the impact of colonialism more evident than 
in the forests. Under European direction, indigenous peoples 
were encouraged to convert jungle into agricultural land, the 
surplus from which formed part of an expanding global export 
trade. Forests were also transformed in other ways. In 
conjunction with European (and Asian) capitalists, colonial 
states extracted such species as sal, deodar (cedar) and teak 
for conversion into railway sleepers, ships and other things. 
Whether viewed as an obstacle to agriculture, or valued for 
selected species, Asia's forests were transformed by the 
expansion of European power in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.
The colonial state played a central role in this trans­
formation. It facilitated agricultural expansion through the 
remission of taxes and the provision of infrastructure. 
However, the colonial state also introduced rules to protect
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what it considered to be valuable forest. From the mid­
nineteenth century, German experts and 'scientific' 
techniques were deployed in the forests of South and South 
East Asia to promote long-term timber production. To this 
end, forest departments were created in, among other places, 
Burma, India, Java and Siam. This thesis has traced the 
efforts of one of those departments to assert control over 
the forests. In doing so, it has shown how such control needs 
to be understood as a function of the contested nature of the 
forest resource, the pivotal role of the forest department as 
a resource manager, and the impact of conflicting perceptions 
of forest use. In what follows, the Burmese experience is 
summarized, and then compared with that of India, Java and 
Siam, in light of these themes.
Contesting the Forest Resource
Conflict was an integral part of British exploitation of 
Burma's forests. At first, conflict was limited by the 
colonial state's focus on teak and its relative political 
and economic weakness. In the mid-nineteenth century, the 
British imposed fewer restrictions on forest access than did 
their Burmese predecessors. Prior to the 1870s, Burmese 
peasants and timber traders enjoyed unprecedented freedom of 
access to non-teak produce. Only shifting cultivators and 
European teak traders were seriously disrupted by the new 
forest policy.
But in the 1870s the Forest Department began to 
systematically control access. Reserves were created and the 
non-teak sector was regulated. These measures exacerbated 
conflict, and forest administration became one of the more
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unpopular aspects of colonial rule. The confrontation between 
foresters and peasants was particularly fierce in the 
twentieth century as the conversion of low-lying forest to 
agriculture increased the pressure on the plains reserves. 
Moreover, the closing of the agricultural frontier and 
growing peasant deprivation coincided with the emergence of 
a nationalist movement such that access restrictions on these 
reserves became a central component of the anti-British 
struggle.
Forest politics in colonial Burma was an escalating 
process of control and resistance. The forest bureaucracy 
grew, but so too did the number and severity of forest 
offenses. Even before administrative retrenchment and 
political intervention began to weaken the Forest Department 
in the 1930s, it could scarcely be said that Burma's forest 
users were becoming more law abiding.
The nature of this conflict also changed as political, 
economic and ecological changes re-arranged the 'landscape 
of resistance'. In the twentieth century, the interests of 
the Forest Department and the European firms converged even 
if differences (notably over royalty rates) remained. By 
affirming the predominance of these firms, the colonial state 
eliminated the possibility of Burmese control of the teak 
trade. In the process, it hindered the development of an 
indigenous business class that might one day have jeopardized 
British rule. Yet, such favouritism guaranteed that the 
question of the teak leases would become a central concern of 
nationalists. Under the dyarchy system, politicians after 
1923 sought to advance the economic interests of the Burmese
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middle class through a campaign to Burmanize the forestry 
sector.
In contrast, an increasingly hard-pressed peasantry 
seized the opportunity presented by the rising nationalist 
movement to become more militant after the First World War. 
As Guha observes in the Indian context, "larger historical 
forces" such as mass nationalism "served to legitimize 
protests oriented towards forest rights, enabling peasants 
to claim these rights more insistently and with greater 
militancy".1 Through the wunthanu athin, peasants sought to 
undermine British rule by denying its financial demands at 
the same time as they rejected the legitimacy of its laws. 
With the Hsaya San rebellion, such resistance turned into 
outright revolt. But, if peasants used these occasions to 
signal in no uncertain terms their opposition to colonialism, 
they also persisted with safer strategies of everyday 
resistance when faced with the superior coercive power of the 
state. As manifested in the inability of the Forest 
Department to protect the plains reserves from illicit 
deforestation, those covert strategies could be highly 
effective indeed.
Conflict between the Forest Department and shifting 
cultivators followed a different course. In the teak-bearing 
Pegu Yoma, foresters sought to win over the hill Karen 
through introduction of the taungya forestry system. But this 
system represented at best an uneasy compromise between two
1 Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological
Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 134. This study in historical
sociology explores the social implications of scientific 
forestry in the Indian Himalaya during the colonial and post­
colonial eras.
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essentially incompatible land uses, and failed to resolve 
conflict in non-teak areas. As the cutch crisis of the 1890s 
illustrated, cultivators resisted regulation by illegally 
felling and burning reserved species. In remote areas, flight 
remained an option throughout the colonial era.
Shifting cultivators destroyed reserved species in their 
clearings. Peasants surreptitiously entered reserves at night 
to steal produce. Burmese traders exceeded the terms of their 
harvesting licenses or suborned villagers to illicitly remove 
timber. These activities were ubiquitous in colonial Burma. 
As such, they are remarkably similar to conflict in other 
parts of Asia where the introduction of scientific forestry 
prompted local resistance. As in Burma, the creation of 
reserves and the multiplication of rules was bitterly 
contested by a peasantry loath to recognize the restriction 
of its forest access.
In northern India, for example, the deforestation of sal 
and deodar forests in the nineteenth century was crucial to 
the growth of that country's cities and railways, but also 
led to the creation of the India Forest Department (1864) and 
the passage of the India Forest Act (1865). These steps 
marked the advent of a new management system that struck "at 
the very root of traditional social and economic 
organization".2 Prior to the 1890s, attention focused on 
demarcating residual sal forest in the Himalayan foothills, 
but the discovery of improved methods of processing chir pine 
resin led to an escalating series of restrictions on peasants
2 Ibid., 185.
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living in the upland Kumaun forests.3 In 1894, eight species 
(including sal, deodar and chir) were reserved, and rules 
were framed that limited peasant access to fuel and timber 
supplies. With the creation of reserves after 1911, customary 
practices such as tree lopping, grazing and the annual 
burning of the forest floor (for pasture), were banned. In 
response, peasants ignored the new rules, and the number of 
forest offenses soared. Such resistance became increasingly 
militant, and culminated in 1921, when a strike against 
compulsory labour (begar) and an incendiary campaign 
paralysed local forest administration. Shortly thereafter, 
the government abandoned many reserves in the area.4
Elsewhere in British India, a similar dynamic of control 
and resistance developed. The forests of southern India were 
originally valued for their teak, but later became an 
important source of timber and fuel for India's growing 
cities.5 In Uttara Kannada district, for example, forests 
were reserved for this latter purpose.6 But as peasants 
experienced growing hardship, they resorted to everyday forms
3 Ibid., 43-45? Richard P. Tucker, "The British 
Colonial System and the Forests of the Western Himalayas, 
1815-1914," in Global Deforestation and the Nineteenth- 
Century World Economy. ed. Richard P. Tucker and J.F. 
Richards (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983), 164- 
65.
4 Guha, Unquiet Woods. chap. 5.
5 Forests were also cleared as part of the development 
of coffee plantations, see C.A. Bayly, Indian Society and the 
Making of the British Empire. The New Cambridge History of 
India, vol. 2, part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 140.
6 Vandana Shiva, Ecology and the Politics of Survival: 
Conflicts over Natural Resources in India (London: Sage, 
1991), 94-95; Madhav Gadgil, "India's Deforestation: Patterns 
and Processes," Society and Natural Resources 3, 2 (1990): 
136.
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of resistance. In addition, peasants openly contested access 
restrictions at conferences on forest grievances. As in 
Burma, however, the inability of these measures to more than 
marginally alleviate oppression led to increased conflict. 
Popular opposition turned into open defiance of the colonial 
state when in 1930 a Jungle Satyaaraha (revolt) broke out in 
this district.7 Such resistance was not unlike that of 
India's tribal minorities who fought restrictions on the 
practice of ihum (shifting cultivation), both covertly, and 
when pressed, openly through fituris (small risings).0
In Java, Dutch rule produced comparable results. From 
the 1850s, the Dutch commissioned a trained staff to 
introduce scientific forestry.9 Rules declaring all forest 
land and teak government property led to a confrontation with 
Javanese villagers who persisted with wood gathering and 
grazing practices that were now illegal. That confrontation 
was particularly severe in teak-forest villages where forest 
police considered even "the smell of teakwood...as evidence 
of punishable theft".10 As with the hill Karen in Burma, 
Java's teak-forest villagers were favourite targets of the 
Forest Department because they were considered a major threat
7 Shiva, Ecology and the Politics of Survival. 97.
B Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil, "State Forestry 
and Social Conflict in British India," Past and Present 123 
(May 1989): 153-57; Indra Munshi Saldanha, "The Political
Ecology of Traditional Farming Practices in Thana District, 
Maharashtra (India)," Journal of Peasant Studies 17 (April 
1990): 433-43.
9 Peter Boomgaard, "Forest Management and Exploitation 
in Colonial Java, 1677-1897," Forest and Conservation History 
36 (January 1992): 10-12; Nancy Lee Peluso, "The History of 
State Forest Management in Colonial Java," Forest and 
Conservation History 35 (April 1991): 67-69.
10 Peluso, "History of State Forest Management," 72.
311
to the teak monopoly. Not surprisingly, peasant resistance 
was especially militant in these areas. The millenarian Samin 
movement that caused the Dutch much trouble around the turn 
of the century was born, and remained centred, in Java's 
central teak forests. Like Burma's wunthanu athin, this 
movement rejected the laws and financial demands of the 
colonial state, and again, as in Burma, forest access 
restrictions were a leading source of peasant grievance.11
In the teak forests of north-west Siam, the introduction 
of scientific forestry coincided with the assertion of royal 
control in this area in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. As in the adjoining British-ruled Shan 
States, conflict at first centred on the struggle between the 
central authorities and the Chao (hereditary local rulers) 
for control of these forests.12 With the assistance of Herbert 
Slade and other British foresters, the Siamese state 
prevailed, and a forest department (modelled on the one in 
Burma) was created in 1896.13 Popular access to the teak
11 Nancy Lee Peluso, Rich Forests. Poor People: Resource 
Control and Resistance in Java (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992), 69-72. This book traces the
evolution of state forest control and popular resistance in 
colonial and post-colonial Java.
12 Banasopit Mekvichai, "The Teak Industry in North 
Thailand: The Role of a Natural-Resource-Based Export Economy 
in Regional Development" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 
1988), 194-223. This thesis draws upon dependency theory to 
explore the political, economic and ecological effects of an 
export-oriented teak industry in northern Thailand.
13 British foresters experienced "great trouble" in 
getting local rulers to relinquish forest ownership, see 
W.F.L. Tottenham, "The Formation of the Forest Department in 
Siam," Indian Forester 31 (August 1905): 447; see also D.
Bourke-Borrowes, "General Thoughts and Observations on 
Forestry in Siam," Indian Forester 54 (March 1928): 152-54; 
Malcolm Falkus, "Early British Business in Thailand," in 
British Business in Asia since 1860. ed. R.P.T. Davenport- 
Hines and Geoffrey Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge Unive^it^
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forests was then gradually limited. If a 1914 decree allowed 
villagers free teak for domestic use, the inconvenience and 
informal costs associated with acquiring a permit led 
peasants to extract produce illegally.14 Illegal extraction 
and agricultural clearance bedeviled Siamese foresters as 
similar offenses did their counterparts in Burma, Java and 
India. Moreover, such resistance continued to grow because 
the more that the teak trade grew, "the less people were 
allowed to use the resource, whether for private use or for 
commercial purposes".15
During the colonial era, British, Dutch and Siamese 
officials transformed popular forest access. That these 
changes provoked local opposition to the policies and 
practices of the forest department was not surprising. In 
the process, the role of this department as a resource 
manager came to be contested as bitterly as the forest 
resource itself.
Resource Management and the Forest Department
To understand forest conflict in colonial times is to 
appreciate the pivotal role of the forest department in 
resource management. In Burma, the creation of the forest 
service in 1856 marked a new phase in state forest control. 
With this agency, a powerful means of political control was 
established.
Press, 1989), 144.
14 David Feeny, "Agricultural Expansion and Forest
Depletion in Thailand, 1900-1975" in World Deforestation in 
the Twentieth Century. ed. John F. Richards and Richard P. 
Tucker (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), 124, 126.
16 Mekvichai, "Teak Industry in North Thailand," 252.
313
The central purpose of the Forest Department was the 
long-term development of Burma's teak forests. The 
combination of a functionally-defined department and 
scientific principles was a felicitous means of promoting 
that goal. Emphasizing regulation, enumeration and 
calculation, scientific forestry was ideally suited to the 
rationalistic outlook of the colonial state. As German 
experts helped to organize the forest service in Burma, 
British recruits were sent to Germany and France for 
training. The result was a professional service that adapted 
European techniques to the Burmese setting. Teak forests were 
mapped, enumerated and demarcated as reserves. Subsequently, 
tree planting, fire-protection and other silvicultural 
operations were conducted under working plans that promoted 
the incidence of teak in these areas. By the early twentieth 
century, the growing complexity of forest management was 
reflected in the department's greater size and specialist 
appointments, as well as in its growing emphasis on non-teak 
timber production and the protection of ecologically- 
sensitive areas. Bureaucratic development and scientific 
management were thus linked in a process which enhanced state 
forest control.
Such control was not unambiguous. The advent of the 
Forest Department led to programmatic differences between 
forest and civil officials. A common paternalistic faith and 
interest in colonial rule meant that such conflict was kept 
within definite bounds, but differences over jurisdiction 
were nonetheless important. With the Burma Forest Act (1881), 
an attempt was made to eliminate such conflict by partiqlly 
integrating the two services, but inter-departmental
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friction, as manifested in the cutch and plains reserves 
issues, remained a feature of colonial rule. Burma may have 
been run as a 'business concern' ,16 but there was not always 
agreement over which business was to be accorded the most 
concern.
This image of a 'business concern' is apt for another 
reason. British foresters were torn between their self-image 
as stewards of Burma's forests, and their duty to develop 
those forests in order to maximize revenue. As the 
administrative retrenchment of the 1930s indicates, senior 
officials were prepared to sacrifice the former in pursuit 
of the latter. Even before the Great Depression, however, 
forest revenue was an overriding concern of government. 
Scientific forestry may have been generally compatible with 
the development of a rational state, but in the quest to make 
financial ends meet, short-term expediency often proved the 
more powerful policy influence.
In contrast, long-term considerations led government to 
concentrate control of the teak trade in the hands of the 
European firms after the turn of the century. As part of a 
broader rationalization of forest activities, this move 
simplified forest management, and limited the power of a 
potentially threatening indigenous business class. In the 
nineteenth century, European firms had been the bane of the 
Forest Department. In the twentieth century, they were an 
essential bulwark of colonial rule.
16 This imagery is from J.S. Furnivall as noted in 
Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (London: C. Hurst,
1987), 8.
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The link between scientific forestry, bureaucratic growth 
and private enterprise in Burma was an important but complex 
one. Elsewhere in Asia, that link was also crucial to the 
political economy of forest use. In Siam, British foresters 
supervised the introduction of scientific forestry as the 
Siamese state asserted control over a notoriously chaotic 
teak trade.17 Siamese foresters were sent to India and Burma 
for training just as their British counterparts had once gone 
to Germany and France. By the Second World War, valuable 
forests and species were being reserved and protected by a 
trained staff that was also beginning to address conservation 
issues.18 As in Burma, however, the quest to maximize revenue 
overshadowed this stewardship role.19
In rationalizing teak extraction, Siamese policy also 
entrenched the pre-eminence of British firms under a system 
of long-term leases.20 This move was dictated by political 
and economic considerations. Whereas in Burma the British 
sought to eliminate a possible internal challenge to their 
rule, the Siamese were anxious not to provide any 
justification for a British invasion (as the Burmese had done 
in 1885). By affirming British economic power, the Siamese 
capitalized on Britain's desire "to keep Thailand as an
17 Mekvichai, "Teak Industry in North Thailand," 196-
207.
18 Feeny, "Forest Depletion in Thailand," 124-25; Kamon 
Pragtong and David E. Thomas, "Evolving Management Systems in 
Thailand," in Keepers of the Forest: Land Management 
Alternatives in Southeast Asia, ed. Mark Poffenberger (West 
Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1990), 169.
19 Bourke-Borrowes, "Forestry in Siam," 157-60.
20 Falkus, "Early British Business in Thailand," 133-
46.
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economic colony, if not a political one".21 This policy also 
reflected the fact that the Siamese were in no position at 
the turn of the century to extract their own timber. As in 
Burma, the working of remote forests (as a result of the 
exhaustion of accessible tracts) demanded "an investment of 
fixed and working capital on a scale that only the major 
Western companies could provide".22 In the end, the result in 
early twentieth-century Burma and Siam was the same: the
assertion of political and economic control over teak forests 
by a central state acting in conjunction with private (mainly 
British) firms.
Unlike Burma, however, Siam was never formally colonized. 
The significance of this situation only became fully apparent 
in the 1930s. In Burma, British rule - even under partial 
self-government - ensured that, in the end, the Burmese 
political elite was unable to rapidly alter the predominance 
of the European firms. In contrast, the absence of formal 
colonial control in Siam meant that indigenous political 
groups, such as the young military and civilian officials who 
ended that country's absolute monarchy in the 193 2 
revolution, had more of an opportunity to challenge European 
control of the teak trade. The movement to nationalize the 
teak industry after 1932, for example, signalled a shift in 
Siam's forest policy that was simply not possible in colonial
21 Mekvichai, "Teak Industry in North Thailand," 207. 
This quasi-colonial status was symbolized in the creation 
after 1883 of a British Consulate at Chiangmai to protect 
British interests in the area.
22 Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam c. 1890- 
1920 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), 118-19; see 
also Falkus, "Early British Business in Thailand," 135.
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Burma at that time.23 Yet, the importance of Siamese autonomy 
during the colonial era must not be overrated. Despite the 
expansion of state logging operations, it was not until 1960 
that British domination of the country's teak industry was 
brought to an end; that is, a decade after the Burmese, who 
had meanwhile gained their independence in 1948, nationalized 
their own forest industry.24
If anything, the relationship between state forest 
control and private enterprise was more ambiguous in Dutch- 
ruled Java than it was in either colonial Burma or Siam. In 
the early to mid-nineteenth century, the Dutch colonial state 
worked the main teak forests, but with the introduction of 
the 1865 forest regulations that arrangement was phased out. 
Private enterprise then assumed a growing role until, in 
1894, it controlled 95 per cent of the trade.25 But, whereas 
in Burma the British moved to concentrate extraction in 
private (European) hands at about this time, the Dutch in 
Java followed a reverse course: "private enterprise, so
important at the turn of the century, was slowly but surely
23 Mekvichai, "Teak Industry in North Thailand," 227.
24 It should be noted that the Second World War was a 
major set-back to Siamese efforts to nationalize the teak 
industry. As a consequence of its alliance with Japan, Siam 
(or Thailand as it was by then known) was forced to restore 
British teak concessions by the Allies. It was not until 1953 
that the Thai government was able to resume its 
nationalization programme through expansion of the state- 
owned Forest Industry Organization, see Ibid., 228-29.
25 Boomgaard, "Forest Management and Exploitation," 12; 
J.S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy 
(1939; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967^, 
201.
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crowded out".26 In part, this decision reflected the under­
developed nature of Dutch capitalism in the forest sector.27 
There was no firm in Java of equivalent stature to the Bombay 
Burmah Trading Corporation Limited (BBTCL) in Burma and 
Siam.28 But, the decision also reflected the ability of Dutch 
foresters to exert greater control over Java's compact teak 
forests than their counterparts elsewhere. As with the 
British, the Dutch imported German personnel and techniques 
to assist in the assertion of state forest control.29 Reserves 
were established and rigorously protected by forest police. 
The creation of working plans paralleled developments in 
Burma, and reflected a similar quest to "get full value from 
the scientific regulation of the forest districts".30 The 
Dutch may ultimately have forsworn private extraction, but 
their control of Java's teak forests was, if anything, more
26 Boomgaard, "Forest Management and Exploitation," 12. 
An 1897 Forest Regulation provided for the gradual exclusion 
of private enterprise. Thus, whereas in 1900 private firms 
managed all of Java's teak forests, by 1930 they controlled 
only 12 per cent of the total area, see Furnivall, 
Netherlands India. 202, 325.
27 Furnivall, Netherlands India. 201. This situation was 
in marked contrast to that in the agricultural sector, see 
Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin for the Asian Studies Association of 
Australia, 1986), 6-10.
28 The BBTCL's attempt to establish operations in Java's 
teak forests in the early twentieth century was ultimately 
frustrated by its inability "to come to any satisfactory 
arrangement with the Dutch Government for a continuity of 
working rights," see Annual Report of the Bombay Burmah 
Trading Corporation Limited (henceforth ARBBTCL) for 1911- 
12, 4? see also ARBBTCL for 1913-14, 4; ARBBTCL for 1906-
07, 4-5.
29 Similarly, the Dutch required that officers destined 
for the superior service be trained in forestry at a 
university in Europe, see Furnivall, Netherlands India r 325.
30 Peluso, "History of State Forest Management," 71.
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pronounced than in Burma. And, while some Dutch officials 
disapproved of the severe access restrictions imposed on 
villagers, their protests were "no match for the increasingly 
efficient state forest protection machine".31
In contrast, the assertion of state forest control in 
nineteenth-century India was the occasion of bitter inter­
departmental wrangling. As in Burma, programmatic differences 
between the Forest and Civil Departments were the source of 
the problem. Although these differences cropped up in 
different places and at various times, they were nowhere more 
evident than in the unwillingness of the Madras government to 
accede to the India Forest Act (1878). If that government had 
a 'tradition' of upholding village rights, it also objected 
to the 'greatly enlarged powers' that the Forest Department 
would enjoy under the proposed legislation.32 Moreover, civil 
officials feared that the new law, "by sharply restricting 
customary usage, would adversely affect the agrarian 
economy".33 In early twentieth-century Kumaun, Commissioner 
Percy Wyndham questioned the wisdom of a Forest Department 
that acted as if "the world were made for growing trees and 
men were vermin to be shut in".34 As elsewhere in British 
India, it was feared that such an attitude would lead to 
civil unrest.
31 Ibid., 72.
32 Ramachandra Guha, "An Early Environmental Debate: The 
Making of the 1878 Forest Act," Indian Economic and Social 
History Review 27, 1 (1990): 69-70.
33 Ibid., 71.
34 Quoted in Guha, Unquiet Woods f 108.
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The role of the Forest Department in India was 
accentuated by the absence of large-scale European firms in 
the extraction business. In the timber trade of northern 
India, for example, British merchants after 1860 were rare, 
and private extraction was "almost entirely in Indian 
hands".35 However, the Department's role in that trade was 
also important, and extended to the operation of a resin 
processing plant.36 As in Burma, forest management became more 
complex in twentieth-century India. The introduction of 
working plans led to a more systematic forest exploitation: 
"a variety of tree species that had previously been 
considered of no commercial value" were harvested and "new 
uses for familiar species were developed".37
During the colonial era, Asia's forest departments 
acquired a knowledge about the forests that was used to 
rationalize forest activities. An expanding bureaucracy used 
scientific principles to assert control over valuable forests 
often, but not always, in conjunction with capitalist 
enterprise, and typically despite the opposition of civil 
officials. But forest politics in colonial times was not only 
about the empowerment of forest departments, and ensuing
35 This trade was controlled by Hindu and Sikh merchant 
sects, see Tucker, "Forests of the Western Himalayas," 162- 
63; see also idem,"The British Empire and India's Forest 
Resources: The Timberlands of Assam and Kumaon, 1914-1950," 
in World Deforestation in the Twentieth Century, ed. John F. 
Richards and Richard P. Tucker (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1988), 107, where it is noted that Calcutta firms were 
given leases on favourable terms in the 1920s to develop 
Upper Assam's forests.
36 It was also responsible for railway-sleeper 
production, see Tucker, "India's Forest Resources," 100.
37 Ibid., 97? see also Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra 
Guha, This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 136-38.
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conflict with diverse forest users. It was also a struggle of 
ideas that embraced conflicting perceptions of what 
constituted legitimate forest use.
Conflicting Perceptions of Forest Use
One of the most important colonial legacies in Asia 
concerned the new ideas that transformed the politics, 
economics and ecology of the conquered territories. That 
transformation was particularly evident in Burma where the 
country's forests bore the imprint of powerful new ideas of 
social practice. For three decades after the first Anglo- 
Burmese war (1824-26), the British subjected the Tenasserim 
forests to unchecked exploitation according to laissez-faire 
principles. The ensuing degradation only confirmed what 
scientists had all along predicted: laissez-faire forestry 
and long-term timber production were incompatible. The 
acquisition of Pegu in 1852 coincided with an altered 
imperial context in which new forms of state forest control 
were possible.
To this end, the British employed German ideas and 
personnel to manage Burma's forests. The new approach 
transformed Burmese forest politics as laissez-faire forestry 
never did. Whereas laissez-faire forestry emphasized freedom 
of access, scientific forestry was based on strictly limited 
access. While the former eschewed state intervention, the 
latter was premised on such action. As such, scientific 
management was bound to come as a shock to forest users 
accustomed to erratic or lax forest rules. That shock turned 
to resistance wherever its impact was felt in Lower Burma 
(after 1856) and Upper Burma (from 1886). But, if all for^i;
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users felt the bite of the new restrictions, some groups were 
more adversely affected than others. As the objective of 
scientific forestry was long-term commercial timber 
production, it was not surprising that the system ultimately 
found favour with the European firms (once Department 
extraction was curtailed after the turn of the century). 
Indeed, with its emphasis on large-scale production over an 
extensive and difficult terrain, scientific management was 
ideally suited to the structure and resources of the BBTCL 
and other capitalist enterprises.
In contrast, scientific forestry limited indigenous 
access with few, if any compensating benefits. Burmese 
traders may have prospered, particularly in the nineteenth 
century, but the rationalization of the teak trade generally 
reduced their economic opportunities. To the peasantry, 
scientific management was an escalating series of 
restrictions that were all the more acutely felt as 
unreserved forests were depleted in the early twentieth 
century. For certain shifting cultivators, such management 
was, as manifested in the taunaya forestry system, an 
opportunity to minimize state exactions and earn a small 
income. But, as the struggle to implement this system 
indicated, these cultivators were well aware that taunaya 
forestry was ultimately based on the elimination of their 
way of life. Moreover, that system did not embrace all 
shifting cultivators. In the twentieth century, the campaign 
against these groups spread even to the remote parts of 
Burma.
That scientific forestry proved inimical to indigenous 
interests was only to be expected. It privileged export-
323
oriented teak production over the domestic forest economy. 
It also aimed to convert Burma's species-rich forests into 
uniform stands of high-value timber. Whereas the former were 
of considerable use value to the Burmese, the latter were 
not, and in any case, were primarily destined for external 
markets. Concurrently, foresters showed little interest in 
peasant needs, as illustrated in their failure to seriously 
address the local-supply issue and their arbitrary 
classification of peasant produce as 'minor'.
Scientific forestry was also used to belittle indigenous 
practices, if long-term commercial timber production was 
scientific, then subsistence-oriented activity was 
'unscientific'. Of course, some practices were considered to 
be more unscientific than others. The degree of official 
disapprobation depended on the threat that a given practice 
posed to commercial timber (and especially teak) production, 
as well as the general pseudo-anthropological reasoning that 
shaped European perceptions of indigenous peoples in the 
colonial era.38 Thus, peasants living on the plains were 
'wasteful', but the 'primitive' hill Karen who inhabited the 
teak-bearing Pegu Yoma were the very antithesis of 
responsible forest use.
However, the fundamental divide was between Europeans 
and Burmese. Whereas Europeans were scientific, modern, 
rational and ecologically-minded, the Burmese were 
unscientific, backward, irrational and anti-ecological. In
38 Robert H. Taylor, "Perceptions of Ethnicity in the 
Politics of Burma," Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 
10, 1 (1982): 7-22? E.R. Leach, Political Systems of Highland 
Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure (1954? reprint, 
London: Athlone Press, 1986).
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practice, this perceptual dichotomy had important 
implications for forest management. Thus, Burmese traders 
failed to obtain sizable teak leases not because they were 
the victims of official discrimination, but rather because 
they were 'inefficient', 'unreliable' and 'wasteful'. 
Peasants were unable to manage their own village forests not 
because they were given insufficient powers and opportunity, 
but rather because they were 'improvident'. shifting 
cultivators were to be dissuaded from their lifestyle not 
because it conflicted with state forest control, but because 
such a lifestyle was ecologically 'destructive'. In short, 
because the natives could not manage their own forests, 
Europeans had an obligation to do it for them.
Scientific forestry was thus a highly paternalistic but 
useful justification for British rule. In response, peasants 
could always hark back to a pre-colonial era in which 
customary usage was reputedly integral to a subsistence- 
oriented economy. Under the Burmese kings, it was believed, 
forest access was guaranteed and peasant needs provided for. 
That such a 'tradition' was largely invented did not detract 
either from its emotive appeal or its usefulness as a 
justification for everyday resistance. After the First World 
War, the rise of Burmese nationalism was an additional means 
of building an alternative perception of forest use. Thus, 
access restrictions were not only a violation of traditional 
rights; they were also fundamentally 'anti-Burmese' in 
character. It was this combination of perceptions that 
underlay the events of the 1920s and 1930s which ultimately 
undermined the colonial system of rationalized forest use.
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The British estimation of what was acceptable may have 
been at odds with Burmese perceptions of what was 
appropriate, but this situation was hardly unique to colonial 
Burma. Elsewhere in Asia, the introduction of scientific 
management represented a belated attempt by the state to 
rectify the damage caused to valuable forests by earlier 
laissez-faire policies. In the process, the new management 
system set forest departments on a collision course with 
indigenous peoples who resisted the subversion of pre­
existing patterns of forest access and use.
In India, as in Burma, scientific forestry was introduced 
as a response to widespread over-harvesting during the 
laissez-faire era.39 If in Burma the depletion of Tenasserim's 
teak forests under early British rule led to the imposition 
of state forest control in 1856, then in India it was "the 
large-scale destruction of accessible forests in the early 
years of railway expansion [that] led to the hasty creation 
of a forest department" in 1864.40
However, as India's Forest Department moved to protect 
valuable forest, it converted areas that, in many cases, were 
already communally managed as common property resources into 
reserves.41 By 1900, over 20 per cent of India's land area had
39 Rudimentary state forest control was introduced in 
the Malabar teak forests in 1806 but the protests of timber 
merchants led to the elimination of such control in 1823, see 
B. Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India (Calcutta: 
Government Printing, 1900), 64-66.
40 Guha, Unquiet Woods f 37.
41 On the difference between 'communally managed' and 
'open access' common property resources in India (and how the 
British failed to distinguish between the two), see J.E.M. 
Arnold and W.C. Stewart, Common Property Resource Management 
in India. Tropical Forestry Papers No. 24 (Oxford: Oxford 
Forestry Institute, 1991), 2-5; Gadgil, "India's
326
been so acquired such that "the working of state forestry 
could not fail to affect almost every village and hamlet in 
the subcontinent".42 Shifting cultivators were the worst 
affected, because, as with the hill Karen of Burma, their 
fields were located in those areas that contained the most 
valuable timber.43 As in Burma, though, the peasantry was also 
adversely affected, because as access to common forests was 
reduced, foresters made no provision for the long-term 
production of minor forest products. As local forests 
deteriorated from a lack of management, villagers resented 
the fact that in nearby reserves "plants that provided their 
forest resources disappeared under management practices that 
favored timber species".44 While foresters denigrated peasant 
practices as 'destructive', Indian peasants responded by 
asserting traditional claims. In Kumaun, for example, the 
firing of the forest floor noted earlier derived much of its 
appeal as a resistance strategy from the fact that it re­
asserted an important traditional practice. The Indian 
nationalist movement reinforced such rural resistance when it 
launched a country-wide campaign against British rule after 
the First World War that linked nationalist objectives to
Deforestation," 131-35.
42 Guha and Gadgil, "State Forestry," 147.
43 Ibid., 152.
44 Peter S. Ashton, "A Question of Sustainable Use," in 
People of the Tropical Rain Forest, ed. Julie Sloan Denslow 
and Christine Padoch (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1988), 191-92. Local forests deteriorated because pre­
colonial management had been eliminated and these forests 
were now treated as an open-access resource, see Gadgil, 
"India's Deforestation," 134-35.
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defiance of the forest regulations.45 As in Burma, the 
assertion of traditional claims combined with nationalist 
agitation to undermine scientific forestry practices.
The destruction of as much as 30 per cent of Java's teak 
forests between 1840 and 1870 prompted the introduction of 
scientific management in that territory.46 During these years, 
the Dutch had imposed the so-called Cultivation System, an 
arrangement whereby Javanese peasants were required to 
dedicate a certain amount of land (20 per cent) and labour 
(66 days per year) to the production of specified commercial 
crops (notably sugar) grown on the state's behalf.47 In the 
process, however, the demand for timber both as a building 
material (sugar factories, coffee warehouses, plantation 
housing), and as a fuel (used in the processing of sugarcane, 
coffee and tobacco), resulted in teak extraction "without 
regard for logging regulations".40 If, in Burma and India, 
forest depletion was broadly associated with military- 
strategic concerns (shipbuilding, railway construction), in 
mid-nineteenth-century Java, over-harvesting reflected a 
Dutch concern to boost sugar and other agricultural exports. 
In Java, as in India and Burma, "the power of other 
government sectors was sufficient to make the state itself 
the forests' major enemy".49
45 Guha and Gadgil, "State Forestry," 161.
46 Boomgaard, "Forest Management and Exploitation," 12.
47 Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital r 6; David
Joel Steinberg et al., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern 
History, rev. ed. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 157-58.
40 Peluso, "History of State Forest Management," 68.
49 Ibid.
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However, state-sanctioned over-harvesting led to fears 
of a timber famine that prompted the imposition of strict 
rules after 1870.50 Yet, as in the British colonies, the 
advent of scientific management in Java's teak forests 
affected indigenous forest users. Subsistence needs were 
subordinated to the dictates of commercial timber production 
as the colonial state usurped control over Java's 'unowned' 
forests. But, rules that required the purchase of wood and 
fuel only encouraged illicit trade and 'theft' as villagers 
sought to meet their needs at the same time as they asserted 
a 'culture of resistance'.51 Like their British counterparts, 
Dutch foresters extolled the virtues of scientific forestry. 
Whereas the demarcation of reserves was beneficial because it 
protected watersheds, teak planting under a local taungya 
forestry scheme known as tumpancr sari gave employment and 
temporary forest access to labourers. However, this scheme 
also gave rise, as in Burma, to "a new kind of forest- 
dependent proletariat" in which the system's success was 
premised on the poverty of its labourers.52 In Java, official 
rhetoric notwithstanding, scientific forestry was a doctrine 
in which basic village needs were given little attention in 
the quest to maximize timber production. But in a context of 
effective Dutch repression, no nationalist movement developed 
in the 1920s and 1930s that could effectively assist peasants
50 Furnivall, Netherlands India. 201-2.
51 Peluso, Rich Forests. Poor People r 12-17.
52 Peluso, "History of State Forest Management," 71.
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(as in India and Burma) in their challenge to the status 
quo.53
As adopted in turn-of-the-century north-west Siam, 
scientific forestry also had a commercial focus. The rapid 
depletion of the teak forests in the nineteenth century was 
less a function of government policy (as in Burma, India and 
Java), as it was a reflection of the absence of central 
authority in the region. Nevertheless, teak over-harvesting 
served as a "major excuse" for the Siamese state to extend 
its rule over "what were previously vassal states".54 In 1899, 
the region's forests were formally claimed by the central 
state, and responsibility for their management was 
transferred to the Royal Forest Department. This move not 
only marginalized the local Chao, it also made the practice 
of shifting cultivation in highland forests illegal.55 
However, the Department was too weak to stop such practices, 
and in any event, focused on the teak trade until the 1930s.56 
Lacking the administrative and coercive powers of the British 
and Dutch, the Siamese were unable to attain more than an 
imperfect control over the forest sector. As a result, the 
impact of scientific forestry on the subsistence economy was 
not as pronounced during the colonial era in Siam, as it was 
in Burma, India and Java. Nevertheless, there was, and still 
is, a "considerable tension between the traditional Thai
53 Steinberg et al., In Search of Southeast Asia. 309.
54 Mekvichai, "Teak Industry in North Thailand," 207-8.
55 Peter Kunstadter, "Hill People of Northern Thailand," 
in People of the Tropical Rain Forest. ed. Julie Sloan 
Denslow and Christine Padoch (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 103.
56 Feeny, "Forest Depletion in Thailand," 124-25.
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villager's view of forests and forest products as common 
property resources and official government policy”.57
It is the impact of scientific forestry (itself a 
response to earlier laissez-faire policies) on pre-existing 
indigenous practices that is at the heart of Asia's colonial 
forest politics. If there is a danger of romanticizing 
'traditional' practices by accepting "honeyed grandmothers' 
tales",58 it is nevertheless apparent that the growing 
commercialization of the forests during the colonial era 
transformed access and use. In many respects, this process 
simply repeated what had occurred in early modern Europe 
where forests were enclosed and peasants dispossessed of 
their rights.59 In seventeenth-century England, for example, 
labourers who were "notoriously better off in woodland areas" 
fought enclosure, but were forced to give way as their needs 
"conflicted with the rational exploitation of woods for the 
production of timber".60 A similar pattern of events unfolded 
in Germany where by the end of the eighteenth century "no 
State organization was more hated...than the forest police".61 
However, the advent of scientific forestry in Asia occurred
57 Ibid., 125-26.
58 Lenin quoted in Peter Linebaugh, "Karl Marx, the
Theft of Wood, and Working Class Composition: A Contribution
to the Current Debate," Crime and Social Justice 6 (Fall- 
Winter 1976), 13.
59 Guha, Unquiet Woods. 186-89? E.P. Thompson, Whicrs and 
Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane, 
1975) .
60 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing
Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin, 1983), 200.
61 Endres cited in Franz Heske, German Forestry (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), 254; Linebaugh, "Theft 
of Wood," 9-14.
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in a different context in which resource extraction was 
tailored to the needs of the European powers. The effects of 
the colonial legacy are still in evidence today. By briefly 
noting those effects by way of conclusion, it may be possible 
to better appreciate the contemporary significance of a 
crucial period in global forest politics.
Conclusion: The Post-Colonial Legacy
With few exceptions, colonialism's collapse after the 
Second World War did not alter the basic dynamic of central 
political control and global economic integration that 
transformed Asia's forests in colonial times. To be sure, 
certain countries (including Burma) rejected Western 
capitalism in favour of Soviet-style state socialism. But, 
as its name implies, this alternative presumed a 
centralization of political and economic power that was 
potentially more disruptive of forest rights than under 
capitalism.62 Moreover, capitalist and socialist states have 
shared a common faith in economic 'development'. In practice, 
this has meant the intensified exploitation of natural 
resources in the quest to industrialize.63 Deforestation has 
been the predictable result.
In the process, Third World states have relied on 
colonial techniques of forest control. Forest departments 
reserve land and species, and restrict popular access, as 
before. And yet, altered political and economic circumstances
62 Melanie Beresford and Lyn Fraser, "Political Economy 
of the Environment in Vietnam," Journal of Contemporary Asia 
22, 1 (1992): 3-19.
63 Gadgil and Guha, This Fissured Land. 185-207.
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have reduced the ability of many departments to sustainably 
manage the resource. If revenue creation was always central 
to colonial policy, in the post-colonial era, the quest for 
development (and the exigencies of debt repayment) have led 
to even greater pressures to produce a forest surplus. 
Moreover, timber harvesting has become so politicized that 
'cronyism' is endemic in such countries as Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and India.64 As in late colonial 
Burma, corruption is an obstacle to forest management. In 
this regard, Third World politicians are not unlike those 
opportunistic English landlords of the eighteenth century who 
cleared forests because trees were regarded as "an 
excrescence of the earth, provided by God for the payment of 
debts".65
Third World elites thus often prevent sustainable 
forestry in their haste to maximize timber production. They 
have also left in place access restrictions that were the 
source of peasant complaint under colonial rule. As a result, 
conflict has not only persisted, it has intensified, as 
agricultural clearance and logging increase the pressure on 
residual forests. By enshrining commercial extraction at the 
heart of forest management, post-colonial states subvert, as
64 James Rush, The Last Tree: Reclaiming the Environment 
in Tropical Asia (New York: Asia Society, 1991), 35-47;
Victor T. King, "Politik Pembangunan: The Political Economy 
of Rainforest Exploitation and Development in Sarawak, East 
Malaysia", and Amador A. Remigio Jr., "Philippine Forest 
Resource Policy in the Marcos and Aquino Governments: A
Comparative Assessment," both in "The Political Ecology of 
South East Asia's Forests: Transdisciplinary Discourses," ed. 
Raymond L. Bryant, Philip Stott and Jonathan Rigg, Global 
Ecology and Bioaeoaraphy Letters (Special Issue, 
forthcoming).
65 Second Earl of Carnarvon, cited in Thomas, Man and 
the Natural World, 200.
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did their colonial predecessors, the subsistence economy on 
which poor peasants depend.
As in colonial times, shifting cultivators are the worst 
affected by access restrictions. Scapegoats for others' 
actions, they have experienced persistent harassment, and in 
many areas face the loss of their way of life. Following the 
Burmese example, certain states have tried taungya forestry 
as a means of cheaply re-stocking forests and gradually 
eliminating a detested agricultural practice. The system has 
been attempted in Asia (Thailand, Indonesia, India) and 
Africa (Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya); in the process, 'tauncrva' 
has become part of the international foresters' lexicon.66 Its 
continued use is further proof of the contemporary influence 
of colonial ideas and practices.67
Given that influence, it is imperative to understand the 
historical development of those inter-linked political and 
economic forces that are transforming Third World forests. 
The political-ecology literature discussed in Chapter 1 has 
begun to address this process, but more work needs to be
66 Dusit Banijbatana, "Forest Policy in Northern 
Thailand," in Farmers in the Forest: Economic Development and 
Marginal Agriculture in Northern Thailand. ed. Peter 
Kunstadter, E.C. Chapman and Sanga Sabhasri (Honolulu: 
University Press of Hawaii, 1978), 57-58; K.G. Tejwani,
"Agroforestry Practices and Research in India," in 
Aoroforestry: Realities. Possibilities and Potentials, ed. 
Henry L. Gholz (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 113-15; 
R.G. Lowe, "Development of Taungya in Nigeria," in Ibid., 
137-54; S.A.O. Chamshama, G.C. Monela, K.E.A. Sekiete and A. 
Persson, "Suitability of the Taungya System at North 
Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation, Tanzania," Aarof orestry 
Systems 17, 1 (1992): 1-11; K.F.S. King, Agri-Silviculture: 
The Taunava System (Ibadan: Department of Forestry,
University of Ibadan, 1968).
67 Stephen M.J. Bass, "Building from the Past: Forest 
Plantations in History," in Plantation Politics: Forest 
Plantations in Development, ed. Caroline Sargent and Stephen 
Bass (London: Earthscan, 1992), 41-75.
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done. In light of this study, what are some of the general 
implications for analysis that may be derived from an 
understanding of forest politics in colonial Burma?
One central finding concerns the central role of the 
state in forest politics. As the Burmese experience 
illustrates, the colonial state facilitated the growth of 
capitalist enterprise. But it also pursued its own 
distinctive, if variable interests. This was most evident in 
its efforts to balance revenue creation with long-term timber 
production. The advent of scientific forestry was critical in 
this regard. But the colonial state was also deeply concerned 
about the assertion of political control - in the remote but 
economically important Pegu Yoma, for example.66 These 
interests did not always coincide with those of capitalist 
enterprise. Even the twentieth-century predominance of the 
European firms was as much a reflection of the state's own 
political and economic interests as it was the result of 
business influence in government. In the pursuit of those 
interests, the colonial state drew upon its unique role as a 
resource manager to enhance control over society and 
resources.
However, the colonial state was not monolithic. 
Undoubtedly, colonialism encouraged social cohesion and a 
particular mind-set that was reflected in the attitudes and
60 For an analysis of how the contemporary Indonesian
state uses social forestry programmes to maintain political
control in rural Java, see Charles Victor Barber, "The State,
the Environment, and Development: The Genesis and
Transformation of Social Forestry Policy in New Order
Indonesia" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley,
1989) .
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actions of European officialdom.69 But there were also 
differences of perception and interest which, at times, 
threatened the internal unity of the state. As noted, 
programmatic differences were at the heart of conflict 
between forest and civil officials in colonial Burma. Such 
conflict was most intense in the 1870s when the forest 
service was rapidly expanding its activities and forest 
legislation was being debated. It nevertheless persisted 
throughout the colonial era, albeit at a much reduced level 
in later years. It is thus important to recognize not only 
the centrality of state interests, but also the bureaucratic 
politics that shaped the determination of those interests.
This thesis has also demonstrated the ability of everyday 
forms of peasant resistance to frustrate state forest 
control. To be sure, there are limits to such resistance. 
Yet, everyday resistance is particularly effective as a means 
of circumventing forest access restrictions. Partly, this is 
because forests provide perfect cover for clandestine action. 
But its efficacy also derives from the fact that it is in 
forests that elite control is usually weakest.70 In a sense, 
the argument here comes full circle with a point made in 
Chapter 1. There, it was suggested that the colonial state 
was anxious to define (or 'imagine') forests because control 
in these areas was most tenuous. As this thesis has shown,
69 George Orwell, Burmese Davs (1935; reprint,
Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1987). On the social
differentiation of colonial elites, see Ann Laura Stoler, 
"Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the 
Boundaries of Rule," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 31 (January 1989): 134-61.
70 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990), 189.
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however, despite the best efforts of foresters to map, 
enumerate, demarcate and patrol reserves, peasants were often 
able to frustrate their attempts. Given the need to police an 
extensive area with a limited staff, what is surprising is 
not that the Forest Department failed to achieve the desired 
control, but rather that it was able to achieve any control 
at all.
Finally, this thesis has highlighted the ambiguous 
relationship between colonialism and the emergence of modern 
indigenous politics on the one hand, and scientific forestry, 
access control and conservation on the other. As Chapter 7 
noted, Burmese nationalists attacked colonial forest policy 
in the 1920s and 1930s for not being in the best interests of 
the Burmese. Whereas peasants were denied access to produce 
or land, the urban middle class was deprived of opportunities 
in government and business. Hence, Burma's forests were not 
only being run as a 'business concern'. They were, above all, 
being managed as a European business concern, complete with 
European doctrines of management (scientific forestry) and 
economics (capitalism).
Yet, the championing of peasant rights and nationalist 
principles notwithstanding, the Burmese political elite 
failed to articulate a comprehensive alternative strategy. 
No effort was made, for example, to suggest how popular 
forest access was to be balanced with long-term conservancy 
under indigenous rule.71 The implications of this lacuna in 
the nationalist programme became readily apparent after 1937
71 But see the remarks of Senator U Kyaw concerning the 
protection of plains reserves, Burma Legislature. Senate 
Proceedings. 1 March 1938, 96, and 4 March 1940, 104-5.
337
when the Burmese elite gained additional powers under the 
last pre-war constitution. In a pattern that has subsequently 
repeated itself in many post-colonial Third World states, 
forest management in late colonial Burma came to be 
associated with political opportunism: the manipulation of 
forest rules and access for the benefit of the incumbent 
elite. Forest management was largely brought under indigenous 
control, and political expediency became the order of the 
day.
In 1876, one of the principal architects of state forest 
control in British India, B.H. Baden-Powell, argued that all 
conservancy measures were "necessarily disliked. . .the fact of 
restriction. reasonable or not, is what the popular mind 
feels".72 In this view, forest conservancy and public opinion 
were inevitably at odds. Regrettably, the subsequent record 
of forest politics in colonial Burma did little to invalidate 
this observation.
But as this thesis has shown, it could hardly have been 
otherwise. Given imperial interests, forest conservancy was 
linked to access restrictions and long-term timber production 
in such a manner that the interests of Burmese peasants, 
shifting cultivators and timber traders were neglected. The 
system of rationalized forest use that was introduced after 
1856 was, after all, a colonial creation, and was seen as 
such by the Burmese. Not surprisingly, then, the advent of 
partial self-rule marked a new phase in forest politics in 
which that system was gradually undermined. If an alternative 
system had not emerged at the time of the Japanese invasion
72 B.H. Baden-Powell, "Forest Conservancy in its Popular 
Aspect," Indian Forester 2 (July 1876): 3-4.
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in 1942, colonial forest policy had nevertheless been 
irrevocably altered. Founded on the ascendancy of British 
interests, that policy in the late colonial period was 
finally beginning to respond to Burmese demands. A new forest 
politics was thus developing in which the local political 
implications of forest management were of central concern. 
The forest resource continued to be contested, but under new 
circumstances.
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APPENDIX A
Bobabaina.
Chao. 
Compound. 
Cutch.
Disforest.
Do Bama 
Asiayon.
Fire-trace.
Girdling.
Improvement 
fellings.
Kyo-waina.
Linear
valuation
survey.
Ma-bap.
Ma-hout. 
Myo-ok.
GLOSSARY
Ancestral lands; used by peasants and traders 
as a means to circumvent colonial restrictions 
on cutch production.
Hereditary local rulers in north-west Siam (see 
also Sawbwa).
To inflict an on-the-spot fine for a violation 
of the forest rules.
Water extract of the sha tree used for tanning 
and dyeing purposes in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.
To clear a reserve of forest cover in order to 
facilitate permanent cultivation.
'We Burmese' Association; 1930s political group 
of youth and students.
An area of varying width on which vegetation 
is cut and burned so as to facilitate the 
protection from fire of a designated area.
Method of killing a tree by removing a ring of 
bark and sapwood around its base; used as a 
means to regulate teak extraction.
Silvicultural technique involving selective 
tree removal in order to facilitate the growth 
of teak and other designated species.
Reserved Forest.
Technique pioneered by Dietrich Brandis in 1856 
to obtain an estimate of the incidence of teak 
in a given area.
'Sole parent' or guardian; paternalistic 
perception of the relationship between a 
European civil official and the Burmese 
peasants under his charge.
Timber elephant manager; occupation popular 
with the Karen in southern Burma.
Township officer under British rule.
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Myo-wun 
Nat.
Pongyi 
kyauna.
Sanad.
Sawbwa.
Sit-tans.
Taik-thu-gvi
Taungya.
Taungya 
forestry.
Teak
selection
system.
Thu-qyi.
Uniform
system.
Working plan
Wunthanu
athin.
Ya-thit. 
Yoma.
Provincial governors appointed by the Burmese 
monarchy.
Animistic beings or spirits thought to control 
most aspects of human life.
Monastery; Buddhist school.
Treaty (as between the British government and 
Sawbwa).
Hereditary local rulers in the Shan States. 
Pre-colonial administrative records.
Headman of a sparsely settled township.
Dry hill cultivation by shifting cultivators.
Reforestation method whereby shifting 
cultivators plant teak and other species in 
their clearings.
Harvesting based on the selective extraction 
of teak.
Headman (usually of a village).
Timber extraction by clear felling followed by 
natural regeneration.
Document detailing timber extraction and 
regeneration operations in a forest reserve or 
division.
Village nationalist organizations of the 1920s 
and 1930s.
Undersized teak log.
Range of hills.
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APPENDIX B
A NOTE ON FOREST LANDS AND SPECIES
As a result of differing conditions of geology, climate 
and elevation, Burma's forests are characteristically 
diverse. From the mangrove swamps of the Irrawaddy delta to 
the pine groves of the Shan hills, these forests embrace a 
wide variety of forest types. Scholars have described Burma's 
forests in detail, but for this thesis a general and 
selective schema is appropriate.1
TABLE B.l
SELECTED BURMESE FOREST TYPES 
BY CHIEF LOCATION AND DISTINGUISHING FEATURES
Forest Type
1. Tropical
* Evergreen 
Rainforest
* Mangrove Swamp
* Mixed Evergreen 
and Deciduous
* Dry Deciduous 
and Scrub
2. Subtropical
3. Temperate
Location
Tenasserim
Delta
Pegu Yoma
Dry Zone 
Shan States 
North Burma
Features
<80" rain 
Tidal/flood
40-80" rain 
>3,500'
>50" rain
3,500-7,500'
<6 ,000'
Source: Adapted from John H. Davis, The Forests of Burma 
(Gainesville, Flor.: University of Florida, 1960), 2-3.
1 For example, see H.G. Champion, "A Preliminary Survey 
of the Forest Types of India and Burma," Indian Forest 
Records (n.s.), Silviculture, 1, 1 (1936): 1-286; M.V.
Edwards, "Burma Forest Types (according to Champion's 
Classification! ," Indian Forest Records (n.s.), Silviculture, 
7, 2 (1950): 135-73; L. Dudley Stamp, The Vegetation of Burma 
from an Ecological Standpoint (Rangoon: University of
Rangoon, 1924); Sulpice Kurz, Preliminary Report on the 
Forest and other Vegetation of Pegu (Calcutta: Baptist
Mission Press, 1875).
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Thus, Burma's forests contain evergreen and deciduous trees, 
and may be divided into tropical, subtropical and temperate 
forest types. In this study, it is the tropical forests that 
are of primary interest.
Table B .2 illustrates why this was so. From a commercial 
perspective, the temperate and subtropical forests of the 
sparsely settled north and north-east are of minimal 
importance when compared with the tropical forests situated 
in the more densely populated central and southern regions.
TABLE B .2
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL SPECIES BY FOREST TYPE
IN BURMA
Forest Type
1. Tropical
* Evergreen 
Rainforest
* Mangrove Swamp
* Mixed Evergreen 
and Deciduous
* Dry Deciduous 
and Scrub
2. Subtropical
3. Temperate
Importance Key Species
High Kanyin, Thingan, Thitkado
Moderate Kanazo
Highest Kyun, Pyinkado, Thingan,
Padauk, Pyinma
High In, Kyun, Sha
Low Tinyu
Source: Derived from John H. Davis, The Forests of Burma
(Gainesville, Flor.: University of Florida, 1960), 5-19; F.T. 
Morehead, The Forests of Burma (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1944), 5-13.
This list is far from complete. It nevertheless 
highlights the commercial importance of the tropical forests.
Above all, it is the tropical forests of the Pegu Yoma 
that are the most valuable. Indeed, this compact range of 
hills was described in 1931 as "one of the most valuable
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forests in the world".2 Separating the Irrawaddy and Sittang 
rivers, the Pegu Yoma begins thirty-five miles north of 
Rangoon, and runs north for two-hundred miles until it ends 
at Yamethin on the edge of the Dry Zone. In terms of forest 
type, this range of hills is characterized by rainforest in 
its southern extremity, which gives way to mixed evergreen 
and deciduous forest, before petering out as dry deciduous 
forest and scrub in the north. With an average width of only 
thirty miles, this rectangular-shaped stretch of forest land 
is about six thousand square miles in area. Yet, it accounted 
for 50 per cent of the country's total annual teak outturn in 
the early twentieth century, and about 60 per cent of its 
total net forest revenue. In recognition of this fact, the 
Pegu Yoma was largely demarcated as reserved forest by the 
Forest Department. As this thesis shows, the region 
(including the surrounding plains forest) was the main 
battleground of colonial forest politics.
Conflict centred on a handful of commercial species.3 The 
most important such species was teak (kyun) . One of the 
premier timbers in the world, teak fTectona arandis! has been 
an important economic resource since pre-colonial times. Its 
role in ship-building is noted in Chapter 2, but the 
durability of teak ensured that it was also in demand for use 
in the construction of houses, public buildings, poncryi 
kaung, furniture, bridges, railway carriages and for
2 C.W. Scott, "Lecture on the Forest Geography of 
Burma," Indian Forester 57 (May 1931): 245. This paragraph is 
based on this source.
3 The following discussion is drawn from Alex Rodger, 
A Handbook of the Forest Products of Burma (1921; reprint, 
Rangoon: Government Printing, 1951).
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conversion into sleepers. A tree which can reach a height of 
150 feet and a girth of 12-14 feet in the mixed evergreen and 
deciduous forests that form its favoured habitat, teak is 
also found in dry deciduous forests. Wherever found, teak 
rarely comprises more than 10 to 12 per cent of the forest 
crop, and it is this fact, along with its long commercial 
maturation (150 years), that was so important in the 
development of colonial forest policy.
Such a policy, however, was not always synonymous with 
teak management. Thus, colonial officials devoted 
considerable attention to the management of cutch, a water 
extract of the sha tree fAccacia catechu! used for tanning 
and dyeing purposes (Chapter 5). A native of the dry 
deciduous and scrub forest, sha attains a height of only 30- 
40 feet and a girth of 4 to 5 feet, and is thus eminently 
suited to extraction by small-scale traders. Primarily 
important as the source of cutch, sha was also used for 
agricultural implements, carts, wheels and fuel.
Next to teak, the key species from a British viewpoint 
was pyinkado or Burmese iron-wood. As its English name 
attests, pyinkado fXylia dolabriformis! is a tree renowned 
for its strength and durability. These qualities made it the 
preferred timber for railway sleepers, but it was also used 
in bridges and jetties. Growing to 120 feet and a girth of 12 
feet, the wood is associated with teak in upper mixed 
evergreen and deciduous forest, but is frequently found in 
rainforests that are devoid of teak. In Arakan, it was the 
preeminent commercial species, and its use was regulated from 
1863 .
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Less well-known than teak and pyinkado. padauk 
(Pterocarpus macrocarpus! was valuable to the British 
primarily for use in gun-carriage wheels. Among the Burmese, 
however, the wood was widely used: in cart wheels and axles, 
boat frames, boxes, furniture, ploughs, house-building and 
musical instruments. A tree of medium height (60-80 feet) and 
girth (5-8 feet), padauk is most commonly found in the upper 
mixed evergreen and deciduous forest, but also grows in dry 
deciduous forest.
Species without military-strategic and commercial value 
to the British were nevertheless important to the indigenous 
economy. Promoted by the Forest Department in Europe (Chapter 
6), in (Dipterocarpus tuberculatus! remained a wood that was 
primarily used locally in cheap housing, carts, boats and 
other purposes. A tree of between 70 and 110 feet and 5 to 10 
feet in girth, it is found through much of the country, but 
particularly in the dry deciduous 'indainq' forests of 
central Burma. Kanvin (Dipterocarpus spp.!, a name applied to 
various species of dipterocarpus. is a wood of inferior 
quality to in, but is used for similar purposes.
Thitka (Pentace burmanica! and thitkado (Cedrela toona! 
are trees of comparable size, range and utility to in and 
kanvin. Thitka and thitkado were thus in demand for use in 
boats, houses, as well as masts and oars; and, as with in, 
were the focus of a sporadic imperial export campaign. It 
was partly for this reason that these two woods were the 
first non-teak species reserved by the British in 1873 
(Chapter 3).
Thingan (Hopea odorata! is another general purpose 
timber. Found primarily in the Tenasserim rainforests and
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the lower mixed evergreen and deciduous forests of Pegu, 
thinaan is especially sought after by boat-builders because 
it is not susceptible to attack by white ants. The wood is 
also used for masts, piles, carts and furniture. Although 
pyinma (Laaerstroemia flos-reainae! is not immune from attack 
by white ants, it too is used in the construction of houses 
and boats. Growing to 100 feet, this tree is found throughout 
Burma, but prefers flat alluvial ground and stream banks.
If the discussion so far has focused on general purpose 
construction timbers, it is because these species were the 
most valuable. However, Burma's forests have also been the 
source of a other timber and non-timber products. In the 
mangrove swamp forests, for example, the medium-sized kanazo 
tree (Heritiera fomes! became valuable as a source of fuel 
for Rangoon, and other towns in Lower Burma in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Such woods as dahat 
(Tectona hamiltoniana!, taukkvan (Terminalia tomentosa! and 
myaukchaw (Homalium tomentosum! served as fuelwoods in other 
parts of the country.
In contrast, the thitsi tree (Melanorrhoea usitata! is 
important primarily because it yields the varnish known as 
thitsi. Found in the dry deciduous forests, thitsi is tapped 
for its resin which is used in Burmese lacquer ware. The pine 
(tinyu! tree of the Shan States was also tapped for its resin 
(used for turpentine), but the general inaccessibility of 
these forests limited the development of this industry.
The preceding discussion illustrates the economic 
importance of Burma's tropical forests. Moreover, it gives 
some indication of why access restrictions were the source 
of so much conflict in colonial Burma.
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APPENDIX C
RESERVED FORESTS 1870-1940 
(Area in square miles)
Year Area Year Area
1870-71 108 1906-07 21,575
1871-72 134 1907-08 22,858
1872-73 134 1908-09 23,581
1873-74 279 1909-10 25,691
1874-75 563 1910-11 26,077
1875-76 614 1911-12 26,136
1876-77 640 1912-13 27,023
1877-78 650 1913-14 27,332
1878-79 1,410 1914-15 28,239
1879-80 1,612 1915-16 28,567
1880-81 2, 288 1916-17 29,110
1881-82 3,274 1917-18 29.116
1882-83 3 ,427 1918-19 29,336
1883-84 3,759 1919-20 29,874
1884-85 3 ,942 1920-21 29,935
1885-86 4,471 1921-22 30,086
1886-87 4,788 1922-23 27,416a
1887-88 5,091 1923-24 27,890
1888-89 5,111 1924-25 28,227
1889-90 5,574 1925-26 28,372
1890-91 5,638 1926-27 28,647
1891-92 6,674 1927-28 29,061
1892-93 8,059 1928-29 29,190
1893-94 10,351 1929-30 29,487
1894-95 11,479 1930-31 29,834
1895-96 12,817 1931-32 31,282
1896-97 14,058 1932-33 31,516
1897-98 14,706 1933-34 31,533
1898-99 15,669 1934-35 31,608
1899-1900 17,153 1935-36 31,487
1900-01 17,836 1936-37 31,339
1901-02 18,606 1937-38 31,375
1902-03 19,708 1938-39 31,407
1903-04 20,038 1939-40 31,637
1904-05 20,411
1905-06 20,544
Source: Progress Report of Forest Administration in Burma 
(various years).
a. Henceforth, Federated Shan States excluded.
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APPENDIX D
FOREST DEPARTMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE 1856-1940
(Amount in rupees)
Year Revenue Expenditure Surplus
1856-57a 86 243 156 329 -70 086
1857-58a 80 620 255 112 174 492
1858-59 502 285 260 360 241 925
1859-60 261 594 198 406 63 188
1860-61 336 984 289 481 47 503
1861-62 396 885 322 335 74 550
1862-63 353 487 309 930 43 557
1863-64 765 619 235 700 529 919
1864-65 936 233 263 239 672 994
1865-66 898 629 312 066 586 563
1866-67 424 054 285 135 138 919
1867-68 647 590 328 388 319 202
1868-69 816 171 422 172 393 999
1869-70 984 773 421 462 563 311
1870-71 818 124 400 738 417 386
1871-72 772 399 378 450 393 949
1872-73 827 469 336 024 491 445
1873-74 1 068 621 474 531 594 090
1874-75 1 074 802 662 638 412 164
1875-76 1 779 020 814 750 964 270
1876-77 1 551 468 1, 005 044 546 424
1877-78 1 603 023 855 816 747 207
1878-79 1 137 562 718 401 419 161
1879-80 1 180 189 753 489 426 700
1880-81 1 516 613 712 568 804 045
1881-82 2 231 804 1 150 222 1/081 582
1882-83 2 503 896 1 228 955 1/ 274 941
1883-84 2 509 275 1 217 823 1,291 452
1884-85 1 670 981 1 212 233 458 748
1885-86 1 973 859 1 150 953 822 906
1886-87 2 106 741 1 078 018 1 028 723
1887-88 2 515 773 1 153 846 1 361 927
1888-89 4 189 233 1 965 851 2 223 382
1889-90 4 940 785 1 606 643 3 334 142
1890-91 4 321 968 1 388 789 2 933 179
1891-92 4 185 414 1 643 598 2 541 816
1892-93 5 473 058 1 818 480 3 654 578
1893-94 5 825 093 1 817 655 4 007 438
1894-95 5 595 886 1 864 501 3 731 385
1895-96 5 590 376 1 913 138 3 677 238
1896-97 6 659 847 2 081 454 4 578 393
1897-98 7 209 903 2 178 878 5 031 025
1898-99 8 291 927 2 373 079 5 918 848
1899-1900 7 987 298 2 697 010 5 290 288
1900-1901 7 706 324 2 644 612 5 061 712
1901-02 5 951 334 2 820 311 3 131 023
1902-03 6 737 825 2 963 316 3 774 509
1903-04 8 519 404 3 500 311 5 019 093
1904-05 10 961 494 3 514 997 7 446 497
1905-06 9 445 134 3 863 894 5 581 240
1906-07 8 639 549 3 634 766 5 004 783
1907-08 8 833 420 3 594 633 5 238 787
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Year Revenue Expenditure Surplus
1908-09 9 125 131 3 724 264 5 400 867
1909-10 9 145 466 3 680 541 5 464 925
1910-11 10 539 615 3 936 961 6 602 654
1911-12 9 430 615 4 169 195 5 261 420
1912-13 11 576 622 4 046 537 7 530 085
1913-14 11 408 980 4 516 620 6 892 360
1914-15 9 046 982 4 688 511 4 358 471
1915-16 9 664 346 4 762 257 4 902 089
1916-17 12 709 169 5 091 082 7 618 087
1917-18 12 676 458 5 285 752 7 390 706
1918-19 12 947 787 5 993 465 6 954 322
1919-20 16 567 281 6 474 006 10 093 275
1920-21 16 779 225 6 034 499 10 744 726
1921-22 22 116 786 9 083 094 13 033 692
1922-23b 18 318 478 9 827 356 8 491 122
1923-24 17 829 565 9 973 685 7 855 880
1924-25 18 184 904 9 243 571 8 941 333
1925-26 20 961 805 8 429 399 12 532 406
1926-27 21 737 618 8 375 111 13 362 507
1927-28 20 814 746 8 898 606 11 916 140
1928-29 16 079 198 7 968 087 8 111 111
1929-30 18 540 178 7 812 198 10 727 980
1930-31 14 407 775 7 563 551 6 844 224
1931-32 10 643 868 6 228 712 4 415 156
1932-33 8 745 897 6 504 850 2 241 047
1933-34 7 999 782 6 196 009 1 803 773
1934-35 11 444 707 5 684 361 5 760 346
1935-36 13 308 654 5 419 526 7 889 128
1936-37 14 264 626 5 540 216 8 724 410
1937-38 16 039 511 5 782 143 10 257 368
1938-39 14 270 010 5 961 066 8 308 944
1939-40 14 393 210 5 967 509 8 425 701
Source: Progress Report of Forest Administration in Burma
(various years).
a. Pegu only.
b. Henceforth, Federated Shan States excluded.
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APPENDIX E
LIST OF CHIEF CONSERVATORS 1905-42
Name Dates Position Held
F. Beadon Bryant • • * • 01-1905 03-1908
J.H. Lace 03-1908 05-1910
M. Hill 05-1910 05-1911
J.H. Lace 05-1911 07-1913
C.G. Rogers 07-1913 10-1919
F.A. Leete 10-1919 05-1922
C.B. Smales 05-1922 11-1922
F.A. Leete 11-1922 03-1924
C.B. Smales 03-1924 11-1924
H.W.A. Watson 11-1924 05-1930
S .F . Hopwood 05-1930 06-1935
H.R. Blanford 06-1935 10-1936
C.E. Milner 10-1936 09-1937
A.W. Moodie 09-1937 05-1939
R. Unwin 05-1939 04-1942
Source: Burmese Forester 6 (June 1956): 3.
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